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► **To cite this version:**

Jade Alglave, Richard Grisenthwaite, Artem Khyzha, Luc Maranget, Nikos Nikoleris. Puss In Boots: on formalising Arm's Virtual Memory System Architecture (extended version). 2024. hal-04567296

HAL Id: hal-04567296

<https://inria.hal.science/hal-04567296>

Preprint submitted on 3 May 2024

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Puss In Boots: on formalising Arm’s Virtual Memory System Architecture (extended version)

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Abstract—We present our formalisation of Arm’s Virtual Memory System Architecture (VMSA). This work has been developed with, and ratified by, Arm and its partners, and is now part of the Arm Architecture Reference Manual (Arm ARM). As part of this work, we uncovered subtleties in the definition of a feature of the VMSA called Enhanced Translation Synchronisation (ETS), which led Arm to deprecate ETS and replace it with a stronger feature called ETS2. Finally, we present our experimental validation methodology, which required extending KVM-unit-tests, a test harness for the Kernel Virtual Machine (KVM). The corresponding patches are currently being integrated into KVM. We used this infrastructure to run around 1300 VMSA litmus tests on a variety of Arm machines, thereby validating our model w.r.t. existing hardware. Our testing also uncovered infidelities to the definition of a feature called Translation Table Hardware Management, which led Arm to relax its architecture to accommodate those cases.

I. INTRODUCTION

Virtual memory gives an abstract view of physical memory, which affords software more memory than might be physically available. The mapping from virtual addresses (VAs) to physical addresses (PAs) is the responsibility of the Memory Management Unit (MMU), and resides in a collection of page table entries, which Arm calls Translation Table Descriptors (TTDs). Translation Lookaside Buffers (TLBs) cache TTDs for faster address translation, but require synchronisation for ensuring coherency when updating TTDs, absence of which may lead to unintended out-of-order execution scenarios. To enable avoiding undesirable scenarios, we capture the ordering implications of address translation by extending Arm’s application-level memory model [21]. Arm provides an informal record of intent in its Virtual Memory System Architecture (VMSA) [30, D8], and our work provides a formal basis for reasoning on the matter. In this paper, we hope to give the reader enough intuition for studying the model in depth.

We use the `cat` language [12] to write our formalisation, since the Arm application-level model [21] is written in `cat`. This also enables us to use the `herd7` tool [9], a simulator for litmus tests under memory models written in `cat`. A litmus test is a small concurrent program with a specific initial state and a question about reachable final states. The `herd7` tool answers the questions by determining final states reachable under a given `cat` model. We extended `herd7` to run VMSA litmus tests. Thus, our VMSA model is an executable artefact, allowing user interaction to develop intuition.

We validated our model in two ways. First, by discussing and refining it with Arm and its partners, up to ratification and integration in the Arm Architecture Reference Manual (Arm ARM) [30]. Second, by testing it extensively on hardware. We extended the `litmus7` testing tool [11], distributed [9] alongside `herd7`, to run VMSA litmus tests. This required extending KVM-unit-tests [2], a test harness for the Kernel Virtual Machine (KVM) [1], to run our tests as virtual machines.

a) Outline: Section II introduces Arm’s application-level memory model. Section III gives an initial view of our VMSA extension: the semantics of memory accesses extended with TTD accesses and Faults as a part of address translation, and behaviours the model forbids in absence of synchronisation.

The VMSA extension has three main aspects, which we expose in turn. Section IV discusses the lack of ordering due to TLBs and means of restoring ordering when needed, as illustrated by a CopyOnWrite example from Linux, a behaviour validated by our model. Section V discusses the ordering implications of the Translation Table Hardware Management (TTHM) feature, which transfers software’s responsibility to modify TTD permissions to hardware. Section VI discusses the stronger ordering guarantees of the Enhanced Translation Synchronisation (ETS) feature [31, pp. A2-78,79], which enables lightweight synchronisation for making an invalid TTD valid. We expose the subtleties we uncovered in the definition of ETS, which led Arm to deprecate it and replace with a new feature called ETS2 [30, pp. A2-84,85].

Section VII details our validation processes, both the work towards ratification by Arm and the experimental work. We discuss the extensions we made to the `litmus7` tool and KVM-unit-tests. Our testing uncovered infidelities to a TTHM principle, which led Arm to relax the architecture to accommodate those cases. Section VIII discusses related works.

b) Companion material: We release a number of companion artefacts: the VMSA `cat` file itself, our litmus tests, the extensions to the `herdtools` distribution necessary to handle VMSA, the KVM-unit-tests patches necessary to run VMSA litmus tests on hardware and our testing logs [6].

