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## ► To cite this version:

Abdelkader Lahmadi, Olivier Festor. SecSip: A Stateful Firewall for SIP-based Networks. 11th IFIP/IEEE International Symposium on Integrated Network Management - IM 2009, May 2009, Long Island, United States. inria-00404853

**HAL Id: inria-00404853**

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Submitted on 17 Jul 2009

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# SecSip: A Stateful Firewall for SIP-based Networks

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**Abstract**—SIP-based networks are becoming the de-facto standard for voice, video and instant messaging services. Being exposed to many threats while playing an major role in the operation of essential services, the need for dedicated security management approaches is rapidly increasing. In this paper we present an original security management approach based on a specific vulnerability aware SIP stateful firewall. Through known attack descriptions, we illustrate the power of the configuration language of the firewall which uses the capability to specify stateful objects that track data from multiple SIP elements within their lifetime. We demonstrate through measurements on a real implementation of the firewall its efficiency and performance.

**Index Terms**—SIP, VoIP, Security, Firewall

## I. INTRODUCTION

The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [1] has established itself among the most important Internet protocols. It is designed to establish, modify, and terminate a session of application services. SIP is currently used in many popular services such as Voice over IP (VoIP), Instant Message (IM), Presence Service and even File Transfer. In the near future, it is expected that SIP will play an essential role in the next-generation telephony networks. Traditional telephony based on PSTN networks was well secured, since it is based on close environments, where calls are carried by dedicated lines and managed by operator-owned devices. To carry calls, SIP-based service architectures use the Internet and expose themselves to all kinds of attacks ranging from Distributed Denial of Service to toll-fraud, vishing or eavesdropping [2].

Offering an efficient security management framework for SIP infrastructures is becoming a challenge to the success and the wide deployment of VoIP services. We believe that one essential building block of such a security management framework is a dedicated SIP firewall. It must be dedicated because the use of generic IP-based firewalls are inefficient to address and mitigate most attacks against SIP services. IP-level firewalls actually have two major drawbacks :

- they do not address the SIP protocol semantics. The SIP protocol messages are text based, and the various fields of a message are exploited to carry out different kinds of attacks. For example, an attacker can easily employ the SIP BYE request to tear down a session, without any violation of an IP level firewall rule.
- they do not allow to consider per device specific vulnerabilities. Different devices have different vulnerabilities. Being able to protect them in an efficient way requires both the knowledge of the devices and a precise specification of the specific vulnerabilities. This is not provided by IP level firewalls.

To remedy these shortcomings, we have designed and implemented a SIP defense system that does support an in-depth message analysis together with a SIP protocol state tracking function. It is also required that the designed SIP defense system satisfies the following properties: it must be fast, accurate, induce low overhead and be safe. Our approach to this problem is an application level firewall implemented as a “bump in the wire” device: it intercepts SIP messages, evaluates their safety before forwarding them to their destinations. If the message or the transaction to which a message belongs is unsafe, our system SecSip blocks it, thus protecting the device from the threat.

Our approach to protect SIP networks from diverse vulnerabilities is depicted in Figure I. The fuzzing module allows the discovering of per device SIP vulnerabilities in the network. It then updates the vulnerability knowledge base that shares with the firewall named SecSip. In a second stage, SecSip translates this vulnerability into defense rules to protect devices from the threat.

The SecSip environment combines two key techniques. First, it uses a rule-based engine to execute rules that model SIP vulnerabilities. These rules are executed against SIP protocol messages, transactions and dialogs. Second, it monitors the SIP protocol to enable stateful semantic tracking through stateful objects claimed by vulnerabilities defense rules. Hence, rules that model SIP vulnerabilities are based on both protocol behaviour and attack signatures.

The system can operate either as a service deployed in the network infrastructure or as a client-side protection tool. While each has its merits as we will explain later, we focus in this paper on the network service deployment model on which performance is a key issue.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II gives an overview on SIP vulnerabilities as well as on achievements in the area of firewalls and the associated specification languages. Then, we discuss the design space of a SIP defense system in section III. The SecSip runtime and language are described in section IV. Their evaluation is performed in section V. Finally, we conclude on the contribution and outline some future work in section VI.

