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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2017

Decoy Password Vaults: At Least as Hard as Steganography?

Résumé

Cracking-resistant password vaults have been recently proposed with the goal of thwarting offline attacks. This requires the generation of synthetic password vaults that are statistically indistinguishable from real ones. In this work, we establish a conceptual link between this problem and steganography, where the stego objects must be undetectable among cover objects. We compare the two frameworks and highlight parallels and differences. Moreover, we transfer results obtained in the steganography literature into the context of decoy generation. Our results include the infeasibility of perfectly secure decoy vaults and the conjecture that secure decoy vaults are at least as hard to construct as secure steganography.
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hal-01648993 , version 1 (27-11-2017)

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Cecilia Pasquini, Pascal Schöttle, Rainer Böhme. Decoy Password Vaults: At Least as Hard as Steganography?. 32th IFIP International Conference on ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection (SEC), May 2017, Rome, Italy. pp.356-370, ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-58469-0_24⟩. ⟨hal-01648993⟩
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