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

PEERCUBE: AN HYPERCUBE-BASED P2P OVERLAY ROBUST AGAINST COLLUSION AND CHURN

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PeerCube: an Hypercube-based P2P Overlay Robust against Collusion and Churn

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Abstract: In this paper we present PeerCube, a DHT-based system that aims at minimizing performance penalties caused by high churn while preventing malicious peers from subverting the system through collusion. This is achieved by *i)* applying a clustering strategy to support quorum-based operations; *ii)* using a randomised insertion algorithm to reduce the probability with which colluding Byzantine peers corrupt clusters, and; *iii)* leveraging on the properties of PeerCube's hypercube structure to allow operations to be successfully handled despite the corruption of some clusters. Despite a powerful adversary that can inspect the whole system and issue malicious join requests as often as it wishes, PeerCube guarantees robust operations in $\mathcal{O}(logN)$ messages, with N the number of peers in the system. Extended simulations validate PeerCube robustness.

Key-words: P2P system, Byzantine failure model, Collusion, Churn, simulation

(Résumé : tsvp)

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PeerCube: Infrastructure logique robuste aux collusions et forte dynamicité

Résumé : Dans ce rapport nous proposons une infrastructure pour systèmes pair-à-pair fortement dynamiques robuste aux intrusions coordonnées

Mots clés : système pair-à-pair, fautes byzantines, collusion, dynamique, simulation

1 Introduction

Research on the development of efficient peer-to-peer systems has received a lot of attention due to the increasing popularity of those systems. This has led to the construction of numerous structured peer-to-peer overlays systems (e.g. CAN [14], Chord [23], Pastry [17], Tapestry [8] to cite some of them). All these systems are based on distributed hash tables (DHTs) which partition an ID space among all the peers of the system. Structured overlays enjoy numerous important properties. They are efficient, scalable, and fault-tolerant. On the other hand, less investigation has been carried out for handling both very high churn and collusive behaviour issues. As pointed out by Locher et al. [12], most proposed peer-to-peer overlays are highly satisfactory in terms of efficiency, scalability and fault tolerance when evolving in weakly dynamic environments. On the other hand, in the presence of very frequent connections/disconnections of peers, a very large number of join and leave operations are locally triggered engendering accordingly multiple and concurrent maintenance traffic. Ensuring routing tables consistency quickly becomes unbearable, leading to misrouting, and to possible partitioning of the system. To efficiently face high churn, DHTs properties have been combined to clustering ones [10, 12]. In particular, in [12] the authors propose to group geographically close peers into clusters and to handle routing tables at the cluster level, so that the overall overlay is no more impacted by peers' joins and departures but only by the creation and disappearance of clusters. However, as will be discussed in the following, by using the proximity neighbour selection (PNS) approach to enjoy low stretch, their design fails in defending against geographically localised attacks. As discussed by Sit and Morris [21], the other fundamental issue faced by any practical open system is the inevitable presence of malicious peers. Guaranteeing the liveness of these systems requires their ability to self-heal or at least to self-protect against this adversity. Malicious peers can devise complex strategies to prevent peers from discovering the correct mapping between peers and data keys. They can mount *Sybil attacks* [5] (i.e., an attacker generates numerous fake peers to pollute the system), they can do *routing-table poisoning* (also called *eclipse attacks* [2, 21]) by having good peers redirecting outgoing links towards malicious ones, or they can simply drop or re-route messages towards other malicious peers. They can magnify their impact by colluding and coordinating their behavior. For instance, poisoning attacks can quickly be incurable when malicious peers intercept correct peers' joining requests, and convince them to fill their whole routing tables with illegitimate peers, "eclipsing" correct peers from each others' view. They can also coordinate their actions to form a parallel system internally consistent but in which stored data do not fulfill correct peers expectation. Thus, being robust to malicious behaviors (coordinated or not) is another important requirement that needs to be satisfied when considering open systems.

This paper presents PeerCube, a DHT-based system that aims at avoiding high churn from impacting the performance of the system and at the same time at preventing malicious behavior from subverting the system. As many existing DHT-based overlays, PeerCube is based on a hypercubic topology. PeerCube peers are organized into clusters whose interconnections form the hypercubic topology. Peers within each cluster are classified into two categories, core members and spares. Core members are actively involved in PeerCube operations as opposed to spares that are temporarily inactive (except for the fact that they are also responsible for storing data and their associated keys). Only the core members of a cluster are aware of the spares that belong to their cluster. As a consequence, only a fraction of churn affects the overall topology of the hypercube. Defences against eclipse attacks are based on the observation that malicious peers can more easily draw a successful adversarial strategy from a deterministic algorithm than from a randomised one. We show that regardless of the adversarial strategy colluders employ, the randomised insertion algorithm we propose guarantees that the expected number of colluders in each routing table is minimal. Since limiting collusion is not sufficient to prevent messages from being re-routed or dropped, PeerCube takes advantage of independent and optimal length paths offered by the hypercubic topology to guarantee that a request sent by a correct peer reaches its legitimate destination with probability close to 1. Finally, PeerCube provides all these enjoyable

properties without sacrificing scalability, namely all operations involve $\mathcal{O}(logN)$ messages, where N is the number of peers in the system.

In the remaining of the paper, we discuss related work in Section 2 and then present the system and adversary models in Section 3. Description of the architecture is given in Section 4, together with an analysis of the churn impact. Robustness against malicious behaviors (coordinated or not) is studied in Section 5. Results of simulations are presented in Section 7. We conclude in Section 8.

2 Related Work

In the following, we first review related work that focuses on robustness against malicious peers and then examine policies to handle high churn.

Regarding robustness to malicious behaviour, different approaches have been proposed, each one focusing on a particular adversary strategy. Regarding eclipse attacks, a very common technique, called *constrained routing table*, relies on the uniqueness and impossibility of forging peers' identifiers. It consists in selecting as neighbours only the peers whose identifiers are closer to some particular points in the identifier space [2]. Such an approach has been successfully implemented into several overlays (e.g., CAN, Chord, Pastry). Another defense against those attacks comes from the observation that during eclipse attacks, the degree of attacker peers is much higher than the average degree of peers in the overlay. Addressing such attacks consists in bounding peers degrees. Singh et al. [20] propose to anonymously audit peers to continuously check the bounded degree of peers. They guarantee anonymity of auditors by using third-party peers randomly chosen within the overlay. Results of their experimentation show that audit efficiency depends on both the audit rate and the stability of the overlay. This makes their solution effective in an overlay with low to moderately high churn. More generally, to prevent messages from being misrouted or dropped, the seminal work on DHT routing security by Castro et al. [2] combine routing failure tests and redundant routing as a solution to ensure robust routing. Ravoaja and Anceaume [15] extend their approach to cope with colluders by constraining the result of a query, which guarantees to reach the legitimate recipient with high probability. However, in both approaches, the topological properties of their overlay do not guarantee that messages do not cross the same peers along different paths, i.e. that redundant paths are independent. In the present work, we take advantage of the topology of our overlay to guarantee independent and optimal length paths. Sit and Morris [21] provide several design principles to defend against malicious attacks. In particular, they suggest to perform validity tests by the source of a message. That recursive technique takes advantage of the fact that the distance to the destination decreases exponentially at each hop made by a request. In addition to this technique, Fiat et al. [6] use the wide paths technique initially proposed by Hildrum and Kubiatowicz [9]. All these solutions require all DHT nodes to maintain $\mathcal{O}(log^2N)$ links to other nodes.

With regard to churn, Li and al. [11] show through a comprehensive performance evaluation that structured overlays (such as Tapestry, Chord, or Kademlia) can achieve similar performance with regard to churn if their parameters are sufficiently well tuned. However, these protocols do not focus on reducing the frequency at which routing tables are updated while maintaining routing consistency. Such an approach has been proposed in the eQuus architecture [12]. This architecture, based on a hypercubic topology, is able to cope with high dynamics. Nodes which are geographically close to each other are grouped into the same cliques to form the vertices of the hypercube. EQuus offers good resilience to churn and good data availability. On the other hand, relying on local awareness to gather peers within cliques makes this architecture vulnerable to adversarial collusion and geographically correlated failures. Geographically close adversaries can easily and progressively gain the majority of a set of cliques (starting with few of them, and then propagating to others through the split operations) and then can start serious application attacks. Evicting them from the system does not seem straightforward.

3 Model

3.1 System Model

Peers are assigned unique random identifiers from an m-bit identifier space when they join the system. Identifiers are derived by using the standard MD5 hash function [16], on the peers' network address. We take the value of m large enough to make the probability of identifiers collision negligible. Each application-specific object, or data-item, of the system is assigned a unique identifier, called *key*, selected from the same m-bit identifier space. Each peer p owns a fraction of all the data items of the system. Data items and peers are mapped by a closeness relationship detailed in Section 4.2. In the following, we will use the term *peer* (or *key*) to refer to both the peer (or key) and its m-bit representation. Regarding timing assumption, we assume an asynchronous model. Rational of this assumption is that it matches communication delays over the Internet, and it makes difficult for malicious peers to devise strategies that could have been exploited in a synchronous timing model, such as denial-of-service attacks [13].

3.2 Adversary Model

Some peers try to manipulate the system by not following the prescribed protocols and by exhibiting undesirable behaviours. Such peers are called *malicious*. Malicious peers can drop messages or forward requests to illegitimate peers. Malicious peers may act independently or may be part of a *collusion group*. A peer which always follows the prescribed protocols is said to be *correct*. We assume that there exists a fraction μ, $(0 \leq \mu \leq 1)$, of malicious peers in the whole system. Malicious peers are controlled by a strong adversary. The adversary can issue join requests for its malicious peers in an arbitrary manner. At any time it can inspect the whole system and make its malicious peers re-join the system as often as it wishes. In this work, we do not consider Sybil attacks [5], that is peers that pollute the system by creating numerous fake identifiers. We suppose the existence of some external technique to counter this problem, as for instance an off-line certification authority as in Castro et al. [2] and leave this issue for future work.

We assume the existence of a public key cryptography scheme that allows each peer to verify the signature of each other peer. We also assume that correct peers never reveal their private keys. Peers identifiers and keys are part of their hard coded state. Keys and signed identifiers are acquired via a central authority [4]. When describing the protocols, we ignore the fact that messages are signed and recipients of a message ignore any message that is not signed properly. We also use cryptographic techniques to prevent a malicious peer from observing or undetectably modifying a message sent by a correct peer. However a malicious peer has complete control over the messages it sends and receives. Note that messages physically sent between any two correct peers are neither lost nor duplicated.

4 Architecture Description

As discussed before, our architecture is based on a hypercubic topology. The hypercube is a popular interconnection scheme due to its attractive topological properties, namely, low node degree and low network diameter. Beyond these good properties, a hypercube offers two important topological features, namely, recursive construction and independent paths. We exploit both properties, first to manage the dynamics of the architecture at a low cost and thus to increase resilience to high churn, and second to increase the robustness of the routing protocol against malicious behaviours.

4.1 Background

This section presents some preliminaries related to the hypercubic topology. For more details the reader is invited to read Saad and Schultz [18].

A d-dimensional hypercube, or d-hypercube for short, consists of 2^d vertices, where each vertex n is labeled by its d-bits representation. Dimension d is a fundamental parameter since it characterises both the diameter and the degree of a d-hypercube. Two vertices n and m respectively labeled $n_0 \dots n_{d-1}$ and $m_0 \dots m_{d-1}$ are connected by an edge if they share the same bits but the ith one for some i, $0 \leq i < d$, i.e. if their Hamming distance $\mathcal{H}(n,m)$ is equal to 1. In the following, the notation $n = m^{\bar{i}}$ stands for two vertices n and m whose labels differ only by their bit i. A d-dimensional hypercube-structured peer-to-peer system, or a d-system for short, is mapped directly into a d-hypercube, with the vertices and edges in the d-hypercube being the peers and their interconnections in the d-system.