## II. RELATED WORK

### A. SIP exploits and vulnerabilities

VoIP networks are subject to many types of attacks. A rich set of existing work [3], [4], [5], [6] has addressed SIP vulnerabilities and exploits to examine how they can be efficiently used to compromise the reliability and trustworthiness




Fig. 1. Overall approach combining the SecSip firewall and fuzzing tools.

of SIP-based VoIP systems. In [3], authors focus on billing attacks. The SIP protocol is also exposed to traditional DoS attacks [7] like network bandwidth and OS/firmware attacks to exhaust available resources. Furthermore, SIP comes with its own specific DoS attacks. These attacks are illustrated in [5] where the author presents stateful solutions based on finite-state machines for SIP transactions to detect them. These two contributions, have mainly illustrated SIP exploits rather than the specification of the vulnerability that allows such attacks. In [6], authors enumerate SIP attacks and identify the vulnerabilities that causes them. The lack of authentication is for example, the major cause of signalling attacks like BYE, CANCEL and Re-INVITE.

### B. Application Level Firewalls and their language

There is a lot of literature on application level firewalls and intrusion detection systems [8], [9], [10] devoted to common protocols like HTTP, SMTP, etc. The SecSip language is inspired by the ModSecurity [8] approach which allows HTTP traffic monitoring and filtering, with real-time intrusion detection. Snort and Hogwash [9] are other intrusion detection systems that target mainly the network level. They recently started to support some SIP exploits such as INVITE flooding attacks in a very limited way.

VoIP firewalls and more specifically those addressing the defense of the SIP protocol, are still in early stages and there is only limited work published [11], [12], [13], [5]. The authors of [12] propose a solution for stateful intrusion detection called *SCIDIVE*. The system relies on a stateful engine that determines the current state from multiple packets involved in the same session. The system also uses cross-protocol detection to verify the consistency between two protocols involved in the same VoIP session, mainly SIP and RTP. The goal of their work are similar to SecSip and shares the stateful feature.

VoIP defender [11] is a SIP-based security architecture designed to monitor, detect, analyse and counter attack. The nature of the employed detection scheme (stateful or stateless) is not clearly defined in the publication. In addition, no details

are provided in about the language used to build defense rules and how it can be used for SIP.

Our work is complementary to existing SIP vulnerability and exploit discovery tools. SecSIP uses the output from vulnerability discovery systems like KIF [14] to close the defense loop by enforcing security policies against attacks exploiting these vulnerabilities. We also take profit from existing intensive literature dedicated to application level firewalls, to instantiate the system.

### III. SIP DEFENSE DESIGN SPACE

The SIP protocol is transaction-based. Each transaction consists of a request that invokes a particular method, or function, on the server and at least one response [1]. Attackers usually use malformed SIP messages within a transaction to compromise a SIP entity. They also employ legitimate messages to attack a SIP infrastructure (e.g. redirect calls, end a session, cancel invitation and update session parameters). Therefore, a SIP defense system must be able to defend a SIP infrastructure against both malicious (but legitimate) transactions and malformed messages.

The underlying approaches we do consider fall into two categories: proactive and reactive. Proactive defense prevents malicious transactions and malformed packets from reaching the intended victim. A common proactive approach to identify malicious behaviour is to record interacting SIP states, objects and messages. In this case, the approach is stateful. A proactive approach may operate anywhere in the network perimeter. However, if located at the victim side such an approach becomes useless, since a denial of service attack damage still occurs while the defense system tries to prevent it. A reactive defense approach generates an inoculation in response to an attack. This response will protect SIP devices. An example of such inoculation is to deploy patches to eliminate a bug exploited by the attacker. There are many additional examples of reactive defense approaches including intrusion prevention systems, statistical analysis, attack signatures, reactive address blacklisting, etc. These solutions attempt to recognise post-attacks and take a counter-measure later.

The effectiveness of each approach depends on the type of attack. A proactive approach is suitable to cover compromise attacks like toll fraud, unwanted calls and messages, ...[6]. This type of attack needs very few SIP messages to cause damage. The proactive approach needs to identify malicious SIP objects and prevent them from reaching the victim. The defense strategy can be exercised either in the network perimeter or at the victims' location. Denial of service attacks keep the victim unaffected if applied at the network level rather than on end-systems.

The design space of SIP defense solutions is summarised in Table I. We observe that a proactive SIP defense in network is more efficient than others, but also more challenging to build. It needs high assumptions about safety and complexity. However it is more efficient to protect SIP-based networks.

