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Cryptanalysis of Dual CRT-RSA

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Abstract. Several schemes under the framework of Dual RSA have been proposed by Sun et al (IEEE-IT, August 2007). We here concentrate on the Dual CRT-RSA scheme and present certain range of parameters for which this is insecure. As a corollary of our work, we prove that the Dual Generalized Rebalanced-RSA (Scheme III of Sun et al) can be efficiently broken for a significant region where the scheme has been claimed to be secure.

Keywords: RSA, CRT-RSA, Dual CRT-RSA, Cryptanalysis, Lattices.

1 Introduction

The famous RSA public key cryptosystem has been proposed in [10] and this is possibly the most studied topic in cryptology research. In [11], a variant of RSA, named Dual RSA, has been described. Dual RSA provides two different instances of RSA that share the same public and private exponents. Here we have two different RSA moduli $N_1 = p_1q_1, N_2 = p_2q_2$ such that the public key eand the private key d satisfies $ed \equiv 1 \mod \phi(N_1)$ as well as $ed \equiv 1 \mod \phi(N_2)$. In general, p_1, q_1, p_2, q_2 are taken to be of same bit size and we also follow that here. In [11], the authors suggested relevant applications of Dual RSA that include blind signatures and authentication/secrecy.

To make the RSA decryption faster, the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) has been exploited and the corresponding version is known as CRT-RSA [9]. In this variant, there are two private exponents d_p, d_q such that $ed_p \equiv 1 \mod (p-1)$ and $ed_q \equiv 1 \mod (q-1)$. The encryption method is the same as it is done in RSA. To decrypt the ciphertext C, one needs to calculate $C_p \equiv C^{d_p} \mod p$ and $C_q \equiv C^{d_q} \mod q$. From C_p, C_q one can get the plaintext M by the application of CRT.

As CRT-RSA is faster than RSA, with the similar motivation, a CRT variant of Dual RSA has been presented in [11], which we refer as Dual CRT-RSA. This variant consists of two different RSA moduli $N_1 = p_1q_1, N_2 = p_2q_2$ with same public exponent e and private exponents d_p, d_q . Hence in this case we have, $ed_p \equiv 1 \mod (p_1-1) \equiv 1 \mod (p_2-1)$ and $ed_q \equiv 1 \mod (q_1-1) \equiv 1 \mod (q_2-1)$. Throughout this paper we will consider N as an integer of same bit-size as of N_1, N_2 .

The outline of the paper is as follows. Let $e = N^{\alpha}$, $\alpha > \frac{1}{4}$ and $d_p, d_q \approx N^{\delta}$. One may note that both ed_p and ed_q are greater than \sqrt{N} and thus we always have $\alpha + \delta > \frac{1}{2}$. In Section 2, we show that the Dual CRT-RSA scheme is insecure when (i) $\delta < \frac{1-\alpha}{2} - \epsilon$ for a very small quantity ϵ , and (ii) $\delta < \frac{3-4\alpha}{5}$ and $\alpha + \delta > \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon'$, for a very small quantity ϵ' .

A method for generating a certain kind of Dual CRT-RSA keys has been presented in Scheme III of [11] and it is referred as Dual Generalized Rebalanced-RSA (in short, we call it DGRR). This method can generate Dual CRT-RSA keys for $e < N^{\frac{1}{2}}$. Applying our results in Section 2, it is shown that the keys generated in DGRR are completely insecure for $N^{\frac{1}{3}} < e < N^{\frac{1}{2}}$. Further, we improve some of the existing cryptanalytic results for $e \leq N^{\frac{1}{3}}$ too. These are presented in Section 3. Detailed experimental results are presented in Section 4.

2 The Main Results

As $N_1 = p_1 q_1$ and $N_2 = p_2 q_2$, we have the following four identities for Dual CRT-RSA.

$$ed_p = 1 + k_{p_1}(p_1 - 1), ed_q = 1 + k_{q_1}(q_1 - 1),$$

$$ed_p = 1 + k_{p_2}(p_2 - 1), ed_q = 1 + k_{q_2}(q_2 - 1).$$
(1)

In this section we present two cryptanalytic results on Dual CRT-RSA. Let us start with the first one.

Theorem 1. Let N_1, N_2 be the public moduli of Dual CRT-RSA and $e = N^{\alpha}$, $d_p, d_q < N^{\delta}$. Consider that $g = N^{\gamma}$, $g_1 = N^{\gamma_1}$ and $g_2 = N^{\gamma_2}$ be such that $g = \gcd(N_1 - 1, N_2 - 1)$, $g_1 = \gcd(e, \frac{N_1 - 1}{g})$, and $g_2 = \gcd(e, \frac{N_2 - 1}{g})$. Let $\epsilon = \frac{\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 + 2\gamma}{2}$. Then, for $\alpha > \frac{1}{4}$, one can factor N_1, N_2 in poly(log N) time if $\delta < \frac{1 - \alpha}{2} - \epsilon$.