Finally, an English transliteration of the VMSA `cat` file appears in Section B2.3 of the Arm ARM [30].

II. ARM’S APPLICATION-LEVEL MEMORY MODEL

The Arm memory model determines which concurrent executions are allowed by the Arm architecture. In this section,

```

AArch64 MP
{
0:X1=x; 1:X1=x;
0:X3=y; 1:X3=y;
x=0; y=0;
}
P0          | P1          ;
MOV W0,#1   | LDR W4,[X3]   ;
STR W0,[X1] | LDR W5,[X1]   ;
MOV W2,#1   |                ;
STR W2,[X3] |                ;
exists (1:X4=1 /\ 1:X5=0)

```

Fig. 1. A message passing litmus test—Allowed




Fig. 2. An execution of the MP test given in Fig. 1

we give an overview of the application-level model, which focuses on concurrent executions of programs agnostic of virtual memory and not manipulating TTDs. We extend the scope in the subsequent section.

a) Litmus tests: We introduce the syntax of litmus tests and Arm’s application-level memory model using a message passing example (MP) in Fig. 1.

The first section of a litmus test is the initial state in curly brackets, where the MP test lets registers X1 on P0 and P1 point to a location x , written $0:X1=x$ and $1:X1=x$ respectively, and registers X3 on P0 and P1 point to a location y . Locations x and y are initialised to 0.

The second section is the sequence of instructions on each thread. In MP, Thread P0 updates x to 1 via `STR W0, [X1]` and a flag y to 1 via `STR W2, [X3]`. Thread P1 reads the flag y via `LDR W4, [X3]` and x via `LDR W5, [X1]`.

The last section, the `exists` clause, is an assertion about reachable final states. The `exists` clause of MP asks whether there is an execution where P1 reads the updated value of the flag y , and the outdated, initial value of x . As a convention, in `exists` clauses we use 64-bit registers like X4 rather than their lower 32-bit counterparts like W4.

We indicate answers to questions asked by `exists` clauses in captions of figures: “Required”, if the final states of all MP

executions allowed by the memory model satisfy the assertion, “Allowed”, if the final states of some (but not all) do, or “Forbidden”, otherwise. The MP test is Allowed, as evidenced by an allowed execution in Fig. 2, given as a graph whose nodes represent the Effects of the program instructions.

The Thread 0 box gives the semantics of P0: a write of x with value 1 (Effect a), in program order before (arrow `po`) a write of y with value 1 (Effect b). The Thread 1 box gives the semantics of P1: a read of y with value 1 (Effect c), in program order before (arrow `po`) a read of x with value 0 (Effect d). The values of the Reads c and d are specific to this execution and determined by the register values in the `exists` clause.

The arrows across boxes are the interactions between P0 and P1. The Read c of y by P1 takes its value from the update b made by P0, and this is depicted by the Reads-from (`rf`) arrow from Effect b to Effect c . The Read d of x by P1 takes its value from the initial state, which is depicted by a Reads-from (`rf`) arrow from the initial Write of x (Effect f) to the Read Effect d . The value read by Effect d is overwritten by the update a of x made by P0 (Effect a), which is depicted by the Coherence-after (`ca`) arrow from the Read d to the Write a .

b) Arm’s application-level memory model: At a high level, a memory model determines which values a Read Effect can see. It does so by checking whether the Effects of an execution meet certain ordering requirements. Those requirements are defined on relations over Effects: (*a*) the Hardware-required-ordered-before relation [30, B2.3], e.g. local orderings that Arm hardware must enforce due to barriers or dependencies; and (*b*) the Observed-by relation [30, B2.3], i.e. interactions between threads such as the Reads-From or Coherence-after relations.

Together they form the Ordered-before relation. Informally, Ordered-before is the order in which Effects from a certain thread become visible to other threads, or in other words, externally visible. Formally, the External visibility requirement forbids executions with cycles in the Ordered-before relation.

The Arm memory model allows the MP test, but the “Forbidden” verdict could be achieved by a modification of it: e.g. with barrier instructions `DMB ST` between the stores on P0 and `DMB LD` between the loads on P1, or with a Release store `STLR W2, [X3]` in place of `STR W2, [X3]` and an Acquire load `LDAR W4, [X3]` in place of `LDR W4, [X3]`. In both cases, the extra synchronisation creates Hardware-Required-Ordered-Before relations between the Effects on each thread, forbidding their reordering. Furthermore, the interactions between P0 and P1 (viz, Reads-from from b to c and Coherence-after from d to a) contribute to Ordered-before by definition of the Arm memory model [30, B2.3]. Therefore the extra synchronisation creates a cycle in Ordered-before, violating the External visibility requirement, hence forbidding the MP behaviour.

