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Event Systems and Access Control

Dominique Méry and Stephan Merz

LORIA – INRIA Lorraine – Université Henri Poincaré
Nancy, France

Abstract. We consider the interpretations of notions of access control (permissions, interdictions, obligations, and user rights) as run-time properties of information systems specified as event systems with fairness. We give proof rules for verifying that an access control policy is enforced in a system, and consider preservation of access control by refinement of event systems. In particular, refinement of user rights is non-trivial; we propose to combine low-level user rights and system obligations to implement high-level user rights.

1 Introduction

The specification of access control policies for information systems is a fundamental building block of a methodology for describing and assessing the security of information infrastructure. Existing languages for describing access control such as RBAC [22] and OrBAC [17] focus on the static structure of information systems. They identify the actors (abstractly represented as roles), objects (abstracted as views), and activities that intervene in an information system, and then impose constraints on activities, in the form of permissions and prohibitions. Certain formalisms also encompass more advanced security properties such as rights or obligations of actors to perform certain activities. OrBAC makes a step toward specifying access control policies that may depend on run-time information by associating rights with contexts. However, it is not possible within OrBAC to verify that a system enforces a given access control policy, because the dynamic behavior of the system is not modeled.

In this paper, we propose to relate the specification of access control policies to formal models of dynamic system behavior, and we give proof rules to demonstrate that a system implements an access control policy. Changing somewhat the perspective, one can also pose the problem of deriving a security monitor that enforces a policy for a fixed, underlying system.

We describe information systems within the well-known paradigm of event systems, see e.g. [2,3,7]. Run-time properties of event systems can be specified as formulas of temporal logic, and there are well-established verification rules to derive properties of event systems. We are therefore led to interpret access control primitives as properties of runs of event systems: permissions and prohibitions are easily expressed as constraints on the enabling condition of events. Dually, the right of an actor to perform a certain activity can be expressed as a lower bound on the enabling condition. The interpretation

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of obligations is less obvious, and we propose to interpret them as liveness properties, expressible in temporal logic.

Event systems have traditionally been associated with a formal development method based on stepwise refinement. We therefore consider how access control annotations are preserved under system refinement. Because permissions, prohibitions, and obligations are interpreted as safety and liveness properties of runs, standard results about refinement of event systems ensure that they are preserved by refinement. Preservation of user rights requires extra conditions, and the precise formulation is non-trivial when the “grain of atomicity” of a system description changes during refinement. We propose a condition that relies on a combination of concrete-level user rights and obligations. We illustrate our proposals with a running example of a simple loan management system on which different access control requirements can be imposed.

Related work. The existing literature on formalisms for the specification of access control considers mainly static methods of analysis. For example, Bertino et al. [10] and Cuppens et al. [11]; among others, analyze security policies for inconsistencies, and Benferhat et al. [9] consider techniques to resolve such inconsistencies based on stratification of rules.

Closer to our concerns is work by Ryan et al. [13, 23] on the use of model checking for verifying access-control policies. However, we work in a deductive framework, and we are mainly interested in verifying refinement relationships. Koch et al. [18] suggest a UML notation for specifying access control, together with a semantics based on graph transformation and corresponding analysis techniques. More distantly related is the work around UMLSec [16], which is mainly concerned with secrecy properties. In particular, Jürjens [15] considers the preservation of secrecy properties by the refinement concepts of the specification language Focus.

2 Fair Event Systems

We use the well-known paradigm of event systems [2, 3, 7], extended by weak fairness conditions, to express system models.\(^1\) This section gives a brief overview over the syntax we use to describe systems and their properties, and introduces associated verification rules.

2.1 Event systems and their runs

A system specification lists the constant parameters, including any underlying sets, functions, and relations that describe the data over which the system operates. A constant assumption Hyp constrains the values of these constants; it is syntactically expressed as a first-order logic formula over the constant parameters.

More importantly, a specification declares a tuple var of state variables that represent the current state of the system. The runs of a system are characterized by an initial

---

\(^1\) Adding strong fairness would not pose any conceptual problems, but it would complicate the presentation because we would have to introduce more elaborate temporal logic operators.
condition, which is a state predicate Init over the variables var, and a list of events that describe the possible system transitions. We write the definition of an event e, with list of parameters x, as

\[ \text{event } e(x) = BA_e(x, var, var') \]

\[ \text{fairness } fair_e(x, var) \]

In such a definition, BA_e is the before-after predicate for the event e; this is a first-order formula built from the constants declared for the system specification, the event’s parameters x, as well as primed and unprimed occurrences of the system variables var. As is conventional, a primed occurrence v’ of a state variable v denotes the value of v in the state following the transition described by BA_e, while an unprimed occurrence denotes the value of v in the state before the transition. Each event is associated with a fairness condition, expressed by a predicate fair_e(x, var). Intuitively, the fairness condition rules out traces where the predicate fair_e(x, var) remains true but the event e(x) never occurs.

