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Conference Papers Year : 2016

A Template Attack Against VERIFY PIN Algorithms


This paper presents the first side channel analysis from electromagnetic emissions on VERIFY PIN algorithms. To enter a PIN code, a user has a limited number of trials. Therefore the main difficulty of the attack is to succeed with very few traces. More precisely, this work implements a template attack and experimentally verifies its success rate. It becomes a new real threat, and it is feasible on a low cost and portable platform. Moreover, this paper shows that some protections for VERIFY PIN algorithms against fault attacks introduce new vulnerabilities with respect to side channel analysis.
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hal-01383143 , version 1 (18-10-2016)




Hélène Le Bouder, Thierno Barry, Damien Couroussé, Jean-Louis Lanet, Ronan Lashermes. A Template Attack Against VERIFY PIN Algorithms. SECRYPT 2016, Jul 2016, Lsbonne, Portugal. pp.231 - 238, ⟨10.5220/0005955102310238⟩. ⟨hal-01383143⟩
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