An NP Decision Procedure for Protocol Insecurity with XOR - Inria - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique
Conference Papers Year : 2003

An NP Decision Procedure for Protocol Insecurity with XOR

Abstract

We provide a method for deciding the insecurity of cryptographic protocols in presence of the standard Dolev-Yao intruder (with a finite number of sessions) extended with so-called oracle rules, i.e., deduction rules that satisfy certain conditions. As an instance of this general framework, we obtain that protocol insecurity is in NP for an intruder that can exploit the properties of the XOR operator. This operator is frequently used in cryptographic protocols but cannot be handled in most protocol models. An immediate consequence of our proof is that checking whether a message can be derived by an intruder (using XOR) is in P. We also apply our framework to an intruder that exploits properties of certain encryption modes such as cipher block chaining (CBC).
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Dates and versions

inria-00103954 , version 1 (05-10-2006)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : inria-00103954 , version 1

Cite

Yannick Chevalier, Ralf Küsters, Michaël Rusinowitch, Mathieu Turuani. An NP Decision Procedure for Protocol Insecurity with XOR. 18th IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS 2003), Jun 2003, Ottawa, Canada, pp.261-270. ⟨inria-00103954⟩
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