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Automating Theories in Intuitionistic Logic

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Abstract. Deduction modulo consists in applying the inference rules of a deductive system modulo a rewrite system over terms and formulæ. This is equivalent to proving within a so-called compatible theory. Conversely, given a first-order theory, one may want to internalize it into a rewrite system that can be used in deduction modulo, in order to get an analytic deductive system for that theory. In a recent paper, we have shown how this can be done in classical logic. In intuitionistic logic, however, we show here not only that this may be impossible, but also that the set of theories that can be transformed into a rewrite system with an analytic sequent calculus modulo is not co-recursively enumerable. We nonetheless propose a procedure to transform a large class of theories into compatible rewrite systems. We then extend this class by working in conservative extensions, in particular using Skolemization.

1 Introduction

Mathematical propositions are seldom proved in pure first-order logic, but more often within a particular theory, e.g. arithmetic or Euclidean geometry. In general, this is performed using an axiomatization of these theories, but this has drawbacks. First, this is rather inefficient from an automated-proof-search point of view, in particular when computations are involved. To be convinced of this, one may try to prove a simple result such as “ $2+2=4$ ” in Peano’s arithmetic. Second, some interesting properties of deductive systems may be lost when proving using axioms. In particular, in a constructive setting, the disjunction property, that says that from a proof of $P \vee Q$ one can find a proof of P or a proof of Q , and the witness property, that says that from a proof of $\exists x. P(x)$ one can find a witness term t and a proof of $P(t)$, no longer hold when using axioms.

Dowek, Hardin and Kirchner [12] proposed an alternative way of proving within a theory: in deduction modulo, the inference rules used to prove a formula are applied modulo a rewrite system. This system can rewrite terms, but also atomic formulæ to formulæ. For instance, given the (propositional) rule $x \times y = 0 \rightarrow x = 0 \vee y = 0$, we can build the following proof of $\forall x. x \times x = 0 \Rightarrow x = 0$ in the sequent calculus modulo:

$$\frac{\text{Ax. } \frac{}{x=0 \vdash x=0} \quad \text{Ax. } \frac{}{x=0 \vdash x=0}}{\vee \vdash \frac{}{x \times x = 0 \vdash x=0}} \quad x \times x = 0 \longrightarrow x = 0 \vee x = 0$$
$$\vdash \Rightarrow \frac{}{\vdash \frac{}{x \times x = 0 \Rightarrow x=0}} \quad \vdash \vee \frac{}{\vdash \forall x. x \times x = 0 \Rightarrow x=0}$$

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We can see that proving in the sequent calculus modulo this rule is equivalent to proving in the theory $\forall x y. x \times y = 0 \Leftrightarrow x = 0 \vee y = 0$. Propositions 1.6 and 1.8 of [12] tell us that given a rewrite system, it is always possible to find a theory such that proving modulo the rewrite system is equivalent to proving in the theory. Presentations of that theory are then called compatible.

We are here interested in the converse problem: given a theory, how is it possible to internalize it into a rewrite system used in deduction modulo? In that case, we will also say that the rewrite system is compatible with the theory. Proof search methods based on deduction modulo, e.g. ENAR [12] and TaMed [6] can then be used to find proofs in those theories. These methods are complete only if the sequent calculus modulo the compatible rewrite system admits cut. (It may not be the case in deduction modulo, as shown by the consistent example $A \rightarrow A \Rightarrow B$.) We therefore want to find compatible rewrite systems ensuring this property. This was for instance successfully done by hand for arithmetic [14] and Zermelo's set theory [13]. However, to be sure that the deductive system modulo admits cuts, some tricks are used that seems difficult to automate. This paper studies the automation of the transformation of the presentation of an intuitionistic first-order theory into a rewrite system that is applied modulo.

In a submitted paper [8], we proposed a complete solution in the case of classical logic: First, we have shown how to transform any presentation of a theory into a compatible rewrite system; Then, we have defined a completion procedure that transforms the resulting rewrite system to ensure that the sequent calculus modulo the final rewrite system admits cut. In intuitionistic logic however, there are theories that cannot be transformed into a compatible rewrite system, as we will soon show, and we cannot separate the production of the rewrite system and its completion that ensure the cut admissibility. To better explain how we will proceed in the intuitionistic case, let us recall how theories can be internalized in classical logic. Remind that an inference rule is called invertible if whenever its conclusion is derivable, its premises also are. Given a presentation Γ of a theory, the idea is to apply the invertible rules of some sequent calculus to $\vdash \bigwedge \Gamma$. If all rules of the sequent calculus are invertible, as it is the case for the system G4 of Kleene [21], this ensures that this can produce a set of sequents which all contain at least one atomic formula. Such sequents can be transformed into semantically equivalent proposition rewrite rules. For instance, $\Gamma \vdash A, \Delta$ where A is atomic is transformed into $A \rightarrow A \vee (\bigwedge \Gamma \wedge \bigwedge \neg \Delta)$. It is quite easy to see that such sequents can be proved in the sequent calculus modulo the associated rule, simply by rewriting A and decomposing the resulting formula. As the set of sequents producing the rules is obtained from the presentation of the theory by applying inference rules, this means that the presentation, and therefore also the whole theory, can be proved in the deduction modulo the produced rewrite system. Furthermore, because the inference rules that we applied are invertible, and because the rewrite rules are semantically equivalent with the sequent they come from, this also means that it is not possible to prove more in deduction modulo than in the theory.

In intuitionistic logic, we cannot hope to obtain such a result. Indeed, if you consider the theory presented by the simple axiom $A \vee B$ with A and B some distinct atomic formulæ, you can prove neither A nor B . However, were it possible to find a rewrite system for that theory such that the sequent calculus modulo this system admits cuts, this deductive system would have the disjunction property (see Proposition 3). As by compatibility $A \vee B$ could be proven, either A or B should be provable, hence the contradiction. Note that in classical logic, the axiom $A \vee B$ would produce the rule $A \rightarrow A \vee \neg B$, whereas it is not intuitionistically equivalent to $A \vee B$. We would like to be able to characterize the presentations that have a compatible rewrite system such that the sequent calculus modulo this system admits cuts, but we prove that the set of such presentations is not co-recursively enumerable, that is, cannot be decided. Nevertheless, we propose a procedure that transforms a large class of theories into compatible rewrite systems. This procedure is a non-trivial generalization of the procedure for classical logic, because we have to mix the transformation into rewrite rules and the completion that ensures the cut admissibility, and because we must develop new techniques to avoid being stuck with examples such as $A \vee (B \Rightarrow A)$.

The same kind of counterexample as $A \vee B$ can be obtained from a theory presented by an axiom of the form $\exists x. A(x)$, using the witness property. In that case however, it is possible to use Skolemization to work in a conservative extension of the theory that has a compatible rewrite system such that the sequent calculus modulo this rewrite system admits cuts. As Skolemization does not always lead to a conservative extension in intuitionistic logic, this means that this will not always be possible. In this paper, we investigate in which cases it is possible to transform the presentation of a theory into a compatible rewrite system, possibly using conservative extensions of the theory.

In the following section we recall some sequent calculi for intuitionistic logic maximizing the number of invertible rules, and we introduce deduction modulo. In Section 3 we prove that the set of presentations that have a compatible rewrite system such that the sequent calculus modulo it admits cut is not co-recursively enumerable. Section 4 presents a procedure that tries to transform a presentation into a compatible rewrite system. Then in Section 5, we extend the domain where this procedure succeeds by looking how to handle infinite presentations, equality and Skolemization. Finally, Section 6 provides an example of application extracted from the Intuitionistic Logic Theorem Proving library [26].

