The Not-so-distant Future: Distance-Bounding Protocols on Smartphones
Résumé
In authentication protocols, a relay attack allows an adversary to impersonate a legitimate prover, possibly located far away from a verifier, by simply forwarding messages between these two entities. The effectiveness of such attacks has been demonstrated in practice in many environments, such as ISO 14443-compliant smartcards and carlocking mechanisms. Distance-bounding (DB) protocols, which enable the verifier to check his proximity to the prover, are a promising countermeasure against relay attacks. In such protocols, the verifier measures the time elapsed between sending a challenge and receiving the associated response of the prover to estimate their proximity. So far, distance bounding has remained mainly a theoretical concept. Indeed in practice, only three ISO 14443-compliant implementations exist: two proprietary smartcard ones and one on highly-customized hardware. In this paper, we demonstrate a proof-of-concept implementation of the Swiss-Knife DB
protocol on smartphones running in RFID-emulation mode. To our best knowledge, this is the first time that such an implementation has been
performed. Our experimental results are encouraging as they show that relay attacks introducing more than 1:5 ms are directly detectable (in
general off-the-shelf relay attacks introduce at least 10 ms of delay). We also leverage on the full power of the ISO-DEP specication to implement the same protocol with 8-bit challenges and responses, thus reaching a better security level per execution without increasing the possibility of
relay attacks. The analysis of our results leads to new promising research directions in the area of distance bounding.