#### IV. ARCHITECTURE AND COMPONENTS

Our approach to defend SIP-based networks relies on the insertion of a proactive point of defense between a SIP-based network of devices (servers, proxies, user agents) and the open Internet. Therefore, all SIP traffic is inspected and analysed before it is forwarded to these devices. Figure 2 depicts the proposed SecSip architecture that integrates four major components: Input/Output Layer, Stateful Inspection Layer, SIP Packet Handler and Rule Compiler and Optimizer.




Fig. 2. Overview of SecSip architecture.

Each component is described in details in the following sections.

*a) Input/Output Layer:* The input and output features provide the service able to capture, inject, send and receive SIP packets from and to the network. They are configured according to the deployment mode of the firewall. In an in-line mode, the capture feature is active on the incoming interface (from the Internet). If the packet is safe, the firewall, will inject it, using raw sockets, on the SIP network while keeping the same source and destination addresses. Features to accept TCP connections and UDP traffic for further deployment modes is also supported.

*b) SIP Packet Handler:* Intercepted packets are moved to the SIP Packet parser module. The main function of this module is to extract different fields within a SIP message. Each field within a SIP message is the composition of a key that represents the field name as defined by the SIP BNF [1] and its respective value. While parsing a sip message, the parser builds a data tree that represents the SIP packet. Each node of the parse tree represents a SIP field defined by a numerical identifier. The parse tree node also contains useful information about the field such as type, length, starting and ending offsets within the SIP packet, ... This information is used later by the stateful inspection layer to check the various SIP fields.

*c) Rules Compiler and Optimizer:* The core of the SecSip firewall is its rule engine. It has the critical task to process defense rules against SIP messages and transactions. When initializing, the rule engine starts loading and parsing rules to identify different targets, operations and actions within each rule. Each rule is transformed into a specification. A specification is a data structure that holds the names and values of each object of the rule. Then, rule specifications are compiled to identify the targeted fields from the parse tree, the pre-registered operations and actions.

During rule parsing, the engine creates stateful objects to store SIP dialogs related data. Each defined rule set is attached to a SIP transaction state machine type as specified in [1]. The rules engine is thus able to store defense rules according to their transaction state machine types. It uses a hash table to store rules where each entry is defined by the rule's transaction type. After being stored, an optimization component traverses the rules hash table and starts scheduling their execution. This component specifies how rules will be executed when a SIP message arrives to the firewall. Rules are ordered in a scheduling list according to their referenced objects. At the top of the list are the rules that declare objects and acts on their values. At the bottom of the list are rules that have many matches and have disruptive actions on a SIP message. In the example depicted in Figure 3, we have two SecSip rules. The first rule declares and updates a counter that counts the number of received INVITE messages. The values 10 and 60 denote that we need to decrease the counter value by 10 each 60 seconds. The second rule will drop SIP messages when the counter is greater than 80.

Even, if the rules are reversed in the configuration files and the administrator writes R2 before R1. The SecSip optimization component will schedule R1 followed by R2 in its scheduling list since R2 references the variable rate that is declared and updated by R1.

*d) Stateful Inspection Layer:* The inspection layer executes the appropriate rules on each received SIP packet without any buffering, even if the SIP message is incomplete.

Figure 4 shows how a SIP message traverses the SecSip runtime and gets analyzed. First a SIP message is captured from the network interface by the IO layer and delivered to the parsing module. Then, the packet is parsed according the pre-registered fields of the SIP parse tree that follows the SIP format specification. These parsed fields will fill the parse tree

TABLE I  
DESIGN SPACE OF SIP DEFENSE SOLUTIONS.

Attack type	Defense approach			Criteria
	Proactive at SIP device	Proactive in SIP network	Reactive in SIP network	
Compromise attacks	High High Low	High High High	Not useful	Assumptions Effectiveness Complexity
Deny of service attacks	Not useful	High High High	Medium Medium Medium	Assumptions Effectiveness Complexity
Examples	Firewalls	Firewall, NAT	IDS	

R1: secsip "FIELDS:sip.method" ""INVITE" declare:rate=counter[10;60]  
R2: secsip rate "@eq 80" drop

Fig. 3. A sample of SecSip rules

and synchronize the stateful objects defined by the SecSip defense rules. SecSip stateful objects are stored to a certain type of container specified in a specific rule. The SecSip language provides three types of containers: set, list and bag. A set is an unordered collection of objects without repeated values. A list is an ordered collection of objects. A variation of a set is the bag. It allows repeated values and multiple objects. The different containers referenced by stateful objects are stored within a hash table. Where each container has a key that is a SIP dialog identifier defined by the triple (Call ID, To Tag, From Tag). Based on the current state of the SIP session and the direction of the packet, the corresponding matching set of rules is invoked to be processed. Rule processing will take considered actions that may lead to a decision of forwarding the packet to its destination or to drop it.




