Strategic Stability Analysis of a Nonlinear Security Game
Résumé
The primary goal of Nations is to maximize their perceived security, which requires each
Nation to develop an effective deterrence strategy [1]. In classical game theoretic models, deterrence
as a military strategy is based upon a standard, iterated two-player prisoner’s dilemma
model by which cooperation can be assured if a rational player understands the punishment
or cost of defection [2].
However, many of the actions taken by Nations in pursuit of the maximization of their
perceived security might, in turn, lead to a decrease rather than an increase in their perceived
security. This dilemma is explained by the fact that the increase in military capability of one
Nation might be interpreted as a risk that the arming Nation will use it to perform an attack
in the future.
In this context, in order to re-establish the balance of power, the other Nations could either
increase their own military capabilities or initiate a preemptive strike. Choosing the first option
may result in a security spiral, in which several Nations are tied in an arms race, and may
lead to war in the long run. Such a situation is known as the security dilemma [3], and is one
possible outcome of arms race models.
If the goal of game-theoretic models is to quantify the outcomes of situations of conflict
between armed Nations, non-proliferation policies and containment treaties are often designed
with the goal to stabilize the rivalry between Nations and reduce strategic risks.
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