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Sequent Calculi for Intuitionistic Logic

We use standard definitions for terms, predicates, propositions (with connectors $\perp, \top, \Rightarrow, \wedge, \vee$ and quantifiers \forall, \exists), substitutions, term rewrite rules and term rewriting, as can be found in [2, 15]. The set of terms built from a signature Σ and a set of variables V is denoted by $\mathcal{T}(\Sigma, V)$, the replacement of a variable x by a term t in a proposition P by $\{t/x\}P$, the application of a substitution

σ in a proposition P by σP , the free variables occurring in P by $FV(P)$. $\neg P$ is a shorthand for $P \Rightarrow \perp$, and when $\Gamma = P_1, \dots, P_n$, then $\bigwedge \Gamma$, $\bigvee \Gamma$ and $\neg \Gamma$ are notations for $P_1 \wedge \dots \wedge P_n$, $P_1 \vee \dots \vee P_n$ and $\neg P_1, \dots, \neg P_n$. $P \Leftrightarrow Q$ denotes $(P \Rightarrow Q) \wedge (Q \Rightarrow P)$. A *context* is a formula where the subterm \square at a particular position, called the hole, is distinguished. The application $C[P]$ of a context $C[\square]$ to a formula P is the replacement of the subterm \square by P in $C[\square]$.

Refer to [15] for an introduction to sequent calculi. A sequent is a pair (Γ, Δ) of multisets of formulæ, denoted by $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$. A logical rule of a sequent calculus decomposes a formula, which is called *principal*, appearing in a sequent, into its direct subformulæ, which are called the *side formulæ*. For instance, in

$$\Rightarrow \vdash \frac{\Gamma \vdash X, \Delta \quad \Gamma, Y \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, X \Rightarrow Y \vdash \Delta}$$

$X \Rightarrow Y$ is the principal formula, X and Y are the side formulæ, and the other formulæ, those appearing in Γ and Δ , are called the *extra formulæ*. An inference rule $\frac{H_1 \quad \dots \quad H_n}{C}$ is said *invertible* if whenever C can be proved, then so do all H_i for $1 \leq i \leq n$. A logical rule r permutes over a logical rule r' if whenever there is a proof ending with

$$r \frac{H_1 \quad \dots \quad H_n}{r' \frac{C}{D} \quad I_1 \quad \dots \quad I_m}$$

where the principal formula of r is not a side formula of r' , it is possible to build a proof with r below r' . If an inference rule permutes with all the other rules, it can be proved that it is invertible. A double horizontal line indicates several application of an inference rule. We will also consider *derivations*, that is, partial proofs where leafs are not all closed by Ax . The sequents appearing in the open leafs of a derivation are called its *premises*.

The usual sequent calculus for intuitionistic logic, LJ, was introduced by Gentzen [16]. It consists in allowing at most one formula to the right of the sequents of the sequent calculus for classical logic LK. However, this has drawbacks, because many rules cannot be permuted contrarily to classical logic [20], so that almost all rules are not invertible. Therefore, it has been proposed to keep multiple conclusions in the sequents, but to restrict only the rules where it is needed, i.e. for the right rules for \Rightarrow and \forall . The resulting system is called L'J [23], LB [28] or LJm [25], with little differences between versions. We represent the system LB in Fig 1, as it appears in [28]. It is shown [28] that the only cases of rules that do not permute are $\forall \vdash$ over $\vdash \forall$; $\forall \vdash$ and $\vdash \exists$ over $\exists \vdash$; and $\Rightarrow \vdash$ over $\vdash \Rightarrow$ and $\vdash \forall$. This means that the only logical rules that are not invertible are $\forall \vdash$, $\vdash \exists$ and $\Rightarrow \vdash$.

To make these rules invertible, one solution is to apply a contraction ($\vdash \vdash$ or $\vdash \vdash$) to the active formula just before applying the logical rule. This is what is done in classical logic to obtain the system G4 [21] from LK. It can be shown [25] that for $\Rightarrow \vdash$ it is only necessary to apply a contraction in the left premise. We also want to get rid of the weakening rules (\vdash and \vdash), that are of course non

Identity rules

$$\text{Ax.} \frac{}{\Gamma, X \vdash X, \Delta}$$

$$\text{Cut} \frac{\Gamma, X \vdash \Delta \quad \Gamma \vdash X, \Delta}{\Gamma \vdash \Delta}$$

Structural rules

$$\vdash \frac{\Gamma, X, X \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, X \vdash \Delta}$$

$$\vdash \frac{\Gamma \vdash X, X, \Delta}{\Gamma \vdash X, \Delta}$$

$$\vdash \frac{\Gamma \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, X \vdash \Delta}$$

$$\vdash \frac{\Gamma \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma \vdash X, \Delta}$$

Logical rules

$$\Rightarrow \vdash \frac{\Gamma \vdash X, \Delta \quad \Gamma, Y \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, X \Rightarrow Y \vdash \Delta}$$

$$\vdash \Rightarrow \frac{\Gamma, X \vdash Y}{\Gamma \vdash X \Rightarrow Y}$$

$$\wedge \vdash \frac{\Gamma, X, Y \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, X \wedge Y \vdash \Delta}$$

$$\vdash \wedge \frac{\Gamma \vdash X, \Delta \quad \Gamma \vdash Y, \Delta}{\Gamma \vdash X \wedge Y, \Delta}$$

$$\vee \vdash \frac{\Gamma, X \vdash \Delta \quad \Gamma, Y \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, X \vee Y \vdash \Delta}$$

$$\vdash \vee \frac{\Gamma \vdash X, Y, \Delta}{\Gamma \vdash X \vee Y, \Delta}$$

$$\forall \vdash \frac{\Gamma, X(t) \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, \forall x, X(x) \vdash \Delta}$$

$$\vdash \forall \frac{\Gamma \vdash X(y)}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x, X(x), \Delta} \quad y \text{ not free in } \Gamma, X(x), \Delta$$

$$\exists \vdash \frac{\Gamma, X(y) \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, \exists x, X(x) \vdash \Delta} \quad y \text{ not free in } \Gamma, X(x), \Delta$$

$$\vdash \exists \frac{\Gamma \vdash X(t), \Delta}{\Gamma \vdash \exists x, X(x), \Delta}$$

$$\perp \vdash \frac{}{\perp \vdash C}$$

$$\vdash \top \frac{}{\vdash \top}$$

Fig. 1. Inference rules of LB [28]

$$\Rightarrow \vdash \frac{\Gamma, X \Rightarrow Y \vdash X, \Delta \quad \Gamma, Y \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, X \Rightarrow Y \vdash \Delta}$$

$$\vdash \Rightarrow \frac{\Gamma, X \vdash Y}{\Gamma \vdash X \Rightarrow Y, \Delta}$$

$$\forall \vdash \frac{\Gamma, X(t), \forall x, X(x) \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, \forall x, X(x) \vdash \Delta}$$

$$\vdash \forall \frac{\Gamma \vdash X(y)}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x, X(x), \Delta} \quad y \text{ not free in } \Gamma, X(x), \Delta$$

$$\exists \vdash \frac{\Gamma, X(y) \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, \exists x, X(x) \vdash \Delta} \quad y \text{ not free in } \Gamma, X(x), \Delta$$

$$\vdash \exists \frac{\Gamma \vdash X(t), \exists x, X(x), \Delta}{\Gamma \vdash \exists x, X(x), \Delta}$$

$$\perp \vdash \frac{}{\Gamma, \perp \vdash \Delta}$$

$$\vdash \perp \frac{\Gamma \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma \vdash \perp, \Delta}$$

$$\top \vdash \frac{\Gamma \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, \top \vdash \Delta}$$

$$\vdash \top \frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \top, \Delta}$$

Fig. 2. Logical rules of LBi

invertible. To do so, we have to allow extra formulæ in $\perp \vdash$ and $\vdash \top$, to add a left rule for \top and a right rule for \perp , and to allow weakening below an application of $\vdash \Rightarrow$ and $\vdash \forall$ and into premises of derivations. By doing so, it can be proved that all structural rules are admissible (see Appendix A). The system that we use here will be called LBi (“i” standing for invertible and not intuitionistic). Its logical rules are presented in Fig. 2, except the rules for \wedge and \vee that are the same than in LB. Note that LBi has *no* structural rules. However, LBi is equivalent to LB (see the proof in Appendix A).