Proof. From the first two equations of (1) we have

 $(ed_p - 1 + k_{p_1})(ed_q - 1 + k_{q_1}) = k_{p_1}k_{q_1}N_1$. From this we get,

$$e^{2}d_{p}d_{q} + e\left(d_{p}(k_{p_{1}}-1) + d_{q}(k_{q_{1}}-1)\right) + \left(1 - k_{p_{1}} - k_{q_{1}}\right) = \left(N_{1}-1\right)k_{p_{1}}k_{q_{1}}.$$
 (2)

Let, $N'_1 = \frac{N_1 - 1}{gg_1}$ and $N'_2 = \frac{N_2 - 1}{gg_2}$. Now consider the polynomial $f_1(x_1, x_2, x_3) = e^2 x_1 + ex_2 + x_3$. Let $y_1 = d_p d_q, y_2 = d_p (k_{p_1} - 1) + d_q (k_{q_1} - 1)$, and $y_3 = 1 - k_{p_1} - k_{q_1}$. Clearly, $f_1(y_1, y_2, y_3) \equiv 0 \mod N'_1$. Similarly, from the last two equations of (1), we have $e^2 d_p d_q + e (d_p (k_{p_2} - 1) + d_q (k_{q_2} - 1)) + (1 - k_{p_2} - k_{q_2}) = (N_2 - 1) k_{p_2} k_{q_2}$. Now assume $y_4 = d_p (k_{p_2} - 1) + d_q (k_{q_2} - 1)$ and $y_5 = 1 - k_{p_2} - k_{q_2}$. For the polynomial $f_2(x_1, x_4, x_5) = e^2 x_1 + ex_4 + x_5$, we have $f_2(y_1, y_4, y_5) \equiv 0 \mod N'_2$. Now using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) over the coefficients of f_1, f_2 , one can construct a polynomial $f_3(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5) = a_1 x_1 + a_2 x_2 + a_3 x_3 + a_4 x_4 + a_5 x_5$, such that $f_3(y_1, y_2, y_3, y_4, y_5) \equiv 0 \mod N'_1 N'_2$. Though the polynomials f_1, f_2 are of the same form, their roots are different in different moduli N'_1, N'_2 . Since $\gcd(e, N'_1) = \gcd(e, N'_2) = 1$ and $a_1 \equiv e^2 \mod N'_1 \equiv e^2 \mod N'_1 \equiv e^2 \mod N'_2$, we have $\gcd(a_1, N'_1 N'_2) = 1$. So from f_3 , we can obtain another polynomial $f_4 = x_1 + b_2 x_2 + b_3 x_3 + b_4 x_4 + b_5 x_5$, such that $f_4(y_1, y_2, y_3, y_4, y_5) \equiv 0 \mod N'_1 N'_2$.

Let, $X_1 = N^{2\delta}, X_2 = N^{\alpha+2\delta-\frac{1}{2}}, X_3 = N^{\alpha+\delta-\frac{1}{2}}, X_4 = N^{\alpha+2\delta-\frac{1}{2}}, X_5 = N^{\alpha+\delta-\frac{1}{2}}$. Clearly X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4, X_5 are the upper bounds of y_1, y_2, y_3, y_4, y_5 neglecting the small constants. We want to find the modular solution of f_4 .

Now f_4 is a linear polynomial of degree 1. Using "Basic Strategy" of [5, Section 3.3.1], one can solve f_4 in poly(log N) time by LLL [7] algorithm if

$$X_1 X_2 X_3 X_4 X_5 < N_1' N_2'. (3)$$

Putting the values of X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4 and X_5 in Inequality (3), we get

$$\delta < \frac{1-\alpha}{2} - \frac{\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 + 2\gamma}{8}.$$
(4)

From the equation (2), we have $(N_1 - 1)k_{p_1}k_{q_1} \equiv 1 - k_{p_1} - k_{q_1} \mod e$, i.e., $\left(\frac{N_1 - 1}{gg_1}\right)gg_1k_{p_1}k_{q_1} \equiv 1 - k_{p_1} - k_{q_1} \mod e$. Thus when

$$gg_1k_{p_1}k_{q_1} < e,$$
 (5)

one can calculate $gg_1k_{p_1}k_{q_1} = \left(\frac{N_1-1}{gg_1}\right)^{-1} (1-k_{p_1}-k_{q_1}) \mod e$. Hence it is possible to obtain $k_{p_1}k_{q_1}$. Putting $g = N^{\gamma}, g_1 = N^{\gamma_1}, k_{p_1} \leq N^{\alpha+\delta-\frac{1}{2}}, k_{p_1} \leq N^{\alpha+\delta-\frac{1}{2}}$ in (5), we have

