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Reports (Research Report) Year : 1989

Information and strategies in dynamic games


We extend to the setting of stochastic dynamic games a theorem of Kuhn, and use it to prove the existence of a saddle point in a suitable class of strategies. We then particularize this result to the situation where one of the players has full information to show existence of a saddle point in another class of strategies exhibiting a constant dimension sufficient statistic. A dynamic programming-like algorithm is naturally associated with this class of strategies, and was proposed in a previous paper in a sufficient condition setting. For this same class of games, we give an example of another use of the main theorem, leading to a different dynamic programming-like algorithm.


Other [cs.OH]
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inria-00075577 , version 1 (24-05-2006)


  • HAL Id : inria-00075577 , version 1


Pierre Bernhard. Information and strategies in dynamic games. [Research Report] RR-0982, INRIA. 1989, pp.19. ⟨inria-00075577⟩
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