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*Specification and Verification of a
Dynamic Reconfiguration Protocol for
Agent-Based Applications*

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N° 4222

Juillet 2001

THÈME 1



*Rapport
de recherche*

Specification and Verification of a Dynamic Reconfiguration Protocol for Agent-Based Applications

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Thème 1 — Réseaux et systèmes
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Abstract: Dynamic reconfiguration increases the availability of distributed applications by allowing them to evolve at run-time. This report deals with the formal specification and model-checking verification of a dynamic reconfiguration protocol used in industrial agent-based applications. Starting from a reference implementation in JAVA, we produced a specification of the protocol using the Formal Description Technique LOTOS. We also specified a set of temporal logic formulas characterizing the correct behaviour of each protocol primitive. Finally, we studied various finite state configurations of the protocol, on which we verified these requirements using the CADP protocol engineering tool set.

Key-words: compositional verification, distributed application, dynamic reconfiguration, LOTOS, mobile agent, model-checking, specification, temporal logic

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Spécification et vérification d'un protocole de reconfiguration dynamique d'applications à base d'agents mobiles

Résumé : La reconfiguration dynamique augmente la disponibilité des applications réparties en leur permettant d'évoluer pendant l'exécution. Ce rapport concerne la spécification formelle et la vérification énumérative d'un protocole de reconfiguration dynamique utilisé dans des applications industrielles à base d'agents mobiles. Sur la base d'une implémentation de référence en JAVA, nous avons produit une spécification du protocole en utilisant la technique de description formelle LOTOS. Nous avons également spécifié un ensemble de formules de logique temporelle caractérisant le comportement correct de chaque primitive du protocole. Finalement, nous avons étudié différentes configurations du protocole ayant un nombre fini d'états, sur lesquelles nous avons vérifié ces formules au moyen de la boîte à outils CADP pour l'ingénierie des protocoles.

Mots-clés : agent mobile, application distribuée, logique temporelle, LOTOS, reconfiguration dynamique, spécification, vérification énumérative, vérification compositionnelle

1 Introduction

As computing resources become decentralized, the development of distributed applications receives increasing attention from the software engineering community. These applications are often complex and must satisfy strong reliability and availability constraints. To avoid stopping an entire distributed application for maintenance operations (e.g., repair, upgrade, etc.), it is essential to provide mechanisms allowing distributed applications to be reconfigured at run-time. Such mechanisms should ensure a proper functioning of the application regardless of run-time changes (e.g., creation or deletion of agents, replacement of agents, migration of agents across execution sites, modification of communication routes, etc). Moreover, these mechanisms should not induce heavy penalties on applications during maintenance operations.

Dynamic reconfiguration has been studied and implemented in various middlewares, such as CONIC [KM89], ARGUS [BD93], and POLYLITH [Pur94]. In some approaches, e.g., POLYLITH, dynamic reconfiguration is part of the applications developed on top of the middleware, thus transferring to application developers the responsibility to ensure consistency after reconfiguration. In other approaches, e.g., CONIC and ARGUS, the middleware is extended with (application-independent) dynamic reconfiguration features.

This report studies the protocol for dynamic reconfiguration of agent-based applications defined in [PBR99], which follows the latter approach. This protocol has been implemented in the middleware platform AAA (*Agents Anytime Anywhere*) [BPF⁺99, PBF⁺00], which allows a flexible, scalable, and reliable development of distributed applications. The protocol has been experimented on several industrial applications developed in cooperation with BULL, and especially on an application for managing a set of network firewalls [PBF⁺00]. In this application (included in BULL's NETWALL security product), each firewall produces a log file of audit information; agents are used to manage logged information, to provide filtering functionalities that can be added and customized lately according to customer requirements, to correlate and coordinate multiple firewalls, and to deploy a set of log management applications over the firewalls.

As this dynamic reconfiguration protocol is non-trivial, it was suitable to ensure its correctness using formal methods, and especially to establish that reconfiguration preserves the consistency of the application. Starting from the informal description of the protocol given in [PBR99] and a JAVA implementation that was already in use, we produced a formal specification of the protocol using the ISO Formal Description Technique LOTOS [ISO88]. We then identified a set of safety and liveness properties characterizing the desired behaviour of each reconfiguration primitive of the protocol. To verify whether these correctness properties hold for the LOTOS specification, we used the *model-checking* approach [CGP00]; verification was carried out using CADP [FGK⁺96], a protocol engineering tool set providing state-of-the-art compilation, simulation, and verification functionalities.

This report is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the AAA agent-based middleware and its dynamic reconfiguration protocol. Section 3 describes the LOTOS specification of the protocol. Section 4 reports about the verification process performed using CADP. Section 5

discusses the results and gives directions for future work. The complete LOTOS specification of the protocol is given in Annex A.

2 The dynamic reconfiguration protocol

In this section, we first introduce the AAA distributed agent model. Then, we state the dynamic reconfiguration problem and present the principles of the reconfiguration protocol under study.

2.1 The AAA distributed agent model

In the AAA model [BPF⁺99], the basic software elements are *agents* executing concurrently on several *sites*. Each agent has only one execution flow (single-thread). Agents are connected by *communication channels*, i.e., unidirectional point-to-point links. Agents can synchronize and communicate only by sending or receiving messages on communication channels, which play the role of references to other agents.

Agents behave according to an *event-reaction* scheme: when receiving an event on a communication channel, an agent executes the appropriate reaction, i.e., a piece of code that may update the agent state and/or send messages to other agents (including the agent itself).

The AAA infrastructure ensures that agents and communications satisfy certain properties [BPF⁺99] listed in the table below. The dynamic reconfiguration protocol relies upon some of these properties, and especially the *causality* property (also called *causal ordering*) [RST91, LBBK01].