Proposition 1. *All inference rules of LBi but $\vdash \Rightarrow$ and $\vdash \forall$ are invertible. Nonetheless, when there is no extra formula on the right hand side of their conclusion, $\vdash \Rightarrow$ and $\vdash \forall$ are also invertible.*

2.2 Deduction Modulo

Refer to [2] for an introduction on term rewriting. We define how propositions can be rewritten. We consider two kind of rules: the usual term rewrite rules, and proposition rewrite rules defined below. An atomic formula $A(s_1, \dots, s_i, \dots, s_n)$ can be rewritten to the atomic formula $A(s_1, \dots, t_i, \dots, s_n)$ by a term rewrite rule $l \rightarrow r$ if s_i can be rewritten to t_i by $l \rightarrow r$. This rewrite relation is extended to non-atomic formulæ by congruence.

A *proposition rewrite rule* is the pair of an atomic proposition A and a proposition P , such that all free variables of P appear in A . It is denoted $A \rightarrow P$. A *proposition rewrite system* is a set of proposition rewrite rules. A formula P can be rewritten to a formula Q by the rule $A \rightarrow O$ at the position p with substitution σ if the subterm of P at position p equals σA and Q is P where its subterm at position p is replaced by σO .

In the following, a *rewrite system* \mathcal{R} will be the disjoint union of a term rewrite system and a proposition rewrite system. $P \xrightarrow[\mathcal{R}]{} Q$ denotes the fact that P can be rewritten to Q by some term or proposition rewrite rule in \mathcal{R} , and $\xrightarrow[\mathcal{R}]{}^*$ (resp. $\xleftarrow[\mathcal{R}]{}^*$) denotes the reflexive and transitive (resp. reflexive, symmetrical and transitive) closure of $\xrightarrow[\mathcal{R}]{}^*$.

As said above, deduction modulo consists in applying the inference rules of a deductive system modulo a rewrite system. For instance, in LBi modulo \mathcal{R} , the left rule for \Rightarrow becomes

$$\Rightarrow \vdash \frac{\Gamma, Z \vdash X, \Delta \quad \Gamma, Y \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, Z \vdash \Delta} Z \xleftarrow[\mathcal{R}]{}^* X \Rightarrow Y$$

Proving modulo a rewrite system \mathcal{R} is equivalent to proving into some theory whose presentations are called compatible with \mathcal{R} :

Definition 2. *A presentation is a set of formulæ with no free variables. The theory presented by a presentation Γ is the set of formulæ P such that $\Gamma' \vdash P$ can be proved in the sequent calculus for some finite subset Γ' of Γ .*

Given a rewrite system \mathcal{R} , its associated theory is the set of formulæ P such that $\vdash P$ can be proved in the sequent calculus modulo \mathcal{R} .

A presentation and a rewrite system \mathcal{R} are said compatible if they are associated with the same theory.

Note that these definitions depend on the considered logic (e.g. classical or intuitionistic). Propositions 1.6 and 1.8 of [12] prove that a rewrite system always has a compatible presentation. This shows that the theory associated with a rewrite system is a theory in the standard meaning, that is, a deductively closed set of formulæ.

Based on deduction modulo, some automated theorem-proving procedures have been designed, e.g. ENAR [12], generalizing resolution, and Tamed [6], a tableau method. These methods are complete only if the sequent calculus modulo admits cut. In fact, as proved by Hermant [18], the proofs found by these methods are exactly the cut-free proofs of the asymmetric sequent calculus modulo [10], a variant of the sequent calculus modulo where rewriting can only be applied from bottom to top in the proofs. For instance the left rule for \Rightarrow becomes

$$\Rightarrow\vdash \frac{\Gamma, X \Rightarrow Y \vdash X, \Delta \quad \Gamma, Y \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, Z \vdash \Delta} Z \xrightarrow[\mathcal{R}]{*} X \Rightarrow Y$$

It can also be useful to distinguish which rules can be applied to the left and to the right of a sequent, or more precisely at positive and negative position in a sequent. Recall that a position in a formula is positive (resp. negative) if it is in the left subformula of an even (resp. odd) number of \Rightarrow . Suppose that the rewrite rules are associated with polarities. We denote by $A \rightarrow^+ P$ the rewrite rule $A \rightarrow P$ associated with a positive polarity, and dually for $-$. A proposition P can be positively rewritten to Q in \mathcal{R} $\left(P \xrightarrow[\mathcal{R}]{+} Q \right)$ if P can be rewritten to Q by a positive rule at a positive position or by a negative rule at a negative position. A proposition P can be negatively rewritten to Q in \mathcal{R} $\left(P \xrightarrow[\mathcal{R}]{-} Q \right)$ if P can be rewritten to Q by a negative rule at a positive position or by a positive rule at a negative position. In the polarized sequent calculus modulo [9], formulæ in the left (resp. right) of a sequent can only be negatively (resp. positively) rewritten, so that for instance the Ax. rule becomes

$$\text{Ax.} \frac{}{\Gamma, X \vdash Y, \Delta} X \xrightarrow[\mathcal{R}]{-} \xleftarrow[\mathcal{R}]{+} Y$$

In [8] we proved for classical logic that the polarized sequent calculus is equivalent to the asymmetric sequent calculus, also w.r.t. the cut admissibility. This also holds for LBi (see Appendix B). The latter is equivalent to the original version of the sequent calculus modulo, but if we are also concerned with the cut admissibility, they are equivalent if and only if the rewrite system is confluent. Given a sequent $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$, we denote by $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{R}}^S \Delta$ the fact that for finite subsets Γ' and Δ' of Γ and Δ , the sequent $\Gamma' \vdash \Delta'$ can be derived from premises in the set of sequents S , in the polarized LBi modulo \mathcal{R} . If S and \mathcal{R} are empty, we write

$\Gamma \vdash \Delta$, which therefore means that there is a proof of $\Gamma' \vdash \Delta'$ in LBi without modulo.

A (polarized) rewrite system \mathcal{R} is called *analytic* if the polarized sequent calculus modulo \mathcal{R} admits cut, that is, if $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{R}} \Delta$ then $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ can be proved in the polarized LBi modulo \mathcal{R} without Cut.