III. INITIAL VIEW OF VMSA EXTENSION

The `exists` clause of the MP test can be interpreted as if x and y were PAs. Usually programs can only access PAs indirectly, through VAs that go through address translation. A

TTD prescribes how to translate a VA seen by software into a PA used by hardware, but only if a validity flag held in the TTD is set. Access to a VA with an invalid TTD raises a Fault.

We introduce the extension of the syntax of litmus tests for manipulating TTDs using the MP-TTD test in Fig. 3, featuring a variation of message passing seen in MP.

In the initial state of MP-TTD, we can now specify that $[TTD(x)]$ holds the value $(valid:0, oa:PA(x))$, meaning that the TTD for VA x is invalid (has its `valid` bit set to 0) and its output address is a symbolic value $PA(x)$.

In the body of MP-TTD, Thread P0 updates the initially invalid $TTD(x)$ via `STR X1, [X2]`, and y to 1 via `STR W7, [X8]`. Thread P1 reads the flag via `LDR W7, [X8]` and attempts to read the VA x via `LDR W4, [X3]` at label L0.

In the `exists` clause of MP-TTD, we can now specify that an instruction is expected to fault. The predicate `Fault(P1:L0, x, MMU:Translation)` holds¹, if the instruction at label L0 on Thread P1 raises a fault due to an invalid $TTD(x)$, that is, an MMU Translation Fault. Overall, the `exists` clause of MP-TTD asks whether there is an execution where P1 reads the updated flag as set by P0, and the outdated, initially invalid $TTD(x)$.

a) *Extending instruction semantics:* The instruction semantics of memory accesses requires extending to account for implicit memory accesses due to address translation and possibility of faulting. We illustrate key extensions for the LDR instruction in Fig. 4, and elaborate further in Section V.

Fig. 4 (i) gives the semantics of LDR without VMSA. We first obtain the location x by reading the source register X2 (Effect *c*). We then obtain value 1 by reading from the location x (Effect *a*), and then write that value 1 into the target register X1 (Effect *d*). The `iico_data` arrows depict the Intrinsic data dependencies due to Effect *c* passing on the location x to Effect *a* and Effect *a* passing on the value 1 to Effect *d*.

Fig. 4 (ii) gives the semantics of LDR with VMSA. We first obtain the VA x by reading the source register X2 (Effect *e*). We then read from $TTD(x)$ (Effect *a*)—Arm calls this an Implicit TTD Read Effect. Given that $TTD(x)$ is valid, we obtain value 1 by reading from $PA(x)$ (Effect *b*)—Arm calls this an Explicit Memory Read Effect. As before, we then write that value 1 into the target register X1 (Effect *g*).

In Fig. 4 (ii), the Branching Effect *f* indicates that a decision has been made: depending on the validity of the TTD read by Effect *a*, we decide to access $PA(x)$ as in Fig. 4 (ii), or to fault. Fig. 5 illustrates the faulting case. There we also read from $TTD(x)$ (Effect *a*), but it is invalid, so after failing the validity check (Branching Effect *e*), we fault at Effect *f*.

Lastly, notice the `tr-ib` arrows between the Implicit Read Effect *a* and the Explicit Memory Effect *b* in Fig. 4, and the Implicit Read Effect *a* and the Fault Effect *b* in Fig. 5. These depict a relation Arm calls Translation-Intrinsically-Before, which it considers as providing order: Explicit Memory Effects

¹Arm’s special-purpose registers, the Fault Address Register `FAR_EL1` and the Exception Syndrome Register `ESR_EL1`, can be used to infer the information about the fault asserted by `Fault(P1:L0, x, MMU:Translation)`.

