Hardware Implementation and Side-Channel Analysis of Lapin - Inria - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique Access content directly
Conference Papers Year : 2014

Hardware Implementation and Side-Channel Analysis of Lapin


Lapin is a new authentication protocol that has been de- signed for low-cost implementations. In a work from RFIDsec 2012, Berstein and Lange argued that at similar (mathematical) security lev- els, Lapin's performances are below the ones of block cipher based au- thentication. In this paper, we suggest that as soon as physical security (e.g. against side-channel attacks) is taken into account, this criticism can be mitigated. For this purpose, we start by investigating masked hardware implementations of Lapin, and discuss the gains obtained over software ones. Next, we observe that the structure of our implementa- tions significantly differs from block cipher ones (for which most results in side-channel analysis apply), hence raising questions regarding how to evaluate physical security in this case. We then provide first results of side-channel analyzes against unprotected and masked Lapin. Despite interesting properties of the masked implementations, our conclusions are still contrasted because of the on-chip randomness requirements of Lapin protocol. These results give strong incentive to design similar but deterministic protocols, e.g. based on the recently introduced Learning With Rounding assumption.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
lapin2.pdf (430.26 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-00934054 , version 1 (21-01-2014)



Lubos Gaspar, Gaëtan Leurent, François-Xavier Standaert. Hardware Implementation and Side-Channel Analysis of Lapin. Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2014, Feb 2014, San Francisco, United States. pp.206-226, ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-04852-9_11⟩. ⟨hal-00934054⟩


180 View
301 Download



Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More