Property 1 (Recursive Construction [18])**.** *A d-hypercube can be constructed from lower dimensional hypercubes.*

The construction consists in joining each vertex of a $(d-1)$-hypercube to the vertex of the other $(d-1)$-hypercube that is equally labeled, and by suffixing all the labels of the vertices of the first $(d-1)$-hypercube with 0 and those of the second one with 1. The obtained graph is a d-hypercube. From this construction, we can derive a simple distributed algorithm for building a d-system from a $(d-1)$-system. This algorithm consists in splitting each peer of the $(d-1)$-system into two peers, in suffixing the labels of the two obtained peers respectively by 0 and 1, and in updating the link structure to map the d-hypercube. Interestingly, this simple algorithm involves only 2 messages per link updated whatever the dimension of the considered system, and thus has a message complexity of $\mathcal{O}(d)$ per peer.

Property 2 (Independent Routes [18])**.** *Let n and m be any two vertices of a d-hypercube. Then there are d independent paths between n and m, and their length is less than or equal to $\mathcal{H}(n,m)+2$.*

Two paths are independent if they do not share any common vertix other than the source and the destination vertices. In a d-hypercube, a path from vertex n to vertex m is obtained by crossing successively the vertices whose labels are obtained by modifying one by one n's bits to transform n's label into m's one. Suppose that $\mathcal{H}(n,m) = b$. Then b independent paths between n and m can be found as follows: path i is obtained by successively correcting bit i, bit $i+1$, ..., bit $(i+b-1) \mod b$ among the b different bits between n and m. Note that these b paths are of optimal length $\mathcal{H}(n,m)$. In addition to these paths, $d-b$ paths of length $\mathcal{H}(n,m)+2$ can be constructed as follows: path j of length $\mathcal{H}(n,m)+2$ is obtained by modifying first bit j on which n and m agree, and then by correcting the b different bits according to one of the b possibilities described previously, and finally by re-modifying bit j. The ability to construct independent paths is an important property since it allows the peer-to-peer system to have alternative paths to tolerate faulty peers. Indeed, if the faulty peers are uniformly distributed in the system, then the probability of encountering a faulty peer decreases *exponentially* with the number of independent paths [22]. Finally, finding paths of almost shortest length minimises the probability of encountering malicious peers.

4.2 PeerCube in a Nutshell

We now present an overview of PeerCube features. Basically, our architecture has two main characteristics: first, peers sharing a common prefix are grouped into *clusters*; and second, clusters are organised into a hypercubic topology.

4.2.1 Clusters

As stated before, each joining peer is assigned a unique random *identifier* from an m-bit ID space. Assigning unique random identifiers to peers prevents the adversary from controlling a portion of the network, since peers are spread wide over the network according to their identifier as follows. Peers whose identifier *share a common prefix* are gathered together within the same *cluster*. Each cluster is uniquely identified with a *label* that characterises the position of the cluster in the overall hypercubic topology[1]. The label of a cluster is

[1] In the rest of the paper, a cluster will refer to both the cluster and its label.

defined as the shortest common prefix shared by all the peers of that cluster such that the *non-inclusion* property is satisfied. The non-inclusion property guarantees that a cluster label never matches the prefix of another cluster label, and thus ensures that each peer in PeerCube belongs to at most one cluster. The non-inclusion property is defined as follows:

Property 3 (Non-Inclusion). *If a cluster $\mathcal{C}$ labeled with $b_0 \dots b_{d-1}$ exists then no cluster $\mathcal{C}'$ with $\mathcal{C}' \neq \mathcal{C}$ whose label is prefixed with $b_0 \dots b_{d-1}$ exists.*

The length of a cluster label, i.e. the number of bits of that label, is called the *dimension* of the cluster. In the following, notation d-cluster denotes a cluster of dimension d. Dimension determines an upper bound on the number of links a cluster has with other clusters of the overlay, i.e. the number of its neighbours. Peers of a d-cluster $\mathcal{C}$ maintain a routing table RT such that entry $RT[i]$, with $0 \leq i < d$, points to peers belonging to one of the d closest clusters to $\mathcal{C}$. (The notion of distance is detailed in Section 4.2.2.) References to clusters that point toward $\mathcal{C}$ are maintained by $\mathcal{C}$'s members in a predecessor table PT. Note that maintaining such a data structure is not mandatory, i.e. those clusters can be easily found by the topological properties of PeerCube. However, keeping this information makes the maintenance operations more efficient. Finally, in addition to inter-cluster links, all the peers within a cluster maintain links to each other. They form a clique.

Regarding data, all the peers of a cluster are responsible for the same data keys and their associated data. As for most existing overlays, a data key is placed on the closest cluster to this key. Placing a data key on all the peers of a cluster naturally improves fault tolerance since this increases the probability that this key remains available even if some of the peers fails. To keep this probability high, the size of a cluster must not undershoot a certain predefined value S_{min} which depends on the probability of peers' failures. Finally, for scalability reasons, the size of each cluster is upper bounded by a constant value S_{max}, with S_{max} in $\mathcal{O}(logN)$, where N is the current number of peers in the system.

4.2.2 Hypercubic Topology

Clusters are organised into a hypercubic topology, such that the position of a cluster into the hypercube is determined by its label. Ideally the dimension of each cluster $\mathcal{C}$ should be equal to a certain value d to conform to a perfect d-hypercube. However, due to churn and random identifier assignment, dimensions may differ from one cluster to another. Indeed, as peers may join and leave the system asynchronously, cluster $\mathcal{C}$ may grow or shrink more rapidly than others. In the meantime, bounds on the size of clusters require that, whenever the size of $\mathcal{C}$ exceeds S_{max}, $\mathcal{C}$ splits into clusters of higher dimensions, and that, whenever the size of $\mathcal{C}$ falls under S_{min}, $\mathcal{C}$ merges with other clusters into a single new cluster of lower dimension. Finally, since peers identifiers, and thus cluster labels, are randomly assigned, some of the labels may initially not be represented at all. For all these reasons dimensions of clusters may not be homogeneous. To keep the structure as close as possible to a perfect hypercube and thus to benefit from its topological properties, we need to define a *distance* function $\mathcal{D}$ that allows to uniquely characterise the closest cluster of a given label. The distance function we propose is based on the numerical value of the "exclusive or" (XOR) of cluster labels. To prevent two labels to be at the same distance from a given bit string, labels are suffixed with as many bits "0" as needed to equalise their size to m. This leads to the following distance function $\mathcal{D}$.

Definition 1 (Distance $\mathcal{D}$). *Let $\mathcal{C} = a_0 \dots a_{d-1}$ and $\mathcal{C}' = b_0 \dots b_{d'-1}$ be any two d (resp. d') -clusters:*

$$\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{C}, \mathcal{C}') = \mathcal{D}(a_0 \dots a_{d-1}0^{m-d}, b_0 \dots b_{d'-1}0^{m-d'})$$

$$= \sum_{i=0, a_i \neq b_i}^{m-1} 2^{m-i} \qquad (1)$$

Distance $\mathcal{D}$ is such that for any point p and distance Δ there is exactly one point q such that $\mathcal{D}(p,q) = \Delta$ (which does not hold for the Hamming distance). Futhermore, labels that have longer prefix in common are closer to each other.

We are now ready to detail the content of a cluster's routing table. Let $\mathcal{C} = b_0 \dots b_{d-1}$ and $\mathcal{C}^{\bar{i}} = b_0 \dots \overline{b}_i \dots b_{d-1}$. Then, $\mathcal{C}$'s i^{th} neighbour in PeerCube is the cluster $\mathcal{C}'$ whose label is the closest to $\mathcal{C}^{\bar{i}}$.

Property 4. *Let $\mathcal{C}$ be a d-cluster in PeerCube. Then, for each $i, 0 \leq i < d$, entry i of the routing table of $\mathcal{C}$ is cluster $\mathcal{C}'$ such that for each cluster $\mathcal{C}'' \neq \mathcal{C}'$, $\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{C}^{\bar{i}}, \mathcal{C}') < \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{C}^{\bar{i}}, \mathcal{C}'')$ holds.*

By the definition of distance $\mathcal{D}$, it is easy to see that if for each cluster $\mathcal{C}$ in the system the distance between $\mathcal{C}^{\bar{i}}$ and its ith neighbour is equal to 0 (with $0 \leq i < d$), then the system maps a perfect d-hypercube. Then, from Property 4, we can derive the following lemma:

Lemma 1. *Let $\mathcal{C} = b_0 \dots b_{d-1}$ be a d-cluster. Then for all i, with $0 \leq i < d$, $\mathcal{C}$'s i^{th} neighbour is cluster $\mathcal{C}'$ such that:*

- *$\mathcal{C}'$ is prefixed with $b_0 \dots \overline{b}_i$ if such a cluster exists,*
- *$\mathcal{C}' = \mathcal{C}$ otherwise.*

This can be seen by observing that, by the definition of $\mathcal{D}$, $\mathcal{C}'$ shares the longest prefix with $\mathcal{C}^{\bar{i}}$, that is at least the prefix $b_0 \dots \overline{b}_i$. Otherwise $\mathcal{C}$ would be the closest cluster to $\mathcal{C}^{\bar{i}}$. We exploit this property to construct a simple lookup protocol which basically consists in correcting the bits of the source towards the destination from the left to the right (see Section 4.4.1).

4.2.3 Dimensions Disparity.

As described before, clusters dimensions are not necessarily equal to each other. By simply setting $S_{max} > log_2 N$, we can make the dimensions disparity small. Indeed, observe that the dimension of a cluster is necessarily greater than or equal to $log_2 \frac{N}{S_{max}}$. This follows from the fact that the minimum number of clusters is N/S_{max}, which determines the minimum number of bits needed to code the label of a cluster. Furthermore, by setting $S_{max} > log_2 N$, we can show by using Chernoff's bounds that the dimension of a cluster is w.h.p.[2] lower than $log_2 \frac{N}{S_{max}} + 3$. This can be seen intuitively by observing that, since labels are uniformly randomly assigned, setting S_{max} to a higher value decreases the dimension of the clusters. Thus the distance δ between any two clusters dimensions is w.h.p. less than or equal to 3.[3] Furthermore the number of non-represented prefixes is at most $2^3 = 8$, which is very small with regard to the total number of clusters N/S_{max}. Consequently, by setting $S_{max} > log_2 N$, PeerCube is very close to a ($log_2 \frac{N}{S_{max}}$)-hypercube, which guarantees PeerCube to enjoy the attractive topological properties of a perfect hypercube. More detailed are given in Section 6. We suppose henceforth that S_{max} is in $\Theta(log N)$.

4.3 Handling Churn

In addition to gathering peers in clusters, only a subset of the peers of a cluster are involved in PeerCube operations. Specifically, peers within a cluster are classified into two categories: *core* and *spare* members. Core members are in charge of PeerCube operations, i.e. they maintain routing tables to keep connectivity between neighbour clusters, they path messages, they compute a new cluster view of their cluster upon join/leave/crash events, and they cache keys. The size of the core set is equal to the minimal size of a cluster, i.e. S_{min}. In the following, the core set view is denoted by V_c. In contrast to core members, spare members are temporarily inactive, in the sense that they are not involved in any of the overlay operations. They only maintain links to a subset of core members of their cluster

[2] In the following, with high probability (w.h.p.) means with probability greater than $1 - \frac{1}{N}$.
[3] Note that for a pure hypercube, the dimension disparity is equal to $log_2 N$.

and cache the set of keys and associated data that core members store. Apart from the core members of its cluster that maintain the view V_s of the spares set, no other peer in the system is aware of the presence of a particular spare, not even the other spares of the cluster. As a consequence, routing tables only point to core members, that is S_{min} references per entry.