AGENT PROPERTIES	
Persistency	Agent lifetime is not bounded to the duration of execution (however, this does not ensure consistent state retrieval after failures).
Atomicity	Upon receipt of an event, the reaction of an agent is either fully executed or not executed at all.
Configurability	Agent attributes and references to other agents can be changed at run-time by a third party (e.g., an administrator).
COMMUNICATION PROPERTIES	
Asynchrony	No assumption is made on transmission speed, allowing applications to be designed and implemented in a time-independent manner.
Reliability	Message delivery is guaranteed in spite of network failures or system crashes and without any involvement from the application.
Causality	Messages are delivered in the same order as they are sent.

2.2 Dynamic reconfiguration

Dynamic reconfiguration of an agent-based application encompasses (at least) four possible changes in the structure of the application at run-time: *architectural changes* (creation or deletion of agents, modification of communication routes), *migration changes* (modification of the placement of agents on execution sites), *agent implementation changes*, and *agent interface changes*. The dynamic reconfiguration protocol under study takes into account only the first two aspects.

Figure 1 shows an example of application reconfiguration involving the migration of an agent across two sites. This example will be used throughout this section.




Figure 1: Migration of agent A_2 from site 2 to site 3

Dynamic reconfiguration must preserve *consistency* [KM90]: after reconfiguration, the application should be able to resume its execution from its global state prior to reconfiguration. Figure 2 shows an inconsistency that may occur during the reconfiguration depicted on Figure 1: message m_3 is lost because while it was in transit, its destination (agent A_2) has migrated from site 2 to site 3.




Figure 2: Inconsistency arising from migration of A_2 from site 2 to site 3

To avoid inconsistencies, three issues must be taken into account:

- *Agent naming*: references to migrating agents must be properly updated (e.g., assuming that agent names include site information, the reference to agent A_2 used by agent A_1 when sending message m_3 may become outdated after A_2 has moved from site 2 to site 3).

- *Agent states*: after an agent has been reconfigured, it must be able to resume its actual computation from its former state (e.g., agent A_2 must resume its computation on site 3 from its state on site 2 prior to migration).
- *Communication channels*: messages in transit during a reconfiguration must be preserved and properly redirected to their destination agents after reconfiguration (e.g., message m_3 should reach A_2 after A_2 has migrated to site 3).

2.3 Principles of the protocol

To ensure consistency in presence of agent migration, different approaches have been proposed, such as checkpointing [LS92] (which performs a rollback of the application to its last consistent state, on which reconfiguration is performed), forwarding techniques [PM83] (which temporarily replace a migrating agent by a *forwarder* responsible for redirecting incoming messages to the new location of the agent), and transparent protocols for location-independent communication [SWP98] (which avoid reference updates between agents by preserving agent names).

Checkpointing techniques require the additional cost of maintaining consistent distributed snapshots of the application (i.e., the agent states and the messages in transit) and of rollbacking. Forwarding techniques induce residual dependencies that may affect application reliability (e.g., in case of a forwarder failure). The AAA agent-based middleware does not provide location-independent communications, but rather reliable communication and agent management primitives.

For these reasons, the dynamic reconfiguration protocol described in [PBR99] does not rely on these techniques. It is derived from the protocol used in CONIC, but improved to take advantage of the properties (event-reaction model, asynchrony, persistency) guaranteed by the AAA middleware. The protocol associates to each application a particular agent, named *configurator*, which is responsible for handling all reconfiguration commands. The configurator maintains a view of the application configuration (placement of agents on sites and communication routes between agents), determines if a reconfiguration command can be performed, executes the corresponding actions, and updates the configuration view accordingly. Unlike a forwarder, the configurator can handle more complex reconfiguration primitives, such as code replacement and agent deletion.

The communication infrastructure provided by the AAA model can be seen as a logical bus that carries all messages between application agents and/or the configurator. Each agent is referenced by an address $\langle a, s \rangle$, where s is the identifier of the current site of the agent and a is the local identifier of the agent on site s . When an agent moves across different sites, its address must be updated appropriately (note that the local identifier may also change when the agent migrates to another site).

The following reconfiguration primitives are supported by the protocol: **ADD** (addition of a new agent to the application), **DELETE** (removal of an agent from the application), **MOVE** (migration of an agent to another site), **BIND** and **REBIND** (creation and modification of a communication channel between two agents). The implementation of the **REBIND**,

MOVE, and DELETE primitives must avoid inconsistencies. Intuitively, when an agent is under reconfiguration, its execution must be suspended; in the event-reaction model, this can be obtained by ensuring that the agent receives no more events during its reconfiguration. The preconditions for a safe execution of the reconfiguration primitives can be summarized as follows: *all communication channels involved must be empty (i.e., must not contain any message in transit) before reconfiguration can occur.*

The dynamic reconfiguration protocol implementing these primitives can be defined using a notion of *abstract state* for application agents. At any time, an agent can be in one of the three abstract states listed in the table below.

STATE	MEANING
Active	The agent can execute normally and communicate with other agents according to the event-reaction model.
Passive	The agent can react to events but cannot send any event to other agents; all events that it must send are delayed until its reactivation.
Frozen	The agent does not receive any event anymore; all agents having a reference towards it are passive and the corresponding channels are empty.

During the execution of reconfiguration commands, the configurator forces certain agents into appropriate abstract states in order to preserve consistency. Roughly speaking, to reconfigure an agent A or one of its outgoing channels, the configurator implements the following protocol:

1. Compute the *Change Passive Set*, noted $cps(A)$, which contains all the agents having a communication channel directed to A : these agents must be made passive in order to freeze A . For the REBIND primitive, $cps(A)$ is empty, but A itself must be made passive.
2. Passivate all agents in $cps(A)$. So doing, all agents with references to A are becoming passive and all communication channels directed to A are progressively flushed. When this is complete, agent A is frozen (except in the case of REBIND, where A is made passive, but not frozen).
3. Send the reconfiguration command to A . The causal ordering property ensures that this command will only be received when A is frozen (although the configurator never knows exactly when A is frozen).
4. Activate all agents in $cps(A)$. Agents in $cps(A)$ that have received messages while they were passive must react to these messages as soon as they are reactivated. In the case of REBIND, agent A is reactivated when it receives the REBIND command.

3 Formal specification

In this section we give a brief overview of LOTOS and then we detail the specification of the dynamic reconfiguration protocol.

