Mechanizing Game-Based Proofs of Security Protocols - Inria - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique Access content directly
Book Sections Year : 2012

Mechanizing Game-Based Proofs of Security Protocols

Bruno Blanchet


After a short introduction to the field of security protocol verification, we present the automatic protocol verifier CryptoVerif. In contrast to most previous protocol verifiers, CryptoVerif does not rely on the Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It produces proofs presented as sequences of games, like those manually done by cryptographers; these games are formalized in a probabilistic process calculus. CryptoVerif provides a generic method for specifying security properties of the cryptographic primitives. It can prove secrecy and correspondence properties (including authentication). It produces proofs valid for any number of sessions, in the presence of an active adversary. It also provides an explicit formula for the probability of success of an attack against the protocol, as a function of the probability of breaking each primitive and of the number of sessions.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
BlanchetMOD11.pdf (204.94 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-00863389 , version 1 (18-09-2013)


  • HAL Id : hal-00863389 , version 1


Bruno Blanchet. Mechanizing Game-Based Proofs of Security Protocols. Tobias Nipkow and Olga Grumberg and Benedikt Hauptmann. Software Safety and Security - Tools for Analysis and Verification, 33, IOS Press, pp.1--25, 2012, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series ― D: Information and Communication Security. ⟨hal-00863389⟩


207 View
171 Download


Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More