For an event e(x), we define its feasibility condition

\[ \text{fis}_e(x) \triangleq \exists var' : BA_e(x, var, var') \]  

by existentially quantifying over the primed occurrences of the state variables; thus, the state predicate fis_e(x) is true of those states that have a successor state related by an occurrence of the event e(x).

Finally, a system specification should provide an invariant that constrains the set of reachable states, syntactically specified by a state predicate Inv over the system variables var.

A system specification is well-formed if all of the following conditions hold:

- The initial condition implies the invariant:

  \[ \text{Hyp} \models \text{Init}(var) \Rightarrow \text{Inv}(var) \]  

- The invariant is preserved by any event e, for any instantiation of the parameters:

  \[ \text{Hyp} \models \text{Inv}(var) \land BA_e(x, var, var') \Rightarrow \text{Inv}(var') \]  

- For any event, the fairness condition implies the feasibility of the event:

  \[ \text{Hyp} \models \text{Inv}(var) \land fair_e(x, var) \Rightarrow \text{fis}_e(x) \]  

Observe that we allow the fairness condition to be strictly stronger than the feasibility predicate. For example, an event without fairness assumption can be modeled by declaring the fairness condition to be false.

In the following, we simplify the notation by writing P and P' for P(var) and P(var’) when P is a state predicate and A(x) for A(x, var, var’) when A is a formula that contains both primed and unprimed occurrences of state variables, such as a before-after predicate.
system Bank

constants Client, Loan, maxDebt

assumption Client ≠ ∅ ∧ Loan ≠ ∅ ∧ maxDebt ∈ ℚ

variables clt, loans, due, rate, maxExtra, extra

invariant ∧ loans ⊆ Loan
∧ clt ∈ [loans → Client] ∧ due ∈ [loans → ℚ] ∧ rate ∈ [loans → ℚ]
∧ maxExtra ∈ [loans → ℚ] ∧ extra ∈ [loans → ℚ]
∧ ∀c ∈ Client : (Σ{due(l)} : l ∈ loans ∧ clt(l) = c) ≤ maxDebt

initial loans = ∅ ∧ clt = ∅ ∧ due = ∅ ∧ rate = ∅ ∧ maxExtra = ∅ ∧ extra = ∅

event newLoan(c,l,amt,dur,mx) =
∧ clt ∈ Client ∧ l ∈ Loan ∧ loans ∧ amnt ∈ ℤ ∧ dur ∈ ℤ
∧ amnt + (Σ{due(l)} : l ∈ loans ∧ clt(l) = c) ≤ maxDebt
∧ loans′ = loans ∪ {l} ∧ clt′ = clt ∪ {l ↦ c}
∧ due′ = due ∪ {l ↦ sum} ∧ rate′ = rate ∪ {l ↦ sum/dur}
∧ maxExtra′ = maxExtra ∪ {l ↦ mx} ∧ extra′ = extra ∪ {l ↦ 0}

fairness false

event payRate(l) =
∧ l ∈ loans
∧ due′ = due + {l ↦ due(l) − rate(l)}
∧ loans′ = loans ∪ clt′ = clt ∧ rate′ = rate ∧ maxExtra′ = maxExtra ∧ extra′ = extra

fairness l ∈ loans ∧ due(l) > 0

event extraPayBack(l,amt) =
∧ l ∈ loans ∧ amnt ∈ ℤ
∧ due′ = due + {l ↦ due(l) − amnt} ∧ extra′ = extra + {l ↦ extra(l) + amnt}
∧ loans′ = loans ∪ clt′ = clt ∧ rate′ = rate ∧ maxExtra′ = maxExtra

fairness false

end system

Fig. 1. Sample system specification.

Figure 1 shows a specification of a simple event system that will serve as a running example for this paper. It models a simple management system for loans: clients can take out loans provided they are not overly indebted, and they should pay them back, either by paying the rates due or via extra payments. The specification is written in a language of set theory where functions are sets of pairs x → y and where ⋄ denotes function override. It is easy to verify that this specification is well-formed according to the above criteria. At this point, we only give the model of the base information system, it will later be extended with annotations corresponding to access control primitives.

