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# Finding low-weight polynomial multiples using discrete logarithm

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**Abstract**—Finding low-weight multiples of a binary polynomial is a difficult problem arising in the context of stream ciphers cryptanalysis. The classical algorithm to solve this problem is based on a time memory trade-off. We will present an improvement to this approach using discrete logarithm rather than a direct representation of the involved polynomials. This gives an algorithm which improves the theoretical complexity, and is also very flexible in practice.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Correlation and fast correlation attacks are probably the most important classes of attacks against stream ciphers based on linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs). They were originally proposed by Siegenthaler [13] and improved by Meier and Staffelbach [11]. Since then, many different versions have been proposed [1], [8], [7], [9], either very general or adapted to specifics designs.

The basic idea is to consider that the output of the stream cipher is a noisy version of a sequence generated by an LFSR with the same initial state. The attack can be seen as an error-correction problem: recover the sequence, and therefore the initial state of the LFSR. To do this most of the attacks take advantage of parity check equations existing in the sequence we are trying to recover. Those parity check equations are in fact given by the multiples of the feedback polynomial, and to keep the bias as low as possible, low-weight multiples are necessary. As a precomputation step, we thus have to find those parity check equations before using them in the active part of the attack.

Depending on our objectives (finding one or many such multiples) and on the parameters (degree of the feedback polynomial and of the multiples, expected weight), there exists different algorithms to find low-weight multiples (see [2], [5]). The complexity of the

best method is often still very high for parameters used in real cryptosystem. We will focus in this paper on the problem of finding many such multiples. Our approach is based on the use of discrete logarithm on finite fields and we will see that it can be of great practical interest. In [10] discrete logarithms were already used in a different way to study properties of low-weight multiples. However the algorithmic aspect was not considered at all.

The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces some notations. The usual approach used to compute low-weight multiples is presented in Section III. In Section IV, we detail our main algorithm and compare its complexity with the classical method. We will then explain in Section V some important points if one wants to use this algorithm in real life. Finally, in Section VI, we will give some experimental results.

## II. PRELIMINARY

### A. Notations

The problem we will be dealing with is the following.

**Problem 1** (*Low-weight polynomial multiple*):

**Input:** A binary primitive polynomial  $P \in \mathbf{F}_2[X]$  of degree  $n$ , and two integers  $w$  and  $D$ .

**Output:** All the multiples of  $P$  of weight at most  $w$  and degree at most  $D$ .

The number of expected such multiples of  $P$  is heuristically approximated by  $\frac{D^{w-1}}{(w-1)!2^n}$ , considering that for  $D$  large enough the values of the polynomials of weight  $w$  and degree at most  $D$  are uniformly distributed. Most of the time, the degree  $D$  and the weight are chosen high enough for many solutions to exist as we need many parity check equations to mount an attack.

It's also worth noticing that we almost never need all the multiples. In fact, to mount a successful attack, one only have to find a fixed number of parity check equations. It is thus sufficient to find many — but not all — multiples, which might be much easier, especially if the constraint on the degree and the weight are high enough. We therefore introduce a slightly different problem.

**Problem 2:**

**Input:** A binary primitive polynomial  $P \in \mathbf{F}_2[X]$  of degree  $n$ , and three integers  $w$ ,  $D$  and  $M$ .

**Output:**  $M$  multiples of  $P$  of weight at most  $w$  and degree at most  $D$ , or as much as possible if there is not  $M$  such multiples.

### III. THE CLASSICAL APPROACH

#### A. The algorithm

The main idea is to use a time-memory trade-off (TMTO). Set  $w = q_1 + q_2 + 1$  with  $q_1 \leq q_2$ .

**Algorithm 1 (TMTO):**

- For all the  $q_1$ -tuples  $\Gamma = (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_{q_1})$  with  $0 < \gamma_1 < \dots < \gamma_{q_1} \leq D$ , compute and store the pairs  $\langle X^{\gamma_1} + \dots + X^{\gamma_{q_1}} \bmod P; \Gamma \rangle$ .
- For all  $q_2$ -tuples  $\Delta = (\delta_1, \dots, \delta_{q_2})$  with  $0 < \delta_1 < \dots < \delta_{q_2} \leq D$ , compute  $X^{\delta_1} + \dots + X^{\delta_{q_2}} \bmod P$ . Look in the table for an element XORing to 1 (this can be efficiently done by using a hash table). If it exists, this gives

$$1 + \sum_{\gamma \in \Gamma} X^\gamma + \sum_{\delta \in \Delta} X^\delta = 0 \bmod P.$$

#### B. Complexity

The usual time-memory trade-off is  $q_1 = \left\lfloor \frac{w-1}{2} \right\rfloor$  and  $q_2 = \left\lceil \frac{w-1}{2} \right\rceil$ , in order to balance the complexity of the two phases of the algorithm.

