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Document Associé À Des Manifestations Scientifiques Année : 2024

Strategic Stability Analysis of a Nonlinear Security Game

Jed Boufaied
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Jean Le Hénaff

Résumé

The primary goal of Nations is to maximize their perceived security, which requires each Nation to develop an effective deterrence strategy [1]. In classical game theoretic models, deterrence as a military strategy is based upon a standard, iterated two-player prisoner’s dilemma model by which cooperation can be assured if a rational player understands the punishment or cost of defection [2]. However, many of the actions taken by Nations in pursuit of the maximization of their perceived security might, in turn, lead to a decrease rather than an increase in their perceived security. This dilemma is explained by the fact that the increase in military capability of one Nation might be interpreted as a risk that the arming Nation will use it to perform an attack in the future. In this context, in order to re-establish the balance of power, the other Nations could either increase their own military capabilities or initiate a preemptive strike. Choosing the first option may result in a security spiral, in which several Nations are tied in an arms race, and may lead to war in the long run. Such a situation is known as the security dilemma [3], and is one possible outcome of arms race models. If the goal of game-theoretic models is to quantify the outcomes of situations of conflict between armed Nations, non-proliferation policies and containment treaties are often designed with the goal to stabilize the rivalry between Nations and reduce strategic risks.
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hal-04490283 , version 1 (05-03-2024)

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Jed Boufaied, Jean Le Hénaff, Hélène Le Cadre. Strategic Stability Analysis of a Nonlinear Security Game. ROADEF 2024, Mar 2024, Amiens, France. ⟨hal-04490283⟩
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