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Conference Papers Year : 2021

On Unpadded NTRU Quantum (In)Security


This paper utilizes the techniques used by Regev \cite{DBLP:journals/jacm/Regev09} and Lyubashevsky, Peikert \& Regev in the security reduction of LWE and its algebraic variants \cite{DBLP:conf/eurocrypt/LyubashevskyPR13} to exhibit a quantum reduction from the decryption of NTRU to leaking information about the secret key. Since this reduction requires decryption with the same key one wishes to attack, it renders NTRU vulnerable to the same type of attacks that affect the Rabin--Williams scheme \cite{DBLP:conf/eurocrypt/Bernstein08} -- albeit requiring a quantum decryption query. A common practice thwarting such attacks consists in applying the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO, \cite{DBLP:conf/pkc/FujisakiO99}) transformation before encrypting. However, not all NTRU protocols enforce this protection. In particular the DPKE version of NTRU \cite{DBLP:conf/eurocrypt/SaitoXY18} is susceptible to such an attack.
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Dates and versions

hal-03933663 , version 1 (10-01-2023)




  • HAL Id : hal-03933663 , version 1


Théodore Conrad-Frenkiel, Rémi Géraud-Stewart, David Naccache. On Unpadded NTRU Quantum (In)Security. 46th Wireless World Research Forum, Jan 2021, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. ⟨hal-03933663⟩
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