3.1 Overview of LOTOS

LOTOS (*Language Of Temporal Ordering Specification*) [ISO88] is a Formal Description Technique standardized by ISO for specifying communication protocols and distributed systems. Its design was motivated by the need for a language with a high abstraction level and strong mathematical basis, which could be used for the description and analysis of complex systems. LOTOS consists of two “orthogonal” sub-languages:

The data part is based on the well-known theory of algebraic abstract data types, more specifically on the ACTONE specification language [dMRV92]. A data type is described by its sorts and operations, which are specified using algebraic equations.

The behaviour part is based on process algebras, combining the best features of CCS [Mil89] and CSP [Hoa85]. A concurrent system is usually described as a collection of parallel processes interacting by rendezvous. Each process behaviour is specified using an algebra of operators (see the table below). Processes can manipulate data values and exchange them at interaction points called *gates*.

BEHAVIOUR OPERATOR	INTUITIVE MEANING
stop	Do nothing.
$G !V ?X : S ; B$	Interact on gate G , sending value V and receiving in variable X a value of sort S , then execute B .
$B_1 \square B_2$	Execute either B_1 or B_2 .
$[E] \rightarrow B$	If E is true then execute B , else do nothing.
$B_1 \parallel [G_1, \dots, G_n] \parallel B_2$	Execute B_1 and B_2 in parallel with synchronization on gates G_1, \dots, G_n .
$B_1 \parallel \parallel B_2$	Execute B_1 and B_2 in parallel without synchronization.
exit	Terminate successfully.
$B_1 \gg B_2$	Execute B_1 followed by B_2 when B_1 terminates.
$P [G_1, \dots, G_n] (V_1, \dots, V_n)$	Call process P with gate parameters G_1, \dots, G_n and value parameters V_1, \dots, V_n .

3.2 Architecture of the protocol

The architecture of the LOTOS specification (see Figure 3) consists of a configurator agent and n application agents. All agents are modelled as LOTOS processes, which execute concurrently and communicate through a software bus (an abstraction of the AAA infrastructure), which is also modeled by a LOTOS process. Agents can send and receive messages (events) via the gates SEND and RECV, respectively. The Bus process acts as an unbounded buffer (initially empty) accepting messages on gate SEND and delivering them on gate RECV.

Dynamic agent creation is modelled in a finite manner by considering a fixed set of Agent processes that initially are all “dead” (an auxiliary abstract state, noted DEAD, meaning that the agent is not part of the application) and will be progressively added to the application.




Figure 3: Architecture of the dynamic reconfiguration protocol

3.3 Configurator agent

The configurator agent is responsible for keeping track of the application configuration and for executing the reconfiguration commands coming from some external user. Since we seek to study a general behaviour of the protocol, we do not specify a particular user, letting the configurator behave as if it would receive an infinite sequence of arbitrary reconfiguration commands.

The `Configurator` process has two parameters: the application configuration C (initially empty) and the address set R of agents currently in the `DEAD` state. The configuration C is modelled as a list of tuples $\langle \langle a, s \rangle, A \rangle$, where $\langle a, s \rangle$ is the address of an agent present in the application and A is the set of agent addresses towards which the agent has a reference (output channels). The `Configurator` process has a cyclic behaviour: it chooses a reconfiguration command non-deterministically, executes the appropriate operations, and calls itself recursively with an updated configuration. In the following example, we only detail the `MOVE` primitive, the other reconfiguration primitives being specified similarly.

```

process Configurator [SEND, RECV] (C:Config, R:AddrSet) : noexit :=
  (* ... other reconfiguration primitives *)
  (choice A:Addr, S:SiteId []
    [(A isin C) and (getsite (A) ne S)] ->
      (let A2:Addr = newaddr (S, C) in
        Passivate [SEND, RECV] (cps (A, C)) >>
          SEND !A !confaddr !MOVE !A2 !dummy;
          RECV !confaddr !A2 !ACK !dummy !dummy;
          Activate [SEND, RECV] (A, A2, cps (A, C)) >>
            Configurator [SEND, RECV]
              (setaddr (A, A2, setchan (cps (A, C), A, A2, C)), R)
          )
        )
  )
endproc

```

The address A of the agent to be moved and its destination site identifier S are chosen non-deterministically. The agents in the set $cps(A)$ are made passive by calling the auxiliary process `Passivate`. Then, a `MOVE` command is sent to agent A , which must respond with

an acknowledgement upon completion of its migration to site S . The agents in $cps(A)$ are then reactivated by calling the auxiliary process `Activate`, which also notifies them with the new address $A2$ of agent A . Finally, the `Configurator` calls itself recursively with a modified configuration obtained from C by updating the address of agent A and the output channels of the agents in $cps(A)$.

3.4 Application agents

Application agents execute the code of the application according to the event-reaction model and must also react to the reconfiguration commands sent by the configurator agent. Since we focus on the reconfiguration protocol itself rather than on the agent-based applications built upon it, we consider only one application-level message (called `SERVICE`) sent between agents.

The `Agent` process has four parameters: its current abstract state S , its current address A , the set R of agent addresses (output channels) towards which it has a reference and a boolean B indicating whether a message was received while it was passive (this may occur during the migration of another agent towards which the current agent has an output channel). The `Agent` process has a cyclic behaviour: it receives an event, executes the corresponding reaction according to its current abstract state S , and calls itself recursively with the parameters updated appropriately. In the following example, we only detail the reaction of an agent to the `MOVE` command, the other reconfiguration commands being specified similarly.

```

process Agent [SEND, RECV] (S:State, A:Addr, R:AddrSet, B:Boolean):noexit:=
  (* ... other reconfiguration commands *)
  [S eq ACTIVE] ->
    RECV !A !confaddr !MOVE ?A2:Addr !dummy;
    SEND !confaddr !A2 !ACK !dummy !dummy;
    Agent [SEND, RECV] (S, A2, R, B)
  []
  [S eq PASSIVE] ->
    RECV !A !confaddr !MOVE ?A2:Addr !dummy;
    ([B] ->
      (choice A3:Addr [] [A3 isin replace (A, A2, R)] ->
        SEND !A3 !A !SERVICE !dummy !dummy;
        SEND !confaddr !A2 !ACK !dummy !dummy;
        Agent [SEND, RECV] (ACTIVE, A2, replace (A, A2, R), false)
      )
    )
    []
    [not (B)] -> SEND !confaddr !A2 !ACK !dummy !dummy;
    Agent [SEND, RECV] (ACTIVE, A2, replace (A, A2, R), false)
  )
endproc

