%0 Unpublished work %T Forgery and Key-Recovery Attacks on CAESAR Candidate Marble %+ Laboratoire de cryptographie de l'ANSSI (LCR) %+ Security, Cryptology and Transmissions (SECRET) %A Fuhr, Thomas %A Leurent, Gaƫtan %A Suder, Valentin %8 2015-01-11 %D 2015 %K CAESAR competition %K authenticated encryption %K Marble %K forgery %K key-recovery %Z Computer Science [cs]/Cryptography and Security [cs.CR]Preprints, Working Papers, ... %X The CAESAR competition, which started in 2014, aims at providing a new standard of authenticated encryption. In this paper, we perform an analysis of the candidate Marble. We show a generic attack on the Marble mode of operation (independent of the E transformations), where we recover the whitening key L, and perform forgeries using 2^64 chosen plaintext queries. Considering the specific internal primitives used in Marble (composed of 4 AES rounds), we also show how to recover the secret key using 2^32 additional decryption queries, in the decryption-misuse setting (where we can decipher plaintexts without valid tags). %G English %2 https://inria.hal.science/hal-01102031v1/document %2 https://inria.hal.science/hal-01102031v1/file/article.pdf %L hal-01102031 %U https://inria.hal.science/hal-01102031