Evolutionary Games - Inria - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique Access content directly
Book Sections Year : 2014

Evolutionary Games


Evolutionary games constitute the most recent major mathematical tool for understanding, modelling and predicting evolution in biology and other fields. They complement other well establlished tools such as branching processes and the Lotka-Volterra [6] equations (e.g. for the predator - prey dynamics or for epidemics evolution). Evolutionary Games also brings novel features to game theory. First, it focuses on the dynam- ics of competition rather than restricting attention to the equilibrium. In particular, it tries to explain how an equilibrium emerges. Second, it brings new de nitions of stability, that are more adapted to the context of large populations. Finally, in contrast to standard game theory, players are not assumed to be \rational" or \knowledgeable" as to anticipate the other players' choices. The objective of this article, is to present founda- tions as well as recent advances in evolutionary games, highlight the novel concepts that they introduce with respect to game theory as formulated by John Nash, and describe through several examples their huge potential as tools for modeling interactions in complex systems.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
evol-game-final.pdf (206.97 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-00927226 , version 1 (12-01-2014)



Eitan Altman. Evolutionary Games. Tamer Başar. Encyclopedia of Systems and Control, Springer, pp.391-396, 2014, ⟨10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_32-1⟩. ⟨hal-00927226⟩


158 View
310 Download



Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More