AArch64 MP-TTD

```

{
0:X2=TTD(x); 0:X1=(valid:1, oa:PA(x));
0:X8=y; 1:X8=y;
1:X3=x;
[TTD(x)]=(valid:0, oa:PA(x));
}
P0          | P1;
STR X1, [X2] | LDR W7, [X8]   ;
MOV W7, #1   | L0:LDR W4, [X3];
STR W7, [X8] |                ;
exists 1:X7=1
        /\ Fault(P1:L0, x, MMU:Translation)

```

Fig. 3. Message passing using TTDs—Allowed




Fig. 4. Semantics of LDR without and with VMSA—Allowed

and Fault Effects are always Ordered-after Implicit TTD Reads of the corresponding address translations.

b) *Extending memory model:* Barriers and inter-thread observations affect memory accesses due to address translation differently from application-level ones. For example, the modification of the MP-TTD test, `MP-TTD+DMB.ST+DMB.LD` in Fig. 6, is not Forbidden, even though the MP test in Fig. 1




Fig. 5. Semantics of LDR when valid is 0—Allowed

```

AArch64 MP-TTD+DMB.ST+DMB.LD
{
0:X2=TTD(x); 0:X1=(valid:1, oa:PA(x));
0:X8=y; 1:X8=y;
1:X3=x;
[TTD(x)]=(valid:0, oa:PA(x));
}
P0 | P1;
STR X1, [X2] | LDR W7, [X8] ;
DMB ST | DMB LD ;
MOV W7, #1 | L0: LDR W4, [X3];
STR W7, [X8] | ;
exists (1:X7=1
/\ Fault (P1:L0, x, MMU:Translation))

```

Fig. 6. Insufficient synchronisation for MP-TTD—Allowed

with the same modification is. Our VMSA model extends Hardware-required-before and Observed-by relations of Arm’s application-level memory model to apply to Implicit TTD Effects and Fault Effects, but accounts for the differences.

The VIS01-load test in Fig. 7 illustrates Implicit TTD Reads exhibiting ordering similar to Explicit Memory Effects. It is Forbidden, because the Implicit TTD Read of the LDR is Hardware-required-ordered-before the write to TTD(x) by the STR later in program order, and must not observe it.

The MP+rfi-addr+dmb.ld test in Fig. 8 and the MP-TTD+rfi-addr+dmb.ld test in Fig. 9 illustrate the only case of Implicit TTD Reads having stronger ordering than Explicit Memory Effects. These message passing tests both order the load of the flag y ahead of the load of the data with a DMB LD. The exists clause of each test reduces to whether there is an order between the stores on P0, and it is only in the MP-TTD+rfi-addr+dmb.ld test that there is—due to a Implicit TTD Read.

In MP+rfi-addr+dmb.ld, the store of the data (STR W0, [X1]) is not ordered before the store of the flag (STR W4, [X5, W3, SXTW]). Indeed, although LDR W2, [X1]

```

AArch64 VIS01-load
{
0:X1=x; 0:X2=0;
0:X4=TTD(x); 0:X3=(oa:PA(y));
y=1;
[TTD(x)]=(oa:PA(x));
}
P0 ;
LDR W2, [X1] ;
STR X3, [X4] ;
exists (0:X2=1)

```

Fig. 7. Visibility of TTD updates—Forbidden

```

AArch64 MP+rfi-addr+dmb.ld
{
0:X1=x; 1:X1=x;
0:X5=y; 1:X5=y;
}
P0 | P1 ;
MOV W0, #1 | LDR W0, [X5];
STR W0, [X1] | DMB LD ;
LDR W2, [X1] | LDR W2, [X1];
EOR W3, W2, W2 | ;
MOV W4, #1 | ;
STR W4, [X5, W3, SXTW] | ;
exists (0:X2=1 /\ 1:X0=1 /\ 1:X2=0)

```

Fig. 8. No Explicit order via Internal Reads-from—Allowed

```

AArch64 MP-TTD+rfi-addr+dmb.ld
{
0:X11=TTD(x); 1:X11=TTD(x);
0:X5=y; 1:X5=y;
0:X10=(oa:PA(x), valid:1);
0:X1=x;
[TTD(x)]=(oa:PA(x), valid:0);
x=1;
}
P0 | P1 ;
STR X10, [X11] | LDR W4, [X5] ;
LDR W2, [X1] | DMB LD ;
EOR W3, W2, W2 | LDR X10, [X11] ;
MOV W4, #1 | ;
STR W4, [X5, W3, SXTW] | ;
exists (1:X4=1 /\ 1:X10=(oa:PA(x), valid:0))

```

Fig. 9. Reads-from orders Implicit TTD Effects—Forbidden

reads the data just written by the former store and creates an address dependency into the latter, Reads-from relation between Explicit Effects on the same thread does not contribute to the Observed-by relation. Intuitively, the new value of x could be in a buffer private to P0 and visible to P0 only.

