Explicit Randomness is not Necessary when Modeling Probabilistic Encryption - Inria - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique Access content directly
Reports (Research Report) Year : 2006

Explicit Randomness is not Necessary when Modeling Probabilistic Encryption

Abstract

Although good encryption functions are probabilistic, most symbolic models do not capture this aspect explicitly. A typical solution, recently used to prove the soundness of such models with respect to computational ones, is to explicitly represent the dependency of ciphertexts on random coins as labels. In order to make these label-based models useful, it seems natural to try to extend the underlying decision procedures and the implementation of existing tools. In this paper we put forth a more practical alternative based on the following soundness theorem. We prove that for a large class of security properties (that includes rather standard formulations for secrecy and authenticity properties), security of protocols in the simpler model implies security in the label-based model. Combined with the soundness result of (\textbf{?}) our theorem enables the translation of security results in unlabeled symbolic models to computational security.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
hordegen_rapport.pdf (282.79 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Loading...

Dates and versions

inria-00078825 , version 1 (07-06-2006)
inria-00078825 , version 2 (08-06-2006)

Identifiers

Cite

Véronique Cortier, Heinrich Hördegen, Bogdan Warinschi. Explicit Randomness is not Necessary when Modeling Probabilistic Encryption. [Research Report] RR-5928, INRIA. 2006, pp.12. ⟨inria-00078825v2⟩
205 View
135 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More