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Conference Papers Year : 2007

Verifying Cryptographic Protocols with Subterms Constraints


Known protocol analysis techniques consider protocols where some piece of information expected in a protocol message is located at a fixed position. However this is too restrictive to model web-services where messages are XML semi-structured documents and where significant information (such as name, signature, ...) has to be extracted from nodes occurring at flexible positions. Therefore we have extended the Dolev Yao model by a subterm predicate that allows one to express data extraction by subterm matching. This also allows one to detect so-called rewriting attacks that are specific to web-services.
Nous étudions les protocoles utilisant une opération d'extraction de sous-message par filtrage, utilisée par exemple dans les web-services et proposons une procédure de détection des attaques par réécriture pour ces protocoles.

Dates and versions

inria-00557710 , version 1 (19-01-2011)



Yannick Chevalier, Denis Lugiez, Michael Rusinowitch. Verifying Cryptographic Protocols with Subterms Constraints. 14th International Conference on Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and Reasoning - LPAR 2007, Oct 2007, Yerevan, Armenia. pp.181-195, ⟨10.1007/978-3-540-75560-9_15⟩. ⟨inria-00557710⟩
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