Runs of a system specification are ω-sequences σ = s₀s₁... of states (i.e., valuations of variables) that satisfy the following conditions:

– the initial state s₀ satisfies the initial condition,
– any two successive states (sᵢ, sᵢ₊₁) either satisfy the before-after predicate BAₑ(x) for some event e and some parameter values x, or agree on the values of all system variables var (so-called stuttering steps), and

---

We adopt the convention of writing long conjunctions and disjunctions as “lists” bulleted with ∧ and ∨, relying on indentation to save parentheses.
\[
P \wedge BA_e(x) \Rightarrow P' \quad \text{for all events } e(x) \quad \text{(stable)}
\]
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{stable } P & \quad \text{(induct)} \\
\text{inv } P & \quad \text{P} \Rightarrow Q \quad \text{(inv-weaken)} \\
\end{align*}
\]
\[
P \wedge BA_e(x) \wedge \neg BA_e(t) \Rightarrow P' \vee Q' \quad \text{for all events } a(x) \quad \text{(fair)}
\]
\[
\forall x \in S : F(x) \leadsto G \quad \text{for all } x \in S : y \prec x \wedge F(y) \quad (S, \prec) \quad \text{well-founded} \quad \text{(wfo)}
\]
\[
\begin{align*}
P \wedge BA_e(t) \Rightarrow Q' & \quad \text{(effect)} \\
F \Rightarrow G & \quad \text{(refl)} \\
inv I \wedge F \Rightarrow G & \quad \text{(inv-leadsto)} \\
F \leadsto G \quad G \leadsto H & \quad \text{(trans)} \\
F \vee G \Rightarrow H & \quad \text{(disj)} \\
F(x) \leadsto G(x) & \quad \text{exists} \\
\end{align*}
\]

**Fig. 2.** Verification rules for fair event systems.

- \( \sigma \) satisfies all fairness conditions: for each event \( e \) and all parameter values \( x \) there are infinitely many positions \( i \in \mathbb{N} \) such that either the fairness condition \( fair_e(x) \) is false at \( s_i \) or \((s_i, s_{i+1})\) satisfy \( BA_e(x) \).

The well-formedness conditions (2) and (3) above ensure that each state \( s_i \) of a system run satisfies the system invariant. If only countably many event instances are feasible at each state of a system run, the condition (4) implies that the specification is machine-closed [1], but this observation will not play a role in the remainder of this paper.

### 2.2 Properties of runs

We can reason about the runs of fair event systems using elementary temporal logic. For the purposes of this paper, we consider safety properties \( \text{stable } P \) and \( \text{inv } P \) where \( P \) is a state predicate, and liveness properties \( F \leadsto G \) (“\( F \) leads to \( G \)”) where \( F \) and \( G \) are Boolean combinations of state predicates and event formulas \( e(x) \) for events \( e \) of the underlying event system. These formulas are interpreted over a run \( \sigma = s_0s_1\ldots \) as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\sigma \models \text{stable } P & \quad \text{iff for all } n \in \mathbb{N} \text{, if } \sigma|_n \models P \text{ then } \sigma|_m \models P \text{ for all } m \geq n \\
\sigma \models \text{inv } P & \quad \text{iff for all } n \in \mathbb{N} \text{, if } \sigma|_n \models P \text{ then } \sigma|_m \models P \text{ for some } m \geq n \\
\sigma \models F \Rightarrow G & \quad \text{iff for all } n \in \mathbb{N} \text{, if } \sigma|_n \models F \text{ then } \sigma|_m \models G \text{ for some } m \geq n \\
\end{align*}
\]

In these definitions, \( \sigma|_n \models F \) means that formula \( F \) holds of the suffix of \( \sigma \) from point \( n \) onwards: if \( F \) is a state predicate then it should be satisfied at state \( s_n \); if \( F \) is an event formula \( e(x) \) then the defining action formula \( BA_e(x) \) should hold of the pair of states \((s_n, s_{n+1})\).
Figure 2 contains proof rules for deriving properties of fair event systems; similar proof rules can be found, for example, in papers on the Unity [21] or TLA [19] formalisms. As before, $\text{Init}$ denotes the initial condition of the system specification, $\text{BA}_e(t)$ denotes the before-after predicate defining the event instance $e(t)$, and $\text{fair}_e(t)$ represents the fairness condition associated with that event instance. The variable $x$ in rules (stable) and (fair) is assumed to be different from the free variables of $P$, $Q$ or $\text{BA}_e(t)$.

The rule (fair) is the basic proof rule for establishing leadsto properties; its soundness relies on the underlying assumption of weak fairness. Rule (wfo) allows us to derive liveness properties by induction over some well-founded ordering. The remaining rules can be used to combine elementary leadsto formulas. In proving the non-temporal hypotheses of these rules, we may of course use any assumptions on the constants appearing in a system specification.

3 Specifying Access Control

Access control policies describe the conditions under which events may occur. Typically, one first specifies the actors (roles), objects (views), and activities of an information system, and then describes which actors are allowed to (or not allowed to) perform which activities on which objects. The OrBAC formalism [17] refines this general idea: first, access control policies are described within organisations (e.g., a hospital or a bank). Second, and more significantly, one can specify conditions under which an access is allowed by defining a “context” of access. Moreover, roles, views, and activities are arranged in hierarchies, with access rules for instances systematically derived with the help of inheritance rules [12].

