Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions, composed keys is NP-complete. - Inria - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique Access content directly
Journal Articles Theoretical Computer Science Year : 2003

Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions, composed keys is NP-complete.

Abstract

We investigate the complexity of the protocol insecurity problem for a finite number of sessions (fixed number of interleaved runs). We show that this problem is NP-complete with respect to a Dolev–Yao model of intruders. The result does not assume a limit on the size of messages and supports non-atomic symmetric encryption keys. We also prove that in order to build an attack with a fixed number of sessions the intruder needs only to forge messages of linear size, provided that they are represented as dags.

Dates and versions

inria-00103985 , version 1 (05-10-2006)

Identifiers

Cite

Michaël Rusinowitch, Mathieu Turuani. Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions, composed keys is NP-complete.. Theoretical Computer Science, 2003, Theoretical Computer Science, 1-3 (299), pp.451-475. ⟨10.1016/S0304-3975(02)00490-5⟩. ⟨inria-00103985⟩
134 View
0 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More