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Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year : 2014

Distinguishing and Key-recovery Attacks against Wheesht

Anne Canteaut
Gaëtan Leurent
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  • PersonId : 951331


Wheesht is one of the candidates to the CAESAR competition. In this note we present several attacks on Wheesht, showing that it is far from the advertised security level of 256 bits. In particular we describe a distinguishing attack with $2^{70.3}$ known plaintext words for any number of rounds of Wheesht, and a key-recovery attack (recovering the encryption key) for versions of Wheesht with a single finalization round with very little data and time complexity $2^{192}$.
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Dates and versions

hal-00966346 , version 1 (26-03-2014)
hal-00966346 , version 2 (26-03-2014)


  • HAL Id : hal-00966346 , version 2


Anne Canteaut, Gaëtan Leurent. Distinguishing and Key-recovery Attacks against Wheesht. 2014. ⟨hal-00966346v2⟩


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