OrBAC thus provides a declarative, PROLOG-like language to define access control policies. The dynamic aspect of a system is captured by the notion of context, which can be defined in terms of the system state. It is straightforward to translate an OrBAC model into an event system: the static structure of roles and views is represented by the constant parameters of a system, activities correspond to the system’s events, and contexts are defined as state predicates. Without completely formalizing this translation, we now consider how event systems can be extended to describe access control policies.\footnote{The running example of Fig. 1 does not mention roles (actors), but it should be obvious how to include them in the static model.}

The interest in doing so can be twofold: first, an event system can be developed in order to verify that it satisfies a given policy. Second, one may be interested in enforcing an access control policy over a fixed underlying system by imposing a security monitor. We will consider both of these views for different access control primitives: permissions and prohibitions, user rights, and obligations.

3.1 Permissions and prohibitions

At its base, an access control policy describes when an activity is permitted, and when it is forbidden. Whereas permissions and prohibitions should be mutually exclusive,
they need not cover all possible situations in cases where the policy is not completely
specified.

We represent permissions and prohibitions by associating two more predicates (besides the fairness predicate already introduced in Sect. 2.1) with event definitions. For example, a security policy might specify

**event newLoan\((c,l,amt,dur,mx)\)**

**permission** \(l \notin \text{loans} \land \text{risk}(c, amt) \in \{\text{low, medium}\} \land mx \leq \text{maxPayback}(amt,dur)\)**

**prohibition** \(\text{risk}(c, amt) = \text{high}\)

to indicate that a new loan for a client may be approved if the associated risk (evaluated according to some unspecified risk function) is below a certain threshold value and if the maximum amount permitted for extra payback is within certain bounds, and that a new loan must not be approved if the risk is too high.

An event system implements the permissions and prohibitions declared in a security policy if the event is feasible only if it is permitted and infeasible when it is forbidden. Formally, we obtain the proof obligations

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Hyp} & \models \text{Inv} \land \text{feas}(x) \Rightarrow \text{perm}_e(x) \\
\text{Hyp} & \models \text{Inv} \land \text{proh}_e(x) \Rightarrow \neg \text{feas}(x)
\end{align*}
\]

where \(\text{perm}_e(x)\) and \(\text{proh}_e(x)\) are the permission and prohibition predicates associated with event \(e\), and \(\text{Inv}\) and \(\text{Hyp}\) are the system invariant and the constant assumptions, as before.

The event system of Fig. 1 does not implement the above permissions and prohibitions, as it does not evaluate the risk associated with a loan. A simple way of ensuring that a system implements the permission and prohibition clauses of a security policy is to conjoin \(\text{perm}_e(x) \land \neg \text{proh}_e(x)\) to the before-after predicate of the event definition. Alternatively, the access control policy can be ensured at run time by a separate monitor that allows events to be activated only if the permissions and prohibitions are respected.

Observe, however, that strengthening the guard of an event may invalidate the well-formedness condition (4) that states that the fairness predicate of an event should imply its feasibility. We therefore add the following proof obligation to the well-formedness conditions of an event system with permissions and prohibitions:

\[
\text{Hyp} \models \text{Inv} \land \text{fair}_e(x) \Rightarrow \text{perm}_e(x) \land \neg \text{proh}_e(x).
\]

This condition is trivially satisfied for the event \(\text{newLoan}\) of our running example, because no fairness is required of that event.

### 3.2 User rights

Permissions and prohibitions restrict the feasibility of events. Dually, it may be interesting to specify user rights: conditions that spell out when an activity should be permitted in a system. User rights can again be represented in event systems by associating a corresponding predicate with an event. For example, we may wish to state explicitly that a client has the right to make extra payments within the agreed-upon limits:

**event extraPayBack\((l,amt)\)**

**right** \(l \in \text{loans} \land amt \in \mathbb{Q} \land amt + \text{extra}(l) \leq \text{maxExtra}(l)\).
An event system implements a user right if the event is feasible whenever the predicate specifying the right holds:

$$Hyp \models Inv \land \text{right}_e(x) \Rightarrow \text{fis}(x)$$

(8)

Because a security monitor can only schedule existing events of the underlying system, user rights will have to be verified over the event system itself rather than enforced by a monitor. However, the monitor will have to observe a similar condition to make sure that an event permitted by a right is never disabled by the monitor.

The conditions (5), (6), and (8) show that the right to perform an activity should imply (assuming the system invariant) that the activity is allowed, and that it is not forbidden. It is not unreasonable for a user right to be strictly stronger than the corresponding permission, or than the feasibility of the event. For example, a bank may accept extra payments beyond the pre-determined bound at its discretion.

User rights can be understood as branching-time properties: whenever the predicate \( \text{right}_e(t) \) is true, the system has a possible continuation that begins with the event (instance) \( e(t) \), and we will take up this discussion in Sect. 4.2.

