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# Standards-based Remote Attestation for Internet-of-Things Swarms

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**Abstract**—Remote attestation is a security service to verify and confirm the integrity and trustworthiness of each robot in the swarm. We developed an efficient method of doing remote attestation in parallel with the network access authentication, utilizing a newly standardized key exchange protocol named EDHOC. We demonstrate the feasibility of this method through benchmarks on the hashing time of 520 kB under constrained scenarios, resulting in times of 780 ms on the nRF52840 and 728 ms on the nRF5340.

## I. INTRODUCTION

To mitigate the risk of cyberattacks on robotic swarms, only legitimate robots should be admitted into the swarm. Let’s imagine a robot in which an attacker has altered the firmware, but which still has valid authentication credentials such as a digital certificate and the corresponding private key. This allows it to still authenticate to the swarm operator. *How to ensure that only robots with verified and trustworthy firmware are allowed to join the swarm?*

The solution is to do a remote attestation. Attestation service running on a robot enables it to generate the evidence about the state of its software and hardware. By sending this evidence to a remote entity called Verifier, the swarm operator can assess whether the robot is compromised.

For a swarm of robots, the remote attestation procedure should be both energy and bandwidth efficient. A lightweight security protocol named Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman over COSE (EDHOC) [1] is standardized recently. EDHOC is a highly compact and efficient protocol that enables authenticated key exchange in constrained scenarios.

In this paper, we present a lightweight method to perform the remote attestation using EDHOC. The attestation procedure is integrated into EDHOC handshake session. An evaluation is achieved on a swarm robotic platform to prove the feasibility of this method. We benchmarked the time to hash the bytes in firmware image size on nRF52840 microcontroller and nRF5340 microcontroller. The results are 780 ms on the nRF52840 and 728 ms on the nRF5340 for hashing 520 kB, which shows that this method can be deployed even on the constrained platforms.

## II. A PRIMER ON REMOTE ATTESTATION

Remote attestation [2] is a security process that can help the swarm central server establish a level of trust in the robot before allowing the robot to join the swarm.

A standardized way of doing remote attestation involves three entities. The *Attester* provides reliable evidence about




Fig. 1. Remote attestation architecture.

the state of itself. The *Verifier* evaluates the evidence and produces attestation results. The *Relying Party* consumes the attestation results to execute application-specific actions.

The architecture for doing remote attestation is shown in Fig. 1. The *Relying Party* conveys the evidence from the *Attester* to the *Verifier*. The *Verifier* then sends back the attestation result to the *Relying Party*.

## III. EPHEMERAL DIFFIE-HELLMAN OVER COSE (EDHOC) PROTOCOL

EDHOC [1] was recently standardized in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It is a key exchange protocol based on ephemeral elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) keys. The execution of EDHOC takes place between an Initiator and a Responder. The protocol consists of three mandatory messages (message\_1, message\_2, and message\_3) and an optional fourth message (message\_4).

EDHOC also allows external security applications to be integrated in the handshake by defining the External Authorization Data (EAD) field. EADs are sent in dedicated fields of the EDHOC messages: EAD\_1, EAD\_2 and EAD\_3.

Fedrechieskiet *al.* [3] have compared EDHOC with Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol 1.3, a widely used protocol for key exchange on the Internet. Their study comprises several metrics, including message footprint, time, energy and memory. Results indicate that, in constrained IoT networks, EDHOC outperformed DTLS in all metrics. Compared to DTLS, EDHOC exhibits a 7× reduction in time-on-air, a 1.44× reduction in handshake duration, a 2.79× reduction in energy consumption, and a 4× reduction in flash and RAM memory usage.

## IV. REMOTE ATTESTATION OVER EDHOC

We propose to do remote attestation in parallel with network access authentication. In that setting (in Fig. 2), we propose




Fig. 2. Overview of message flow.

to map the EDHOC Initiator to the Attester, and the EDHOC Responder to the Relying Party. The Verifier is hosted on the central swarm server.

The Attester and the Relying Party communicate by transporting messages within EDHOC’s External Authorization Data (EAD) fields. The Attester sends an attestation proposal in EDHOC’s EAD\_1 field, which contains all the supported evidence types by the Attester. The evidence type indicates the format type and an appropriate profile of the evidence. For example, an evidence type indicates that the evidence is formatted as CBOR Web Token (CWT), with a profile of Platform Security Architecture (PSA) claims [4].

If the Verifier can support at least one of the provided evidence types, the Relying Party signals to the Attester an attestation request in EDHOC’s EAD\_2 field. The Verifier specifies a selected evidence type, and a Nonce in order to guarantee the message freshness.

The Attester conveys the evidence to the Relying Party in EDHOC’s EAD\_3 field. The evidence is defined as an attestation token [5], an attested claims set. The information about the state of robot softwares, such as the active firmware image or the software configurations are carried within the evidence. The value of the measurement must be a hash of 32, 48 or 64 bytes. This hash, together with other useful information is then signed or symmetrically protected with a MAC to construct the evidence. The evidence is then sent to and evaluated by the Verifier.

## V. EVALUATION

To evaluate the feasibility of doing remote attestation in a constrained swarm, we benchmark the execution of a SHA-256 hash function on the *DotBot* swarm robot (Fig. 3). *DotBot* is a cm-scale micro-robot that is developed for education and research purposes. All *DotBot* developments are done under an open source hardware and software licenses. The first version runs on the nRF52840 microcontroller and the second version runs on the nRF5340 microcontroller.

We evaluate the time to hash a string of bytes about the same size as a firmware image. The maximum size of a firmware image is 520 kB. The results are shown in Fig. 4: the time to hash increases linearly with number of bytes. We can see that the hash of 520 kB takes approx. 780 ms on the nRF52840, approx. 728 ms on the nRF5340. This result shows the feasibility of hashing the entire firmware image even on




Fig. 3. Dotbot platform.




Fig. 4. Benchmark of a software implementation of SHA-256 on a constrained swarm robotic platform *DotBot*.

the constrained platforms. This does not need to be done in real time; attestation is expected to be done only a handful of times throughout the lifetime of the robot.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

Remote attestation is an essential process for a remote entity to verify the trustworthiness of a device joining the swarm. Remote attestation also ensures that the device remains uncompromised and untampered while within the swarm. In this paper we present a secure and lightweight approach to perform remote attestation over EDHOC, a recently standardized lightweight key exchange protocol.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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