Extended Security Arguments for Signature Schemes - Inria - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique Access content directly
Conference Papers Year : 2012

Extended Security Arguments for Signature Schemes


The well-known forking lemma by Pointcheval and Stern has been used to prove the security of the so-called generic signature schemes. These signature schemes are obtained via the Fiat-Shamir transform from three-pass identification schemes. A number of five-pass identifi- cation protocols have been proposed in the last few years. Extending the forking lemma and the Fiat-Shamir transform would allow to ob- tain new signature schemes since, unfortunately, these newly proposed schemes fall outside the original framework. In this paper, we provide an extension of the forking lemma in order to assess the security of what we call n-generic signature schemes. These include signature schemes that are derived from certain (2n + 1)-pass identification schemes. We thus obtain a generic methodology for proving the security of a number of signature schemes derived from recently published five-pass identifica- tion protocols, and potentially for (2n + 1)-pass identification schemes to come.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
africacrypt.pdf (272.15 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Publisher files allowed on an open archive

Dates and versions

hal-00684486 , version 1 (20-02-2013)



Sidi Mohamed El Yousfi Alaoui, Özgür Dagdelen, Pascal Véron, David Galindo, Pierre-Louis Cayrel. Extended Security Arguments for Signature Schemes. Africacrypt 2012, Jul 2012, Ifrane, Morocco. pp.19-34, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-31410-0_2⟩. ⟨hal-00684486⟩
261 View
534 Download



Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More