$$\delta < \frac{1 - \alpha - \gamma - \gamma_1}{2}.\tag{6}$$

Since $\frac{1-\alpha-\gamma_1-\gamma_2-2\gamma}{2} \leq \min\left\{\frac{1-\alpha}{2} - \frac{\gamma_1+\gamma_2+2\gamma}{8}, \frac{1-\alpha-\gamma-\gamma_1}{2}\right\}$, the conditions (4) and (6) on δ will be satisfied if $\delta < \frac{1-\alpha-\gamma_1-\gamma_2-2\gamma}{2}$. Hence $k_{p_1} + k_{q_1}$ and $k_{p_1}k_{q_1}$ can be obtained if $\delta < \frac{1-\alpha-\gamma_1-\gamma_2-2\gamma}{2} = \frac{1-\alpha}{2} - \epsilon$, where $\epsilon = \frac{\gamma_1+\gamma_2+2\gamma}{2}$. From the knowledge of $k_{p_1} + k_{q_1}$ and $k_{p_1}k_{q_1}$, one gets k_{p_1}, k_{q_1} . Since $p_1 \equiv 1 - k_{p_1}^{-1} \mod e$, one can factor N_1 in poly(log N) time obtaining half of the LSBs of p_1 (as explained in [2, Corollary 1]) when $\alpha > \frac{1}{4}$. The proof for factoring N_2 is similar. \Box

In general g, g_1, g_2 will be small, and so $\gamma, \gamma_1, \gamma_2 \to 0$, which gives $\epsilon \to 0$. We have also found that the experimental results support this claim.

2.1 Observation on experimental setup

In the proof of Theorem 1, we have studied the conditions when one can collect the roots efficiently. To actually collect the roots we use Gröbner basis techniques [5] and in all the experiments find polynomials of the form $x_3 - \frac{1-k_{p_1}-k_{q_1}}{1-k_{p_2}-k_{q_2}}y_3$. In all these situations, $\gcd(1-k_{p_1}-k_{q_1}, 1-k_{p_2}-k_{q_2})$ is small, that helps us to collect $1-k_{p_1}-k_{q_1}, 1-k_{p_2}-k_{q_2}$ efficiently. Directly one cannot obtain y_1, y_2, y_4 , but we use the following technique to factorize N_1 and N_2 in the experiments. Moreover, in Theorem 1, we have the constraint $\alpha > \frac{1}{4}$. Using the following approach one can remove the lower bound on α .

Let $g_3 = N^{\gamma_3}$ and $g_4 = N^{\gamma_4}$ such that $g_3 = \gcd(e, N_1 - 1)$ and $g_4 = \gcd(e, N_2 - 1)$. From the knowledge of $1 - k_{p_1} - k_{q_1}$ and $1 - k_{p_2} - k_{q_2}$, one can find

 $\begin{array}{l} k_{p_1}k_{q_1}\equiv a \ \mathrm{mod}\ \frac{e}{g_3} \ \mathrm{and}\ k_{p_2}k_{q_2}\equiv b \ \mathrm{mod}\ \frac{e}{g_4}. \ \mathrm{So}, \ \mathrm{we}\ \mathrm{can}\ \mathrm{write}\ k_{p_1}k_{q_1}=a+\frac{e}{g_3}z_1\\ \mathrm{and}\ k_{p_2}k_{q_2}=b+\frac{e}{g_4}z_2, \ \mathrm{where}\ z_1, z_2 \ \mathrm{are}\ \mathrm{unknown}. \ \mathrm{Note}\ \mathrm{that}\ z_1\approx N^{\gamma_3+\alpha+2\delta-1}\\ \mathrm{and}\ z_2\approx N^{\gamma_4+\alpha+2\delta-1}. \ \mathrm{Let}\ z_3=k_{p_1}k_{q_1}(N_1-1)-k_{p_2}k_{q_2}(N_2-1). \ \mathrm{It}\ \mathrm{is}\ \mathrm{clear}\\ \mathrm{that}\ |z_3|\approx |k_{p_1}k_{q_1}(p_1+q_1)|\approx N^{2\alpha+2\delta-\frac{1}{2}}. \ \mathrm{Hence}, \ \mathrm{we}\ \mathrm{have}\ \mathrm{to}\ \mathrm{find}\ \mathrm{the}\ \mathrm{root}\\ (z_1,z_2,z_3)\ \mathrm{of}\ \mathrm{the}\ \mathrm{polynomial}\ h(x_1,x_2,x_3)=(a+\frac{e}{g_3}x_1)(N_1-1)-(b+\frac{e}{g_4}x_2)(N_2-1)\\ -x_3. \ \mathrm{Let},\ X_1=N^{\gamma_3+\alpha+2\delta-1}, X_2=N^{\gamma_4+\alpha+2\delta-1}\ \mathrm{and}\ X_3=N^{2\alpha+2\delta-\frac{1}{2}}.\\ \mathrm{Clearly},\ X_1,X_2,X_3\ \mathrm{are}\ \mathrm{the}\ \mathrm{upper}\ \mathrm{bounds}\ \mathrm{of}\ \mathrm{the}\ z_1,z_2,z_3. \ \mathrm{Note}\ \mathrm{that}\ W=\\ ||h(x_1X_1,x_2X_2,x_3X_3)||_\infty\geq \frac{e}{g_3}X_1N=N^{2\alpha+2\delta}. \ \mathrm{We}\ \mathrm{can}\ \mathrm{find}\ \mathrm{the}\ \mathrm{root}\ fh\ \mathrm{in}\ \mathrm{poly}(\log N)\ \mathrm{time}\ \mathrm{if}\ X_1X_2X_3<W. \ \mathrm{Now}\ \mathrm{putling}\ \mathrm{the}\ \mathrm{values}\ \mathrm{of}\ X_1,X_2,X_3\ \mathrm{and}\ \mathrm{the}\ \mathrm{lower}\ \mathrm{bound}\ \mathrm{of}\ W\ \mathrm{in}\ X_1X_2X_3<W. \ \mathrm{where}\ \delta<\frac{5}{8}-\frac{\alpha}{2}-\frac{\gamma_3+\gamma_4}{4}. \ \mathrm{Since}\ \gamma_3,\gamma_4\to 0\ \mathrm{in}\ \mathrm{gentarily}\ \mathrm{th}\ \mathrm{reque}\ \mathrm{upper}\ \mathrm{bound}\ \mathrm{of}\ \delta\ \mathrm{in}\ \mathrm{this}\ \mathrm{case}\ \mathrm{is}\ \mathrm{better}\ \mathrm{than}\ \mathrm{th}\ \mathrm{upper}\ \mathrm{bound}\ \mathrm{of}\ \delta\ \mathrm{in}\ \mathrm{this}\ \mathrm{case}\ \mathrm{is}\ \mathrm{better}\ \mathrm{than}\ \mathrm{th}\ \mathrm{upper}\ \mathrm{bound}\ \mathrm{of}\ \delta\ \mathrm{in}\ \mathrm{this}\ \mathrm{case}\ \mathrm{is}\ \mathrm{better}\ \mathrm{than}\ \mathrm{th}\ \mathrm{upper}\ \mathrm{bound}\ \mathrm{of}\ \delta\ \mathrm{in}\ \mathrm{the}\ \mathrm{upper}\ \mathrm{bound}\ \mathrm{of}\ \delta\ \mathrm{in}\ \mathrm{in}$