Proposition 3 (Disjunction and witness property). *Consider an analytic rewrite system \mathcal{R} .*

- *If $\vdash_{\mathcal{R}} P \vee Q$ then either $\vdash_{\mathcal{R}} P$ or $\vdash_{\mathcal{R}} Q$.*
- *If $\vdash_{\mathcal{R}} \exists x. P$ then for some $t \in T(\Sigma, V)$, we have $\vdash_{\mathcal{R}} \{t/x\}P$.*

Proof. If $\vdash_{\mathcal{R}} P \vee Q$, because \mathcal{R} is analytic there is a cut-free proof of $\vdash P \vee Q$ in the polarized LBi modulo \mathcal{R} , and so also in the polarized LJ modulo \mathcal{R} (see Appendix B). As the left hand side of proposition rewrite rules are atomic formulæ, if $P \vee Q \xrightarrow[\mathcal{R}]{*} O$ then the connector at the root of O has to be \vee , so that the only rule that can be applied is \vdash_{\vee} , hence the conclusion. The proof of the witness property is similar. \square

3 Undecidability of the Automation

As we saw in the introduction, the theory $A \vee B$ with A and B atomic cannot be transformed into an analytic compatible rewrite system. Therefore, we may want to characterize the theories that have an analytic compatible rewrite system, and to find an algorithm to build such rewrite systems. We prove in this section that it cannot be done through a decidable characterization, because the set of such theories is not co-recursively enumerable. In other words, if we have a procedure that transforms a presentation into an analytic compatible rewrite system, it would either be incomplete, that is, the procedure would not answer for some theories that do have an analytic compatible rewrite system, or it would not always terminate.

Theorem 4. *The set of presentations that can be transformed into an analytic compatible rewrite system is not co-recursively enumerable.*

Proof. Recall that the set of valid formulæ in classical first-order logic is not co-recursively enumerable. Using the not-not translation, neither is the set of valid formulæ in intuitionistic first-order logic.

Let P be a formula and A an atomic formula not appearing in P . We do not have $(A \Rightarrow P) \vee A \vdash A$: it does not hold in classical logic, so neither does it in intuitionistic logic.

Suppose that P is intuitionistically valid. Hence so does $(A \Rightarrow P) \vee A$. Consequently, the theory presented by $(A \Rightarrow P) \vee A$ is the theory presented by an empty set of axioms. Consider the empty rewrite system. It is therefore compatible with $(A \Rightarrow P) \vee A$, and the sequent calculus modulo the empty rewrite system admits cuts. Thus, the theory presented by $(A \Rightarrow P) \vee A$ has an analytic compatible rewrite system.

Conversely, suppose that the theory presented by $(A \Rightarrow P) \vee A$ has an analytic compatible rewrite system \mathcal{R} . By compatibility, $\vdash_{\mathcal{R}} (A \Rightarrow P) \vee A$. By Proposition 3, either $\vdash_{\mathcal{R}} A \Rightarrow P$ or $\vdash_{\mathcal{R}} A$. In the latter case, that would mean by compatibility that $(A \Rightarrow P) \vee A \vdash A$, but this does not hold as mentioned above. Hence $\vdash_{\mathcal{R}} A \Rightarrow P$ and by compatibility $(A \Rightarrow P) \vee A \vdash A \Rightarrow P$. Because $\vee \vdash$ is invertible, $A \vdash A \Rightarrow P$. Because $\vdash \Rightarrow$ is invertible when there is only one formula on the right hand side, $A \vdash P$. Because A is atomic and does not appear in P , it cannot be used in this proof, so that $\vdash P$. By soundness of LBi, P is valid.

We therefore reduced the problem of deciding validity in intuitionistic first-order logic to the problem of deciding whether a theory has an analytic compatible rewrite system. The set of theories having one is therefore not co-recursively enumerable. \square

4 A Procedure to Produce Compatible Rewrite Systems

In this section, we try to find a way to transform the presentation of a theory into a compatible rewrite system, and we want this rewrite system to be analytic. Because of Theorem 4, it is not possible to find a terminating algorithm producing such a rewrite system in all cases where it is possible to find one. The procedure that we propose does not contradict this because it may not terminate. Notwithstanding, it will cover a large class of theories.

To ease the description, we present the procedure by a set of transition rules as it is traditional for completion procedures, e.g. in [4]. It is therefore non-deterministic, and we highlight once again that it may not terminate, in particular when the theory does not have a compatible rewrite system. Transition rules, which are given below in Procedure 1 transforms a set of sequent S and a set of polarized rewrite rules \mathcal{R} . Given a presentation Θ , the input of the procedure is $\{\vdash P : P \in \Theta\}$ for the set of sequents and the empty rewrite system. Let us describe the transition rules. **Orient+** and **Orient-** transforms a sequent containing an atomic formula into rewrite rules. These are the base cases. To obtain sequents in which there are atomic formulæ, one may apply the inference rules of LBi. This is what does **Decompose**, with the proviso that the inference rules are invertible to remain in the same theory. Contrary to in classical logic, it remains sequents that cannot transformed into rewrite rules although there exists a compatible rewrite system, for instance for the presentations used in the proof of Theorem 4. **Discard** and **Delete** permit to deal with these sequents. For instance, given the presentation $A \vee (B \Rightarrow A)$, **Discard** leads for instance to the compatible rewrite system $A \rightarrow^+ B$. **Delete** also permits to eliminate redundancies in the construction of the rewrite system. The rewrite systems produced by all these rules may nevertheless not admit cuts, as shown by the example $A \Leftrightarrow A \Rightarrow B$ which can lead to the rewrite rules $A \rightarrow^+ A \Rightarrow B$ and $A \rightarrow^- A \Rightarrow B$. **Deduce** complete the theory to recover the cut admissibility.

Procedure 1 Transition rules to compute a compatible rewrite system

Orient+	$S \cup \{\Gamma \vdash A\}, \mathcal{R} \rightsquigarrow S, \mathcal{R} \cup \{A \rightarrow^+ \exists x_1, \dots, x_n. \bigwedge \Gamma\}$ if A atomic and $\{x_1, \dots, x_n\} = FV(\Gamma) \setminus FV(A)$
Orient-	$S \cup \{\Gamma, A \vdash \Delta\}, \mathcal{R} \rightsquigarrow S, \mathcal{R} \cup \{A \rightarrow^+ \forall x_1, \dots, x_n. \bigwedge \Gamma \Rightarrow \bigvee \Delta\}$ if A atomic and $\{x_1, \dots, x_n\} = FV(\Gamma, \Delta) \setminus FV(A)$
Decompose	$S \cup \{\Gamma \vdash \Delta\}, \mathcal{R} \rightsquigarrow S \cup \bigcup_{1 \leq i \leq n} \{\Gamma_i \vdash \Delta_i\}, \mathcal{R}$ if $\mathfrak{r} \frac{\Gamma_1 \vdash \Delta_1 \quad \dots \quad \Gamma_n \vdash \Delta_n}{\Gamma \vdash \Delta}$ is invertible
Discard	$S \cup \{\Gamma \vdash P, \Delta\}, \mathcal{R} \rightsquigarrow S \cup \{\Gamma \vdash \Delta\}, \mathcal{R}$ if $\Gamma, P \vdash_{\mathcal{R}}^S \Delta$
Delete	$S \cup \{\Gamma \vdash \Delta\}, \mathcal{R} \rightsquigarrow S, \mathcal{R}$ if $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{R}}^S \Delta$ without Cut
Deduce	$S, \mathcal{R} \rightsquigarrow S \cup \{\Gamma \vdash \Delta\}, \mathcal{R}$ if $\Gamma \vdash \Delta \in CP(\mathcal{R})$

The set $CP(\mathcal{R})$ is the set of conclusions of critical proofs of \mathcal{R} . A critical proof

of \mathcal{R} is a proof of the form $\text{Cut} \frac{\frac{\pi}{\Gamma, P \vdash \Delta} \quad \frac{\pi'}{\Gamma \vdash Q, \Delta}}{\Gamma \vdash \Delta}$ where

- P, Q is a critical pair of \mathcal{R} , i.e. there exists A atomic such that $P \xleftarrow{\mathcal{R}} A \xrightarrow{\mathcal{R}} Q$;
- π and π' are cut-free;
- P (resp. Q) is the principal formula of the last inference rule of π (resp. π');
- all formulæ in Γ, Δ are principal in one of the inference rules of π or π' ;
- there is no cut-free proof of $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ modulo \mathcal{R} .

