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Chapitre D'ouvrage Année : 2018

Arrow’s (im)possibility theorem

Résumé

Arrow’s (im)possibility theorem is one of the most famous and important contri- butions in economics. It concerns the difficulty to aggregate a set of individual preferences, given as rankings of a set of available alternatives, into a unique social preferences ranking via a social welfare function, or into a unique social choice. Arrow proves that in a specific framework, it is impossible to find a social welfare function which simultaneously satisfies four conditions: universal domain, weak Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and no dictator. Our no- tice presents this theorem, one of its proofs, and, we hope, invites the reader to discover social choice theory
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Dates et versions

hal-01941037 , version 1 (11-12-2018)

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  • HAL Id : hal-01941037 , version 1

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Pierre Bernhard, Marc Deschamps. Arrow’s (im)possibility theorem. Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, In press. ⟨hal-01941037⟩
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