Beyond that, by keeping the size of the core set to a small and constant value, we can afford to rely on the powerful consensus building block to guarantee consistent routing tables among correct core members despite the presence of Byzantine peers among them. Briefly, in the consensus problem, each process proposes a value, and all the non-faulty processes have to eventually decide (termination property) on the same output value (agreement property), this value having been proposed by at least one process (validity property). Various Byzantine consensus algorithms have been proposed in the literature (good surveys can be found in [7, 3]). In PeerCube, we use the solution proposed by Correia et al. [3] essentially because it provides optimal resiliency, i.e. it is resilient to the failure of up to one fourth of the peers that form the core set, and guarantees that a value proposed only by byzantine processes is never decided by correct ones. Message complexity is in $\mathcal{O}(n^3)$. Note that in our context, $n = S_{min}$.

4.4 PeerCube Operations

From the application point of view, three key operations are provided by the system: the `lookup`(k) operation which enables to search for key k, the `join` operation that enables a peer to join the system, and the `leave` operation, indicating that some peer left the system. Note that a `put`(x) operation that enables to insert data x in the system is provided by the system but since it is very similar to the `lookup`() operation we omit its presentation in the paper. On the other hand, from the topology structure point of view, three events may result in a topology modification: first when the size of a cluster exceeds S_{max}, this cluster splits into two new clusters; in contrast, when the size of a cluster reaches S_{min}, this cluster merges with other clusters to guarantee the cluster resiliency; finally, when a peer cannot join any existing cluster because none of them matches the peer identifier prefix, then a new cluster is created through the `create` operation. Note that for robustness reasons, a cluster may have to temporarily exceed its maximal size S_{max} before being able to split into two new clusters to guarantee that resiliency of both new clusters is met, i.e both clusters size is at least equal to S_{min}. A similar argument applies for the `create` operation. For this specific operation, peers whose identifiers do not match any cluster label, temporarily join the closest cluster to their identifier, and as soon as there are $T_{split} \geq S_{min}$ temporary peers sharing the same prefix then they create their new cluster. Threshold T_{split} is discussed in Section 4.4.4. These three additional operations, namely `split`, `merge`, and `create` are specified in such a way that they minimize topology changes. This is achieved by exploiting the recursive construction property of hypercubes.

4.4.1 `lookup` Operation

In this section we describe how peer $p \in \mathcal{C}$ locates a given key k through the `lookup` operation. Basically, locating k consists in walking in the overlay by correcting one by one and from left to right the bits of p's identifier to match k. By Lemma 1 and by distance $\mathcal{D}$ definition, this simply consists in recursively contacting the closest cluster to k. Let us first assume a failure-free environment. If p is not a core member, it simply forwards its request to a ramdom subset of its core members. Upon receiving of such a request, a core member finds in its routing table the entry that refers to the closest cluster $\mathcal{C}'$ to k. If $\mathcal{C}'$ is closer to k than the current cluster, then p randomly chooses a peer q from that entry and sends the request to q. This process is repeated until either a peer of a cluster labeled with a prefix of k is found, or no cluster is closer to k than the current one. The last contacted peer q returns to the requesting peer p either the requested data if it exists, or null otherwise.

Theorem 1. *The `lookup`(k) operation returns some core member belonging to the closest cluster to k in $\mathcal{O}(logN)$ hops.*

```
Upon lookup(k) from the application do
  if (p.type ≠ {core}) then
    {q_0 ... q_⌊(S_min−1)/3⌋} ← p.coreRandomPeer();
    p sends (LOOKUP, k,p) to {q_0 ... q_⌊(S_min−1)/3⌋}
  else
    C ← p.findClosestCluster(k);
    p sends (LOOKUP,k,p) to a random subset of
    ⌊(S_min − 1)/3⌋ + 1 peers in C.coreSet;
enddo
Upon receiving (LOOKUP,k,q) from the network do
  C ← p.findClosestCluster(k);
  if (p.cluster.label= C) then
    p sends (LOOKUP, k,q) to core members in C
    if not already done;
    data ← k's data if cached otherwise null;
    sends (k,C,data) to q;
  else
    p sends (LOOKUP, k,q) to a random subset of
    ⌊(S_min − 1)/3⌋ + 1 peers in C.coreSet;
enddo
findClosestCluster(k)
  if (p.dim=0 or p.cluster.prefix(k)) then
    C ← p.cluster;
  else
    C.label ← RT_p(0).label;
    for (i = 0 to p.dim − 1) do
      if (D(k,RT_p(i).label) < (D(k,C.label))) then
        C.label ← RT_p(i).label;
  return C;
```

Figure 1: `lookup` Operation at Peer p

Proof. Consider a peer p invoking `lookup`(k). First, observe that since at each hop, the next contacted cluster is necessarily closer to k than the current one, the lookup eventually terminates.

Let $\mathcal{N}'$ be the cluster of the core member returned by the `lookup`(k) operation. To prove that $\mathcal{N}'$ is the closest cluster to k we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exists some cluster $\mathcal{N}''$ such that $\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{N}'', k) < \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{N}', k)$. By definition of $\mathcal{D}$, if we denote the position of the leftmost different bit between $\mathcal{N}'$ and $\mathcal{N}''$ by i, it must be the case that $\mathcal{N}''$ and k share their i^{th} bit:

- $\mathcal{N}' = a_0 \dots a_i a_{i+1} \dots$
- $\mathcal{N}'' = a_0 \dots \overline{a}_i b_{i+1} \dots$
- $k = a_0 \dots \overline{a}_i c_{i+1} \dots$

By Property 3, i necessarily exists. Then since a cluster prefixed with $a_0 \dots \overline{a}_i$ exists ($\mathcal{N}''$), by Lemma 1 the ith neighbour $\mathcal{N}'_i$ of $\mathcal{N}'$ is prefixed with $a_0 \dots \overline{a}_i$, that is $\mathcal{N}'_i$ necessarily shares its ith bit with k.

- $\mathcal{N}'_i = a_0 \dots \overline{a}_i a'_{i+1} \dots$

Thus $\mathcal{N}'_i$ is closer to k than $\mathcal{N}'$ is. But by the algorithm, $\mathcal{N}'$ should have forwarded the request for k to $\mathcal{N}'_i$. This contradicts the assumption and thus proves the first part of the theorem.

Let us now prove that the lookup stops after $O(logN)$ hops. First, since the distance to k stricly decreases at each hop, at least one bit is corrected. Second, from the distance definition and by Lemma 1, bits are corrected from the left to the right, and a corrected bit is never flipped again. Then the maximum number of hops is not greater than the maximum dimension of a cluster. Since the dimension of a cluster is w.h.p. at most $log_2 N - log_2 S_{max} + 3$ (see Lemma 10), the number of hops needed to complete a lookup is w.h.p. $O(logN)$. □

```
Upon join(p) from the application do
  {q_0 ... q_⌊(S_min−1)/3⌋} ← findBootstrap();
  p sends (JOIN,p) to q ∈ {q_0 ... q_⌊(S_min−1)/3⌋};
enddo;
Upon receiving (JOIN,q) from the network do;
  C ← p.findClosestCluster(q.id);
  if (p.cluster= C) then
    if (p.cluster.prefix(q.id)) then
      p broadcasts (JOINSPARE,C,q) to p's core set;
    else
      p broadcasts (JOINSTEMP,C,q) to p's core set;
  else
    p sends (JOIN,q) to a random subset of
    ⌊(S_min − 1)/3⌋ + 1 peers in C's core set;
enddo;
Upon delivering (JOINSPARE,C,q) from the network do;
/* each core member ∈ C executes this code once by the
broadcast properties */
  V_s ← V_s ∪ q;
  if (p.clusterIsSplit) then p.split();
  C′=p.findClosestCluster(q.id);
  p sends (JOINACK,C′,state) to q;
enddo;
Upon delivering (JOINSTEMP,C,q) from the network do;
/* each core member ∈ C executes this code once by the
broadcast properties */
  p.temp← p.temp ∪ q;
  if (p.tempIsSplit) then p.create(p.temp);
  C′=p.findClosestCluster(q.id);
  p sends (JOINACK,C′,state) to q;
enddo;
```

Figure 2: `join` Operation at Peer p

Now, suppose that malicious peers may drop or misroute requests they receive to prevent them from reaching their legitimate destination. We extend the `lookup` operation to guarantee that requests sent by correct peers reach their legitimate destination. The extension described in Figure 1, uses the *width path* approach, commonly used in fault tolerant algorithms, which consists in forwarding a request to sufficiently enough peers so that at least one correct peer receives it. Specifically, a request is forwarded to $\lfloor (S_{min}-1)/3 \rfloor + 1$ randomly chosen core members of the closest cluster to the request destination, instead of only one randomly chosen core member as in the basic `lookup` operation. In addition, in the last contacted cluster $\mathcal{C}$, when a core member $p \in \mathcal{C}$ receives the request, if p has not already sent it to all core members of its cluster $\mathcal{C}$ then it does so and then returns the response through the reverse path. Hence, each peer that forwarded the request waits for a quorum of responses (i.e., $\lfloor (S_{min}-1)/3 \rfloor + 1$) before propagating the response back in the reverse path. Peer q can safely use the received *data* upon receipt of $\lfloor (S_{min}-1)/3 \rfloor + 1$ similar responses $(k, data, \mathcal{C})$ issue from peers belonging to the core set of the cluster it contacted[4]. It is easy to see that if there are no more than $\lfloor (S_{min}-1)/3 \rfloor$ malicious core members per cluster crossed, then a lookup operation invoked by a correct peer returns the legitimate response.

Note that since core sizes are bounded by a constant, this algorithm does not influence the operation asymptotic complexity.

```
leave(p) /* run by core member p upon q's departure*/
Upon (q's failure detection) do
  if (q ∈ V_s) then V_s ← V_s \ {q};
  else
    p chooses S_min random peers R = {r_1, ..., r_j} in V_s ∪ V_c;
    {s_1, ..., s_j} ← run consensus on R among V_c members;
    /* the decision value is delivered at all core members */
    p.leavePredTable() ;
    V_s ← V_s ∪ V_c \ {s_1, ..., s_j};
    V_c ← {s_1, ..., s_min};
    p sends (LEAVE, V_c) to all spare members ∈ V_s;
    p.leaveRoutingTable();
enddo;
```

Figure 3: `leave` Operation at Peer p

4.4.2 `join` Operation

We now describe the `join` operation. Recall that each cluster $\mathcal{C}$ contains all the peers p such that $\mathcal{C}$'s label is a prefix of p's identifier, and that each peer p belongs to a unique cluster. To join the system, peer p sends its request to a correct peer it knows in the system. The request is forwarded until finding the closest cluster $\mathcal{C}$ to p's identifier. Two cases are possible: either $\mathcal{C}$'s label matches the prefix of p's identifier or the cluster $\mathcal{C}'$ p should be inserted into does not exist ($\mathcal{C}$ is only the closest cluster to $\mathcal{C}'$). In the former case, p is inserted into $\mathcal{C}$ as a spare member. As will be shown in Section 5, by inserting newcomers as spare members, malicious peers cannot design deterministic strategies to increase their probability to join the core set of a cluster. In the latter case, p is temporarily inserted into $\mathcal{C}$ until creation of $\mathcal{C}'$ is possible, i.e., predicate `tempIsSplit()` in Figure 2 holds. This predicate holds if there exist T_{split} temporary peers in $\mathcal{C}$ that share a common prefix. Note that temporary peers do not participate in the cluster life (they do not even cache data, contrary to spares), and only core members are aware of their presence. The `create` operation is presented in Section 4.4.6. In both cases, p's insertion is broadcast to all the core members. The *broadcast* primitive allows the sender to reliably send a message m to all peers in the core set, that is, this primitive guarantees that if a correct sender broadcasts m, then all correct recipients eventually deliver m once[5]. Peer p's insertion in cluster $\mathcal{C}$ (or new cluster $\mathcal{C}'$ due to the invocation of a `create` operation or a `split` one) is acknowledged to p via a JOINACK message. This message carries the necessary information (*state*) that p needs to join its cluster (p's status, i.e. spare or temporary, and according to this status the required data structures).