We first prove that the procedure produces compatible rewrite systems:

Proposition 5. *If $S, \mathcal{R} \rightsquigarrow S', \mathcal{R}'$ then for all sequents $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$, we have $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{R}}^S \Delta$ iff $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{R}'}^{S'} \Delta$.*

Moreover, if the derivation of $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{R}}^S \Delta$ is Cut-free, so is the derivation of $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{R}'}^{S'} \Delta$.

Proof. We prove it by cases on the transition rules. For **Orient+**, for the “only if” direction, it is enough to show that $\Gamma \vdash A$ can be proved without Cut in $A \rightarrow^+ \exists x_1, \dots, x_n. \bigwedge \Gamma$, which is easy. For the “if” direction, we proceed by induction on the lexicographic order of the number of rewrite steps using the rule $A \rightarrow^+ \exists x_1, \dots, x_n. \bigwedge \Gamma$ and the structure of the proof. Except for Cut, the application of an inference rule in LBi modulo \mathcal{R} can be decomposed into an application of \mathfrak{r} without modulo followed by an explicit conversion rule (two for Ax.) of the form

$$\uparrow^* \vdash \frac{\Gamma, Q \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, P \vdash \Delta} P \xrightarrow{\mathcal{R}^-}^* Q \quad \text{or} \quad \vdash \uparrow^* \frac{\Gamma \vdash Q, \Delta}{\Gamma \vdash P, \Delta} P \xrightarrow{\mathcal{R}^+}^* Q.$$

For Cut, we need two explicit conversions above the application of Cut without modulo. Consider the last application of an inference rule in a derivation of $\Gamma' \vdash \Delta'$ modulo $\mathcal{R} \cup \{A \rightarrow^+ \exists x_1, \dots, x_n. \bigwedge \Gamma\}$, and decompose it as shown

above. If the explicit conversion step does not use $A \rightarrow^+ \exists x_1, \dots, x_n. \bigwedge \Gamma$, then we proceed by structural induction on the proof. Else, suppose that $\Gamma' = P, \Sigma$ where P is negatively rewritten by $A \rightarrow^+ \exists x_1, \dots, x_n. \bigwedge \Gamma$ into Q . By induction hypothesis, we obtain a derivation of $Q, \Sigma \vdash \Delta$ in \mathcal{R} . From $\Gamma \vdash A$ we can derive $\exists x_1, \dots, x_n. \bigwedge \Gamma \vdash A$, and using Lemma 13, we know how to build a derivation of $P \vdash Q$. Using a Cut, we therefore have a derivation of $P, \Sigma \vdash \Delta$ as expected. The case where the rewriting occurs in Δ is dual.

The case of **Orient**– is dual.

For **Decompose**, this results from the fact that r is supposed invertible.

For **Discard**, for the “only if” part is obtained by weakening. For the “if” direction, we replace the premise $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ by a Cut between the premise $\Gamma \vdash P, \Delta$ and the derivation of $\Gamma, P \vdash_{\mathcal{R}}^S \Delta$.

For **Delete**, the “if” part is trivial. For the “only if” direction, replace the premises $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ by the derivation $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{R}}^S \Delta$.

For **Deduce**, the “only if” part is trivial. For the “if” direction, because $\Gamma \vdash \Delta \in CP(\mathcal{R})$, it is the conclusion of a proof modulo \mathcal{R} . We can therefore replace the premises $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ by this proof.

Remark that for the “only if” direction, we never added Cuts. \square

Corollary 6. *Given a presentation Θ , if $\{\vdash P : P \in \Theta\}, \emptyset \rightsquigarrow^* \emptyset, \mathcal{R}$, then Θ and \mathcal{R} are compatible.*

Proof. A proof $\Theta \vdash Q$ can be seen as a derivation $\vdash_{\{\vdash P : P \in \Theta\}} Q$ by replacing $\text{Ax.} \frac{}{\Theta \vdash P}$ where $P \in \Theta$ by the premise $\vdash P$. \square

As usual in completion procedures, we need a fairness condition to ensure that all critical proofs are dealt with. This condition is the following: at any moment, if $\Gamma \vdash \Delta \in CP(\mathcal{R}) \setminus S$ then **Deduce** will eventually add $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ in the set of sequents.

Proposition 7. *Under this fairness condition, if the procedure terminates and produces \emptyset, \mathcal{R} , then \mathcal{R} is analytic.*

Proof. Suppose that \mathcal{R} is not analytic. There exists a sequent that can be proved with Cut but not without. Consider proofs as trees of couple of inference rules and principal formula, and define the recursive path ordering defined by the following precedence: $(\text{Cut}, P) > (\text{Ax.}, Q) > (r, R)$ for all inference rules r different from Cut and Ax., and all formulæ P, Q, R ; and $(\text{Cut}, P) > (\text{Cut}, Q)$ and $(\text{Ax.}, P) > (\text{Ax.}, Q)$ if Q is a subformula of P . As the precedence is well-founded, so is this ordering. By induction on this ordering, and following the cut-elimination procedure as

described in [17], we can find a proof of the form
$$\text{Cut} \frac{\frac{\pi}{\Gamma, P \vdash \Delta} \quad \frac{\pi'}{\Gamma \vdash Q, \Delta}}{\Gamma \vdash \Delta}$$

where

- P, Q is a critical pair of \mathcal{R} , i.e. there exists A atomic such that $P \xleftarrow{\mathcal{R}} A \xrightarrow{\mathcal{R}} Q$;
- π and π' are cut-free;
- P (resp. Q) is the principal formula of the last inference rule of π (resp. π');

- there is no cut-free proof of $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ modulo \mathcal{R} .

In this proof, we can prune all formulæ that are not principal in one of the inference rules of π or π' , and we therefore obtain a critical proof. By the fairness assumption, the sequent $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ has been added to S during the procedure. By Proposition 5, the Cut-free derivation $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ using the premise $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ has been transformed by the procedure into a Cut-free derivation using premises in \emptyset and rewrite rules in \mathcal{R} . We therefore have a Cut-free *proof* of $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ modulo \mathcal{R} , hence the contradiction. \square

Note that the procedure is not computable, in the sense that **Discard**, **Delete** and **Deduce** use oracles that are not recursive. Indeed, the sets $\vdash_{\mathcal{R}}^S$ and $CP(\mathcal{R})$ are not co-recursively enumerable in general. Nonetheless, we believe that is not possible to do better, because we conjecture the set described in Theorem 4 to be Σ_3^0 -complete in the arithmetical hierarchy (see [5, Chapter C.1] for an introduction on the arithmetical hierarchy), that is, it is not even recursively enumerable. Once this conjecture has been proved, we could try to prove that our procedure with oracles is complete, that is, for all presentations that can be transformed into an analytic rewrite system, the procedure terminates without failure. Of course, in the case where the procedure fails, we can keep the remaining sequents in S and use them either as premises, or, if we want only to work with proofs and not derivations, we can transform these sequents $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ into axioms $\forall x_1, \dots, x_n. \bigwedge \Gamma \Rightarrow \bigvee \Delta$ with $\{x_1, \dots, x_n\} = FV(\Gamma, \Delta)$.