The most time consuming part depends on the parity of  $w$ , as we do not have to compute anything to find the collisions if  $q_1 = q_2$ .

The memory complexity is then  $\mathcal{O}(D^{q_1})$  (for the first phase) while the time complexity is  $\mathcal{O}(D^{q_2})$ .

### IV. USING DISCRETE LOGARITHM

#### A. The algorithm

In this section, we will consider the field  $\mathbf{F}_{2^n}$  defined as  $\mathbf{F}_2[x]/\langle P \rangle$ . The discrete logarithm (with base element  $x$ ) in this field will be denoted by  $\text{Log}$ .

Set  $w = q_1 + q_2 + 2$  with  $q_1 \leq q_2$ . Take two tuples

$$\Gamma = (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_{q_1}) \text{ with } 0 < \gamma_1 < \dots < \gamma_{q_1} \leq D$$

and

$$\Delta = (\delta_1, \dots, \delta_{q_2}) \text{ with } 0 < \delta_1 < \dots < \delta_{q_2} \leq D.$$

Denoting by  $L_\Gamma$  and  $L_\Delta$  the logarithms of  $1 + \sum_{\gamma \in \Gamma} x^\gamma$  and  $1 + \sum_{\delta \in \Delta} x^\delta$  respectively, the following equalities hold in  $\mathbf{F}_2[x]/\langle P \rangle$ :

$$1 + \sum_{\gamma \in \Gamma} x^\gamma = x^{L_\Gamma - L_\Delta} \left( 1 + \sum_{\delta \in \Delta} x^\delta \right) \quad \text{and}$$

$$x^{L_\Delta - L_\Gamma} \left( 1 + \sum_{\gamma \in \Gamma} x^\gamma \right) = 1 + \sum_{\delta \in \Delta} x^\delta.$$

Now let  $e \in ]-2^{n-1}, 2^{n-1}]$  such that  $e$  is equal to  $L_\Gamma - L_\Delta$  modulo  $2^n - 1$ . If  $e > 0$ , then the polynomial

$$\left( 1 + \sum_{\gamma \in \Gamma} x^\gamma \right) + x^e \left( 1 + \sum_{\delta \in \Delta} x^\delta \right)$$

is a multiple of  $P$  with degree  $\max(\gamma_{q_1}, \delta_{q_2} + e)$ . If  $e < 0$ , then the polynomial

$$x^{-e} \left( 1 + \sum_{\gamma \in \Gamma} x^\gamma \right) + \left( 1 + \sum_{\delta \in \Delta} x^\delta \right)$$

is a multiple of  $P$  with degree  $\max(\gamma_{q_1} - e, \delta_{q_2})$ . So, if one of the two following conditions is satisfied

$$\begin{aligned} e > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \delta_{q_2} + e \leq D \\ e < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \gamma_{q_1} - e \leq D \end{aligned}$$

we get a multiple of  $P$  with degree at most  $D$  and weight at most  $w$ . We can rewrite both conditions in a single inequality

$$\gamma_{q_1} - D \leq e \leq D - \delta_{q_2}. \quad (1)$$

The algorithm is then straightforward.

**Algorithm 2 (LogTMTO):**

- For all the  $q_1$ -tuples  $\Gamma = (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_{q_1})$  with  $0 < \gamma_1 < \dots < \gamma_{q_1} \leq D$ , compute

$$L_\Gamma = \text{Log}(1 + x^{\gamma_1} + \dots + x^{\gamma_{q_1}})$$

and store the pairs  $\langle L_\Gamma; \Gamma \rangle$ .

- For all  $q_2$ -tuples  $\Delta = (\delta_1, \dots, \delta_{q_2})$  with  $0 < \delta_1 < \dots < \delta_{q_2} \leq D$  compute the logarithm

$$L_\Delta = \text{Log}(1 + x^{\delta_1} + \dots + x^{\delta_{q_2}})$$

and look in the table for all the elements with a logarithm  $L_\Gamma$  satisfying (1). For each of them we obtain a multiple of  $P$ .