Remark 1. The experimental results, as presented in Section 4, are better than the theoretical upper bound on δ in Theorem 1. This is because the practical runs of the LLL algorithm [7] tend to provide basis vectors that may be shorter than the estimated theoretical upper bound. Further, it may also provide one of the shortest vectors as the lattice dimension is quite small, i.e., 5. Thus, it may very well happen that we may cross the upper bound of δ in Theorem 1, i.e., $\frac{1-\alpha}{2}$ (considering $\epsilon \to 0$), during the experiments. Given this, one can use the approach described above to find $k_{p_1}k_{q_1}, k_{p_2}k_{q_2}$ from the knowledge of $k_{p_1} + k_{q_1}, k_{p_2} + k_{q_2}$. This works for a higher upper bound of δ (than in Theorem 1), i.e., $\frac{5}{8} - \frac{\alpha}{2}$ (considering $\frac{\gamma_3 + \gamma_4}{4} \to 0$).

2.2 Better cryptanalytic bound for small e

Let us now show that one can get a better bound than that of Theorem 1 for smaller values of e.

Theorem 2. Let N_1, N_2 be the public moduli of Dual CRT-RSA and $e = N^{\alpha}$, $d_p, d_q < N^{\delta}$. Then one can factor N_1, N_2 in poly(log N) time if $\delta < \frac{3-4\alpha}{5}$ given $\alpha + \delta > \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon'$, where $\epsilon' = \log_N(K')$, where $K' = \gcd(k_{p_1}k_{q_1}, k_{p_2}k_{q_2})$.

Proof. We have two identities:

 $e^{2}d_{p}d_{q} + e\left(d_{p}(k_{p_{1}}-1) + d_{q}(k_{q_{1}}-1)\right) + (1-k_{p_{1}}-k_{q_{1}}) = (N_{1}-1)k_{p_{1}}k_{q_{1}},$ $e^{2}d_{p}d_{q} + e\left(d_{p}(k_{p_{2}}-1) + d_{q}(k_{q_{2}}-1)\right) + (1-k_{p_{2}}-k_{q_{2}}) = (N_{2}-1)k_{p_{2}}k_{q_{2}}.$ From these we get,

 $e \ (d_q k_{p_1} + d_p k_{q_1} - d_q k_{p_2} - d_p k_{q_2}) + (-k_{p_1} - k_{q_1} + k_{p_2} + k_{q_2}) + (N_2 - 1)k_{p_2}k_{q_2} = (N_1 - 1)k_{p_1}k_{q_1}.$ Now consider the polynomial $f = ex + y + (N_2 - 1)z$. Clearly, $f(d_q k_{p_1} + d_p k_{q_1} - d_q k_{p_2} - d_p k_{q_2}, -k_{p_1} - k_{q_1} + k_{p_2} + k_{q_2}, k_{p_2}k_{q_2}) \equiv 0 \mod (N_1 - 1).$ Let $X = N^{\alpha + 2\delta - \frac{1}{2}}, Y = N^{\alpha + \delta - \frac{1}{2}}$ and $Z = N^{2\alpha + 2\delta - 1}.$ Then neglecting small constants, X, Y and Z will be upper bound of the modular root $(d_q k_{p_1} + d_p k_{q_1} - d_q k_{p_2} - d_p k_{q_2}, -k_{p_1} - k_{q_1} + k_{p_2} + k_{q_2}, k_{p_2}k_{q_2})$ of f. One can solve f_4 in poly(log N)

time if $XYZ < N_1 - 1$. Putting the values of X, Y, Z in $XYZ < N_1 - 1$, we get $\delta < \frac{3-4\alpha}{5}.$

