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Oussema Dabbebi, Rémi Badonnel, Olivier Festor

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Managing Risks at Runtime in VoIP Networks and Services

O. Dabbebi and R. Badonnel and O. Festor

INRIA Nancy Grand Est - LORIA
Campus Scientifique - BP 239
Technopôle de Nancy Brabois
54506 Vandœuvre-lès-Nancy, France

Abstract. IP telephony is less confined than traditional PSTN telephony. As a consequence, it is more exposed to security attacks. These attacks are specific to VoIP protocols such as SPIT, or are inherited from the IP layer such as SYN flooding. Protection mechanisms are often available, but they may seriously impact on the quality of service of such critical environments. We propose to exploit and automate risk management methods and techniques for VoIP infrastructures. Our objective is to dynamically adapt the exposure of a VoIP network with regard to the attack potentiality while minimizing the impact for the service. This paper describes the challenges of risk management for VoIP, our runtime strategy for assessing and treating risks, preliminary results and future work.

1 Introduction and challenges

Voice over IP (VoIP) defines a new paradigm for telephony services. It permits to transmit telephony communications directly over IP networks at low cost and with a higher flexibility than traditional PSTN¹ telephony. It relies on a network infrastructure composed of VoIP phones, IPBX servers for establishing and managing call sessions, and VoIP gateways to interconnect with the PSTN. It exploits dedicated protocols including signalling protocols such as SIP² and H.323, and transport protocols such as RTP and RTCP. However, VoIP communications are less confined and then more exposed to security attacks. They are concerned by security attacks coming from the IP layer such as flooding attacks, and also by VoIP-specific attacks such as SPIT³ [1]. Moreover, existing security mechanisms may significantly deteriorate the quality and usability of such sensitive services. Typically, the application of encryption, filtering and authentication techniques may seriously increase the VoIP communication delays and loads.

Risk management provides new opportunities for dealing with these security issues in VoIP networks and services. It can be defined as a process which

¹ Public Switch Telephony Network

² Session Initiation Protocol

³ Spam Over IP Telephony

consists in assessing risks and treating them, i.e. taking steps in order to minimize them to an acceptable level [2]. Existing work related to risk assessment in VoIP infrastructures includes (1) approaches for assessing threats (defender viewpoint) such as honeypot architectures and intrusion detection systems based on signatures, or anomalies [3, 4], and (2) approaches for assessing vulnerabilities (attacker side) such as fuzzing-based discovery and auditing/benchmarking tools [5]. Risk models supporting the assessment activity may be qualitative (based on linguistic scales), quantitative (based on probabilities) or mixed (based on aggregations of qualitative parameters) [6]. Existing work on risk treatments permit to eliminate them (risk avoidance) by applying best practices, to reduce and mitigate them (risk optimization) by deploying protection and prevention systems [7], to ensure against them (risk transfert) by subscribing an insurance contract or to accept them (risk retention, when using a peer-to-peer VoIP service) [8].

When we look further at the approaches proposed for VoIP networks and services, we can clearly observe that most of them do not really address risk management. They usually do not integrate any risk model, or at least explicitly, and they often only focus on one activity of the risk management process. There is a serious need for applying risk management in these environments in order to protect them while maintaining their quality of service.

2 Runtime risk management for VoIP

We therefore propose to investigate risk management methods and techniques for VoIP infrastructures. In particular, we are interested in automating risk management at runtime: the objective is to dynamically adapt the exposure of the VoIP network and its equipments with respect to the potentiality of a given attack. This automation aims at reinforcing the coupling between the risk assessment phasis and the risk treatment phasis. The exposure is continuously controlled based on the activation and the deactivation of countermeasures (also called safeguards). A countermeasure permits to reduce the execution of a security attack, but it may also deteriorate the service by introducing additional delays or reducing the access to some specific features. In that context, we have extended the rheostat runtime risk model [9]. Let consider a security attack noted $a \in A$ with A the set of potential VoIP attacks.

$$\mathcal{R} = \sum_{a \in A} P(a) \times E(a) \times C(a), \quad (1)$$

Risk is typically defined as the combination of the potentiality of the related threat $P(a)$, the exposure of the VoIP infrastructure $E(a)$ and the consequence $C(a)$ on the infrastructure if the attack succeed (see Equation 1). Rheostat exploits a risk reduction algorithm and risk relaxation algorithm. The risk reduction algorithm permits to reduce the risk level when the potentiality $P(a)$ of threat is high, by activating security safeguards (such as passwords and turing

tests). This activation reduces the exposure $E(a)$ of the infrastructure, and then decreases the risk level to an acceptable value. The risk relaxation algorithm permits to minimize the impact on the infrastructure by deactivating security safeguards when the risk level is low. We have already evaluated this risk model and specified several safeguards for specific VoIP attacks in [10]. We are generalizing this work to multiple VoIP security attacks.




Fig. 1. Runtime risk management for VoIP environments

We have also specified a functional architecture for supporting runtime risk management in these environments, as depicted on Figure 1. This architecture is composed of an intrusion detection system responsible for detecting threats in the VoIP platform, a risk manager for managing risks and selecting security safeguards with respect to a given context, and a configuration server for dynamically activating or deactivating the security safeguards. We are determining several strategies to deploy this architecture on a VoIP infrastructure.

3 Preliminary results

We have developed a first implementation of the risk manager component and evaluated its behaviour based on a set of experiments. We have focused on SPIT attacks during these experiments and have considered two main scenarios: a first one corresponding to the case when the threat potentiality increases over time (risk reduction algorithm), and a second one corresponding to the case when the potentiality decreases (risk relaxation algorithm). We have shown the capability of the risk manager to reduce risks and to minimize costs due to safeguards with respect to the probability of VoIP attacks. We have also shown the benefits and limits of our approach in comparison with traditional strategies. Our runtime solution permits to mitigate the risk level (benefit of up to 41%) and to maintain the continuity of the VoIP service in an dynamic manner. The benefits are limited in the case of instantaneous VoIP attacks. We are performing additional and complementary experiments of this strategy based on Monte-Carlo simulations.

4 Conclusions and perspectives

Telephony over IP has known a large-scale deployment but VoIP communications are exposed to multiple security attacks as they are less confined than in traditional telephony. Security mechanisms are required for protecting communications, but their application may seriously deteriorate the performances of such a critical service: a VoIP communication is considered as incomprehensible as soon as the delay is more than 150 ms, or the packet loss is more than 5%. In that context, we propose to exploit and automate risk management methods and techniques in VoIP infrastructures at runtime. Our aim is to dynamically adapt the exposure of the VoIP network based on a set of security safeguards in order to provide a graduated and progressive answer to risks. We have exploited the rheostat risk management model for dealing with risks in VoIP environments. We have also specified a functional architecture for this approach and evaluated the case scenario of SPIT attacks. We are extending this approach to multiple VoIP attacks are evaluating the performance impact of risk model parameters based on Monte-Carlo simulations. For future work we are planning to evaluate several configurations for deploying our functional architecture, and will investigate return-on-experience mechanisms for dynamically configuring and refining the risk model parameters.

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