```

The migration is specified simply by changing the agent address. If the agent is active, it simply sends an acknowledgement with its new address $A2$ back to the configurator, and

then calls itself recursively with an updated address. If the agent is passive (this can happen only if it has an output channel directed to itself), it first reacts to the events received from other agents while it was passive, then sends an acknowledgement to the configurator, and finally becomes active, updating its address and its output channels.

4 Model-checking verification

To analyze the behaviour of the dynamic reconfiguration protocol, we used the CADP tool set, which we briefly present. We then express the correctness properties of the protocol and give experimental results regarding model-checking verification.

4.1 Overview of the CADP tool set

CADP (CÆSAR/ALDÉBARAN Development Package) [FGK⁺96] is a state-of-the-art tool set dedicated to the verification of communication protocols and distributed systems. CADP offers an integrated set of functionalities ranging from interactive simulation to exhaustive, model-based verification. In this case-study, we used the following tools of CADP:

CAESAR.ADT [Gar89] and **CAESAR** [GS90] are compilers for the data part and the control part of LOTOS specifications, respectively. They can be used to translate a LOTOS specification into a Labelled Transition System (LTS), i.e., a state-transition graph modelling exhaustively the behaviour of the specification. Each LTS transition is labelled with an action resulting from synchronization on a gate, possibly with communication of data values.

EVALUATOR 3.0 [MS00] is an on-the-fly model-checker for temporal logic formulas over LTSS. The logic considered is an extension of the alternation-free μ -calculus [EL86] with action predicates and regular expressions. The tool also provides diagnostics (examples and counterexamples) explaining the truth value of the formulas.

BCG_MIN is a tool for minimizing LTSS according to various equivalence relations, such as strong bisimulation, observational or branching equivalence, etc.

SVL 2.0 [GL01] is a tool for compositional and on-the-fly verification based on the approach proposed in [KM97]. Compositional verification is a mean to avoid state explosion in model-checking by dividing a concurrent system into its parallel components (e.g., the configurator agent, application agents, and the bus), generating (modulo some abstractions) the LTS corresponding to each component, minimizing each LTS and recombining the minimized LTSS to obtain the whole system.

4.2 Correctness properties

To express the correct behaviour of the dynamic reconfiguration protocol, we expressed a set of relevant properties about its behaviour. Two main classes of properties are usually considered for distributed systems: *safety properties*, stating that “something bad never

happens”, and *liveness properties*, stating that “something good eventually happens” during the execution of the system. For the dynamic reconfiguration protocol under study, we identified, together with the developers of the AAA middleware, 10 safety and liveness properties characterizing either the global behaviour of the protocol or the particular behaviour of each reconfiguration primitive. These properties are shown in the table below (the *S* and *L* superscripts indicate safety and liveness, respectively).

No.	CORRECTNESS PROPERTY
P_1^L	There is no deadlock in the specification.
P_2^L	Every reconfiguration command is eventually followed by an acknowledgement.
P_3^S	There is a strict alternation between commands and acknowledgements.
P_4^L	Every command sent to the bus is eventually delivered to its receiver.
P_5^S	Initially, no event can be sent before at least one agent has been created.
P_6^S	Initially, no application event can be sent before the underlying channel has been created.
P_7^L	Every event sent to a migrating agent will be delivered properly.
P_8^S	After a move command has been sent, the target agent cannot receive any event until it completes its migration.
P_9^S	Every event sent to a channel being rebound will be delivered before the rebound completes.
P_{10}^S	An agent that has been removed from the application cannot execute anymore.

Then, we expressed these properties in regular alternation-free μ -calculus, the temporal logic accepted by the EVALUATOR 3.0 model-checker. This logic allows to succinctly encode safety properties by using regular modalities of the form $[R]F$, which state the absence of “bad” execution sequences characterized by a regular expression R . For instance, property P_3 is encoded by the formula $[T^*.SEND_CMD1.(-SEND_ACK)^*.SEND_CMD2]F$, where the action predicates $SEND_CMD1$, $SEND_CMD2$, and $SEND_ACK$ denote the emission of two reconfiguration commands and of an acknowledgement, respectively.

4.3 Verification results

As model-checking verification is only applicable to finite-state models (of tractable size), we considered several instances of the protocol involving a finite number of agents, sites, and reconfiguration commands. The experimental results regarding LTS generation are shown in the table below. For each instance, the table gives the LTS size (number of states and transitions) and the time required for its generation using CADP. All experiments have been performed on a 500 MHz Pentium II machine with 768 Mbytes of memory.

As expected, the LTS size increases rapidly with the number of agents present in the instance, because the number of possible application configurations is exponential in the number of agents. Using the EVALUATOR 3.0 model-checker, we verified that all temporal properties given in Section 4.2 are valid on each instance considered. The average verification time of a property over an LTS was about one minute.

AGENTS	SITES	COMMANDS	STATES	TRANS.	TIME
2	2	ADD, BIND, REBIND	77	84	9"
2	2	ADD, DELETE, BIND, REBIND	4 424	5 832	43"
2	2	ADD, BIND, REBIND, MOVE	599 474	832 864	4'25"
3	1	ADD, DELETE	493	639	15"
3	1	ADD, BIND	3 391	5 031	32"
3	1	ADD, BIND, REBIND	590 119	935 397	5'13"
3	1	ADD, BIND, MOVE	646 592	917 796	5'46"

5 Conclusion and future work

In this report, we used the ISO language LOTOS [ISO88] and the CADP verification tool set [FGK⁺96] to analyse a protocol for dynamic reconfiguration proposed in [PBR99] and used in the AAA platform [BPF⁺99].