As we have found $k_{p_2}k_{q_2}$ as the last component of the root of f, one can similarly find $k_{p_1}k_{q_1}$. After getting $k_{p_1}k_{q_1}$ and $k_{p_2}k_{q_2}$, one can factor N_1 and N_2 using the approach of [4, Section 7.5.2, Page 157] when $\alpha + \delta > \frac{1}{2} + \log_N K'$ where $K' = \gcd(k_{p_1}k_{q_1}, k_{p_2}k_{q_2}).$ П

Similar to our comment on ϵ in Theorem 1, we note that in general $\epsilon' \to 0$ and this is also confirmed experimentally. Thus in the following part of this paper we always consider that $\epsilon \to 0$ as well as $\epsilon' \to 0$.

While implementing the idea of Theorem 2, we use Gröbner basis technique to collect the root and in all the experiments we obtain polynomials of the form $y - \frac{-k_{p_1} - k_{q_1} + k_{p_2} + k_{q_2}}{k_{p_2} k_{q_2}} z$. Since in all the cases $gcd(-k_{p_1} - k_{q_1} + k_{p_2} + k_{q_2}, k_{p_2} k_{q_2})$ is very small, we can successfully collect $k_{p_2}k_{q_2}$. Similarly, we can successfully collect $k_{p_1}k_{q_1}$ as well.

From the Theorems 1, 2, we get the upper bound of δ as $\frac{1-\alpha}{2}$ and $\frac{3-4\alpha}{5}$ respectively. Now, $\frac{1-\alpha}{2} < \frac{3-4\alpha}{5}$ iff $\alpha < \frac{1}{3}$. Hence, Theorem 2 will be better than Theorem 1 for $\alpha < \frac{1}{3}$. Later in Section 4, we will discuss the comparison with respect to the experimental results.

$\mathbf{2.3}$ Comparison with Existing Results

Using continued fraction over $\frac{N_1-1}{N_2-1}$, in [4], it is proved that when $\delta < \frac{5}{8} - \alpha$, one can find $\frac{k_{p_2}k_{q_2}}{k_{p_1}k_{q_1}}$ in the lowest terms. Using the knowledge of $\frac{k_{p_2}k_{q_2}}{k_{p_1}k_{q_1}}$, in the lowest term, one can factor N_1, N_2 in polynomial time if $\alpha + \delta > \frac{1}{2} + \log_N(K')$, where $K' = \gcd(k_{p_2}k_{q_2}, k_{p_1}k_{q_1})$. Since in general K' will be of constant order, we can say one can factor N_1, N_2 using continued fraction approach if $\delta < \frac{5}{8} - \alpha$. In Theorem 1, upper bound of δ is $\frac{1-\alpha}{2}$. Thus when $\alpha > \frac{1}{4}$, our approach is better than the idea of [4]. The upper bound of δ in Theorem 2 is $\frac{3-4\alpha}{5}$. Hence, in this case, for $\alpha > \frac{1}{8}$, bound of δ in Theorem 2 is better than that of [4].

It is clear that the existing results on cryptanalysis of CRT-RSA will directly work on Dual CRT-RSA. Thus the region of interest is where the existing state-of-the-art cryptanalytic results on CRT-RSA cannot be used for Dual CRT-RSA.

In [1] (improved results of [8]), it is proved that when $\delta < \frac{2}{5}(1-\alpha)$, one can factor CRT-RSA modulus efficiently. Thus as long as $\alpha < 1$, our bound of δ in Theorem 1 is better than [1]. When $\alpha < \frac{1}{2}$, our bound of δ in Theorem 2 is better than of [1]. For full bit size of e, i.e., for $\alpha = 1$ both our ideas as well as that of [1] do not work successfully towards cryptanalysis of Dual CRT-RSA.

When $\delta < \frac{1}{2} - \frac{2}{3}\alpha$, it is proved in [3] that one can factor the CRT-RSA modulus efficiently. Our bound of δ in Theorem 1 is always better than that of [3]. Also for $\alpha < \frac{3}{4}$, our bound of δ in Theorem 2 is better than that of [3]. For $\alpha \geq \frac{3}{4}$, both our method of Theorem 2 and idea of [3] will not work.