3.3 Obligations

Languages for access control policies such as OrBAC also include primitives for specifying obligations. Intuitively, whereas a user right states when a certain activity may occur, an obligation asserts that the activity should occur. The article [17] introducing the OrBAC notation does not define a formal semantics for obligations, but concepts of permission, rights, and obligations have traditionally been the domain of deontic logic [14, 20]. To our knowledge, the interpretation of formulas of deontic logic over models of information systems such as event systems has not been studied, and we do not wish to introduce this extra complication.

As before, we associate obligations with events by defining suitable predicates. In our running example, we might want to assert that a user has an obligation to pay the rates as long as they are due by writing

\[
\text{event payRate}(l) \\
\text{obligation } l \in \text{loans} \land \text{due}(l) > 0.
\]

What does it formally mean for an event system to implement an obligation? A first idea would be to interpret an obligation to perform a certain activity as prohibiting the system from performing any other activity. However, this interpretation appears to be unreasonably stringent and prone to contradictions. For example, a user of a computer system may have an obligation to regularly change his password, but he can do so only when logged in. Clearly, the obligation to change the password should not preclude the user from logging in, although it is conceivable that one could then prevent the user from doing anything but changing his password.

We believe instead that obligations can, in a first approximation, be interpreted as liveness properties, and can be formalized in temporal logic. The two following interpretations appear particularly plausible.

\[
\text{strict obligation: } \text{obl}_e(x) \leadsto e(x)
\]

(9)
weak obligation: \( obl_e(x) \rightarrow \neg obl_e(x) \lor e(x) \) \hspace{1cm} (10)

The strict interpretation of obligations requires that the event occurs eventually whenever the obligation arises. Under the weak interpretation, the obligation ceases as soon as the predicate \( obl_e \) becomes false, which need not be due to an occurrence of \( e \). In our example, the weak interpretation appears more reasonable: it is satisfied when a client pays back the loan via an extra payment. Observe that the weak interpretation of an obligation coincides with the interpretation of a weak fairness requirement, with \( obl_e(x) \) as the fairness condition.

Whatever interpretation is chosen, the proof rules of Fig. 2 can be used to verify that a fair event system implements its obligations. The temporal interpretation of obligations may also be of interest when one is interested in deriving a security monitor that enforces obligations for a given system, at least for controllable events. To do so, one could apply recent work on controller synthesis based on game-theoretic interpretations [6], but we do not pursue this idea any further here.

In some applications, the interpretation of obligations as liveness properties may be too abstract, and it would be more natural to indicate real-time deadlines for obligations (“the payment should be received before the end of the current month”). We do not consider real-time specifications in this paper.

## 4 Refinement of System Specifications

Stepwise methods of system development insist that systems should be developed in a succession of models that gradually add representation detail and that introduce new correctness properties. The key requirement for a sensible notion of refinement is that system properties that have been established at higher levels of abstraction are preserved by construction so that they do not have to be reproven. Refinement-based approaches help to discover potential problems early on. They also distribute the overhead of formal verification over the entire development process. We will first consider verification conditions for proving refinement of fair event systems that preserve temporal logic properties. In a second step, we will study how refinement interacts with the access control primitives considered in Sect. 3.

### 4.1 Refinement of fair event systems

Standard refinement notions for event systems are known to preserve safety properties, and extensions for liveness and fairness properties have also been considered, for example in [5]. In the following, we make use of the language of temporal logic of Sect. 2.2 to state verification conditions for preserving liveness properties at a higher level of abstraction than in traditional formulations.

Refined models describe the system at a finer level of granularity and typically introduce new events that have no observable effect at the previous levels of abstraction. Formally, we assume (without loss of generality) that the refinement is described with the help of a tuple \( \text{var}_{\text{ref}} \) of variables disjoint from the variables \( \text{var}_{\text{abs}} \) used in the original model. The two state spaces are related by a gluing invariant \( J \), a state predicate
built from the variables $\text{var}_{\text{abs}}$ and $\text{var}_{\text{ref}}$, and the constant parameters of both models. We may assume that $J$ implies both the abstract-level and the concrete-level invariants $\text{Inv}_{\text{abs}}$ and $\text{Inv}_{\text{ref}}$. An event $ea(x)$ of the abstract model may be refined by a number of low-level events $er_1(x,y_1), \ldots, er_n(x,y_n)$; for technical simplicity, we assume that all parameters of $ea$ are also parameters of $er_i$, although this assumption could easily be removed. Also, new events $en(z)$ may be introduced in the refined model.

An event system $\text{Ref}$ is a refinement of an event system $\text{Abs}$ with respect to the gluing invariant $J$ if $\text{Ref}$ is itself well-formed according to the conditions (2), (3), and (4), and if moreover all the following conditions hold (again, we drop the variables that occur in the respective predicates; besides, $\text{Hyp}$ denotes the conjunction of the abstract- and concrete-level constant assumptions).

