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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2018

Breaking and Fixing the Security Proof of Garbled Bloom Filters

Cédric Van Rompay
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Melek Önen

Résumé

We identify a flaw in the proof of security of Garbled Bloom Filters, a recent hash structure introduced by Dong et al. (ACM CCS 2013) that is used to design Private Set Intersection (PSI) protocols, a important family of protocols for secure cloud computing. We give counter-examples invalidating a claim that is central to the original proof and we show that variants of the GBF construction have the same issue in their security analysis. We then give a new proof of security that shows that Garbled Bloom Filters are secure nonetheless.
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hal-01954406 , version 1 (13-12-2018)

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Cédric Van Rompay, Melek Önen. Breaking and Fixing the Security Proof of Garbled Bloom Filters. 32th IFIP Annual Conference on Data and Applications Security and Privacy (DBSec), Jul 2018, Bergamo, Italy. pp.263-277, ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-95729-6_17⟩. ⟨hal-01954406⟩
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