In all cases, a constant number of messages are exchanged. Thus the message complexity of a `join` is $\mathcal{O}(logN)$ which is the cost of the lookup for $\mathcal{C}$.

4.4.3 `leave` Operation

The `leave` operation is executed when a peer q wishes to leave a cluster or when q's failure has been detected. Note that in both cases, q's departure has to be detected by at least $\lfloor(2S_{min}+1)/3\rfloor+1$ core members so that a malicious peer cannot abusively pretend that some peer q left the system. Thus, when core members detect that q left, two scenarios are possible. Either q belonged to the spare set, in which case, core members simply update their spare view to reflect q's departure, or q belonged to the core set. In the latter case, q's departure has to be immediately followed by the core set maintenance to ensure its

[4]The algorithm presented in Figure 1 was simplified for space reasons, in particular regarding the response which is directly sent to the requesting peer. Replying directly to the requesting peer makes the system vulnerable to some malicious behaviors.

[5]PeerCube relies on the asynchronous Byzantine-resistant reliable broadcast proposed by Bracha [1], whose time complexity is in $\mathcal{O}(1)$ (the protocol runs in exactly 3 asynchronous rounds, where an asynchronous round involves the sender sending a message and receiving one or more messages sent by recipients), and message complexity is in $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$ with $n = S_{min}$ in our case.

resiliency (and thus the cluster resiliency). To prevent the adversary from devising collusive scenario to pollute the core set, the whole composition of this set has to be refreshed. Indeed, replacing the peer that left by a single one (even randomly chosen within the spare set) does not prevent the adversary from ineluctably corrupting the core set. (Once malicious peers succeed in joining the core set, they maximise the benefit of their insertion by staying in place; this way, core sets will eventually be populated by more than $\lfloor \frac{S_{min}-1}{3} \rfloor$ malicious peers, and thus become – and remain – corrupted. Impact of this solution is illustrated in Section 5.). Thus each core member chooses S_{min} random peers among both core and spare members, and proposes this subset to the consensus. By the consensus properties, a single decision is delivered to all core members, and this decision must have been proposed by at least one correct core member. Thus core members agree on a unique subset which becomes the new core set. Note that in addition to preventing collusion, refreshing the whole core set minimises the expected number of malicious peers in core sets, and thus the number of corrupted entries in routing tables (see Section 5). Remark that because of the asynchrony of the system, some of the agreed peers s_i may still belong to some views while having been detected as failed or left by others, or may belong to only some views because of its recent join. In the former case, all the correct core members eventually deliver the consensus decision notifying s_i's departure, and new consensus is run to replace it. Note that for efficiency reason, before invoking the consensus algorithm, each core member can ping the peers it proposes. In the latter case, s_i's recent arrival will eventually be notified at all correct core members by properties of the broadcast primitive (see `join` operation), and thus they will be able to insert s_i in their core view. Then each core member p notifies all the clusters that point to $\mathcal{C}$ (i.e. members of p's PT table) of $\mathcal{C}$'s new core set. Core members of each such cluster can safely update their entries upon receipt of $\lfloor \frac{S_{min}-1}{3} \rfloor + 1$ similar notifications. This is encapsulated into the `leavePredTable()` procedure in Figure 3. Similarly, all the peers $\{s_1, \ldots, s_{min}\}$ are safely notified about their new state, and locally handle the received data structures (invocation of `leaveRoutingTable()` procedure in Figure 3). Former core members only keep their keys and the associated data.

In all cases a constant number of messages are exchanged for a `leave`.

4.4.4 `split` Operation

As discussed above, when the size of a cluster $\mathcal{C}$ exceeds the S_{max} threshold, then $\mathcal{C}$ has to split into two new clusters. We exploit the recursive construction property of hypercubes to achieve a `split` operation involving $\mathcal{O}(logN)$ messages.

When locally some core member p of a d-cluster $\mathcal{C}$, with $1 \leq d \leq m$, detects that the conditions to split its cluster are satisfied (i.e., predicate `clusterIsSplit` holds) then p invokes the `split` operation. Let $a_0 \ldots a_{d'-1}$ and $a_0 \ldots \overline{a}_{d'-1}$, with $d' > d$ be the *shortest non-common prefixes* shared by $\mathcal{C}$'s members identifiers (i.e., core and spare members). Predicate `clusterIsSplit` holds iff *i)* $|\mathcal{C}| \geq S_{max}$, *ii)* the number of peers whose identifier satisfies $a_0 \ldots a_{d'-1}$ is greater than or equal to T_{split} and, *iii)* the number of peers whose identifier satisfies $a_0 \ldots \overline{a}_{d'-1}$ is greater than or equal to T_{split}, with $T_{split} \leq S_{max}/2$. Threshold T_{split} is introduced to prevent the adversary from triggering a "split-merge" cyclic phenomenon. Indeed, a strong adversary can inspect the system and locate the clusters that are small enough so that the departure of malicious peers from that cluster triggers a merge operation with other clusters, and their re-joining activates a split operation of the newly created cluster. Thus by setting $T_{split} - S_{min} > \lfloor \frac{S_{max}-1}{3} \rfloor$ with $\lfloor \frac{S_{max}-1}{3} \rfloor$ the expected number of malicious peers in a cluster, probability of this cyclic phenomenon is negligible.

The `split` operation is described in Figure 4. The first step consists in building the core sets of the two new clusters $\mathcal{C}'$ and $\mathcal{C}''$. Specifically, new core sets are prioritarily populated with core members of $\mathcal{C}$ and then completed with randomly chosen spares of $\mathcal{C}$. This is handled as in the `leave` operation through consensus invocation by core members. The second step consists, for each core member $p \in \mathcal{C}'$ (similarly for $p \in \mathcal{C}''$), in updating its views V_c and V_s by removing all the peers that do not anymore share a common prefix with its new cluster, and similarly with data and associated keys (p keeps data closest to its new cluster). Peer p sends to V_s members the label of their new cluster and the new core view.

```
split(𝒞) /* run by core member p in 𝒞*/
  label_0, label_1 ← the two shortest non common prefixes
  shared by at least T_split peers in 𝒞
  for (i=0,1) do
    V_{c_i} ← {q | q ∈ 𝒞's core set and q's prefix is label_i};
    V_{s_i} ← {q | q ∈ 𝒞's spare set and q's prefix is label_i};
    p chooses V_i = S_min− | V_{c_i} | random peers from V_{s_i}
  enddo;
    (V'_0, V'_1) ← run consensus on (V_0, V_1) among V_c members;
    if (p ∈ V'_0) then i = 0 else i = 1;
    p updates its cluster label and dimension;
    V_{c_i} ← V_{c_i} ∪ V'_i; V_{s_i} ← V_{s_i} \ V'_i;
    p.splitRoutingTable() to update RT;
    p.splitPredTable() to update PT;
    p sends (SPLIT,label'_i,state) to all peers in V_{s_i};
```

Figure 4: `split` Operation at Peer p

Peers in V_s then remove any keys and associated data that do not belong to the cluster anymore. The final step consists in updating routing tables of $\mathcal{C}'$ and $\mathcal{C}''$, as well as the ones that pointed to $\mathcal{C}$ prior to its splitting (i.e. entries in the predecessor table) as follows.

We adapt the distributed algorithm sketched in Section 4.1 to a imperfect hypercube as follows: This procedure is referred as `splitRoutingTable()` in Figure 4. Consider w.l.o.g cluster $\mathcal{C}' = a_0 \ldots a_{d'-1}$ (the same argument applies for $\mathcal{C}''$). By construction of routing tables, the $(d'-1)^{th}$ neighbour of $\mathcal{C}'$ is set to $\mathcal{C}''$. Now, for all $i = 0 \ldots d-1$, if the dimension of the ith neighbour of $\mathcal{C}$ was greater than d, then the ith neighbour of $\mathcal{C}'$ is found by invoking `lookup`($\mathcal{C}'^{\bar{i}}$). Otherwise, the ith neighbour of $\mathcal{C}'$ remains equal to the ith neighbour of $\mathcal{C}$. Finally, for all j, such that $d-1 < j < d'-1$, the jth neighbour of $\mathcal{C}'$ is set to $\mathcal{C}'$ itself.

We now describe how routing tables of clusters that used to point to $\mathcal{C}$ are updated to reflect the creation of the two new clusters $\mathcal{C}'$ and $\mathcal{C}''$. Let Γ be the set of these clusters, and $\mid \Gamma \mid= k$. Each core member p (at least each correct one) that used to be in $\mathcal{C}$ contacts all $q \in Pred_{\mathcal{C}}[i].core$, with $0 \leq i < k$. Then for each d''-cluster $\mathcal{Q} = b_0 \ldots b_{d''-1} \in \Gamma$, let $i \leq d''-1$ be the entry that referred to $\mathcal{C}$. If $\mathcal{Q}^{\bar{i}}$ is closer to $\mathcal{C}'$ than it is to $\mathcal{C}''$, then it is set to $\mathcal{C}'$, otherwise it is set to $\mathcal{C}''$. The routing tables of clusters that did not refer to $\mathcal{C}$ are left unchanged. This procedure is referred as `splitPredTable()` in Figure 4. Note that the `split` operation has been described by assuming the creation of two clusters. This can be easily extended to $k \geq 2$ clusters. This completes the `split` operation.

Lemma 2. *Let $\mathcal{C}$ be some d-cluster that splits into two d'-clusters $\mathcal{C}'$ and $\mathcal{C}''$, with $d \leq d' \leq m$. If $\mathcal{C}$ satisfied Properties 3 and 4 prior to splitting, then both $\mathcal{C}'$ and $\mathcal{C}''$ satisfy Properties 3 and 4.*

Proof. We prove first that Property 3 holds. By assumption $\mathcal{C}$ initially satisfies Property 3. Thus there is no cluster prefixed with $\mathcal{C}$. Then after the invocation of `split`, $\mathcal{C}'$ and $\mathcal{C}''$ are the only two clusters prefixed with $\mathcal{C}$. From the `split` algorithm, $\mathcal{C}'$ and $\mathcal{C}''$ differ by their last bit. Thus neither $\mathcal{C}'$ nor $\mathcal{C}''$ is prefixed with the other one. Thus $\mathcal{C}'$ and $\mathcal{C}''$ satisfy Property 3.