5 Extensions

In this section, we present some extensions to the procedure presented in the previous section. Due to a lack of space, we only briefly discuss them.

5.1 Axiom Schemata

Theories are often presented not only by axioms but also by axiom schemata. An axiom schema is a formula in which proposition variables can appear. The instance of an axiom schema are the formulæ where these proposition variables are substituted by formulæ. For instance, the induction principle in Peano's arithmetic

$$\forall x. (X(0) \wedge \forall y. X(y) \Rightarrow X(s(y))) \Rightarrow X(x)$$

is an axiom schema with the proposition variable $X(x)$.

$$\forall x. (0 + 0 = 0 \wedge \forall y. y + 0 = y \Rightarrow s(y) + 0 = s(y)) \Rightarrow x + 0 = x$$

is an instance of this axiom schema, $X(x)$ being substituted by $x + 0 = x$.

Axiom schemata can be seen as the infinite set of their instances, so that our procedure works on such presentations. However, in that case, \mathcal{R} may be infinite. The rewrite relation would therefore not be implementable as it is.

If the theory is presented by a finite set of axiom schemata, we can use the work of Kirchner [19] who shows how to get a finitely presented conservative extension of the theory. The idea is to transform an axiom schema depending on a proposition variable $X(y_1, \dots, y_n)$ into an axiom where $X(y_1, \dots, y_n)$ is replaced by an atomic formula $\langle y_1, \dots, y_n \rangle \in x$, x being a representation of a formula as a term. Formulae of the original signature are translated into terms using some axioms and a system of explicit substitutions. For instance there is an axiom $\forall l \ a \ b. l \in a \cup b \Leftrightarrow l \in a \vee l \in b$, with \cup a new function symbol encoding the disjunction as a term, and for all predicate symbol A there is a new function symbol \dot{A} and an axiom $\forall l \ t_1 \dots t_n. l \in \dot{A}(t_1, \dots, t_n) \Leftrightarrow A(t_1[l], \dots, t_n[l])$. If the original signature is finite, the number of added axioms is finite, and an axiom schema is transformed into an axiom. For the induction, it becomes

$$\forall c \ x. (\langle 0 \rangle \in c \wedge \forall y. \langle y \rangle \in c \Rightarrow \langle s(y) \rangle \in c) \Rightarrow \langle x \rangle \in c$$

Moreover, the axioms for decoding the terms representing formulae can easily be oriented as rewrite rules. So, we obtain a finite presentation of a conservative extension of the input theory, and we can apply Procedure 1 to this presentation.

5.2 Equalities

First-order theories often use equality, for instance in Peano's arithmetic we have the axiom $\forall x. 0 + x = x$. Such axioms are better represented by term rewrite rules instead of proposition rewrite rules. In this example, $0 + x \rightarrow x$ is better than $0 + x = x \rightarrow \top$. Therefore, given a presentation, before applying our procedure, a better approach is to take away the equational logic subset of the presentation (axioms of the form $\forall x_1, \dots, x_n. s = t$) and to apply to it standard tools, for instance Knuth-Bendix completion [22], to obtain a compatible confluent term rewrite system for that subset. Then, we apply Procedure 1 to the remaining axioms.

5.3 Skolemization

The theory presented by $\exists x. A(x)$ has no analytic compatible rewrite system, because it does not have the witness property. However, for some new constant c not appearing in the original signature, $A(c)$ is a presentation of a conservative extension of this theory that does have an analytic compatible rewrite system, e.g. $A(c) \rightarrow^+ \top$. One is therefore tempted to apply Skolemization to the presentations we want to transform into rewrite systems before applying Procedure 1, to avoid the use of $\vdash \exists$ which can make the procedure fail. Nevertheless, contrarily to classical logic, Skolemization does not always lead to a conservative extension in intuitionistic logic. Mints [24] gives some counterexamples, among them $\neg \neg \exists x. A(x)$, and characterizes the presentations that can be correctly Skolemized. The idea is therefore to apply Skolemization to the input presentation in the cases characterized by Mints, and to apply Procedure 1 to the resulting presentation, therefore having reduced the number of $\forall \vdash$ and $\vdash \exists$ to be applied

during the procedure. As these rules contain an implicit contraction, they are sometimes the cause why we cannot produce a sequent that can be oriented by **Orient** $+$ or **Orient** $-$, as in the example of $\exists x. A(x)$. Nevertheless, even doing so, we will not be able to handle presentations such as $\neg\neg\exists x. A(x)$.

Baaz and Iemhoff [3] propose a generalization of Skolemization which works every time. To sum up the idea, formulæ are translated into their semantic in a Kripke structure. For instance $\forall x. A(x) \Rightarrow \exists y. B(x, y)$ is translated for some k into $\forall l. l \geq k \Rightarrow \forall x. E(l, x) \Rightarrow \forall m. m \geq l \Rightarrow A(m, x) \Rightarrow \exists y. E(m, y) \wedge B(m, x, y)$, where \geq denotes the accessibility relation in the Kripke structure, and $E(k, x)$ is a predicate indicating the existence of the interpretation of x in the node k . Formulæ are proved in a theory Ax_o which reflects the behavior of the Kripke structure:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \forall k. K(k) \Rightarrow k \geq k \\
& \forall k \ k' \ k''. (K(k) \wedge K(k') \wedge K(k'') \wedge k \geq k' \wedge k' \geq k'') \Rightarrow k \geq k'' \\
& K(\iota) \\
& \forall k. K(k) \Rightarrow k \geq \iota \\
& E(\iota, \epsilon) \\
& \forall k \ x_1 \ \dots \ x_n. (K(k) \wedge E(k, x_1) \wedge \dots \wedge E(k, x_n)) \Rightarrow E(k, f(x_1, \dots, x_n)) \\
& \forall k \ x_1 \ \dots \ x_n. (A(k, x_1, \dots, x_n) \wedge E(k, x_1) \wedge \dots \wedge E(k, x_n) \wedge K(k) \wedge K(l) \wedge l \geq k) \\
& \hspace{15em} \Rightarrow A(l, x_1, \dots, x_n)
\end{aligned}$$

where K is a predicate designing the nodes, ι is the root of the structure, and ϵ an element of its domain, and the two last axioms are for all function symbols f except ι and for all predicates A except \geq . As the semantic of a Kripke model is defined in classical logic, the translated formulæ can be Skolemized.

For our purpose, we do not even need to Skolemize these formulæ. Indeed we can apply the completion procedure described in [8] to the translated presentation plus Ax_o because they present a classical theory. Indeed, Baaz and Iemhoff proved that a formula is valid in intuitionistic logic iff its translation is valid in the theory Ax_o in classical logic [3, Lemma 11]. However, we think that this is probably highly inefficient, in particular because of the second axiom of Ax_o which expresses the transitivity of the accessibility relation.

