Rewriting for Cryptographic Protocol Verification - Extended Version - - Inria - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique Access content directly
Reports (Research Report) Year : 2000

Rewriting for Cryptographic Protocol Verification - Extended Version -

Thomas Genet
Francis Klay
  • Function : Author
  • PersonId : 756522
  • IdRef : 191770396

Abstract

On a case study, we present a new approach for verifying cryptographic protocols, based on rewriting and on tree automata techniques. Protocols are operationally described using Term Rewriting Systems and the initial set of communication requests is described by a tree automaton. Starting from these two representations, we automatically compute an over-approximation of the set of exchanged messages (also recognized by a tree automaton). Then, proving classical properties like confidentiality or authentication can be done by automatically showing that the intersection between the approximation and a set of prohibited behaviors is the empty set. Furthermore, this method enjoys a simple and powerful way to describe intruder work, the ability to consider an unbounded number of parties, an unbounded number of interleaved sessions, and a theoretical property ensuring safeness of the approximation.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
RR-3921.pdf (415.1 Ko) Télécharger le fichier

Dates and versions

inria-00072731 , version 1 (24-05-2006)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : inria-00072731 , version 1

Cite

Thomas Genet, Francis Klay. Rewriting for Cryptographic Protocol Verification - Extended Version -. [Research Report] RR-3921, INRIA. 2000. ⟨inria-00072731⟩
104 View
258 Download

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More