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Conference Papers Year : 2015

Formal verification of ACAS X, an industrial airborne collision avoidance system

Abstract

Formal verification of industrial systems is very challenging, due to reasons ranging from scalability issues to communication difficulties with engineering-focused teams. More importantly, industrial systems are rarely designed for verification, but rather for opera- tional needs. In this paper we present an overview of our experience using hybrid systems theorem proving to formally verify ACAS X, an airborne collision avoidance system for airliners scheduled to be operational around 2020. The methods and proof techniques presented here are an overview of the work already presented in an earlier work by the authors, while the evaluation of ACAS X has been significantly expanded and updated to the most recent version of the system, run 13. The effort presented in this paper is an integral part of the ACAS X development and was performed in tight collaboration with the ACAS X development team.
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Dates and versions

hal-01660902 , version 1 (11-12-2017)

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Jean-Baptiste Jeannin, Khalil Ghorbal, Yanni Kouskoulas, Ryan Gardner, Aurora Schmidt, et al.. Formal verification of ACAS X, an industrial airborne collision avoidance system. 2015 International Conference on Embedded Software, EMSOFT 2015, Amsterdam, Netherlands, October 4-9, 2015, 2015, Amsterdam, Netherlands. pp.127--136, ⟨10.1109/EMSOFT.2015.7318268⟩. ⟨hal-01660902⟩
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