Coordinating resources in Stackelberg Security Games - Inria - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique Access content directly
Journal Articles European Journal of Operational Research Year : 2021

Coordinating resources in Stackelberg Security Games


In this work we formulate a Stackelberg Security Game that coordinates resources in a border patrol problem. In this security domain, resources from different precincts have to be paired to conduct patrols in the border due to logistic constraints. Given this structure, models that enumerate the pure defender strategies scale poorly. We describe the set of mixed strategies using a polynomial number of variables but exponentially many constraints that come from the matching polytope. We then include this description in a mixed integer formulation to compute the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium efficiently with a branch and cut scheme. Since the optimal patrol solution is a probability distribution over the set of exponential size, we also introduce an efficient sampling method that can be used to deploy the security resources every shift. Our computational results evaluate the efficiency of the branch and cut scheme developed and the accuracy of the sampling method.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
preprint_border.pdf (926.76 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-02999966 , version 1 (11-11-2020)



Víctor Bucarey, Carlos Casorrán, Martine Labbé, Fernando Ordoñez, Oscar Figueroa. Coordinating resources in Stackelberg Security Games. European Journal of Operational Research, 2021, ⟨10.1016/j.ejor.2019.11.002⟩. ⟨hal-02999966⟩
64 View
207 Download



Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More