Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models - Inria - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique Access content directly
Conference Papers Year : 2012

Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models

Bruno Blanchet

Abstract

Security protocol verification has been a very active research area since the 1990s. This paper surveys various approaches in this area, considering the verification in the symbolic model, as well as the more recent approaches that rely on the computational model or that verify protocol implementations rather than specifications. Additionally, we briefly describe our symbolic security protocol verifier ProVerif and situate it among these approaches.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
BlanchetETAPS12.pdf (224.3 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-00863388 , version 1 (18-09-2013)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00863388 , version 1

Cite

Bruno Blanchet. Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models. First Conference on Principles of Security and Trust (POST'12), 2012, Tallinn, Estonia. pp.3--29. ⟨hal-00863388⟩

Collections

INRIA INRIA2
163 View
449 Download

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More