We now prove that Property 4 holds. Let us focus on cluster $\mathcal{C}'$ (case for $\mathcal{C}''$ is similar). Let $\mathcal{C} = b_0 \ldots b_{d-1}$, $\mathcal{C}' = b_0 \ldots b_{d'-1}$, and $\mathcal{C}'' = b_0 \ldots \overline{b}_{d'-1}$. Observe first that as $\mathcal{C}'$ and $\mathcal{C}''$ differ by exactly their $(d'-1)^{th}$ bit, $\mathcal{C}''$ is trivially the $(d'-1)^{th}$ neighbour of $\mathcal{C}'$. Consider now the jth neighbor of $\mathcal{C}'$ such that $d-1 < j < d'-1$. Since no cluster other than $\mathcal{C}'$ and $\mathcal{C}''$ prefixed with $\mathcal{C}$ exists, no cluster prefixed with $b_0 \ldots b_{d-1} \ldots \overline{b}_{j-1}$ exists. Then by Lemma 1, the jth neighbor of $\mathcal{C}'$ has to be set to $\mathcal{C}'$ itself. Finally, consider the jth neighbor of $\mathcal{C}'$ such that $0 \leq i \leq d-1$. Two cases have to be considered. First, the dimension of that neighbour cluster is smaller than or equal to d. By construction, the prefix of length d of $\mathcal{C}'$ is $\mathcal{C}$. By the distance definition, that j^{th} neighbour remains the closest cluster to $\mathcal{C}'^{\bar{i}}$. In

the second case, by Theorem 1 the ith neighbour of $\mathcal{C}'$ found by invoking $\texttt{lookup}(\mathcal{C}'^{\bar{i}})$ is the closest cluster to $\mathcal{C}'^{\bar{i}}$. □

Lemma 3. *Let $\mathcal{C}$ be some d-cluster that splits into two d'-clusters $\mathcal{C}'$ and $\mathcal{C}''$, with $d \leq d' \leq m$. Let $\mathcal{O}$ be any d'-cluster different from both $\mathcal{C}'$ and $\mathcal{C}''$. Then if $\mathcal{O}$ satisfied Properties 3 and 4 prior to the splitting operation, then $\mathcal{O}$ satisfies Properties 3 and 4 after that split.*

Proof. An argument similar to the one used in Lemma 2 shows that Property 4 holds. Let $\mathcal{O}$ be some d'-cluster, with $1 \leq d' \leq m$. Two cases are possible:

- $\mathcal{O}$ did not have $\mathcal{C}$ as neighbour. We show that $\mathcal{O}$ is not affected by $\mathcal{C}$'s split. Let $\mathcal{N}_i$ be some i^{th} neighbour of $\mathcal{O}$, with $0 \leq i \leq d'-1$. Then by construction $D(\mathcal{O}^{\bar{i}}, \mathcal{N}_i) < D(\mathcal{O}^{\bar{i}}, \mathcal{C})$. Since $\mathcal{C}'$ is prefixed with $\mathcal{C}$, by the definition of $\mathcal{D}$, $\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{O}^{\bar{i}}, \mathcal{N}_i) < \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{O}^{\bar{i}}, \mathcal{C}')$. The proof is similar for $\mathcal{C}''$. This shows that $\mathcal{O}$ is not affected by $\mathcal{C}$'s split.

- $\mathcal{O}$ had $\mathcal{C}$ as neighbour, that is, there exists some i, such that the ith neighbour of $\mathcal{O}$ was $\mathcal{C}$. By construction, $\mathcal{C}$ was the closest cluster to $\mathcal{O}^{\bar{i}}$. By the split algorithm, only $\mathcal{C}'$ and $\mathcal{C}''$ are prefixed with $\mathcal{C}$, and one of them is the new i^{th} neighbour of $\mathcal{O}$. Thus, by the routing table update algorithm, Property 4 holds.

□

Lemma 4. *The number of messages involved in the* `split` *operation is in $\Theta(logN)$.*

Proof. Recall that a `split` proceeds in two steps: first a split message is sent to the peers of the splitting cluster, second routing tables of the created clusters as well as the ones of clusters that should point to them are updated. In the first step, since the size of a cluster is in $\Theta(logN)$, the number of messages exchanged is obviously $\Theta(logN)$. In the second step, two substeps are executed to update routing tables.

Consider a core member p of a splitting cluster $\mathcal{C} = b_0 \dots b_{d-1}$. Denote by $\mathcal{C}' = b_0 \dots b_{d-1} \dots b_{d'-1}$ the label of $\mathcal{C}'$ after the split is completed and suppose that $p \in \mathcal{C}'$. First, the ith entry of the routing table of p is updated only when the dimension of the cluster $\mathcal{C}_i$ initially referred by entry i of $\mathcal{C}$ is greater than the initial dimension d of $\mathcal{C}$ (see Section 4.4.4). In this case, p executes $\texttt{lookup}(\mathcal{C}'^{\bar{i}})$ and updates the entry to refer to the found cluster. Actually, the `lookup` consists in correcting only the bits b_d to $b_{d'-1}$ of $\mathcal{C}_i$ up to the `split`. Indeed, since $\mathcal{C}_i$ is already the closest cluster to $\mathcal{C}^{\bar{i}}$, only the $d'-d$ last bits of $\mathcal{C}_i$ need to be corrected. But since w.h.p. dimensions d and d' differ by only a constant number, the `lookup` operation involves only a constant number of messages. Thus, since only core peers handle routing tables and since the number of core peers is bounded by a constant number, the number of messages exchanged when updating the entries of the routing table is $O(logN)$.

Second, p contacts the clusters in Γ initially pointing to $\mathcal{C}$ through `pred`. Since the cost of `pred` is $O(logN)$ and since only a constant number of peers per cluster (core members) are involved in the procedure, this operation consumes $O(logN)$ messages.

Thus the number of messages involved in a `split` is $\Theta(logN)$. □

4.4.5 `merge` Operation

We now describe how PeerCube is updated when the size of a cluster falls under S_{min}. The `merge` operation is the dual to the `split` one, and incurs the same cost in terms of number of messages exchanged. The `merge` consists in merging all the clusters that share the longest common prefix with a cluster that has detected the need to merge with others. Specifically, suppose that core member $p \in \mathcal{C} = b_0 \dots b_{d'-1}$, locally detects that its cluster size falls under S_{min}. Then, the following steps are executed. Firstly, p discovers the set of clusters that share as prefix the bit string $b_0 \dots \overline{b}_{d'-1}$. This set, named Γ, is returned by invocation of the function $\texttt{commonPrefix}(b_0 \dots \overline{b}_{d'-1})$. This search function is based on a constrained flooding approach. The constraint prevents a cluster from being contacted twice. It is directly derived from the property of routing tables (Lemma 1). This makes this function

optimal in the number of messages exchanged, i.e. the number of sent messages is equal to the number of clusters prefixed by the bit string. From the dimension disparity remark, the number of clusters that share as prefix the bit string is constant. Thus a constant number of messages are sent during the search. Secondly, p broadcasts to the other core members of $\mathcal{C}$ that their cluster has to merge with the clusters in Γ.

All the clusters $\mathcal{Q} \in \Gamma$ merge with $\mathcal{C}$ as follows. First, the core set of the cluster with the lowest label in $\mathcal{C} \cup \Gamma$ is kept as the core set of the new cluster, and spare members from this cluster together with all the core and spare members of the other clusters merging are included in the spare set of the new cluster. Both core and spare members update their keys by copying those from the other merging clusters. Temporary peers belonging to all the merging clusters keep their temporary status in the new cluster. Dimension d of the new cluster is the lowest dimension so that Property 3 holds. Finding that dimension comes to choose the value of the largest entry of $\mathcal{C}$ that does not point to itself. In most cases, $d = d' - 1$. Let $\mathcal{N}$ be the label of the new cluster, i.e. $\mathcal{N} = b_0 \ldots b_{d-1}$.

```
merge(𝒞) /* run by core member p in the d'-cluster 𝒞*/
  Γ ← p.commonPrefix(𝒞);
  p broadcasts (MERGE, Γ) to core members of 𝒞;
  Upon delivery (MERGE,Γ) do
    𝒩.dim ← i | RT[i] ≠ 𝒞 ∧ (RT[i + 1] = 𝒞 ∨ i ≥ d');
    𝒩.label ← the leftmost first d bit of label of 𝒞;
    V_c^𝒩 ← V_c^𝒞; V_s^𝒩 ← V_s^𝒞; 𝒩.temp ← 𝒞.temp;
    for (each 𝒬 ∈ Γ) do
      V_s^𝒩 ← V_s^𝒩 ∪ V_c^𝒬 ∪ V_s^𝒬; 𝒩.temp ← 𝒩.temp ∪ 𝒬.temp;
      p.mergeIncomingLinks();
      p.mergeOutgoingLinks();
    enddo
    p sends (MERGRq, 𝒩, state) to each q ∈ V_s^𝒩 ∪ temp;
  enddo
```

Figure 5: `merge` Operation at Peer p

Second, routing tables of clusters that used to point toward the merging clusters $\mathcal{C} \cup \Gamma$ have to be updated to reflect the merge operation. Core members of each cluster $\mathcal{Q} \in \Gamma$ notify their predecessors (i.e., entries of their predecessor table) to update the entry that used to point to $\mathcal{Q}$ so that it now points to peers in the core set of the new cluster $\mathcal{N}$. Note that regarding clusters that used to point toward $\mathcal{C}$, only label of $\mathcal{C}$'s label has to be replaced by $\mathcal{N}$'s one. This function is referred as `mergeIncomingLinks()` in Figure 5.

Finally, $\mathcal{N}$'s routing table has to be created. Specifically, if bit $(d' - 1)$ of $\mathcal{C}$ label is bit "0" then $\mathcal{N}$'s routing table entries are set to entries $0 \ldots (d - 1)$ of $\mathcal{C}$'s routing table. Otherwise $\mathcal{N}$'s routing table entries are set with the $(d - 1)$ first entries of the $(d' - 1)^{th}$ neighbour of $\mathcal{C}$. In both cases entries $d \ldots (d' - 1)$ do not exist anymore. This function is referred as `mergeOutgoingLinks()` in Figure 5. This completes the `merge` operation.

Lemma 5. *Let $\mathcal{C}$ be some d'-cluster that merges with all the clusters of Γ into a unique d-cluster $\mathcal{C}$, with $d < d' \leq m$. Then, if all clusters satisfied Properties 3 and 4 prior to the merge operation, then they all satisfy Properties 3 and 4 after the merge.*

Proof. First note that, trivially, for all clusters $\mathcal{O}$ different from $\mathcal{C}'$ and not in Γ, if $\mathcal{O}$ satisfies Property 3 before the merge operation, then it satisfies it after the merge.
Let us now prove that $\mathcal{C}$ satisfies Property 3. First, since $\mathcal{C}'$ satisfies Property $\overline{3}$, no cluster prefixed with $\mathcal{C}'$ exists. From the algorithm, all clusters prefixed with $b_0 \ldots \overline{b}_{d'-1}$ and $\mathcal{C}'$ exists are merged in $\mathcal{C}$. From the algorithm, d is the highest value such that the $(d - 1)^{th}$ neighbor of $\mathcal{C}'$ is not $\mathcal{C}'$ itself. By Lemma 1, no cluster prefixed with $b_0 \ldots b_{d-1} \ldots \overline{b}_{i'-1}$ for all $d + 1 \leq i' \leq d' - 1$ exists. Therefore no cluster prefixed with $\mathcal{C}$ other than $\mathcal{C}$ itself exists. Therefore $\mathcal{C}$ satisfies Property 3.