Fig. 4. SIP message traversal through SecSip runtime.

#### A. The SecSip language

The main feature of the stateful firewall is its language designed to model SIP vulnerabilities. We here define a SIP vulnerability as a flaw in one of its objects where execution may go wrong and violate the intended semantics of the SIP protocol (i.e., the protocol state machine and message formats).

Object scope	Lifetime	Type
message-object	message	stateless
transaction-object	transaction	stateful
session-object	session	stateful

TABLE II  
THE LIFETIME AND SCOPES OF SEC SIP LANGUAGE OBJECTS

This leads to the following definitions :

*Definition 1:*  $S$  is the set of all possible object states in a SIP interaction.

*Definition 2:* A SIP vulnerability is a tuple  $v = (f, P)$ , where  $f$  is a state transition function that defines post-conditions, and  $P \subseteq S$  is a set of SIP objects states satisfying pre-conditions.

A vulnerability contains a set  $P \subseteq S$ , where  $P$  defines the required SIP object state for the vulnerability to exist, also known as pre-condition. The post-condition function  $f$  expresses a transition from one SIP object state to another.

*Definition 3:* A SecSip rule is modeled as a tuple  $i = (v, S', A)$ , where  $v$  is a vulnerability,  $S'$  is a SIP state defined by  $S' = f_v(P_v)$  and  $f_v$  is the vulnerability function associated to  $v$ .

In this setting if  $S'$  is detected by the post-condition function  $f_v$ , the SecSip runtime triggers the set of actions  $A$ , before enabling  $f_v$  to occur on the real network.

A SIP object contains properties that describe network entities and logical relationships. Logical relationship describes communication and trust patterns between SIP network entities. We identify three types of entities for which SIP objects are necessary : messages and their fields, transactions and dialogs. In the SecSip defense language, a user-defined SIP object follows the dot notation. It's syntax form is as follows: *Object::= ObjectIdentifier [\*(' ObjectIdentifier)]*

A user-define SIP object describes the SIP protocol properties over its lifetime. In the SecSip language, we define several kinds of SIP objects with different lifetimes and scopes. Table II summarizes the SIP objects defined by the SecSip language. These objects are employed by the user-defined rules to detect SIP vulnerabilities.

Stateful objects are defined using the *hold* instruction. A stateful object has predefined properties when it is created.

The objects related to a SIP message track the values of its fields. These objects are stateless since they are re-initialized with each message. By default the SecSip runtime provides a set of stateless objects mapped to the parsed fields of a SIP message. These objects are defined by the *FIELDS* or *BODY* identifiers mapped to the header or the body parts of a SIP message. The identifier is followed by the name of the object that follows a dot notation. For example, to access the *From* specific field of a SIP message, we use: *FIELDS : sip.from*.

Transaction related objects are used to record data across the lifetime of a transaction, spanning a request and multiple responses. Within the SecSip runtime, a transaction is identified by the combination of the *BranchID* and the *CSeq* command value.

A dialog is defined by the *Call-ID* together with the *From IP* and *To IP*. It spans multiple transactions. Objects related to a dialog are stateful and provide data across the lifetime of the dialog. For example, to initialize a stateful object that tracks the values of the *From* field in all messages within a dialog, we use the following:

```
hold:FROM_LIST=set[MESSAGE_HEADERS:sip.from]
```

In the above example, the statement defines a stateful object *FROM\_LIST* that holds the values of the stateless object *sip.from* from the message-object *FIELDS* over all messages within a dialog. We note, that *FROM\_LIST* is a user defined object that will hold stateful data. However, the *FIELDS:sip.from* is a predefined object in the SecSip language.

To illustrate the ease of use of the SecSip language, we present two real attacks against SIP protocol on which we will illustrate the defense specification.

e) *DoS attacks detection*: A well known example of DoS attack against the SIP protocol is the BYE-attack [6]. In this scenario, the aim of the attacker is to teardown a VoIP session between two UAs. To this end, it sends a faked BYE message to one UA on behalf of the other UA. When the targeted UA receives the fake BYE message, it prematurely tears down the established call assuming that is requested by the partner UA. This attack is illustrated in Figure 5.

