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Documents Associated With Scientific Events Year : 2011

Revisiting Collusion in Routing Games: a Load Balancing Problem

Abstract

Is it profitable for players to unite and merge to a single player? Obviously, the sum of utilities at an equilibrium cannot exceed the sum obtained if all players join together. But what happens if only a subset of players join together? Previous work on collusion have already shown that the society may either gain or loose from collusion of a subset of players. In this paper we show for a simple load balancing example that not only the society may loose, but also the subset of players that collude may end up with a worse performance than without collusion. In doing so, we introduce new concepts that measure the price of collusion.
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Dates and versions

hal-00644539 , version 1 (24-11-2011)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00644539 , version 1

Cite

Eitan Altman, Hisao Kameda, Yezekael Hayel. Revisiting Collusion in Routing Games: a Load Balancing Problem. Roberto Cominetti and Sylvain Sorin and Bruno Tuffin. NetGCOOP 2011 : International conference on NETwork Games, COntrol and OPtimization, Oct 2011, Paris, France. IEEE, pp.6, 2011. ⟨hal-00644539⟩
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