- Every initial state of the refinement can be mapped to a corresponding initial state of the abstract specification:

$$\text{Hyp} \models Init_{\text{ref}} \Rightarrow \exists \text{var}_{\text{abs}} : Init_{\text{abs}} \land J \quad (11)$$

- Events of the refinement can be mapped to events or to stuttering transitions of the abstract specification. There are two cases:

  - If event $er(x,y)$ refines an abstract event $ea(x)$ then its effect can be mapped to an occurrence of $ea$:

$$\text{Hyp} \models J \land BA_{er}(x,y) \Rightarrow \exists \text{var}_{\text{abs}}' : BA_{ea}(x) \land J' \quad (12)$$

  - If event $en(z)$ is a new event then its effect is invisible at the abstract level:

$$\text{Hyp} \models J \land BA_{en}(z) \Rightarrow \exists \text{var}_{\text{abs}}' : \text{var}_{\text{abs}}' = \text{var}_{\text{abs}} \land J' \quad (13)$$

- The refinement preserves the fairness constraints of the abstract level. Formally, assume that the abstract event $ea(x)$ is refined by low-level events $er_1(x,y_1), \ldots, er_n(x,y_n)$:

$$\text{Ref} \models J \land \text{fair}_{ea}(x) \quad (14)$$

where the ”abstract trace” $ea_i(x)$ of $er_i(x,y_i)$ is defined as

$$ea_i(x) \triangleq \exists y_i : \land er_i(x,y_i) \land \forall \text{var}_{\text{abs}}, \text{var}_{\text{abs}}' : J \land J' \Rightarrow ea(x)$$

Intuitively, condition (14) requires to prove that any state in a run of the refinement that corresponds to a state satisfying the abstract fairness condition of event $ea(x)$ is followed either by the occurrence of one of the refining actions or by a state that no longer satisfies the fairness condition. Although the formal statement is somewhat technical, the abstract-level fairness condition is conveniently represented as a concrete-level “leads to” formula that can be established using the proof system

---

4 As suggested in [4], this requirement could be weakened by requiring that event $en(z)$ merely preserves the high-level invariant.
of Fig. 2. In particular, any fairness conditions of the implementation may be used, as well as induction over well-founded orderings. In this way, a specifier has much more freedom in justifying a refinement than with the more traditional verification conditions of [5,8].

Using a standard simulation argument that critically relies on the possibility of stuttering in the definition of runs of event systems, one obtains the following correctness theorem: every run of the refined event system $Ref$ corresponds to a run of the abstract event system $Abs$, modulo the gluing invariant.

**Theorem 1.** Assume that $Ref$ is a refinement of $Abs$ with respect to the gluing invariant $J$ and that $\sigma = s_0s_1\ldots$ is a run of $Ref$. Then there is a run $\tau = t_0t_1\ldots$ of $Abs$ such that $J$ holds at the joint valuations obtained from $s_i$ and $t_i$, for all $i \in \mathbb{N}$.

As a consequence, temporal logic properties can be transferred from an abstract event system $Abs$ to its refinement $Ref$ modulo the gluing invariant $J$. Formally, this is asserted by the following corollary.

**Corollary 2.** Assume that $Ref$ is a refinement of $Abs$ with respect to the gluing invariant $J$ and that $\sigma = s_0s_1\ldots$ is a run of $Ref$. If $Abs \models \varphi$, then $Ref \models \varphi$ where $\varphi$ is obtained from $\varphi$ by replacing every positive occurrence of a non-temporal formula $A$ by $\exists \text{var}_{\text{abs}}: J \land A$ and every negative occurrence by $\forall \text{var}_{\text{abs}}: J \implies A$.

### 4.2 Refinement preserving access control

Let us now consider how refinement interacts with access control policies. Assume that event system $Ref$ is a refinement of $Abs$ with respect to the gluing invariant $J$. Also, assume that $Abs$ was known to implement certain permissions, prohibitions, obligations or user rights concerning an abstract event $ea(x)$.

For permissions $\text{perm}_{ea}(x)$ and prohibitions $\text{proh}_{ea}(x)$, the conditions (5) and (6) ensure that $\text{perm}_{ea}(x)$ and $\neg \text{proh}_{ea}(x)$ hold whenever event $ea(x)$ occurs in a run of $Abs$. Any concrete-level event $er(x,y)$ refining $ea(x)$ has to satisfy condition (12). Using the definition of feasibility (1) and first-order logic, it follows that $\text{perm}_{ea}(x)$ and $\neg \text{proh}_{ea}(x)$ hold whenever event $er(x)$ occurs in a run of $Ref$. This is the best preservation result we can hope for in such a general discussion of refinement modulo a gluing invariant; for most practical choices of $J$ these formulas will imply that the abstract-level permissions and prohibitions are preserved in the refined system.

