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Conference Papers Year : 2020

Improving Key-Recovery in Linear Attacks: Application to 28-Round PRESENT

Abstract

Linear cryptanalysis is one of the most important tools in usefor the security evaluation of symmetric primitives. Many improvementsand refinements have been published since its introduction, and manyapplications on different ciphers have been found. Among these upgrades,Collard et al. proposed in 2007 an acceleration of the key-recovery partof Algorithm 2 for last-round attacks based on the FFT.In this paper we present a generalized, matrix-based version of the pre-vious algorithm which easily allows us to take into consideration an ar-bitrary number of key-recovery rounds. We also provide efficient variantsthat exploit the key-schedule relations and that can be combined withmultiple linear attacks.Using our algorithms we provide some new cryptanalysis on PRESENT,including, to the best of our knowledge, the first attack on 28 rounds.
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Dates and versions

hal-03139574 , version 1 (12-02-2021)

Identifiers

Cite

Antonio Florez-Gutierrez, María Naya-Plasencia. Improving Key-Recovery in Linear Attacks: Application to 28-Round PRESENT. EUROCRYPT 2020 - 39th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic, May 2020, Zagreb / Virtual, Croatia. pp.221-249, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-45721-1_9⟩. ⟨hal-03139574⟩

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