We now show that all clusters satisfy Property 4 after the merge operation. By assumption, $\mathcal{C}'$ and clusters of Γ satisfy Property 4 before `merge`. From the algorithm, $\mathcal{C}'$ and all

```
create(𝒞) /* run by core member p in the d-cluster 𝒞*/

  𝒯 ← set of the T_split temporary peers that share a prefix;
  𝒩.label ← shortest common prefix of 𝒯's members;
  𝒩.dim ← length of 𝒩.label;
  V_c ← S_min randomly chosen peers within 𝒯;
  V_c^𝒩 ← run consensus on V_c among core members of 𝒞;
  V_s^𝒩 ← {q | q ∈ 𝒯 \ V_c^𝒩};
  𝒩.temp ← {q | 𝒟(q,𝒩) < 𝒟(q,𝒞)};
  p.pred(𝒩);
  p.createOutgoingLinks();
  enddo
```

Figure 6: `create` Operation at Peer p

clusters in Γ are prefixed with $\mathcal{C}$. If the last bit of $\mathcal{C}'$ is 0, then by the distance definition $\mathcal{C}$ is closer to $\mathcal{C}'$ than to any cluster in Γ. In constrast, if the last bit of $\mathcal{C}'$ is 1 then the $(d'-1)^{th}$ neighbour of $\mathcal{C}'$ is the closest to $\mathcal{C}''$. Thus, after `merge`, $\mathcal{C}$ satisfies Property 4. Finally, since $\mathcal{C}'$ and all clusters in Γ are prefixed with $\mathcal{C}$, each cluster that referred to $\mathcal{C}'$ or to a cluster in Γ still refers to $\mathcal{C}$. This ends the proof. □

Lemma 6. *The number of messages incurred by a* `merge` *is* $\Theta(logN)$.

Proof. Given a core member p of a merging cluster $\mathcal{C}' = b_0 \dots b_{d-1} \dots b_{d'-1}$. A `merge` consists in contacting all the clusters prefixed with $b_0 \dots b_{d-1} \dots \overline{b}_{d'-1}$, with d the new dimension, and merging with them.

Thus by the same reasoning as previously, only a constant number of messages are exchanged by `commonprefix` to crawl the appropriate clusters. To merge the clusters, all the peers of each cluster are contacted. Thus the number of messages consumed is $\Theta(logN)$. Routing tables are updated by copying the routing tables of the appropriate cluster. Thus the routing tables updates is constant w.h.p.

As a consequence, the number of messages incurred by a `merge` is $\Theta(logN)$.

□

4.4.6 `create` Operation

The `create` operation enables to create a new cluster whenever sufficiently enough peers that share a common prefix do not find a cluster that match their prefixes. This operation consists in defining the label and the dimension of the new cluster $\mathcal{N}$, in finding outgoing and incoming links for $\mathcal{N}$, and in transferring to $\mathcal{N}$ the closest keys to it.

Specifically, when core member p in $\mathcal{C}$ detects that temporary peers in its cluster satisfy predicate
`tempIsSplit()`, then p computes the label of the new cluster $\mathcal{N}$ as the shortest common prefix shared by those T_{split} temporary peers, and its dimension d as that label length. Then p randomly chooses S_{min} peers among those T_{split} peers and run consensus with all the other core members of $\mathcal{C}$ to agree on $\mathcal{N}$'s core set; the other $T_{split} - S_{min}$ peers being $\mathcal{N}$ spare members. Remaining temporary peers in $\mathcal{C}$ that are closer to $\mathcal{N}$ than to $\mathcal{C}$ are moved from $\mathcal{C}$ to $\mathcal{N}$ as temporary peers. Similarly for keys and associated data.

Regarding outgoing links, each core member of $\mathcal{N}$ creates a routing table containing d entries such that entry i is filled with the closest cluster to $\mathcal{N}^{\bar{i}}$. This is achieved through `lookup` invocations. This construction is encapsulated in the `createOutgoingLinks()` procedure in Figure 6. Finally, core members build their predecessor table by contacting all clusters that should point to $\mathcal{N}$. These clusters are returned by procedure `pred`($\mathcal{N}$). This procedure is very similar to the `commonPrefix` one except that all paths not connected to $\mathcal{N}$ are pruned from the search. Each returned cluster updates its routing table accordingly. This procedure incurs $\mathcal{O}(logN)$ messages.

Lemma 7. *The* `create` *operation does not violate Properties 3 and Property 4.*

Proof. Let $\mathcal{C}' = b_0 \ldots b_{d'-1}$. From Theorem 1, $\mathcal{C}'$ is the closest cluster to p. Let d be the position of the first different bit between p and $\mathcal{C}'$, that is p is prefixed with $b_0 \ldots \overline{b}_{d-1}$. Since $\mathcal{C}'$ is the closest cluster to p, no cluster prefixed with $b_0 \ldots \overline{b}_{d-1} = \mathcal{C}$ exists. Thus $\mathcal{C}$ satisfies Property 3.

From Theorem 1, the ith neighbor of $\mathcal{C}$ is the closest cluster to $\mathcal{C}^{\overline{i}}$ for each $0 \leq i \leq d-1$. Thus $\mathcal{C}$ satisfies Property 4. Finally, since `pred` returns all the clusters that should have outgoing links to $\mathcal{C}$, after `create`, all clusters other than $\mathcal{C}$ satisfy Property 4. This completes the proof. □

Lemma 8. *The number of messages incurred by the* `create` *operation is in* $\mathcal{O}(log^2 N)$.

Proof. Given a new cluster $\mathcal{C}$. A `create` consists in updating the routing table of $\mathcal{C}$ and of the concerned clusters. First, for each $i = 1 \ldots d$, the ith entry of the routing table of $\mathcal{C}$ is updated to refer to the cluster found through `lookup`($\mathcal{C}^{\overline{i}}$). This operation costs in sum $O(log^2 N)$ messages. Second, clusters that must refer to $\mathcal{C}$ are contacted through `pred` which consumes $O(logN)$ messages. Then the number of messages incurred by a `create` is $O(log^2 N)$. □

Theorem 2. *Suppose that at some time t all the clusters of the system satisfy both Properties 3 and 4. Then, invocation of operations* `split`*,* `merge`*, or* `create` *does not jeopardize any of these properties.*

Proof. The theorem follows directly from Lemmata 2, 3, 6, and 7. □

4.4.7 Bootstrapping PeerCube

Initially the system contains S_{min} well known peers grouped together in a bootstrap cluster. That cluster has no label. We assume that no more than a fraction μ of these peers are Byzantine. When a new peer p wishes to join PeerCube it sends its joining request to one of those bootstrap peers[6]. Upon receipt of such a request, a bootstrap peer forwards it to all other bootstrap peers, acknowledges p, and inserts p in a waiting list. Peer p knows that its request has been accepted whenever it receives acks from $\lfloor \frac{S_{min}-1}{3} \rfloor + 1$ bootstrap peers. When the size of the bootstrap cluster (i.e., number of bootstrap peers plus number of peers in the waiting list) is such that there are at least *i*) S_{min} peers whose identifiers are prefixed by "0", and *ii*) S_{min} peers whose identifiers are prefixed by "1", then the bootstrap cluster splits into two new clusters $\mathcal{C}$ and $\mathcal{C}'$. $\mathcal{C}$ (resp. $\mathcal{C}'$) contains all the peers whose id is prefixed by "0" (resp. prefixed by "1"). Label of $\mathcal{C}$ (resp. $\mathcal{C}'$) is equal to the common prefix shared by its members, typically "0" (resp. "1"). Peers *state* is build: each $p \in \mathcal{C}$ creates its routing and predecessor tables, such that they both point to peers in $\mathcal{C}'$. The same applies for peers in $\mathcal{C}'$.

5 Handling Collusion

5.1 Thwarting Eclipse Attacks

As presented in the Introduction, an eclipse attack enables the adversary to control all overlay traffic by coordinating its attack to infiltrate routing tables of correct peers. In PeerCube, this amounts for core sets to be under control of malicious peers, i.e. more than $\lfloor \frac{S_{min}-1}{3} \rfloor$ peers in the core set of a cluster to behave maliciously. As shown in the previous section, PeerCube operations thwart those attacks essentially by preventing colluders from devising deterministic strategies to join core sets and by reaching agreement among core members on any event that affects PeerCube topology. Correctness of these operations relies on the hypothesis that no more than $\lfloor \frac{S_{min}-1}{3} \rfloor$ malicious peers populate core sets, that is the fraction of malicious peers in any core set is no more than 1/4. Probability that such an assumption does not hold is now discussed.

[6] Note that we assume that p knows a correct peer. Otherwise there is no guarantee that p may ever join the system. This is a classic assumption in P2P overlays

Let us first compute the upper bound on the probability to corrupt a core set. This holds when the number of clusters in PeerCube is minimal (i.e. equal to N/S_{max}). Denote by X_u the random variable describing the number of malicious peers in a cluster, and by Y_u the random variable describing the number of malicious peers in a core. Clearly, Y_u depends on X_u. Since identifiers are randomly chosen, inserting malicious peers into clusters can be interpreted as throwing $\mu.N$ balls one by one and randomly into N/S_{max} bins. The probability that x balls (malicious peers) are inserted into a bin (cluster) is $P\left(X_u = x\right) = \binom{\mu.N}{x}\left(\frac{S_{max}}{N}\right)^x\left(1-\frac{S_{max}}{N}\right)^{\mu.N-x}$. Now, from the core set insertion algorithm (see Section 4.4.3), each departure from a core set is followed by the rebuilding of this set with S_{min} randomly chosen peers among the S_{max} peers of the cluster. This can be interpreted as picking simultaneously S_{min} balls among S_{max} balls among which x are black (malicious peers) and $S_{max} - x$ are white (correct peers). Thus, the probability of having y malicious peers inserted in the core, knowing the number of malicious peers x in the cluster, is given by $P\left(Y_u = y | X_u = x\right) = \frac{\binom{x}{y}\binom{S_{max}-x}{S_{min}-y}}{\binom{S_{max}}{S_{min}}}$. Finally, the upper bound on the corruption probability is equal to $p_u = 1 - \sum_{y=0}^{\lfloor\frac{S_{min}-1}{3}\rfloor}\sum_{x=0}^{\mu.N} P\left(Y_u = y|X_u = x\right)P\left(X_u = x\right)$.

We now compute the lower bound on the corruption probability. This holds when the number of clusters in PeerCube is maximal (i.e. N/S_{min}). Note that in this case, clusters' population is minimal, since they are reduced to their core set. Let X_l be the random variable representing the number of malicious peers in a cluster in this case. Remark that X_l also represents the number of malicious peers in the core set. By proceeding as above, $P\left(X_l = x\right) = \binom{\mu.N}{x}\left(\frac{S_{min}}{N}\right)^x\left(1-\frac{S_{min}}{N}\right)^{\mu.N-x}$.
Thus, the lower bound on the corruption probability is $p_l = 1-\sum_{x=0}^{\lfloor\frac{S_{min}-1}{3}\rfloor} P\left(X_l = x\right)$. Both bounds are tight.

We can now derive upper and lower bounds on the probability that a request reaches a legitimate destination. Remark first that the probability that the number of hops of a request is h is equal to the probability that the number of bits that differs between the source cluster and the destination cluster of this request is exactly h. Since identifiers are uniformly generated, and since the maximum dimension of a cluster is w.h.p. $d_{max} = log_2(N/S_{max})+3$, this probability is equal to $\binom{d_{max}}{h}\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{d_{max}}$. A request of length h is successful if all the h clusters crossed by this request are not corrupted. Thus the probability of success of that request is at least $\sum_{h=0}^{d_{max}}\binom{d_{max}}{h}\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{d_{max}}\left(1-p_u\right)^h$.

Similarly, since the minimum dimension of a cluster is $d_{min} = log_2(N/S_{max})$, the probability of success of a request is at most $\sum_{h=0}^{d_{min}}\binom{d_{min}}{h}\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{d_{min}}\left(1-p_l\right)^h$.

Figure 7 shows the lower bound on the probability that a request sent by a correct peer reaches its legitimate recipient. The probability of success decreases slightly (logarithmically) with respect to N whatever the percentage of malicious peers in the system. For instance, for $N = 10,000$ peers and up to $1,000$ of these peers being malicious, then at least 45% of the submitted requests are successful.