The LOTOS specification developed (about 900 lines) provides a non-ambiguous description of the protocol and a basis for future development and experimentation of new reconfiguration primitives. Using model-checking and temporal logic, we were able to verify the correct functioning of the protocol on various configurations involving several agents, sites, and reconfiguration primitives. This experiment increased the confidence in the correctness of the protocol and demonstrated the usefulness of formal methods for agent-based applications.

Three future research directions are of interest. Firstly, to improve scalability, the protocol could be extended to use a distributed configurator instead of the current centralized solution. Secondly, the validation activity could be continued on larger configurations of the protocol and more detailed specification of the AAA communication infrastructure. Thirdly, one could investigate the generation of test suites for the JAVA implementation of the protocol, by using the TGV tool [FJJ⁺96] recently integrated in CADP, which allows to automatically derive test suites from user-defined test purposes.

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A The LOTOS specification of the protocol

This annex contains the complete LOTOS specification of the dynamic reconfiguration protocol (data part and behaviour part).

A.1 Data part

```

library BOOLEAN, NATURAL endlib

(*****
 * Agent identifier
 *****)

type AgentIdentifier is Boolean
  sorts
    AgentId

  opns
    agent1 (*! constructor *), agent2 (*! constructor *),
    agent3 (*! constructor *), aconf (*! constructor *) :-> AgentId
    _eq_, _ne_, _lt_ : AgentId, AgentId -> Bool
    succ : AgentId -> AgentId
    dummyagent :-> AgentId

  eqns
    forall P1, P2:AgentId

  ofsort Bool
    P1 eq P1 = true;
    P1 eq P2 = false;

  ofsort Bool
    P1 ne P2 = not (P1 eq P2);

  ofsort Bool
    agent1 lt agent2 = true;
    agent1 lt agent3 = true;
    agent1 lt aconf = true;
    agent2 lt agent3 = true;
    agent2 lt aconf = true;
    agent3 lt aconf = true;
    P1 lt P2 = false;

  ofsort AgentId
    succ (agent1) = agent2;
    succ (agent2) = agent3;
    succ (agent3) = aconf;
    succ (aconf) = agent1;

  ofsort AgentId
    dummyagent = agent1;
endtype

```

```

(*****
 * Site identifier
 *****)

type SiteIdentifier is Boolean
  sorts
    SiteId

  opns
    site1 (*! constructor *), site2 (*! constructor *) :-> SiteId
    _eq_, _ne_, _lt_ : SiteId, SiteId -> Bool
    dummysite :-> SiteId

  eqns
    forall S1, S2:SiteId

  ofsort Bool
    S1 eq S1 = true;
    S1 eq S2 = false;

  ofsort Bool
    S1 ne S2 = not (S1 eq S2);

  ofsort Bool
    site1 lt site2 = true;
    S1 lt S2 = false;

  ofsort SiteId
    dummysite = site1;
endtype

(*****
 * Agent address
 *****)

type AgentAddress is AgentIdentifier, SiteIdentifier
  sorts
    Addr

  opns
    @_ (*! constructor *) : AgentId, SiteId -> Addr
    getsite : Addr -> SiteId
    _eq_, _ne_, _lt_ : Addr, Addr -> Bool
    confaddr :-> Addr
    dummy :-> Addr

```

```

eqns
  forall P, P1, P2:AgentId, S, S1, S2:SiteId, A1, A2:Addr

ofsort SiteId
  getsite (P@S) = S;

ofsort Bool
  (P1@S1) eq (P2@S2) = (P1 eq P2) and (S1 eq S2);

ofsort Bool
  A1 ne A2 = not (A1 eq A2);

ofsort Bool
  (P1@S1) lt (P2@S2) = (P1 lt P2) or ((P1 eq P2) and (S1 lt S2));

ofsort Addr
  confaddr = aconf@dummysite;

ofsort Addr
  dummy = dummyagent@dummysite;
endtype

(*****
 * Set of agent addresses
 *****)

type AgentAddressSet is Natural, AgentAddress
  sorts
    AddrSet

  opns
    {} (*! constructor *) :-> AddrSet
    _+_ (*! constructor *) : Addr, AddrSet -> AddrSet
    insert : Addr, AddrSet -> AddrSet
    remove : Addr, AddrSet -> AddrSet
    replace : Addr, Addr, AddrSet -> AddrSet
    empty : AddrSet -> Bool
    _isin_, _notin_ : Addr, AddrSet -> Bool
    _subset_ : AddrSet, AddrSet -> Bool
    _eq_, _ne_, _lt_ : AddrSet, AddrSet -> Bool
    card : AddrSet -> Nat
    pick : AddrSet -> Addr

eqns
  forall A, A1, A2:Addr, R, R1, R2:AddrSet

```

```

ofsort AddrSet
  (* assert: elements are unique and sorted in increasing order *)
  insert (A, {}) = A + {};
  insert (A, A + R) = A + R;
  A lt A1 => insert (A, A1 + R1) = A + (A1 + R1);
  insert (A, A1 + R1) = A1 + insert (A, R1);

ofsort AddrSet
  remove (A, {}) = {};
  remove (A, A + R) = R;
  remove (A, A1 + R1) = A1 + remove (A, R1);

ofsort AddrSet
  replace (A1, A2, R) = insert (A2, remove (A1, R));

ofsort Bool
  empty (A + R) = true;
  empty (A + R) = false;

ofsort Bool
  A isin {} = false;
  A isin (A1 + R1) = (A eq A1) or (A isin R1);

ofsort Bool
  A notin R = not (A isin R);

ofsort Bool
  {} subset R = true;
  (A1 + R1) subset R2 = (A1 isin R2) and (R1 subset R2);

ofsort Bool
  R1 eq R2 = (R1 subset R2) and (R2 subset R1);

ofsort Bool
  R1 ne R2 = not (R1 eq R2);

ofsort Bool
  (* assert: elements are unique and sorted in increasing order *)
  {} lt (A + R) = true;
  (A1 + R1) lt (A2 + R2) = (A1 lt A2) or ((A1 eq A2) and (R1 lt R2));
  R1 lt R2 = false;

ofsort Nat
  card (A + R) = 0;
  card (A + R) = 1 + card (R);