The detection of this attack, needs to track stateful objects within a SIP session<sup>1</sup>. In this scenario, we start with recording the values of the *From* field used by SIP messages within a session in the user defined stateful object *from\_list*. We also track the IP addresses in the messages and record them under the main stateful object *from\_list* with a child object *ip\_addr*. The two stateful objects have a list as container since we need to track all values. In the SecSip language, the different objects are expressed by the rules depicted in the Figure 6.

When a request of type BYE is seen by SecSip, its *From* field is checked against the data store object *from\_list*. If

<sup>1</sup>i.e. a sequence of multiple SIP messages exchanged between two or more SIP entities.




Fig. 5. Illustration of the BYE attack.

its value is not in the list then the message is dropped by the SecSip runtime. The set of rules that detects this attack is depicted in Figure 7.

f) *INVITE request flooding attack detection*: Another type of DoS attack, used to illustrate the SecSip language, is the flooding attack that targets either SIP phones or proxies and servers. The objective of the attack is to exhaust resources (CPU, memory, bandwidth) of the targeted device by generating multiple calls within a short duration of time.

In [5], the author proposes a method based on thresholds to detect this kind of attacks. He considers that an upper bound on the number of allowed transactions per node should be defined and enforced to defend SIP devices from flooding attacks. This defense strategy can be easily specified in and enforced by our framework as depicted in Figure 8.

The illustrated rule set tracks INVITE attempts within each monitored transaction expressed by the *TR* object and its *count* sub-object. In the first rule, we declare the stateful object that will hold transactions identified by the branch parameter from the *Via* field. The second rule declares a counter and updates it every time an Invite message is seen. If the screened traffic crosses the threshold of more than 15 attempts in 1 minute, SecSip will drop subsequent transactions.

## V. FRAMEWORK EVALUATION

When we designed and built the SecSip runtime, we had several goals, the most important one being efficiency in terms of both safety and performance.

### A. SecSip safety

Since SecSip is designed to ensure SIP devices security in an adversarial environment, it is imperative that it does not introduces new source of failure and vulnerabilities. Given the fact that we implemented the environment in C, we employed several techniques to make it safe. They are listed below.

1) *Buffering optimization*: The stateful nature of SecSip, exposes it to state-holding attacks [15]. Such attacks may occur when buffering data from parsed SIP message. To prevent the environment from such attacks, each stateful object used

```
SecSip hold:from_list=list[FIELDS:sip.from]
SecSip hold:from_list.ip_addr=list[FIELDS:sip.from.addr]
```

Fig. 6. Declaration of stateful objects to track the *From* field values and their respective source IP addresses.

```
SecSip "FIELDS:sip.method" "!^BYE$" hold:from_list=set[FIELDS:sip.from]
SecSipRule "FIELDS:sip.method" "^BYE$" && "FIELDS:sip.from" "!@in from_list" drop
```

Fig. 7. SecSip rules to detect the BYE attack and drop the malicious message.

```
SecSipaction hold:tr=set[FIELDS:sip.via.branch]
SecSip FIELDS:sip.method "^INVITE$" declare:tr.count=counter[10;60]
SecSip tr.count "@gt 15" drop
```

Fig. 8. SecSip rules to detect a flooding attack INVITE transactions and drop the malicious messages.

by SecSip rules is hold within a timed container that when expired, removes the object and blocks further traffic on the object. The lifetime of the container is adjusted according the scope of the object (message, transaction or session). Furthermore, each buffered data is normalized to a maximum size specified by the user from SecSip rules. For example, the following SecSip rule normalizes a buffered SIP URI object to a maximum size of 1024 bytes. Parsers do strictly limit the length of data at runtime to avoid buffer overflows.

```
SecSip FIELDS:sip.uri "@normalize 1024"
```

2) *SIP parser optimization*: In the SecSip runtime, we employed a lazy parser to optimize the time consumed by the parsing of a SIP message. After loading the rules, the SecSip runtime computes which objects of a SIP message are referenced by the user defined rules. Therefore, only those objects will be defined in the parse tree generated by the SIP parser module.

### B. SecSip performance

SIP dialogs and transactions are delay sensitive. Therefore a SIP firewall needs low overhead when inspecting packets before forwarding them to the target devices. To assess the performance of our system, we start by looking at how SecSip performs with a stressing SIP traffic and what latency it adds while inspecting this traffic.