Of course, since we can decompose all polynomials of weight  $w$  in  $\binom{w-1}{q_1}$  way, we obtain each multiple many times.

### B. Complexity

In order to perform the second phase, one could sort the table with increasing logarithms, but using an appropriate data structure like a hash table indexed by the most significant bits of the logarithm is a lot more efficient. As long as  $D < 2^{n/2}$ , the search cost is  $\mathcal{O}(1)$ .

Once again, we choose the parameters of the time-memory trade-off in order to balance the complexity of the two phases, taking  $q_1 = \lfloor \frac{w-2}{2} \rfloor$  and  $q_2 = \lfloor \frac{w-2}{2} \rfloor$ .

As for the classical algorithm, the most time consuming part depends on the parity of  $w$  as we do not have to compute any logarithm in the second phase if  $q_1 = q_2$ .

The memory usage is then  $\mathcal{O}(D^{q_1})$ , while the time complexity is  $\mathcal{O}(D^{q_2})$  logarithm computations. We will see in Section V-C that the logarithm can be computed quite efficiently. Actually for many practical value of  $n$  we can even compute it in  $\mathcal{O}(1)$ . Hence we neglect it in Table I.

TABLE I  
COMPARISON BETWEEN TMTO AND LOGTMTO

Algorithm	$w = 2p$		$w = 2p + 1$	
	Time	Memory	Time	Memory
TMTO	$D^p$	$D^{p-1}$	$D^p$	$D^p$
LogTMTO	$D^{p-1}$	$D^{p-1}$	$D^p$	$D^{p-1}$

As we can see in Table I, if  $w$  is even we improve the time complexity and otherwise we save memory. Heuristically, the improvement by a factor  $D$ , either in time or in space, can be explained by the fact that we look for values in an interval of size roughly  $D$  instead of exact collisions.

## V. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

### A. Bounds on the degree

First of all, it is worth noticing that it is not necessary to take  $q_2$ -tuples up to the degree  $D$ .

As a polynomial of weight  $w$  has many representation as a sum of a polynomial of weight  $q_1 + 1$  and  $q_2 + 1$  respectively, we can choose the one with the smallest  $q_2$ -tuple.

**Proposition 1:** Let  $M = 1 + \sum_{i \in I} X^i$  be a multiple of  $P$  of weight  $w = q_1 + q_2 + 2$  and degree at most  $D$ .

Then there exists an integer  $1 \leq e \leq D$ , and two polynomials  $A$  and  $B$  of respective weight  $q_1$  and  $q_2$  and of degree respectively at most  $D$  and at most  $\frac{Dq_2}{w-1}$  such that  $M = (1 + A) + X^e(1 + B)$  or  $X^e(1 + A) + (1 + B)$ .

With the usual trade-off, we can restrict ourselves to the degree  $D/2$ , dividing the cost of the second phase approximately by a factor  $2^{w/2}$ .

### B. Find many but not all

When we are not looking for all the multiples (Problem 2), our method is also very efficient.

Just by computing logarithms of polynomials  $A$  of weight  $w - 1$  and degree less than  $D$ , we can obtain easily low-weight multiples of type  $A + x^{Log(A)}$  if the logarithm is at most  $D$ . After  $N$  iterations we could thus expect to have  $N \frac{D}{2^n}$  multiples. Of course if the degree  $D$  is too low, this is inefficient.

If  $D$  is low, then we can once again profit from a precomputation step. Let  $K$  be such that  $DK \ll 2^{n/2}$ . If during the first step of the algorithm we only compute and store  $K$  logarithms amongst the  $\binom{D}{q_1}$ , using the birthday paradox, we can expect the intervals defined by condition (1) to be almost disjoint. As those intervals are of size approximately  $D$ , the probability to find a logarithm in one of them during the second phase is  $\frac{DK}{2^n}$ . For each such logarithm we get a low-weight multiple. So, after  $N$  iterations we can expect to have  $N \frac{DK}{2^n}$  multiples. The speedup of this second phase is then proportional to the time we spend in precomputation. In Section VI we will see an illustration of this result.