```

```

    ofsort Addr
      (* assert: set not empty *)
      pick (A + R) = A;
    endtype

(*****
 * Reconfiguration and application commands
 *****)

type Command is Boolean
  sorts
    Cmd

  opns
    ACTIVATE  (! constructor *), ACK      (! constructor *),
    ADD       (! constructor *), BIND    (! constructor *),
    DELETE    (! constructor *), FLUSH   (! constructor *),
    MOVE      (! constructor *), PASSIVATE (! constructor *),
    REBIND    (! constructor *), SERVICE (! constructor *) :-> Cmd
    _eq_, _ne_ : Cmd, Cmd -> Bool

  eqns
    forall D1, D2:Cmd

  ofsort Bool
    D1 eq D1 = true;
    D1 eq D2 = false;

  ofsort Bool
    D1 ne D2 = not (D1 eq D2);
endtype

(*****
 * Abstract states of an agent
 *****)

type AbstractAgentState is Boolean
  sorts
    State

  opns
    ACTIVE  (! constructor *),
    DEAD   (! constructor *),
    PASSIVE (! constructor *) :-> State
    _eq_, _ne_ : State, State -> Bool

```

```

eqns
  forall T1, T2:State

ofsort Bool
  T1 eq T1 = true;
  T1 eq T2 = false;

ofsort Bool
  T1 ne T2 = not (T1 eq T2);
endtype

(*****
 * Configuration of an agent (address, set of "output" agents)
 *****)

type AgentConfiguration is AgentAddressSet
  sorts
    AgentConfig

  opns
    &_amp;_ (*! constructor *) : Addr, AddrSet -> AgentConfig
    _eq_, _ne_, _lt_ : AgentConfig, AgentConfig -> Bool

  eqns
    forall C1, C2:AgentConfig, R1, R2:AddrSet, A1, A2:Addr

  ofsort Bool
    (A1 & R1) eq (A2 & R2) = (A1 eq A2) and (R1 eq R2);

  ofsort Bool
    C1 ne C2 = not (C1 eq C2);

  ofsort Bool
    (A1 & R1) lt (A2 & R2) = (A1 lt A2) or ((A1 eq A2) and (R1 lt R2));
endtype

(*****
 * Configuration of an application (list of agent configurations)
 *****)

type Configuration is AgentConfiguration
  sorts
    Config

```

```

opns
  nil (*! constructor *) :-> Config
  _._ (*! constructor *) : AgentConfig, Config -> Config
  insert : AgentConfig, Config -> Config
  delete : Addr, Config -> Config
  remove : Addr, Config -> Config
  getchan : Addr, Config -> AddrSet
  addchan : Addr, Addr, Config -> Config
  setchan : Addr, Addr, Addr, Config -> Config
  setchan : AddrSet, Addr, Addr, Config -> Config
  setaddr : Addr, Addr, Config -> Config
  cps : Addr, Config -> AddrSet
  _isin_, _notin_ : Addr, Config -> Bool
  newaddr : SiteId, Config -> Addr
  newaddr2 : AgentId, SiteId, Config -> Addr

eqns
  forall C, C1:AgentConfig, C1_Cn, C2_Cn:Config, A, A1, A2, A3:Addr,
    R, R1:AddrSet, P:AgentId, S:SiteId

ofsort Config
  (* assert: elements are unique and sorted in increasing order *)
  insert (C, nil) = C.nil;
  insert (C, C.C2_Cn) = C.C2_Cn;
  C lt C1 => insert (C, C1.C2_Cn) = C.(C1.C2_Cn);
  insert (C, C1.C2_Cn) = C1.insert (C, C2_Cn);

ofsort Config
  delete (A, nil) = nil;
  delete (A, (A & R).C2_Cn) = delete (A, C2_Cn);
  delete (A, (A1 & R1).C2_Cn) = (A1 & remove (A, R1)).delete (A, C2_Cn);

ofsort Config
  remove (A, nil) = nil;
  remove (A, (A & R).C2_Cn) = C2_Cn;
  remove (A, C1.C2_Cn) = C1.remove (A, C2_Cn);

ofsort AddrSet
  (* assert: A is in the configuration *)
  getchan (A, (A & R).C2_Cn) = R;
  getchan (A, C1.C2_Cn) = getchan (A, C2_Cn);

ofsort Config
  (* assert: A1 isin C1_Cn *)
  addchan (A1, A2, C1_Cn) =
    insert (A1 & insert (A2, getchan (A1, C1_Cn)), remove (A1, C1_Cn));

```

```

ofsort Config
  (* assert: A1 isin C1_Cn *)
  setchan (A1, A2, A3, C1_Cn) =
    insert (A1 & insert (A3, remove (A2, getchan (A1, C1_Cn))),
           remove (A1, C1_Cn));

ofsort Config
  (* assert: each address in the set isin C1_Cn *)
  setchan ({} , A2, A3, C1_Cn) = C1_Cn;
  setchan (A + R, A2, A3, C1_Cn) =
    setchan (A, A2, A3, setchan (R, A2, A3, C1_Cn));

ofsort Config
  (* assert: A1 isin C1_Cn *)
  setaddr (A1, A2, C1_Cn) =
    insert (A2 & getchan (A1, C1_Cn), remove (A1, C1_Cn));

ofsort AddrSet
  cps (A, nil) = {};
  A isin R1 => cps (A, (A1 & R1).C2_Cn) = insert (A1, cps (A, C2_Cn));
  cps (A, C1.C2_Cn) = cps (A, C2_Cn);

ofsort Bool
  A isin nil = false;
  A isin ((A1 & R1).C2_Cn) = (A eq A1) or (A isin C2_Cn);

ofsort Bool
  A notin C1_Cn = not (A isin C1_Cn);

ofsort Addr
  (* iterate on all agent identifiers until get a new address *)
  newaddr (S, C1_Cn) = newaddr2 (agent1, S, C1_Cn);

ofsort Addr
  (P@S) isin C1_Cn =>
  newaddr2 (P, S, C1_Cn) = newaddr2 (succ (P), S, C1_Cn);
  newaddr2 (P, S, C1_Cn) = P@S;
endtype

(*****
 * Messages between agents
 *****)

type Message is Command, AgentAddressSet
  sorts
    Msg

