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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2015

Forgery and Key-Recovery Attacks on CAESAR Candidate Marble

Résumé

The CAESAR competition, which started in 2014, aims at providing a new standard of authenticated encryption. In this paper, we perform an analysis of the candidate Marble. We show a generic attack on the Marble mode of operation (independent of the E transformations), where we recover the whitening key L, and perform forgeries using 2^64 chosen plaintext queries. Considering the specific internal primitives used in Marble (composed of 4 AES rounds), we also show how to recover the secret key using 2^32 additional decryption queries, in the decryption-misuse setting (where we can decipher plaintexts without valid tags).
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Dates et versions

hal-01102031 , version 1 (11-01-2015)
hal-01102031 , version 2 (13-01-2015)
hal-01102031 , version 3 (14-12-2015)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01102031 , version 1

Citer

Thomas Fuhr, Gaëtan Leurent, Valentin Suder. Forgery and Key-Recovery Attacks on CAESAR Candidate Marble. 2015. ⟨hal-01102031v1⟩
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