Non-Determinism and Nash Equilibria for Sequential Game over Partial Order - Inria - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique Access content directly
Conference Papers Discrete Mathematics and Theoretical Computer Science Year : 2005

Non-Determinism and Nash Equilibria for Sequential Game over Partial Order

Abstract

In sequential games of traditional game theory, backward induction guarantees existence of Nash equilibrium by yielding a sub-game perfect equilibrium. But if payoffs range over a partially ordered set instead of the reals, then the backward induction predicate does no longer imply the Nash equilibrium predicate. Non-determinism is a solution: a suitable non-deterministic backward induction function returns a non-deterministic strategy profile which is a non-deterministic Nash equilibrium. The main notions and results in this article are constructive, conceptually simple and formalised in the proof assistant Coq.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
dmAF0106.pdf (86.92 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Publisher files allowed on an open archive
Loading...

Dates and versions

hal-01183332 , version 1 (12-08-2015)

Identifiers

Cite

Stéphane Le Roux. Non-Determinism and Nash Equilibria for Sequential Game over Partial Order. Computational Logic and Applications, CLA '05, 2005, Chambéry, France. pp.77-86, ⟨10.46298/dmtcs.3468⟩. ⟨hal-01183332⟩
97 View
729 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More