Similarly, obligations have been interpreted as liveness properties, represented by the temporal logic formulas (9) or (10). Corollary 2 implies that a similar “leads to” formula is true of the refined model, again modulo translation along the gluing invariant. Therefore, obligations are preserved in the same sense as permissions and prohibitions.

These preservation results are not really surprising: we have interpreted permissions, prohibitions, and obligations as (safety or liveness) properties of runs, and the refinement notion of event systems are defined in such a way that properties of runs are preserved. However, we have also considered user rights, which were interpreted as branching properties in Sect. 3.2, and refinement of event systems does not necessarily preserve branching behavior.
event askPayback(l, amt) =
\( l \in \text{loans} \land \text{amt} \in \mathbb{Q} \)
\( \land \text{askExtra} = \text{askExtra} \cup \{ l \mapsto \text{amt} \} \)
\( \land \text{loans}' = \text{loans} \land \text{clt}' = \text{clt} \land \text{due}' = \text{due} \land \text{rate}' = \text{rate} \)
\( \land \text{maxExtra}' = \text{maxExtra} \land \text{extra}' = \text{extra} \)
right \( l \in \text{loans} \land \text{amt} \in \mathbb{Q} \)

**Fig. 3.** Refining event \( \text{extraPayback} \).

For a concrete example, consider a proposed refinement of the event \( \text{extraPayback} \) shown in Fig. 3. Instead of an atomic event modeling an extra payment, the refinement introduces a protocol: the client has to apply for making an extra payment (event shown in Fig. 3. Instead of an atomic event modeling an extra payment, the refine-
ment is acceptable according to the conditions (12) and (13) because \( \text{approvePayback} \) requires the precon-
dition \( (l \mapsto \text{amt}) \in \text{askExtra} \land \text{amt} + \text{extra}(l) \leq \text{maxExtra}(l) \)

\begin{align*}
\text{event} & \text{approvePayback}(l, \text{amt}) = \\
& \land (l \mapsto \text{amt}) \in \text{askExtra} \land \text{amt} + \text{extra}(l) \leq \text{maxExtra}(l) \\
& \land \text{due}' = \text{due} \oplus (l \mapsto \text{due}(l) - \text{amt}) \land \text{extra}' = \text{extra} \oplus (l \mapsto \text{extra}(l) + \text{amt}) \\
& \land \text{askExtra}' = \text{askExtra} \backslash \{ l \mapsto \text{amt} \} \\
& \land \text{loans}' = \text{loans} \land \text{clt}' = \text{clt} \land \text{rate}' = \text{rate} \land \text{maxExtra}' = \text{maxExtra} \\
\text{fairness} & (l \mapsto \text{amt}) \in \text{askExtra} \land \text{amt} + \text{extra}(l) \leq \text{maxExtra}(l) \\
\text{event} & \text{rejectPayback}(l, \text{amt}) = \\
& \land (l \mapsto \text{amt}) \in \text{askExtra} \land \text{amt} + \text{extra}(l) > \text{maxExtra}(l) \\
& \land \text{askExtra}' = \text{askExtra} \backslash \{ l \mapsto \text{amt} \} \\
& \land \text{due}' = \text{due} \land \text{extra}' = \text{extra} \\
& \land \text{loans}' = \text{loans} \land \text{clt}' = \text{clt} \land \text{rate}' = \text{rate} \land \text{maxExtra}' = \text{maxExtra} \\
\end{align*}

\( \text{extraPayBack}(l, \text{amt}) \)
right \( l \in \text{loans} \land \text{amt} \in \mathbb{Q} \land \text{amt} + \text{extra}(l) \leq \text{maxExtra}(l) \)

considered in Sect. 3.2, the concrete-level event \( \text{approvePayback} \) requires the precon-
dition \( (l \mapsto \text{amt}) \in \text{askExtra} \), which is not implied by the predicate specifying the user
right. Preservation of user rights thus requires extra consideration.

A first idea would be to impose the condition

\[ \text{Hyp} \models \text{Inv}_{\text{ref}} \land \text{right}_{\text{ref}} \rightarrow (\exists y_1 : \text{fis}_{r_1}(x, y_1)) \lor \ldots \lor (\exists y_n : \text{fis}_{r_n}(x, y_n)) \] (15)

where again \( r_1(x, y_1), \ldots, r_n(x, y_n) \) are the concrete-level events corresponding to the
abstract event \( ea \). Although condition (15) obviously preserves user rights, it would
rule out the refinement of Fig. 3. More generally, this condition appears too strong to
us, when the concrete model refines the grain of atomicity. Recall that a single abstract-
level event \( ea \) can be implemented in the refinement by a sequence of concrete-level
events all but the last of which are invisible at the abstract level. The final event \( er \nrefining the abstract event \( ea \) need not be immediately feasible in the concrete model
whenever \( ea \) is, but it requires preparation by the auxiliary events that are unobservable
at the abstract level. We therefore believe that a more useful condition for refining user rights is to require a combination of concrete-level user rights that ensure that the branch leading to $er$ can be started and concrete-level obligations that ensure that $er$ will then occur eventually.