Recall that the policy we propose to replace a core member that left is to refresh the whole composition of the core set by randomly choosing peers within the cluster. For robustness reasons, we opposed this policy to the one which consists in replacing the core member that left by a single one randomly chosen in the cluster (see Section 4.4.3). Figure 8 compares the lower bound on the probability of successful requests of these two policies according to S_{max}, for different ratio of malicious peers in the system, considering $N = 1,000$. The first observation is that probability of success for the policy we propose (denoted by `w randomisation` in the figure) is independent from S_{max} value. This confirms the fact that setting $S_{max} > \mathcal{O}(logN)$ does not bring any additional robustness to PeerCube. The second observation is that for the second policy (denoted by `w/o randomisation` in the figure), probability of successful requests drastically decreases with increasing values of S_{max}, even for small values of μ. This corroborates the weakness of such a policy in presence of a strong adversary as described in Section 4.4.3.



Figure 7: Probability of success of requests w.r.t N



Figure 8: Probability of success of requests w.r.t. S_{max}

5.2 Robust Routing against Localized Attacks

We have just seen that because identifiers are randomly assigned, the ratio of malicious peers in some clusters can exceed the assumed ratio of malicious peers in the system (note that by our insertion algorithm, we guarantee that in expectation, the ratio of malicious peers in core sets is equal to the one in clusters), and thus impacts the probability of success of a request as shown in Figure 7. Since pollution decreases with S_{min} (more precisely with $\lfloor (S_{min}-1)/3 \rfloor$) a solution to increase that probability is to augment S_{min} according to S_{max} value, that is to have S_{min} in $\mathcal{O}(logN)$.The main consequence of this solution is to obtain costly maintenance operations (i.e. in $\mathcal{O}(S_{min}^3)$ or $\mathcal{O}(S_{min}^2)$ because of the Byzantine resistant consensus algorithm and broadcast primitive). To circumvent this issue, we extend Castro et al. [2] approach by sending a request over independent paths (note that in the figures below IR stands for independent routes). We adapt the procedure presented in Section 4.1 to match PeerCube features. Essentially, the search is adapted to find the closest cluster to the theoretical one when this latter one does not exist. Denote by b the number of bit differences between p's identifier, the source of the request, and q's identifier, the destination peer. Recall that the ith path is obtained by successively correcting bits $p_i, p_{i+1}, \ldots, p_{(i+b-1) \bmod b}$ for $0 \leq i \leq b-1$, with $p_i, p_{i+1}, \ldots, p_{(i+b-1) \bmod b}$ the position of the b bits that differ between p and q. We modify this procedure by invoking the `lookup` operation on keys obtained by successively correcting bits $p_i, p_{i+1}, \ldots, p_{(i+b-1) \bmod b}$ for $0 \leq i \leq b-1$. Other independent paths of non-optimal length are found by modifying first one bit on which p and q both agree (say n_i), by looking for the closest cluster to that key, then by finding independent paths from that cluster by proceeding as above, and finally by re-modifying bit n_i.

Theorem 3. *The independent paths algorithm crawls at least $log_2 N - log_2 S_{max}$ independent paths, each of length $\mathcal{O}(logN)$ w.h.p.*

Proof. Consider a d-cluster $\mathcal{C} = b_0 \ldots b_{d-1}$. Consider the minimal dimension d_{min} of clusters. Then all the clusters are labelled with a prefix of length at least d_{min}; that is for all the labels of the clusters, at least d_{min} bits positions are always fully represented. Denote such bits positions by $\mathcal{P}$ ($card(\mathcal{P}) = d_{min}$). Then for some $k \in \mathcal{P}$, each `lookup`($\mathcal{C}^{\overline{k}}$) invocation necessarily returns a cluster $\mathcal{C}_k$ such that its kth bit is $\overline{b}_k$ and its ith bit is b_i for all $i \in \mathcal{P}$. Thus the algorithm can be reduced to the standard independent routes construction in a perfect (d_{min})-hypercube. That is the number of independent routes is at least d_{min} which is greater than $log_2 N - log_2 S_{max}$.

Second, note that each `lookup`($\mathcal{C}^{\overline{k}}$) procedure call in the independent routes algorithm incurs more than 1 hop only when the dimension of the closest cluster to $\mathcal{C}^{\overline{k}}$ is greater than the dimension of the current cluster (to correct the remaining bits). Indeed, if that is not the case, the closest cluster to $\mathcal{C}^{\overline{k}}$ is simply the kth neighbour of the current cluster (this can be seen by recurrence). Consequently, since the maximum dimension difference is w.h.p. equal to 8, each `lookup` operation call in the algorithm consumes $O(1)$ number of messages. That is w.h.p. each independent route consumes $O(logN)$ messages. □

We now examine the probability for a request issued by a correct peer to reach its legitimate destination when that request is sent over r independent paths, each of length h, with $d_{min} \leq r \leq d_{max}$. This request is successful if not all the r paths fail, that is if at least one path does not contain any corrupted cluster. Let p denote the exact probability that a cluster is corrupted, i.e. $p_l \leq p \leq p_u$. The probability of success of a request using r independent paths of length h is $1 - \left(1-(1-p)^h\right)^r$. Thus the probability of success of a request using r independent paths is lower bounded by

$$\sum_{h=0}^{d_{max}+2} \binom{d_{max}+2}{h} \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{d_{max}+2} \left(1 - \left(1-(1-p_u)^h\right)^r\right)$$



Figure 9: Probability of success of requests with independent paths w.r.t. N

and upper bounded by

$$\sum_{h=0}^{d_{min}} \binom{d_{min}}{h} \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{d_{min}} \left(1 - \left(1 - (1-p_l)^h\right)^r\right)$$

Term $d_{max} + 2$ in the first equation comes from the non-optimal paths of the indepedent routing algorithm. Figure 9 shows the lower bound on the probability of success with independent paths. The main observation drawn from the experiment is the remarkable increase in PeerCube robustness w.r.t. to the single path. For instance, for $N = 10,000$ and the presence of 25% of malicious peers in the system, the lower bound on the probability of success goes from 12% to 70%.

6 Dimensions Disparity in PeerCube

The next lemmata give (probabilistic) bounds on the dimensions of clusters according to the maximal size S_{max} of the clusters.

Lemma 9. *The dimension of a cluster is greater than* $log_2 N - log_2 S_{max}$.

Proof. The minimum dimension is given by the minimum number of bits needed to code the labels of the clusters. Note that the lower the number of clusters, the lower the dimensions of these clusters (the lower the minimum number of bits needed to code them). Since the maximum number of peers per cluster is S_{max}, the minimum number of clusters is N/S_{max}. Thus, the minimum number of bits needed to code the label of a cluster is $log_2 N - log_2 S_{max}$. □

Lemma 10. *If* $S_{max} \geq log_2 N$, *w.h.p. the dimension of a cluster is lower than* $log_2 N - log_2 S_{max} + 3$.

Proof. Let D be the random variable representing the dimension of a cluster, and X_d be the random variable that represents the number of peers suffixed with a bit string of length d. Then if the dimension of the cluster is greater than d, the number of peers suffixed with the string of length d is greater than S_{max}. Thus $Prob(D > d) \leq Prob(X_d > S_{max})$.

By assumption, peers identifiers are assigned uniformly randomly. Thus X_d follows a binomial law of parameters N and $\frac{1}{2^d}$ where $\frac{1}{2^d}$ is the probability that a peer is suffixed with

a string of length d. Thus by the Chernoff's upper bound, for $S_{max} > \frac{N}{2^d}$:

$$Prob(D > d) \leq \left(\frac{e^{S_{max}\frac{2^d}{N}-1}}{\left(\frac{2^d}{N}S_{max}\right)^{\frac{2^d}{N}S_{max}}} \right)^{\frac{N}{2^d}}$$

$$\leq \frac{e^{S_{max}-\frac{N}{2^d}}}{\left(\frac{2^d}{N}S_{max}\right)^{S_{max}}} \leq \frac{e^{S_{max}}}{\left(\frac{2^d}{N}S_{max}\right)^{S_{max}}}.$$

If we suppose that $\frac{2^d}{N}S_{max} \geq 2e$, then $Prob(D > d) \leq \frac{1}{2^{S_{max}}}$. It follows that, if $d > log_2 N - log_2 S_{max} + log_2(2e)$ and if $S_{max} \geq log_2 N$, then we have $Prob(D > d) \leq \frac{1}{N}$. □

This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 1. *Let δ be the difference between the dimensions of any two clusters. If $S_{max} \geq log_2 N$, then $2^\delta \leq 8$ w.h.p.*

Proof. This follows from lemmata 10 and 9. □

Proposition 2. *If $S_{max} \geq log_2 N$, the number of non-represented prefixes is w.h.p. at most 8.*

Proof. Since w.h.p the dimension of a cluster is lower than $log_2 N - log_2 S_{max} + 3$, the number of non-represented prefixes is maximal when the dimensions of the clusters are all $log_2 N - log_2 S_{max} + 3$ and the number of clusters is minimal (N/S_{max}). Since the minimal number of bits needed to code N/S_{max} clusters is $log_2 N - log_2 S_{max}$, the number of non-represented prefixes is at most $2^3 = 8$. □

7 Simulation

In this section, we present the results of an experimental evaluation of PeerCube performed on PeerSim a simulation platform for P2P protocols. The aim of the simulation is to support the basic motivation behind the PeerCube overlay, i.e. efficiency of the clustering approach w.r.t. churn, and resiliency against collusion. The simulation is event based. The workload is characterised by the number of and arrival/departure pattern of peers and by the distribution of requests they issue. Each experiment uses a different workload.

Churn Impact In these experiments, we test the ability of PeerCube to greatly reduce the impact of dynamism on the overlay. Indeed, it is well known that the main issue with using the hypercube for an overlay is that it requires complex operations when new peers join (the dimension of the hypercube has to be increased through a split operation) or when peers leave either voluntary or due to failures (the dimension has to be decreased through a merge operation). Because of this issue, constructing hypercube deterministically has been told inappropriate under high churn [19]. We show with these experiments that by gathering peers into clusters, topology changes occur rarely, namely only when the critical mass of a cluster does not hold anymore. Results of these experiments are shown in Figures 11.a and 11.b These figures show the maintenance cost of an hypercube compared to PeerCube. We simulate the hypercube by setting $S_{min} = S_{max} = 1$, i.e., PeerCube without clustering. For both structures, we evaluate the number of messages involved in the `join`, `leave`, `merge` and `create` operations. Note that we assume a failure free environment. However, PeerCube operations cost include the fault-tolerant mechanisms (consensus and reliable broadcast costs), while these mechanisms have been inhibited in the hypercube, and thus do not appear in the operations costs. These experiments show the maintenance cost of both topologies when only join requests (resp. leave requests) are issued. Regarding the hypercube, operations cost increases linearly with N. The reason comes from the dimension



(a)

Figure 10: Cost of the `join` operation w.r.t. to N



(a)

Figure 11: Cost of the `leave` operation w.r.t. to N

disparity of this topology. Indeed, nodes of the hypercube with low dimension have up to $N.log_2N$ predecessors, which makes operation cost in N. This does not hold for PeerCube since its dimension disparity is boundedÊby 3.

