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Journal Articles Economic Theory Bulletin Year : 2015

Evolutionary dynamics and dominated strategies


Do evolutionary processes lead economic or biological agents to behave as if they were rational? To test this idea, many authors examined whether evolutionary game dynamics eliminate strictly dominated strategies.We survey, unify, and fill some gaps in this literature in the case of monotonic dynamics: a class of selection dynamics in which the growth rates of the pure strategies are ordered in accordance with their payoffs. We also survey results for other dynamics.
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hal-01253535 , version 1 (10-01-2016)



Yannick Viossat. Evolutionary dynamics and dominated strategies. Economic Theory Bulletin, 2015, 3 (1), pp.91-113. ⟨10.1007/s40505-014-0062-4⟩. ⟨hal-01253535⟩
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