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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2013

Recovering Private Keys Generated with Weak PRNGs

Résumé

Suppose that the private key of discrete logarithm-based or factoring-based public-key primitive is obtained by concatenating the outputs of a linear congruential generator. How seriously is the scheme weakened as a result? While linear congruential generators are cryptographically very weak "pseudorandom" number generators, the answer to that question is not immediately obvious, since an adversary in such a setting does not get to examine the outputs of the congruential generator directly, but can only obtain an implicit hint about them—namely the public key. In this paper, we take a closer look at that problem, and show that, in most cases, an attack does exist to retrieve the key much faster than with a naive exhaustive search on the seed of the generator.
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Dates et versions

hal-01094296 , version 1 (12-12-2014)

Identifiants

Citer

Pierre-Alain Fouque, Mehdi Tibouchi, Jean-Christophe Zapalowicz. Recovering Private Keys Generated with Weak PRNGs. Cryptography and Coding - 14th {IMA} International Conference, Dec 2013, Oxford, United Kingdom. pp.158 - 172, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-45239-0_10⟩. ⟨hal-01094296⟩
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