An NP Decision Procedure for Protocol Insecurity with XOR - Inria - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique Access content directly
Journal Articles Theoretical Computer Science Year : 2005

An NP Decision Procedure for Protocol Insecurity with XOR

Abstract

We provide a method for deciding the insecurity of cryptographic protocols in presence of the standard Dolev-Yao intruder (with a finite number of sessions) extended with so-called oracle rules, i.e., deduction rules that satisfy certain conditions. As an instance of this general framework, we obtain that protocol insecurity is in NP for an intruder that can exploit the properties of the exclusive or (XOR) operator. This operator is frequently used in cryptographic protocols but cannot be handled in most protocol models. An immediate consequence of our proof is that checking whether a message can be derived by an intruder (using XOR) is in PTIME. We also apply our framework to an intruder that exploits properties of certain encryption modes such as cipher block chaining (CBC).

Dates and versions

inria-00103807 , version 1 (05-10-2006)

Identifiers

Cite

Yannick Chevalier, Ralf Küsters, Michaël Rusinowitch, Mathieu Turuani. An NP Decision Procedure for Protocol Insecurity with XOR. Theoretical Computer Science, 2005, Theoretical Computer Science, 338 (1-3), pp.247-274. ⟨10.1016/j.tcs.2005.01.015⟩. ⟨inria-00103807⟩
6123 View
0 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More