Robustness against Collusion In these experiments, we test the ability of PeerCube to achieve a robust lookup operation despite the presence of a strong adversary. As described in the previous section, robust lookup is realized by two techniques. First, by preventing malicious peers from strategizing to get inserted within core sets; through the randomization insertion algorithm, we minimize the ratio of malicious peers into routing tables. Second, by taking advantage of independent and optimal length paths offered by the hypercubic topology to guarantee that a request sent by a correct peer reaches its legitimate destination with probability close to 1. Figure 12 shows for $N = 1,000$ peers, the probability of successful requests sent by correct peers w.r.t. to the ratio of malicious peers in the system. The main observation is that experiments fully validate theoretical results. Namely, for up to 15% of malicious peers, 98% of the requests issued from correct peers are successful, and for 25% of malicious peers, in average, 90% of the requests are successful, which clearly emphasises PeerCube robustness to co-ordinated malicious behaviour.



Figure 12: Probability of success of requests wrt malicious peers

8 Conclusion

In this paper we have presented PeerCube, a DHT-based system that is able to handle high churn without compromising the system's performance. In contrast to other systems proposed, PeerCube combines this feature with a high level of resilience against malicious peers. Moreover, both features are provided without affecting the efficiency and scalability normally associated to DHT-based systems, i.e. with operation costs that are logarithmic in the number of peers in the system. Main lessons drawn from experiments are that clustering combined with robust routing provide excellent resilience to failures and to high churn.

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Appendix

9 `commonprefix` and `pred` Procedures

9.1 `commonprefix` Procedure

The `commonprefix` procedure is used for contacting all the clusters prefixed with a given bit string $b_0 \dots b_i$. It guarantees that each cluster prefixed with $b_0 \dots b_i$ is crossed once and only once. This makes `commonprefix` optimal in messages number, i.e., the number of sent messages is equal to the number of clusters prefixed by $b_0 \dots b_i$. This procedure is based on a constrained flooding approach. The constraint avoids messages redundancy, and is derived from the property of routing tables (Lemma 1).

Suppose that some peer $p \in \mathcal{C}$ wishes to find all clusters that share a common prefix with $\mathcal{C}$. Let $b_0 \dots b_i$ be that common prefix. Let $d' \geq i+1$ be $\mathcal{C}$'s dimension. Then p proceeds as follows. For $k = i+1, \dots, d'-1$, p sends a `commonprefix`$(b_0 \dots b_i, k)$ message to an arbitrary core member of the kth entry of its routing table. When a core member q receives such a request, it sends back to p his identifier, and proceeds as above by forwarding this request to a random core member of the k'^{th} entry of its routing table with $k' = k+1, \dots, d''-1$, with d'' the dimension of q's cluster. If $d'' = k+1$, q does not forward the request to its neighbours.

Lemma 11. *An invocation of `commonprefix`$(b_0 \dots b_i)$ contacts once and only once all clusters prefixed by $b_0 \dots b_i$.*

Proof. Let $\mathcal{C}_0$ be a d-cluster $b_0 \dots b_i b_{i+1} \dots b_{d-1}$ initiating a `commonprefix`$(b_0 \dots b_i)$ procedure call. We first show that all clusters prefixed by $b_0 \dots b_i$ are contacted. Consider a d'-cluster $\mathcal{C}' = b_0 \dots b_i a_{i+1} \dots a_{d-1}$. By the algorithm and by Property 4, each bits b_j, for $j > i$ of $\mathcal{C}_0$ is eventually flipped to a_j. Since a corrected bit is never flipped again $\mathcal{C}'$ is eventually contacted.

We now prove that clusters are contacted only once. Briefly, the proof consists in showing that if a cluster is contacted by two different clusters then this cluster has two incompatible prefixes (i.e., none of them is a prefix of the other one).

We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that some cluster $\mathcal{C}'$ prefixed by $b_0 \dots b_i$ is contacted by two different clusters $\mathcal{A}_j$ and $\mathcal{B}_k$. Then it must be the case that two routes P_1 and P_2 exist between $\mathcal{C}$ and $\mathcal{C}'$ with $P_1 = \mathcal{C}_0 \dots \mathcal{C}_l \mathcal{A}_0 \dots \mathcal{A}_j \mathcal{C}'$ and $P_2 = \mathcal{C}_0 \dots \mathcal{C}_l \mathcal{B}_0 \dots \mathcal{B}_k \mathcal{C}'$.

Note that $\mathcal{C}_0$ is not necessarily different from $\mathcal{C}_l$. Suppose that $\mathcal{A}_0$ (resp. $\mathcal{B}_0$) is the i'^{th} (resp. i''^{th}) neighbour of $\mathcal{C}_l$ (i.e., bit i' is the first bit that differs from $\mathcal{A}_0$ and $\mathcal{C}_l$.). Thus, from Lemma 1, the i'^{th} bit of $\mathcal{A}_0$ is different from the i'^{th} bit of $\mathcal{B}_0$. From the algorithm, all the clusters traversed from $\mathcal{A}_0$ to $\mathcal{C}'$ must share the same prefix of length $i'+1$, i.e., the prefix $b_0 \dots b_i \dots \overline{a}_{i'}$. Similarly for all the clusters traversed from $\mathcal{B}_0$ to $\mathcal{C}'$ that must share the same prefix of length $i''+1$, i.e., prefix $b_0 \dots b_i \dots a_{i'} \dots \overline{a}_{i''}$. Which is impossible as $\mathcal{C}'$ cannot share both prefix $b_0 \dots b_i \dots \overline{a}_{i'}$ and prefix $b_0 \dots b_i \dots a_{i'} \dots \overline{a}_{i''}$. This concludes the proof. ☐

Lemma 12. *Let $b_0 \dots b_{d-1}$ some cluster label. The number of messages incurred by `commonprefix`$(b_0 \dots b_{d-1})$ is constant w.h.p.*

Proof. By Lemma 11, `commonprefix` crosses each cluster prefixed with $b_0 \dots b_{d-1}$ exactly once. Let $\mathcal{C}$ be the cluster prefixed with $b_0 \dots b_{d-1}$ of which the dimension is the greatest one among all clusters prefixed with $b_0 \dots b_{d-1}$. Let δ be the difference between $\mathcal{C}$'s dimension and d. Then the number of clusters crawled by `commonprefix`$(b_0 \dots b_{d-1}$,-) is at most 2^δ. Thus, if d represents the dimension of a cluster labelled $b_0 \dots b_{d-1}$, then by Proposition 1 the number of clusters crawled by `commonprefix` is $O(1)$ w.h.p. Finally, since only core members are involved in `commonprefix` and since the number of core peers per cluster is constant, the number of messages incurred by `commonprefix` is w.h.p. constant. ☐

9.2 `pred` Procedure

We now describe how peers of a given d-cluster $\mathcal{C}$ locate all clusters that have outgoing links to $\mathcal{C}$ through the `pred` procedure. The procedure is similar to `commonprefix` except that all routes not connected to $\mathcal{C}$ are pruned. Suppose that some peer $p \in \mathcal{C}$ wishes to locate all the clusters that have an outgoing link to $\mathcal{C}$. Then p proceeds as follows:

1. For each $0 \leq i \leq d-1$, p sends a `pred`($\mathcal{C}$, $\mathcal{E}$,i) message to its ith neighbour $\mathcal{C}_i$. The set $\mathcal{E}$ indicates the entries of p's routing table that refer to $\mathcal{C}$ itself.
2. If $\mathcal{C}_i$ has an outgoing link to $\mathcal{C}$, then $q \in \mathcal{C}_i$ sends a feedback message to $\mathcal{C}$. In all cases q forwards `pred`($\mathcal{C}$, $\mathcal{E}$, i') to its neighbor $r \in \mathcal{C}_{ii'}$ for each $i' > i$ such that either $i' \in \mathcal{E}$ or $i' > d$.
3. $r \in \mathcal{C}_{ii'}$ in turn executes Step 2 unless i' is equal to the dimension of $\mathcal{C}_{ii'}$.

We can state the following lemma.

Lemma 13. *Let $p \in \mathcal{C}$ such that p invokes `pred()`. Then all the clusters that have outgoing links to $\mathcal{C}$ are contacted once and only once.*

Proof. Note first that, in the algorithm, if the condition "$i' \in \mathcal{E}$ or $i' > d$" was removed, the algorithm would be equivalent to a `commonprefix` procedure on a prefix of length 0. By Lemma 11, all the clusters of the system would be contacted once and only once. To prove that all clusters that have outgoing links to $\mathcal{C}$ are contacted, it suffices to prove that all the clusters that do not satisfy this condition cannot have any outgoing link to $\mathcal{C}$.

First consider any two clusters $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$, and denote by i the position of the first different bit between $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$. Then $\mathcal{A}$ has an outgoing link to $\mathcal{B}$ if and only if $\mathcal{B}$ is the ith neighbor of $\mathcal{A}$. Indeed by Lemma 4 for any $j \neq i$ the jth neighbor of $\mathcal{A}$ (if it is not $\mathcal{A}$) differ with $\mathcal{B}$ by at least its $\min(i,j)^{th}$ bit and thus cannot be equal to $\mathcal{B}$. Thus, to prove that some cluster $\mathcal{A}$ cannot have any outgoing link to some cluster $\mathcal{B}$, it suffices to prove that $\mathcal{B}$ cannot be the ith neighbor of $\mathcal{A}$ with i the position of the first different bit between $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$.

Now given a cluster $\mathcal{C}'$ having received a `pred(`$\mathcal{C}$`,`$\mathcal{E}$`,`i`)` message. Let us show that for each $i' > i$ s.t. $i' \notin \mathcal{E}$ the i'^{th} neighbor $\mathcal{C}'_{i'}$ of $\mathcal{C}'$ cannot have any outgoing link to $\mathcal{C}$. Note first that from the algorithm, the first different bit between $\mathcal{C}'_{i'}$ and $\mathcal{C}$ is some j, such that $j \leq i < i'$. For simplicity, we assume that $j = i$

- $\mathcal{C} = a_0 \ldots a_i \ldots a_{i'} \ldots$,
- $\mathcal{C}' = a_0 \ldots \overline{a}_i \ldots a_{i'} \ldots$,
- $\mathcal{C}'_{i'} = a_0 \ldots \overline{a}_i \ldots \overline{a}_{i'} \ldots$.

But since $i' \notin \mathcal{E}$, the i'^{th} neighbor $\mathcal{C}_{i'}$ of $\mathcal{C}$ is prefixed by $a_0 \ldots a_i \ldots \overline{a}_{i'}$. Then we necessarily have,

$$\mathcal{D}(a_0 \ldots \overline{a}_i \ldots \overline{a}_{i'}, a_0 \ldots a_i \ldots \overline{a}_{i'}) < \mathcal{D}(a_0 \ldots \overline{a}_i \ldots \overline{a}_{i'}, a_0 \ldots a_i \ldots a_{i'})$$

That is,

$$\mathcal{D}(\mathcal{C}'^{\bar{i}}_{i'}, \mathcal{C}_{i'}) < \mathcal{D}(\mathcal{C}'^{\bar{i}}_{i'}, \mathcal{C})$$

Thus $\mathcal{C}$ is not the ith neighbor of $\mathcal{C}'_{i'}$, with i the position of the first different bit between $\mathcal{C}'_{i'}$ and $\mathcal{C}$, and $\mathcal{C}'_{i'}$ cannot have any outgoing link to $\mathcal{C}$. □

Lemma 14. *The number of messages incurred by `pred` is w.h.p. in $\mathcal{O}(logN)$*

Proof. Consider a d-cluster $\mathcal{C}$ invoking `pred`. To prove the lemma, it suffices to observe first that the number of non-existing entries of $\mathcal{C}$'s routing table is w.h.p. at most 8. Second, the maximum difference between the dimensions of two clusters is w.h.p 3. Thus, each `pred` message sent to a neighor of $\mathcal{C}$, is forwarded at most O(1) times. Finally, since the number of neighbor of $\mathcal{C}$ is $O(logN)$, the number of messages consumed by a `pred` is $O(logN)$. □