CRT-RSA is proved to be weak in [6] in the cases when: (i) $\delta < \frac{5-4\alpha+20\tau-16\alpha\tau+18\tau^2-12\alpha\tau^2}{14+56\tau+66\tau^2+24\tau^3}$,

(i)
$$\delta < \frac{5-4\alpha+20\tau-10\alpha\tau+18\tau-12\alpha\tau}{14+56\tau+66\tau^2+24\tau^3}$$

(ii) $\delta < \frac{5-4\alpha+20\tau-16\alpha\tau+27\tau^2-30\alpha\tau^2+12\tau^3-24\alpha\tau^3}{14+56\tau+66\tau^2+24\tau^3}$, for some non-negative τ . The second bound works better than the first one for $\alpha < \frac{1}{2}$. Towards larger values of α , the first one provides better cryptanalytic bound. One can check [5, Table 5.1, Page 87] that for $\alpha \in [0.31, 0.8]$, the optimal value of τ is zero and in that case both the bounds on δ are same, which is $\frac{5-4\alpha}{14}$. For $\alpha \in [0.31, \frac{2}{3})$, our bound in Theorem 1 is better than that of [6] as $\frac{1-\alpha}{2} > \frac{5-4\alpha}{14}$. Our ideas in both Theorem 1

	Th	eory of [6]	Our upper bounds on δ			
α	optimal τ	upper bound of δ	Theorem 1	Theorem 2		
0.10	0	0.324	0.450	0.520		
0.15	0	0.314	0.425	0.480		
0.20	0	0.300	0.400	0.440		
0.25	0.382	0.287	0.375	0.400		
0.26	0.283	0.283	0.370	0.392		
0.27	0.203	0.280	0.365	0.384		
0.28	0.137	0.277	0.360	0.376		
0.29	0.081	0.274	0.355	0.368		
0.30	0.033	0.271	0.350	0.360		

Table 1. Numerical comparison of our theoretical results with those of [6].

and Theorem 2 are better than the approach of [6] in this range as explained in Table 1. For $\alpha < 0.31$, the optimal values of τ are not zero and hence we provide numerical results as in Table 1 for [6].



Fig. 1. New attack region is *EFGHE*.

In Figure 1, *IA*, *JB*, *KC* and *LD* represent the lines $\delta = \frac{5}{8} - \alpha$, $\delta = \frac{3-4\alpha}{5}$, $\delta = \frac{1-\alpha}{2}$, and $\delta = \frac{5-4\alpha}{14}$ which are relevant to the upper bounds of δ in [4], Theorem 2, Theorem 1 and [6] respectively. The area *EFGHE* shows the new region obtained from our result where Dual CRT-RSA is not secure. The line *KM*

represents $\alpha + \delta = \frac{1}{2}$. All the CRT-RSA keys (as well Dual CRT-RSA keys) must stay above this line as ed_p , ed_q are greater than $N^{\frac{1}{2}}$.

In summary, the earlier results have pointed out that the region DEIKMD is insecure. In this paper, we add the region EFGHE to it. Adding our result, Dual CRT-RSA is insecure in the region DFGHIKMD.

3 Attack on DGRR [11, Section III C]

Let n_B be the number of bits in the binary representation of an integer B. Also, in short, we write $n_N = n$. The key generation algorithm of Dual Generalized Rebalanced RSA [11] is as follows. The key generation algorithm of Dual CRT-

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\label{eq:spectrum} \fbox{\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|} \hline \mathbf{Input:} (n_e, n_d, n_k, n) \mbox{ such that } n_e < n/2 \mbox{ and } n_e + n_d = n/2 + n_k. \\ \mathbf{Output:} \mbox{ The public key } (e, N_1, N_2) \mbox{ and the private key } (d_p, d_q, p_1, q_1, p_2, q_2). \\ 1 \mbox{ Randomly select an } n_e \mbox{-bit integer } e \mbox{ and set } k = \lceil \frac{n/2 - n_e}{n_k} \rceil; \\ 2 \mbox{ Randomly select } (k-1) \ n_k \mbox{-bit integer } p_{a_1}, \dots, p_{a_{(k-1)}} \mbox{ and an even integer } p_{a_k} \mbox{ such that } p_a = p_{a_1} \dots p_{a_{(k-1)}} p_{a_k} \mbox{ has bit length } (n/2 - n_e) \mbox{ and gcd}(e, p_a) = 1; \\ 3 \mbox{ Randomly select an } n_k \mbox{-bit integer } k_{p_1} \mbox{ such that } gcd(e, k_{p_1}) = 1; \\ 4 \mbox{ Compute } d_p \mbox{ and } p_b \mbox{ such that } ed_p = (k_{p_1}p_a)p_b + 1, \mbox{ where } e < p_b < 2e \mbox{ and } k_{p_1}p_a < d_p < 2k_{p_1}p_a. \mbox{ If } p_1 = p_ap_b + 1 \mbox{ is not prime then go back to step 3; } \\ 5 \mbox{ If } (k_{p_1}p_ap_b/p_{a_i}) + 1 \mbox{ is prime for some } 1 \le i \le k - 1 \mbox{ then let } p_2 = (k_{p_1}p_ap_b/p_{a_i}) + 1. \\ 0 \mbox{ Otherwise, go back to step 3; } \\ 6 \mbox{ Randomly select } (k-1) \ n_k \mbox{-bit integer } q_{a_1}, \dots, q_{a_{(k-1)}} \mbox{ and even integer } q_{a_k} \mbox{ such that } q_a = q_{a_1} \dots q_{a_{(k-1)}}q_{a_k} \mbox{ has bit length } (n/2 - n_e) \mbox{ and gcd}(e, q_a) = 1; \\ 7 \mbox{ Randomly select } n_k \mbox{-bit integer } k_{q_1} \mbox{ such that } gcd(e, k_{q_1}) = 1; \\ 8 \mbox{ Compute } d_q \mbox{ and } q_b \mbox{ such that } ed_q = (k_{q_1}q_a)p_b + 1, \mbox{ where } e < q_b < 2e \mbox{ and } k_{q_1}q_a < d_q < 2k_{q_1}q_a. \mbox{ If } q_1 = q_aq_b + 1 \mbox{ is not prime then go back to step 7; } \\ 9 \mbox{ If } (k_{q_1}q_aq_b/q_{a_1}) + 1 \mbox{ is prime for some } 1 \le i \le k - 1 \mbox{ then let } q_2 = (k_{q_1}q_aq_b/q_{a_i}) + 1. \\ 0 \mbox{ Otherwise, go back to step 7; } \\ 10 \mbox{ Calculate } N_1 = p_1q_1 \mbox{ and } N_2 = p_2q_2; \\ \end{cases}
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Algorithm 1: Key Generation Algorithm for DGRR [11].

