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Conference Papers Year : 2010

Simple Power Analysis on Exponentiation Revisited

Abstract

Power Analysis has been studied since 1998 when P. Kocher et al. presented the first attack. From the initial Simple Power Analysis more complex techniques have been designed and studied during the previous decade such as Differential and Correlation Power Analysis. In this paper we revisit Simple Power Analysis which is at the heart of side channel techniques. We aim at showing its true efficiency when studied rigorously. Based on existing Chosen Message attacks we explain in this paper how particular message values can reveal the secret exponent manipulated during a modular exponentiation with a single power consumption curve. We detail the different ways to achieve this and then show that some blinded exponentiations can still be threatened by Simple Power Analysis depending on the implementation. Finally we will give advice on countermeasures to prevent such enhanced Simple Power Analysis techniques.
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hal-01056099 , version 1 (14-08-2014)

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Jean-Christophe Courrège, Benoit Feix, Mylène Roussellet. Simple Power Analysis on Exponentiation Revisited. 9th IFIP WG 8.8/11.2 International Conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications (CARDIS), Apr 2010, Passau, Germany. pp.65-79, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-12510-2_6⟩. ⟨hal-01056099⟩
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