```



```

opns
  message (*! constructor *) :
    Addr, (* address of the receiver agent *)
    Addr, (* address of the sender agent *)
    Cmd, (* reconfiguration command *)
    Addr, (* first agent address sent *)
    Addr (* second agent address sent *)
  -> Msg
  getrcv : Msg -> Addr
  getsnd : Msg -> Addr
  getcmd : Msg -> Cmd
  getad1 : Msg -> Addr
  getad2 : Msg -> Addr

eqns
  forall A1, A2, A3, A4:Addr, D:Cmd

ofsort Addr
  getrcv (message (A1, A2, D, A3, A4)) = A1;
  getsnd (message (A1, A2, D, A3, A4)) = A2;
  getad1 (message (A1, A2, D, A3, A4)) = A3;
  getad2 (message (A1, A2, D, A3, A4)) = A4;

ofsort Cmd
  getcmd (message (A1, A2, D, A3, A4)) = D;
endtype

(*****
 * Buffer (FIFO) of messages
 *****)

type MessageBuffer is Message
  sorts
    Buffer

  opns
    <> (*! constructor *) :-> Buffer
    _+_ (*! constructor *) : Buffer, Msg -> Buffer
    head : Buffer -> Msg
    tail : Buffer -> Buffer
    empty : Buffer -> Bool
    length : Buffer -> Nat

  eqns
    forall M:Msg, B:Buffer

```

```
ofsort Msg
  (* assert: queue not empty *)
  head (<> + M) = M;
  head (B + M) = head (B);

ofsort Buffer
  (* assert: queue not empty *)
  tail (<> + M) = <>;
  tail (B + M) = tail (B) + M;

ofsort Bool
  empty (<>) = true;
  empty (B + M) = false;

ofsort Nat
  length (<>) = 0;
  length (B + M) = 1 + length (B);
endtype
```

A.2 Behaviour part

```

specification RECONFIGURATION_PROTOCOL [SEND, RECV, INBUS, OUTBUS] : noexit

library DATA endlib

(*****
 * Architecture of the protocol
 *****)

behaviour

(
  Agent [INBUS, OUTBUS] (DEAD, agent1@site1, {}, false)
  |||
  Agent [INBUS, OUTBUS] (DEAD, agent2@site1, {}, false)
  |||
  Agent [INBUS, OUTBUS] (DEAD, agent3@site1, {}, false)
  |||
  Configurator [INBUS, OUTBUS] (nil, agent1@site1 + (agent2@site1 +
    (agent3@site1 + {})))
)
|[INBUS, OUTBUS]|
Bus [INBUS, OUTBUS] (<>)

where

(*****
 * Configurator agent
 *****)

process Configurator [SEND, RECV] (C:Config, R:AddrSet) : noexit :=
  (* ADD: add a new agent to the application *)
  (choice A:Addr [] [(A notin C) and (A isin R)] ->
    SEND !A !confaddr !ADD !dummy !dummy;
    RECV !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
    Configurator [SEND, RECV] (insert (A & {}), C), remove (A, R))
  )
[]
  (* DELETE: delete an agent from the application *)
  (choice A:Addr [] [A isin C] ->
    Passivate [SEND, RECV] (cps (A, C)) >>
    SEND !A !confaddr !DELETE !dummy !dummy;
    RECV !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
    Activate [SEND, RECV] (A, A, cps (A, C)) >>
    Configurator [SEND, RECV] (delete (A, C), insert (A, R))
  )
)

```

```

[]
(* BIND: add a new output channel to an agent *)
(choice A2:Addr [] [A2 isin C] ->
  (choice A3:Addr []
    [(A3 isin C) and (A2 ne A3) and not (A3 isin getchan (A2, C))] ->
      SEND !A2 !confaddr !BIND !A3 !dummy;
      RECV !confaddr !A2 !ACK !dummy !dummy;
      SEND !A3 !A2 !SERVICE !dummy !dummy;
      Configurator [SEND, RECV] (addchan (A2, A3, C), R)
    )
  )
)
[]
(* REBIND: change an existing communication channel *)
(choice A:Addr [] [A isin C] ->
  (choice A2:Addr []
    [(A2 isin C) and (A2 notin getchan (A, C)) and (A ne A2)] ->
      (choice A1:Addr []
        [A1 isin getchan (A, C)] ->
          SEND !A !confaddr !PASSIVATE !dummy !dummy;
          RECV !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
          SEND !A1 !confaddr !FLUSH !dummy !dummy;
          RECV !confaddr !A1 !ACK !dummy !dummy;
          SEND !A !confaddr !REBIND !A1 !A2;
          RECV !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
          Configurator [SEND, RECV]
            (setchan (A, A1, A2, C), R)
        )
      )
    )
  )
)
[]
(* MOVE: move an agent to another site *)
(choice A:Addr [] [A isin C] ->
  (choice S:SiteId []
    (let A2:Addr = newaddr (S, C) in
      [A2 ne confaddr] ->
        (* new valid address *)
        Passivate [SEND, RECV] (cps (A, C)) >>
          SEND !A !confaddr !MOVE !A2 !dummy;
          RECV !confaddr !A2 !ACK !dummy !dummy;
          Activate [SEND, RECV] (A, A2, cps (A, C)) >>
            Configurator [SEND, RECV] (setaddr (A, A2,
              setchan (cps (A, C), A, A2, C)), R)
          )
        )
    )
  )
)
endproc