RSA is not known for any range of values of $e, d_p.d_q$. Further, for any such choice of keys, it may not be possible to obtain N_1, N_2 . The above algorithm for Dual CRT-RSA key generation provides keys in a certain range.

From the key generation algorithm 1, we have the following simple result.

Lemma 1. Let $e = N^{\alpha}$ and $d_p, d_q \approx N^{\delta}$ be the public and private exponents generated by the Algorithm 1. Then, $\delta < 1 - 2\alpha$.

Proof. From the Step 1 in the key generation Algorithm 1, we have $n_k < \frac{n}{2} - n_e$. Also from the fact that $n_e + n_d = \frac{n}{2} + n_k$, we get $n_e + n_d < \frac{n}{2} + \frac{n}{2} - n_e$. Hence, we obtain $n_d < n - 2n_e$. As $n_e = \alpha n$ and $n_d = \delta n$, we get the desired upper bound on δ .

As presented in [11, Table IV], the safe parameters for DGRR is as follows: $-n_k > \frac{n}{8} + \frac{l}{2} - 1$, where *l* is the exhaustive search parameter;

- $\begin{array}{l} -n_e+n_d>\frac{5n}{8}+\frac{l}{2}-1; \mbox{ this implies } \alpha+\delta>\frac{5}{8}, \mbox{ neglecting } l;\\ -5n_d+2n_e>2n+l; \mbox{ this implies } 5\delta+2\alpha>2, \mbox{ neglecting } l. \end{array}$

Thus the parameters proposed in [11] for which DGRR is secure is

$$\alpha < \frac{3}{8} \text{ and } \alpha + \delta > \frac{5}{8}.$$
 (7)

The constraint $\alpha < \frac{3}{8}$ follows from $n_e < \frac{n}{2} - n_k$ and $n_k > \frac{n}{8}$. We neglect the exhaustive search parameter l and the small constants.

Next we show that DGRR is weak for $\alpha > \frac{1}{3}$ when one uses Algorithm 1 and thus DGRR is weak even when the safe parameters are chosen as in (7).

Theorem 3. Given the safe parameters in (7), the key generation Algorithm 1 for DGRR is insecure when

 $\begin{array}{l} - (using \ Theorem \ 1) \ (i) \ \frac{1}{3} < \alpha < \frac{3}{8}, \ (ii) \ \frac{1}{4} < \alpha \leq \frac{1}{3} \ and \ \delta < \frac{1-\alpha}{2}; \\ - (using \ Theorem \ 2) \ (i) \ \frac{1}{3} < \alpha < \frac{3}{8}, \ (ii) \ \frac{1}{8} < \alpha \leq \frac{1}{3} \ and \ \delta < \frac{3-4\alpha}{5}. \end{array}$

Proof. From Lemma 1, we know that the key generation Algorithm 1 provides DGRR keys under the constraint $\delta < 1 - 2\alpha$.