6 Example of Application

We can apply Procedure 1 to one of the axiom sets proposed in the Intuitionistic Logic Theorem Proving library [26], for instance the presentation of constructive geometry derived from [27] (files **GEJxxx+1.ax**). We obtain an analytic compatible rewrite system including among others the three following rules:

$$\begin{aligned}
x \neq_p y \rightarrow \neg \neg x \notin ln(x, y) & \hspace{10em} (\text{GEJ002+1.ax, a1}) \\
x \neq_p y \rightarrow \neg \neg y \notin ln(x, y) & \hspace{10em} (\text{GEJ002+1.ax, a2}) \\
x \neq_p y \rightarrow \neg \forall u \ v. u \neq_l v \Rightarrow (x \notin u \vee x \notin v \vee y \notin u \vee y \notin v) & \hspace{2em} (\text{GEJ003+1.ax, a1})
\end{aligned}$$

The theorem proposed in the problem GEJ001+1.p therefore has the following proof in which Γ stands for $x \neq_p y, \neg x \notin z, \neg y \notin z, z \neq_l \ln(x, y)$ and the inference rules that are applied modulo are marked by *:

$$\begin{array}{c}
\text{Ax.} \frac{x \notin z \vdash x \notin z}{\neg \vdash x \notin z, \neg x \notin z \vdash} \quad \dots \quad \text{Ax.} \frac{y \notin \ln(x, y) \vdash y \notin \ln(x, y)}{\neg \vdash x \neq_p y, y \notin \ln(x, y) \vdash} * \\
\text{Ax.} \frac{z \neq_l \ln(x, y) \vdash z \neq_l \ln(x, y)}{\Rightarrow \vdash z \neq_l \ln(x, y) \Rightarrow (x \notin z \vee x \notin \ln(x, y) \vee y \notin z \vee y \notin \ln(x, y)), \Gamma \vdash} \\
\vee \vdash \frac{\Gamma \vdash}{z \neq_l \ln(x, y) \Rightarrow (x \notin z \vee x \notin \ln(x, y) \vee y \notin z \vee y \notin \ln(x, y)), \Gamma \vdash} * \\
\vdash \Rightarrow \frac{x \neq_p y, \neg x \notin z, \neg y \notin z \vdash \neg z \neq_l \ln(x, y)}{x \neq_p y \wedge \neg x \notin z \wedge \neg y \notin z \vdash \neg z \neq_l \ln(x, y)} \\
\wedge \vdash \frac{x \neq_p y \wedge \neg x \notin z \wedge \neg y \notin z \vdash \neg z \neq_l \ln(x, y)}{\vdash (x \neq_p y \wedge \neg x \notin z \wedge \neg y \notin z) \Rightarrow \neg z \neq_l \ln(x, y)} \\
\vdash \Rightarrow \frac{\vdash (x \neq_p y \wedge \neg x \notin z \wedge \neg y \notin z) \Rightarrow \neg z \neq_l \ln(x, y)}{\vdash \forall x y z. (x \neq_p y \wedge \neg x \notin z \wedge \neg y \notin z) \Rightarrow \neg z \neq_l \ln(x, y)}
\end{array}$$

7 Conclusion

We have proposed a method to find automated theorem proving procedures adapted to proof search in a particular intuitionistic theory. The idea is to transform a presentation of the theory into a rewrite system, and to combine the inference rules of a sequent calculus with rewriting. We first proved that it is not decidable to transform the presentation of a theory into a rewrite system with an analytic sequent calculus modulo. We nonetheless proposed a (possibly non-terminating) procedure to do so, covering a large class of presentations. We then extended the domain of applicability of this procedure by working in conservative extensions of the theories we want to automate, to get finite presentations, to better handle equality and to partially authorize Skolemization. This work opens new challenges that we are now considering.

First, we would like to know the difficulty of the transformation of a presentation into a compatible analytic rewrite system in the arithmetical hierarchy, and to prove that Procedure 1 is complete, or to find a complete procedure, in order to be able to transform all presentations that can be. Also, the procedure only guarantees the Cut admissibility, and not the strong normalization. It would be interesting either to refine the procedure to also have it, because strong normalization helps at conceiving proof checkers. Note that if we are only interested in automated proof search, the normalization is less crucial, because the admissibility of cuts suffices to ensure the completeness of the proof-search procedures.

Remark that the rewrite system produced by Procedure 1 may be not confluent. The original version of the sequent calculus modulo may therefore not be equivalent to the polarized version. Nonetheless, this is not problematic because we are mainly interested in the automated proving procedures based on deduction modulo, which are equivalent to the cut-free portion of the polarized version.

We also need to implement Procedure 1. To control its non-termination, we can resort to iterative deepening, that is limiting the number of times $\Rightarrow \vdash, \vee \vdash$

and $\vdash \exists$ can be applied. We should link this implementation with a theorem prover based on deduction modulo that will serve as an oracle to compute $\vdash_{\mathcal{R}}^S$ and $CP(\mathcal{R})$.

Another interesting point is the combination of theories. Given two theories whose presentations have been transformed into analytic compatible rewrite systems, in which cases would the union of the rewrite system still be analytic? Investigating this question implies the study of modularity in deduction modulo.

Finally, we have researched how theories can be presented in deduction modulo. We could also examine how deductive systems can be encoded in it, in order to use deduction modulo as a logical framework. It was already proven that deduction modulo can encode HOL [11] and every functional pure type system [7]. An interesting issue is to automate how to find out such encodings.

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A Properties of LBi

We introduce the notion of proof skeleton. Indeed, we need to prove some lemmata by induction on the proof structure, but without caring about formulæ that can be pruned.

Definition 8. *The proof skeleton associated with a proof is the tree whose nodes are the inference rules of the proof. Proof skeletons are ordered by the subtree relation, which is well-founded.*

We first prove that LBi admits the structural rules:

Lemma 9. *If $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ then $\Gamma, P \vdash \Delta$ and $\Gamma \vdash P, \Delta$ with the same proof skeleton.*

Proof. By induction on the proof structure. \square

Proposition 10. *All inference rules of LBi but $\vdash \Rightarrow$ and $\vdash \forall$ are invertible, and the proofs of their premises is smaller or equal for the proof skeleton ordering. Nonetheless, when there is no extra formula on the right hand side of their conclusion, $\vdash \Rightarrow$ and $\vdash \forall$ are also invertible, with the same property about the proof skeleton ordering.*

Proof. We prove it by induction on the proof skeleton ordering. We only detail the most relevant cases.

For all rules r but $\forall \vdash$, $\vdash \exists$, $\Rightarrow \vdash$, $\vdash \Rightarrow$ and $\vdash \forall$, either the last inference rule in the proof of the conclusion of r is r , in which case this is trivial, or we can proceed by induction. For instance, if we have a proof finishing by

$$\forall \vdash \frac{\Gamma, P, R \wedge S \vdash \Delta \quad \Gamma, Q, R \wedge S \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, P \vee Q, R \wedge S \vdash \Delta}$$

then by induction hypothesis we have proofs of $\Gamma, P, R, S \vdash \Delta$ and $\Gamma, Q, R, S \vdash \Delta$ and therefore we can build a proof of $\Gamma, P \vee Q, R, S \vdash \Delta$.

For $\forall \vdash$, $\vdash \exists$, the premises of the inference rule can be obtained by weakening the proof of its conclusion.

For $\Rightarrow \vdash$, for the left premise we use weakening, for the right we use induction with permutations as above.