```

```

(*****
 * Auxiliary process for making passive a set of agents
 *****)

process Passivate [SEND, RECV] (AS:AddrSet) : exit :=
  [card (AS) > 0] ->
    (let A:Addr = pick (AS) in
      SEND !A !confaddr !PASSIVATE !dummy !dummy;
      RECV !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
      Passivate [SEND, RECV] (remove (A, AS))
    )
  []
  [card (AS) = 0] ->
    exit
endproc

(*****
 * Auxiliary process for making active a set of agents
 *****)

process Activate [SEND, RECV] (A1, A2:Addr, AS:AddrSet) : exit :=
  [card (AS) > 0] ->
    (let A:Addr = pick (AS) in
      SEND !A !confaddr !ACTIVATE !A1 !A2;
      RECV !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
      Activate [SEND, RECV] (A1, A2, remove (A, AS))
    )
  []
  [card (AS) = 0] ->
    exit
endproc

(*****
 * Application agent
 *****)

process Agent [SEND, RECV] (S:State, A:Addr, R:AddrSet, B:Bool) : noexit :=
  [S eq DEAD] ->
    RECV !A !confaddr !ADD !dummy !dummy;
    SEND !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
    Agent [SEND, RECV] (ACTIVE, A, {}, false)
  []
  [S eq ACTIVE] ->

```

```

(
  (* receive an application event *)
  RECV !A ?A1:Addr !SERVICE !dummy !dummy [A ne A1];
  (
    [not (empty (R))] ->
      (choice A2:Addr []
        [A2 isin R] ->
          (* react to the event *)
          SEND !A2 !A !SERVICE !dummy !dummy;
          Agent [SEND, RECV] (S, A, R, B)
        )
      )
    []
    (* silently ignore the event *)
    Agent [SEND, RECV] (S, A, R, B)
  )
  )
  []
  RECV !A !confaddr !BIND ?A2:Addr !dummy [(A ne A2) and (R eq {})];
  SEND !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
  Agent [SEND, RECV] (S, A, insert (A2, R), B)
  []
  RECV !A !confaddr !PASSIVATE !dummy !dummy;
  SEND !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
  Agent [SEND, RECV] (PASSIVE, A, R, B)
  []
  RECV !A !confaddr !MOVE ?A2:Addr !dummy;
  SEND !confaddr !A2 !ACK !dummy !dummy;
  Agent [SEND, RECV] (S, A2, R, B)
  []
  RECV !A !confaddr !FLUSH !dummy !dummy;
  SEND !confaddr !A !ACK ! dummy !dummy;
  Agent [SEND, RECV] (S, A, R, B)
  []
  RECV !A !confaddr !DELETE !dummy !dummy;
  SEND !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
  Agent [SEND, RECV] (DEAD, A, R, B)
  )
  []
  [S eq PASSIVE] ->
  (
    (* receive and store an application event *)
    RECV !A ?A1:Addr !SERVICE !dummy !dummy [A ne A1];
    Agent [SEND, RECV] (S, A, R, true)
    []
    RECV !A !confaddr !ACTIVATE ?A1:Addr ?A2:Addr [(A ne A2) and (A1 eq A2)];
    (* agent A1 has been deleted *)
    (

```

```

[B] ->
(
  (choice A3:Addr []
    [A3 isin remove (A1, R)] ->
      (* react to the event received when the agent was passive *)
      SEND !A3 !A !SERVICE !dummy !dummy;
      SEND !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
      Agent [SEND, RECV] (ACTIVE, A, remove (A1, R), false)
    )
  []
  (* silently ignore the event *)
  SEND !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
  Agent [SEND, RECV] (ACTIVE, A, remove (A1, R), false)
)
[]
[not (B)] ->
  SEND !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
  Agent [SEND, RECV] (ACTIVE, A, remove (A1, R), false)
)
[]
RECV !A !confaddr !ACTIVATE ?A1:Addr ?A2:Addr [(A ne A2) and (A1 ne A2)];
(
  [B and not (empty (R))] ->
  (
    (choice A3:Addr []
      [A3 isin replace (A1, A2, R)] ->
        (* react to the event received when the agent was passive *)
        SEND !A3 !A !SERVICE !dummy !dummy;
        SEND !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
        Agent [SEND, RECV] (ACTIVE, A, replace (A1, A2, R), false)
      )
    []
    (* silently ignore the event *)
    SEND !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
    Agent [SEND, RECV] (ACTIVE, A, replace (A1, A2, R), false)
  )
  []
  [not (B) or empty (R)] ->
    SEND !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
    Agent [SEND, RECV] (ACTIVE, A, replace (A1, A2, R), false)
  )
)
[]

```

```

RECV !A !confaddr !REBIND ?A1:Addr ?A2:Addr [A ne A2];
(
  [B and not (empty (R))] ->
  (
    (choice A3:Addr []
      [A3 isin replace (A1, A2, R)] ->
      (* react to the event received when the agent was passive *)
      SEND !A3 !A !SERVICE !dummy !dummy;
      SEND !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
      Agent [SEND, RECV] (ACTIVE, A, replace (A1, A2, R), false)
    )
    []
    (* silently ignore the event *)
    SEND !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
    Agent [SEND, RECV] (ACTIVE, A, replace (A1, A2, R), false)
  )
  [not (B) or empty (R)] ->
  SEND !confaddr !A !ACK !dummy !dummy;
  Agent [SEND, RECV] (ACTIVE, A, replace (A1, A2, R), false)
)
)
endproc

(*****
 * Software bus (communication medium)
 *****)

process Bus [INBUS, OUTBUS] (B:Buffer) : noexit :=
  INBUS ?R:Addr ?S:Addr ?D:Cmd ?A1:Addr ?A2:Addr;
  Bus [INBUS, OUTBUS] (B + Message (R, S, D, A1, A2))
  []
  [not (empty (B))] ->
  (let M:Msg = head (B) in
    OUTBUS !getrcv (M) !getsnd (M) !getcmd (M) !getad1 (M) !getad2 (M);
    Bus [INBUS, OUTBUS] (tail (B))
  )
endproc

endspec

```


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