Using Theorem 1, one can factor N_1, N_2 efficiently if $\delta < \frac{1-\alpha}{2}$. Hence, when $1 - 2\alpha < \frac{1-\alpha}{2}$, i.e., when $\alpha > \frac{1}{3}$, one can break DGRR generated by the Algorithm 1. Hence given the safe parameters in (7), the key generation Algorithm 1 for DGRR is insecure when $\frac{1}{3} < \alpha < \frac{3}{8}$. Also (7) requires $\delta > \frac{5}{8} - \alpha$ and from Theorem 1, we need $\delta < \frac{1-\alpha}{2}$, which gives $\alpha > \frac{1}{4}$. Using Theorem 2, one can factor N_1, N_2 efficiently if $\delta < \frac{3-4\alpha}{5}$. Hence, when

 $1-2\alpha < \frac{3-4\alpha}{5}$, i.e., $\alpha > \frac{1}{3}$, one can break DGRR generated by the Algorithm 1. This gives proof of item (i). Further (7) requires $\delta > \frac{5}{8} - \alpha$ and from Theorem 2, we need $\delta < \frac{3-4\alpha}{5}$. So, we need $\frac{5}{8} - \alpha < \frac{3-4\alpha}{5}$, which gives $\alpha > \frac{1}{8}$.

For DGRR, keys can be generated within $\triangle IAB$ in Figure 2. The shaded area represents the new region for which DGRR is weak. In Figure 2, IA, AB, DH, CG and CI represent the lines $\delta = \frac{1}{2} - \alpha$, $\delta = 1 - 2\alpha$, $\delta = \frac{5}{8} - \alpha$, $\delta = \frac{3 - 4\alpha}{5}$ and $\delta = \frac{1 - \alpha}{2}$ respectively. Theoretically, $\triangle C\bar{D}E$ represents our new attack region. Moreover, the experimental results show that even some regions outside $\triangle CDE$ can be vulnerable in practice and C'CDEC' is the extended region where DGRR is vulnerable. This is explained in more details in the following section. According to the analysis of [11], the region, where DGRR was known to be weak, has been HDAIH.

Experimental Results 4

Let us now present the experimental results. We have implemented the programs in SAGE 3.1.1 over Linux Ubuntu 8.04 on a Compag laptop with Dual CORE Intel(R) Pentium(R) D CPU 1.83 GHz, 2 GB RAM and 2 MB Cache.

Since our polynomial f_4 in Theorem 1 is a linear polynomial on 5 variables, the lattice dimension in our approach is only 5. Also, the polynomial f in Theorem 2 is a linear polynomial on 3 variables and hence the lattice dimension in this approach is 3.

34

We have implemented the idea of continued fraction (CF) of [4]. Its experimental results are almost same as its theoretical bounds. We have also implemented the approach of [6] and in some cases its experimental results are better than the theoretical bound of itself.



Fig. 2. Attack regions: $\triangle CDE$ (theoretical), C'CDEC' (experimental).

In all cases we take 1000-bit N_1, N_2 . For the experiments, the Dual CRT-RSA keys are generated using Algorithm 1 [11], and we note that g, g_1, g_2 and K' are always very small. This justifies considering $\epsilon \to 0$ and $\epsilon' \to 0$. Let us consider the experiments corresponding to the idea of Theorem 2. When $\alpha \leq 0.1$, after lattice reduction, the coefficient of y in the first polynomial is equal to $\frac{k_{p_2}k_{q_2}}{\gcd(k_{p_1}k_{q_1},k_{p_2}k_{q_2})}$. Since $\gcd(k_{p_1}k_{q_1},k_{p_2}k_{q_2})$ is small, one can easily obtain $k_{p_2}k_{q_2}$. In these cases corresponding to Theorem 2, we get better experimental results than the theoretical bound.

From Lemma 1, it is clear that for $\alpha = 0.315$, the maximum possible bits of d_p, d_q is 369 ($\delta < 1 - 2\alpha = 0.370$) for 1000-bit N. From table 2, one may note that in such a situation it is possible to factor N_1, N_2 . Thus, although we have proved in Theorem 3 that DGRR is weak for $\alpha > \frac{1}{3}$, in practice DGRR becomes insecure when $\alpha > 0.315$.

DGRR Parameters		Upper bound δ when DGRR is not secure						
α	$1 - 2\alpha$ (upper	Result of [4]	Result of [6]		Theorem 1 (our)		Theorem 2 (our)	
	bound of δ)	Theory/Expt.	Theory	Expt.	Theory	Expt.	Theory	Expt.
0.100	0.800	0.525	0.324	0.430	0.450	0.489	0.520	0.525
0.150	0.700	0.475	0.314	0.400	0.425	0.477	0.480	0.478
0.200	0.600	0.425	0.300	0.370	0.400	0.445	0.440	0.436
0.250	0.500	0.375	0.286	0.333	0.375	0.410	0.400	0.398
0.300	0.400	0.325	0.271	0.300	0.350	0.376	0.360	0.358
0.315	0.370	0.310	0.267	0.285	0.342	0.369	0.348	0.347
0.350	0.300	0.275	0.257	0.260	0.325	0.299 *	0.320	0.299 *

Table 2. Comparison our theoretical and experimental results with the existing works. Lattice Dimension in experiment of [6] is 36. In our case, it is 5 for Theorem 1 and 3 for Theorem 2. For the * marked entries, we could not generate larger d_p , d_q as we do not have any other method other than DGRR to generate the Dual CRT-RSA keys.

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