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Conference Papers Year : 2014

Soft Analytical Side-Channel Attacks


In this paper, we introduce a new approach to side-channel key recovery, that combines the low time/memory complexity and noise tolerance of standard (divide and conquer) differential power analysis with the optimal data complexity of algebraic side-channel attacks. Our fundamental contribution for this purpose is to change the way of ex-pressing the problem, from the system of equations used in algebraic at-tacks to a code, essentially inspired by low density parity check codes. We then show that such codes can be efficiently decoded, taking advantage of the sparsity of the information corresponding to intermediate variables in actual leakage traces. The resulting soft analytical side-channel attacks work under the same profiling assumptions as template attacks, and di-rectly exploit the vectors of probabilities produced by these attacks. As a result, we bridge the gap between popular side-channel distinguishers based on simple statistical tests and previous approaches to analytical side-channel attacks that could only exploit hard information so far.


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Dates and versions

hal-01096218 , version 1 (17-12-2014)



Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon, Benoît Gérard, François-Xavier Standaert. Soft Analytical Side-Channel Attacks. Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2014 - 20th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Palash Sarkar, Tetsu Iwata, Dec 2014, Kaoshiung, Taiwan. pp.282 - 296, ⟨10.1007/978-3-662-45611-8_15⟩. ⟨hal-01096218⟩
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