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Conference Papers Year : 2015

Differential Attacks Against SPN: A Thorough Analysis

Abstract

This work aims at determining when the two-round maximum expected differential probability in an SPN with an MDS diffusion layer is achieved by a differential having the fewest possible active Sboxes. This question arises from the fact that minimum-weight differentials include the best differentials for the AES and several variants. However, we exhibit some SPN for which the two-round MEDP is achieved by some differentials involving a number of active Sboxes which exceeds the branch number of the linear layer. On the other hand, we also prove that, for some particular families of Sboxes, the two-round MEDP is always achieved for minimum-weight differentials.
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Dates and versions

hal-01237293 , version 1 (03-12-2015)

Identifiers

Cite

Anne Canteaut, Joëlle Roué. Differential Attacks Against SPN: A Thorough Analysis. Codes, Cryptology, and Information Security - C2SI 2015, May 2015, Rabat, Morocco. pp.45-62, ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-18681-8_4⟩. ⟨hal-01237293⟩

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