Fair division of indivisible goods under risk - Inria - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique Access content directly
Conference Papers Year : 2012

Fair division of indivisible goods under risk


We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of m indivisible objects to n agents having additive preferences over them. In this paper we propose an extension of this classical problem, where each object can possibly be in bad condition (\textite.g broken), in which case its actual value is zero. We assume that the central authority in charge of allocating the objects does not know beforehand the objects conditions, but only has probabilistic information. The aim of this work is to propose a formal model of this problem, to adapt some classical fairness criteria to this extended setting, and to introduce several approaches to compute optimal allocations for small instances as well as suboptimal good allocations for real-world inspired allocation problems of realistic size.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
ECAI12.pdf (147.03 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-00953153 , version 1 (28-02-2014)


  • HAL Id : hal-00953153 , version 1


Charles Lumet, Sylvain Bouveret, Michel Lemaître. Fair division of indivisible goods under risk. Proceedings of the 20th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI'12), 2012, Montpellier, France. pp.564-569. ⟨hal-00953153⟩
308 View
139 Download


Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More