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Journal Articles Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation Year : 2017

New Winning Strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma


In the iterated prisoner's dilemma game, new successful strategies are regularly proposed especially outperforming the well-known tit_for_tat strategy. New forms of reasoning have also recently been introduced to analyse the game. They lead William Press and Freeman Dyson to a double infinite family of strategies that-theoretically-should all be eeicient strategies. In this paper, we study and confront using several experimen-tations the main strategies introduced since the discovery of tit_for_tat. We make them play against each other in varied and neutral environments. We use the complete classes method that leads us to the formulation of four new simple strategies with surprising results. We present massive experiments using simulators specially developed that allow us to confront up to ,,,, strategies simultaneously, which had never been done before. Our results show without any doubt the most robust strategies among those so far identified. This work defines new systematic, reproductible and objective experiments suggesting several ways to design strategies that go a step further, and a step in the sooware design technology to highlight eeicient strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma and multiagent systems in general.
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Dates and versions

hal-01635333 , version 1 (15-11-2017)



Philippe Mathieu, Jean-Paul Delahaye. New Winning Strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2017, 20 (4), ⟨10.18564/jasss.3517⟩. ⟨hal-01635333⟩
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