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Reports (Research Report) Year : 2013

Ballot secrecy and ballot independence: definitions and relations

Abstract

We study ballot independence for election schemes. First, we formally define ballot independence as a cryptographic game and prove that ballot secrecy implies ballot independence. Secondly, we introduce a notion of controlled malleability and prove that it is sufficient for ballot independence. We also prove that non-malleable ballots are sufficient for ballot independence. Thirdly, we prove that ballot independence is sufficient for ballot secrecy in a special case. Our results show that ballot independence is necessary in election schemes satisfying ballot secrecy. Furthermore, our sufficient conditions enable simpler proofs of ballot secrecy.
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Dates and versions

hal-01102313 , version 1 (12-01-2015)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-01102313 , version 1

Cite

Ben Smyth, David Bernhard. Ballot secrecy and ballot independence: definitions and relations. [Research Report] 2013/235, Cryptology ePrint Archive. 2013, pp.24. ⟨hal-01102313⟩

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