For $\vdash \Rightarrow$ and $\vdash \forall$ when there is no extra formula on the right hand side of their conclusion, either the formula on the right hand side is principal somewhere in the proof of the conclusion, in which case we can permute rules to put it at the end of the proof, or it is nowhere principal, so that we can prune it and add the side formulæ by weakening to get the premise. \square

Lemma 11. *If $\Gamma, P, P \vdash \Delta$ then $\Gamma, P \vdash \Delta$ with a smaller or equal proof skeleton. and if $\Gamma \vdash P, P, \Delta$ then $\Gamma \vdash P, \Delta$ with a smaller or equal proof skeleton.*

Proof. By induction on the proof skeleton ordering. For all cases but when P is $Q \Rightarrow S$ or $\forall x. Q$ on the right hand side, we can use the invertibility of the rule to decompose P twice, apply the induction hypothesis on the resulting proofs and

then apply the inference rule to recompose P . For instance, if we have $\Gamma, P \vee Q, P \vee Q \vdash \Delta$, we use the invertibility of $\vee \vdash$ twice to obtain $\Gamma, P, Q, P, Q \vdash \Delta$. We apply the induction hypothesis twice to get $\Gamma, P, Q \vdash \Delta$ (note the importance to state that the contracted proof is smaller or equal for the proof skeleton ordering). We apply $\vee \vdash$ to get $\Gamma, P \vee Q \vdash \Delta$.

If P is $Q \Rightarrow S$ or $\forall x. Q$, we reason by case: Either the principal formula of the last inference rule in $\Gamma \vdash P, P, \Delta$ is P , in which case the other P and Δ are discarded in the proof above. We can therefore discard the other P in the conclusion. For instance if we have

$$\vdash \Rightarrow \frac{\Gamma, R \vdash S}{\Gamma \vdash R \Rightarrow S, R \Rightarrow S, \Delta}$$

we can build

$$\vdash \Rightarrow \frac{\Gamma, R \vdash S}{\Gamma \vdash R \Rightarrow S, \Delta}$$

Or we can use the induction hypothesis on the subproofs and apply the last inference rule to get $\Gamma \vdash P, \Delta$. For instance, if we have

$$\vee \vdash \frac{\Gamma, P \vdash R \Rightarrow S, R \Rightarrow S, \Delta \quad \Gamma, Q \vdash R \Rightarrow S, R \Rightarrow S, \Delta}{\Gamma, P \vee Q \vdash R \Rightarrow S, R \Rightarrow S, \Delta}$$

then by induction hypothesis we have $\Gamma, P \vdash R \Rightarrow S, \Delta$ and $\Gamma, Q \vdash R \Rightarrow S, \Delta$ and we can apply $\vee \vdash$ to get $\Gamma, P \vee Q \vdash R \Rightarrow S, \Delta$. \square

Proposition 12. *LBi and LB are equivalent.*

Proof. We first consider how LB rules are admissible in LBi:

- The lemmata above shows that structural rules are admissible in LBi.
- $\Rightarrow \vdash$ (LB) is admissible by using weakening and applying $\Rightarrow \vdash$ (LBi). This is the same for $\forall \vdash$, $\vdash \exists$, $\perp \vdash$ and $\vdash \top$.
- $\vdash \Rightarrow$ (LB) is a particular case of $\vdash \Rightarrow$ (LBi) where $\Delta = \emptyset$. This is the same for $\vdash \forall$.
- $\wedge \vdash$, $\vdash \wedge$, $\vee \vdash$, $\vdash \vee$ and $\exists \vdash$ are the same in LB and LBi.

Conversely, we consider how LBi rules are admissible in LB:

- $\Rightarrow \vdash$ (LBi) is admissible by using weakening on the right, applying $\Rightarrow \vdash$ (LB) and applying $\cdot \vdash$. This is the same for $\forall \vdash$ and $\vdash \exists$.
- $\vdash \Rightarrow$ (LBi) is obtained by applying $\vdash \Rightarrow$ (LB) and applying weakenings. This is the same for $\vdash \forall$, $\perp \vdash$ and $\vdash \top$.
- $\vdash \perp$ and $\top \vdash$ are particular instances of $\cdot \vdash$ and $\vdash \cdot$.

\square

B Properties of polarized LBi

Lemma 13.

- If $P \xrightarrow{+} Q$ using the rule $A \rightarrow^+ R$, then we can derive $Q \vdash P$ from $R \vdash A$.
 If $P \xrightarrow{+} Q$ using the rule $A \rightarrow^- R$, then we can derive $Q \vdash P$ from $A \vdash R$.
 If $P \xrightarrow{-} Q$ using the rule $A \rightarrow^+ R$, then we can derive $P \vdash Q$ from $R \vdash A$.
 If $P \xrightarrow{-} Q$ using the rule $A \rightarrow^- R$, then we can derive $P \vdash Q$ from $A \vdash R$.

Proof. By mutual induction on the position where the rewriting occurs. \square

We now prove the equivalence between polarized and asymmetric sequent calculi modulo: Given a non-polarized rewrite system \mathcal{R} , it is trivial to find a polarized rewrite system \mathcal{R}^\pm such that the asymmetric LBi modulo \mathcal{R} is equivalent to the polarized LBi modulo \mathcal{R}^\pm : simply consider two rules $A \rightarrow^+ P$ and $A \rightarrow^- P$ for each rule $A \rightarrow P$ in \mathcal{R} .

Conversely, given a polarized rewrite system \mathcal{R} , we can define a non-polarized rewrite system \mathcal{R}^\mp :

- $A \rightarrow^+ P$ becomes $A \rightarrow A \vee P$;
- $A \rightarrow^- P$ becomes $A \rightarrow A \wedge P$.

Proposition 14. $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ can be proved in the polarized LBi modulo \mathcal{R} iff it can be proved in the asymmetric LBi modulo \mathcal{R}^\mp .

Proof. A formal proof would require an induction on the structure of the proof. The proof for classical logic, as can be found in [8], can easily be adapted for LBi. To give the idea, suppose that a rule $A \rightarrow^+ P$ is used somewhere in the proof. If P is the principal formula elsewhere in the proof, it is necessarily on the right of the sequent because of the polarity conditions. If we rewrite A into $A \vee P$ instead, we can first apply $\vdash\vee$ in the place where P is principal. This is dual for the negative rule.

Conversely, suppose that $A \rightarrow A \vee P$ is used somewhere in the proof. If $A \vee P$ is principal on the right of a sequent, it means that the rewriting occurred at a positive position. We can instead use weakening and the rewrite by $A \rightarrow^+ P$ in the position where $A \vee P$ is principal. If $A \vee P$ is principal on the left of a sequent, we get a proof where A appears on the left, so that its rewriting into $A \vee P$ was not necessary. \square

Finally, let us remark that polarized LJ, polarized LB and polarized LBi are equivalent. Indeed, working in a polarized sequent calculus modulo \mathcal{R} can be seen as working in the same sequent calculus without modulo but with explicit conversion rules:

$$\uparrow^* \vdash \frac{\Gamma, Q \vdash \Delta}{\Gamma, P \vdash \Delta} P \xrightarrow{\mathcal{R}^-} Q \quad \text{and} \quad \vdash \uparrow^* \frac{\Gamma \vdash Q, \Delta}{\Gamma \vdash P, \Delta} P \xrightarrow{\mathcal{R}^+} Q.$$

As LJ, LB and LBi are equivalent, adding these conversion rules does not break this equivalence. (One has to be careful with LJ, because the right conversion rule is not exactly the same because the right hand side of the sequent contains at most one formula, but it works.)