The testing environment is composed of three hosts with a core 2 CPU cadenced at 2.93GHZ with 2 GB of RAM. The first host plays the role of the SIP packet injector where we have used the SIPp tool [16]. This tool is dedicated to sip performance testing and provides a flooding feature capable to generate INVITE SIP messages at higher rates. The second host, where SecSip is running, is deployed as a bump in the wire device between the attacking host where the INVITE messages injector is deployed and the targeted host. The three hosts are connected through a 100 Mbits switched Ethernet. SecSip performs all necessary functions including (1) capturing the incoming SIP traffic on the specified interface (2) extracting SIP fields, (3) Comparing extracted fields with the available rules of the current transaction phase, and forwarding the SIP messages to the outgoing interface towards SIP

devices. Our metrics are the delay introduced by the SecSip runtime while processing a SIP message and its throughput in terms of messages/second. To measure the delay introduced by SecSip, a Tcpdump instance did continuously run on the incoming-traffic interface to capture incoming SIP INVITE messages from the attacker and another Tcpdump instance was operational on the egress interface to capture the same messages after having been processed by the SecSip runtime. We analysed captured data using a developed Perl scripts to compute the throughput and processing delays of SecSip.

In this work, we evaluated the performance of SecSip with two scenarios:

- In the first one, we only vary the rate of INVITE messages from 10 to 1000 messages/second by a step of 10. Each value is maintained by the SIPp tool one minute and then it is incremented by 10. SecSip is deployed without any rule, only messages parsing overhead is measured.
- In the second one, we maintained the INVITE message rate at a level of 60 messages per second. We then vary for each test the number of rules from 1 to 650 by a step of 10. Herein, our goal is to measure the overhead of the rules processing module.




Fig. 9. Delays introduced by SecSip deployed as a bump in the wire device. No rules are loaded by SecSip

The results of the first scenario are depicted in Figures 9 and 10. In this scenario, we measure the effect of a stressing






Fig. 10. Throughput of SecSip in terms of number of SIP messages per second. No rules are loaded by SecSip.

load towards SecSip. In figure 9, we show the mean delay introduced by the SecSip runtime while processing a varying number of injected INVITE messages towards the SIP device. We observe that the delay stays below 1 ms, even with an injection rate close to 500 messages/second.

The SecSip throughput is depicted in Figure 10 with respect to an injection rate from the source host. We observe that the throughput stays close to the injection rate.




Fig. 11. Delays introduced by SecSip deployed as a bump in the wire device. We varied the number of rules loaded by SecSip. The y-axis is in log scale.

The results of the second scenario, where we only varied the number of rules, are depicted in Figures 11 and 12. We observe from the Figure 12 that SecSip maintains its throughput close to the injection rate of 60 SIP messages/second. However, as depicted in Figure 11, the delays introduced by SecSip become more important when we increase the number of loaded rules.

It seems that the rules processing module is the largest component contributing to the SecSip overhead. Therefore, we need to better optimize this component, to obtain a better performance of the firewall.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

With the increasing importance of SIP-based systems in the Internet, the availability of defense solutions able to protect all




Fig. 12. Throughput of SecSip in terms of number of SIP messages per second. We varied the number of rules loaded by SecSip.

these systems against malicious exploitation of vulnerabilities is essential. In this paper, we have shown that SecSip is one solution able to deal with known, and to some extent unknown, vulnerabilities by efficiently building a per device tuned protection scheme. Our key contribution include the design of a runtime and a rule-based language to protect SIP-based networks from discovered vulnerabilities. The specification language is easy to use for authoring SIP vulnerabilities based on the protocol states prior any potential exploitation, along with message parsing for exploit detection. To achieve this, the SecSip language allows the use of stateful objects that track protocol states. The evaluation of a SecSip implementation, indicates that the introduced delays are acceptable for an on-line analysis engine. The SecSip implementation is distributed in Open Source (GPL 2 license) and can be downloaded from the INRIA Gforge <sup>2</sup>.

We are currently working on the improvement of the SecSip implementation and its language to stabilize the release and provide improved performances. Interfaces with several management services are also under development (e.g. Syslog, SNMP). The idea behind it is to allow secsip to interact directly with SIP devices management interfaces to collect some useful data. For example, SecSip may need to know if the SIP device is up or down. Finally, we also plan to couple SecSip with attack and vulnerability tools [14] to automatically generate defense rules.

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