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Conference Papers Year : 2007

A Formal Theory of Key Conjuring.

Abstract

Key conjuring is the process by which an attacker obtains an unknown, encrypted key by repeatedly calling a cryptographic API function with random values in place of keys. We propose a formalism for detecting computationally feasible key conjuring operations, incorporated into a Dolev-Yao style model of the security API. We show that security in the presence of key conjuring operations is decidable for a particular class of APIs, which includes the key management API of IBM's Common Cryptographic Architecture (CCA).
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Dates and versions

inria-00181612 , version 1 (24-10-2007)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : inria-00181612 , version 1

Cite

Véronique Cortier, Stéphanie Delaune, Graham Steel. A Formal Theory of Key Conjuring.. 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium - CSF'07, Jul 2007, Venice, Italy. pp.79-96. ⟨inria-00181612⟩
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