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Rapport (Rapport De Recherche) Année : 2006

Handling Algebraic Properties in Automatic Analysis of Security Protocols

Résumé

This paper extends the approximation-based theoretical framework in which the security problem secrecy preservation against an intruder may be semi-decided through a reachability verification. We explain how to cope with algebraic properties for an automatic approximation-based analysis of security protocols. We prove that if the initial knowledge of the intruder is a regular tree language, then the security problem may by semi-decided for protocols using cryptographic primitives with algebraic properties. More precisely, an automatically generated approximation function enables us 1) an automatic normalization of transitions, and 2) an automatic completion procedure. The main advantage of our approach is that the approximation function makes it possible to verify security protocols with an arbitrary number of sessions. The concepts are illustrated on an example of the view-only protocol using a cryptographic primitive with the exclusive or algebraic property.

Domaines

Autre [cs.OH]
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Dates et versions

inria-00070169 , version 1 (19-05-2006)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : inria-00070169 , version 1

Citer

Yohan Boichut, Pierre-Cyrille Héam, Olga Kouchnarenko. Handling Algebraic Properties in Automatic Analysis of Security Protocols. [Research Report] RR-5857, INRIA. 2006, pp.18. ⟨inria-00070169⟩
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