### C. How to compute logarithms

In practice, it is important to compute efficiently discrete logarithms in  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}^*$  and hopefully there exists well studied algorithms to do that. It is important to take into account that we are going to compute many logarithms and not only one. All the efficient algorithms for computing logarithms (Baby-step Giant-step, Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [12] and Coppersmith algorithm [3], [4]) can profit from a bigger precomputation step that can be done once and for all. For instance, if  $2^n - 1$  is smooth enough, one can tabulate the logarithms in all the subgroups of  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}^*$  to make the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm very efficient. In this case, a subsequent discrete logarithm computation can be done in  $\mathcal{O}(1)$ . This approach can be used for all the  $n$  up to 78 except  $\{37, 41, 49, 59, 61, 62, 65, 67, 69, 71, 74, 77\}$ . In addition we have listed in Table II some larger  $n$  for which it is applicable and the corresponding memory requirement. Notice that a full tabulation corresponds to a Giant-step of 1 and that by increasing a little this Giant-step, we can efficiently deal with more values of  $n$ .

This leads to a very easy and efficient implementation as we will see in Section VI. Moreover, for the most

TABLE II  
MEMORY USAGE FOR A FULLY TABULATED POHLIG-HELLMAN  
ALGORITHM AND SOME SMOOTH  $2^n - 1$

$n$	53	96	110	156	210
memory	439MB	510MB	1.7GB	940MB	201MB

useful cases (that is  $w \in \{3, 4, 5\}$ ) we have to compute logarithms of the form  $\text{Log}(1 + x^i)$ . This logarithm is known as the Zech's logarithm of  $i$ , and we can exploit some properties of Zech's logarithm (see [6]) to speed up the computation. Actually, by computing one Zech logarithm we get  $6n$  other logarithms for free. Of course not all of them are useful for us, but the computation time can be divided by a factor at least 2.

## VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

We have implemented our algorithm in C to test its efficiency. The computer used for our experiments is a 3.6GHz Pentium4 with 2MB of cache and 2GB of RAM.

### A. Problem 1

We give in Table III the timings to find all the multiples of weight  $w$  up to degree  $D$  of the polynomial

$$P = x^{53} + x^{47} + x^{45} + x^{44} + x^{42} + x^{40} + x^{39} + x^{38} + x^{36} + x^{33} + x^{32} + x^{31} + x^{30} + x^{28} + x^{27} + x^{26} + x^{25} + x^{21} + x^{20} + x^{17} + x^{16} + x^{15} + x^{13} + x^{11} + x^{10} + x^7 + x^6 + x^3 + x^2 + x^1 + 1.$$

As explained in the previous section, we used a fully tabulated Pohlig-Hellman.

TABLE III  
PROBLEM 1: FIND ALL THE MULTIPLES UP TO DEGREE  $D$

$n$	53					
$w$	4			5		
$\log_2(D)$	20	22	28	13	14	16
time	47''	2'02''	1h52'	4'11''	14'40''	3h33'

We can see that the algorithm is, as expected, very efficient for weight 4 as its complexity is linear in the degree  $D$ , both for time and memory (to be compared to a quadratic complexity for the best algorithms known so far).

We were also able to compute all the multiples of weight 5 and degree up to  $2^{16}$  of a polynomial of degree 53 within a few hours. We can ask ourselves how far we can go with this method. As the second step can easily be distributed over many computers, roughly a month of computation with 16 computers would be necessary to reach the degree  $2^{22}$ .

### B. Problem 2

With the same polynomial of degree  $n = 53$ , we also looked for multiples with an higher weight  $w = 7$ , and degree at most  $D = 15$ . The precomputation was limited to all the trinomials up to the degree  $K$ , which corresponds to  $q_1 = 2$ , instead of 3 for the optimal trade-off.

We can see in Figure 1 that a bigger precomputation can greatly improve the performance.




Fig. 1. Evolution of the number of multiples of weight 7 and degree lower than 15 found with  $K$  precomputed logarithms

## VII. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we devised a new algorithm to find low-weight multiples of a given binary polynomial. Depending on the parity of the weight  $w$  of the sought multiples, we either improve the time complexity or reduce the amount of memory needed. Therefore we obtain a very efficient algorithm for weight 3 up to 6. In fact, the complexity is respectively linear for weight 3 and 4, and quadratic for weight 5 and 6, compared to quadratic and cubic respectively for the best algorithm known so far.

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