Formally, assume that the abstract system specification contains an event $ea(x)$ for which we wish to ensure a user right via predicate $right_{ea}(x)$. Also assume that $ea(x)$ is refined by the concrete-level events $er_1(x,y_1), \ldots, er_n(x,y_n)$. We then require the event system $Ref$ to contain events $ei_1(x,z_1), \ldots, ei_m(x,z_m)$ with user rights specified by $right_{ei_j}(x,z_j)$ such that

\[
right_{ea}(x) \Rightarrow (\exists z_1 : right_{ei_1}(x,z_1)) \lor \ldots \lor (\exists z_m : right_{ei_m}(x,z_m)) \quad \text{and} \quad (16)
\]

\[
ei_j(x,z_j) \Rightarrow \neg right_{ea}(x) \lor (\exists y_1 : er_1(x,y_1)) \lor \ldots \lor (\exists y_n : er_n(x,y_n)) \quad \text{and} \quad (17)
\]

Condition (17) applies for all $j = 1, \ldots, m$; the disjunct $\neg right_{ea}(x)$ on the right-hand side of (17) corresponds to a weak interpretation of obligations.

The above conditions, together with the interpretations of the user rights for the refined specification, imply that whenever the translated abstract user right holds at some point during a concrete-level run, the user has a concrete-level right to start a branch which will eventually lead to the occurrence of an event refining the original event $ea(x)$ provided the abstract-level right persists. For example, the abstract-level right may cease due to the concurrent exercise of another right.

Back to the example of Fig. 3, we claim that this refinement respects the abstract-level user right because it satisfies the conditions (16) and (17). We assume that the gluing invariant contains the conjunct

\[askExtra \subseteq \text{loans} \times \mathbb{Q}\]

that asserts the “type correctness” of the new variable $askExtra$. We choose $askPayback$ for the auxiliary event $ei$, and condition (16) boils down to proving

\[l \in \text{loans} \land \text{amt} \in \mathbb{Q} \land \text{amt} + \text{extra}(l) \leq \text{maxExtra}(l) \Rightarrow l \in \text{loans} \land \text{amt} \in \mathbb{Q}\]

which is trivial. On the other hand, condition (17) requires us to show

\[askPayback(l,\text{amt}) \Rightarrow \neg(l \in \text{loans} \land \text{amt} \in \mathbb{Q} \land \text{amt} + \text{extra}(l) \leq \text{maxExtra}(l)) \lor \text{grantPayback}(l,\text{amt})\]

and this condition is ensured by the fairness condition for event $approvePayback$. Note that although the abstract user right is preserved, the client cannot cheat on the bank by demanding two extra payments that together would exceed the allowed limit: although a client may always ask for an extra payment (including in the time between applying for a payment and the approval or rejection by the bank), the bank’s obligation to approve extra payments ceases when the limit has been reached, so it is free to reject a second application for extra payments. This is just what the abstract user right of Sect. 3.2 required.
5 Conclusion

Event systems are a convenient and widely accepted framework for modeling information systems. In particular, properties of their runs can be derived using well-known rules, and refinement concepts for event systems are well established. In this paper, we have considered annotating event systems with clauses to specify access control properties, thereby implementing a given security policy. Existing, declarative languages for describing access control such as OrBAC identify the static structure of an information system, including the subjects, the objects, and the activities, and then spell out the conditions under which activities may, must, or must not be performed. In this paper, we have interpreted such policies within a formal system model based on event systems, and have proposed proof rules for verifying that a system implements a security policy. We have considered permissions and prohibitions, which are the most frequent annotations in practice, and which can be interpreted as safety properties of system runs. We have proposed to interpret obligations as liveness properties, and have therefore used a simple temporal logic to formulate these as properties of event systems. As a fourth category of primitives, we have considered user rights, which can be interpreted as elementary branching properties of systems.

Development methods based on stepwise refinement have traditionally been associated with event systems. They allow a developer to justify a system as a result of a sequence of models that introduce more and more details in the representation of systems, as well as their correctness properties. The cornerstone of refinement is the preservation of properties that have been established for abstract models. Standard refinement concepts preserve traces of models, and this ensures preservation of permissions, prohibitions, and obligations across refinements. Branching properties, including user rights, are not automatically preserved, and we have proposed additional conditions that rely on a combination of concrete-level rights and obligations.

More experience will be necessary to evaluate whether our notions are useful and feasibility in practice. It would also be helpful to have an integrated tool environment for combining event system descriptions and access control specifications. On a more conceptual level, it will be interesting to study the possibility of synthesizing security monitors that enforce a security policy (that could possibly even vary during runtime) over a fixed underlying information system.

References


