Side-channel Analysis of Lightweight Ciphers: Does Lightweight Equal Easy? - Inria - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique Access content directly
Conference Papers Year : 2016

Side-channel Analysis of Lightweight Ciphers: Does Lightweight Equal Easy?

Abstract

Side-channel attacks represent a powerful category of attacks against cryptographic devices. Still, side-channel analysis for lightweight ciphers is much less investigated than for instance for AES. Although intuition may lead to the conclusion that lightweight ciphers are weaker in terms of side-channel resistance, that remains to be confirmed and quantified. In this paper, we consider various side-channel analysis met-rics which should provide an insight on the resistance of lightweight ciphers against side-channel attacks. In particular, for the non-profiled scenario we use the theoretical confusion coefficient and empirical correlation power analysis. Furthermore, we conduct a profiled side-channel analysis using various machine learning attacks on PRESENT and AES. Our results show that the difference between AES and lightweight ciphers is smaller than one would expect. Interestingly, we observe that the studied 4-bit S-boxes have a different side-channel resilience, while the difference in the 8-bit ones is only theoretically present.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
RFIDSec_camera_ready.pdf (633.81 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)
Loading...

Dates and versions

hal-01402238 , version 1 (24-11-2016)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-01402238 , version 1

Cite

Annelie Heuser, Stjepan Picek, Sylvain Guilley, Nele Mentens. Side-channel Analysis of Lightweight Ciphers: Does Lightweight Equal Easy?. RFIDSec 2016: 12th Workshop on RFID and IoT Security, Nov 2016, Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR China. ⟨hal-01402238⟩
559 View
455 Download

Share

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More