In MP-TTD+rfi-addr+dmb.ld, the store of the data (STR X10, [X11]), which is TTD(x) in this case, is ordered before the store of the flag (STR W4, [X5, W3, SXTW]).

Indeed, an Implicit TTD Read of $\text{TTD}(x)$, which is due to $\text{LDR } W2, [X1]$, reads the TTD value just written by the former store, and uses the outcome of the Explicit Read of the load to create an address dependency into the latter. This internal Reads-from relation contributes to the Observed-by relation due to ending on an Implicit TTD Read. Arm considers thread’s translation table walks generating Implicit TTD Reads a “separate observer” [30, D8.2.6,R_TGRMW] from the thread itself. The associated Reads-from relations are externally visible and have ordering implications akin to Reads-from relations due to Explicit Memory Effects of different threads that also contribute to the Observed-by relation in the Arm application-level memory model.

IV. TLB MAINTENANCE

Translation Lookaside Buffers (TLBs) are caches that store recently used TTDs for faster address translation. Caching in TLBs is visible to system-level software, and TLBs must be managed at that level, which Arm calls Exception Level 1 (EL1). TTDs change infrequently, so it is pragmatic for hardware not to enforce coherence of TLBs. Therefore, unlike the application-level model, where Coherence-after orders Explicit Memory Effects and contributes to the Observed-by relation (as discussed in Section II), in the VMSA extension Coherence-after does not always order Implicit TTD Effects. Some TTDs are never cached in TLBs, e.g. invalid ones, and are always subject to ordering due to Coherence-after, while the TTDs that can be cached require using an instruction called TLBI to ensure that TLBs are coherently up to date.

Part of the complexity of modelling VMSA is in capturing the ordering implications of TLBI. We illustrate this complexity by first presenting load hazarding in an application-level example, and then explain its implications for VMSA in a case study of the CopyOnWrite example.

a) Load hazarding: The `coRR` test in Fig. 10 exposes load hazarding. Thread P0 reads x twice, while thread P1 updates x from 1 to 2. Arm forbids P0 from first seeing the updated value and then the outdated value due to the Hazard-ordered-before relation, which is included in Ordered-before and defined as follows [30, B2.3]. *An Effect E1 is Hazard-ordered-before an effect E2 if all of the following apply:*

- *E1 is an Explicit Read Memory Effect R1.*
- *R1 appears in program-order before an Explicit Read Memory Effect R3*
- *R1 and R3 access the same Location.*
- *R1 and E2 are from different Observers.*
- *R3 is Coherence-before E2.*
- *E2 is an Explicit Write Memory Effect W2.*

Looking at the execution in Fig. 10: the Read a is Hazard-ordered-before the Write c (using a as E1, c as E2 and the Read b as R3 in the definition). Moreover the Read a takes its value from the update of x by P1 and hence a Reads-from c , which forms a cycle in Ordered-before and therefore violates the External visibility requirement of Arm’s memory model.

```
AArch64 coRR
{
0:X2=x; 1:X2=x;
int x=1;
}
P0          | P1          ;
LDR W0,[X2] | MOV W0,#2   ;
LDR W1,[X2] | STR W0,[X2] ;
exists(0:X0=2 /\ 0:X1=1)
```




Fig. 10. Load hazarding behaviour—Forbidden

```
AArch64 CopyOnWrite
{
int x=1; int y=0; int z=0;
[TTD(x)]=(oa:PA(x),valid:1);
[TTD(z)]=(oa:PA(x)); 2:X7=(oa:PA(x),valid:0);
2:X6=TTD(x); 2:X8=TTD(y);
0:X2=x; 1:X2=x; 2:X2=x; 2:X4=y; 2:X10=z;
}
P0          | P1          | P2          ;
(*invalidates x*)
|          |          | STR X7,[X6] ;
|          |          | (*TLB maintenance*)
|          |          | DSB ISH    ;
|          |          | LSR X3,X2,12 ;
|          |          | TLBI VAAE1IS,X3 ;
|          |          | DSB ISH    ;
|          |          | (*memcpy via z*)
|          |          | LDR W5,[X10] ;
|          |          | STR W5,[X4] ;
|          |          | DMB ISH    ;
|          |          | (*overwrites TTD(x)*)
LDR W0,[X2] | MOV W0,#2   | LDR X1,[X8] ;
LDR W1,[X2] | STR W0,[X2] | STR X1,[X6] ;
exists 0:X0=2 /\ 0:X1=1
```

Fig. 11. A CopyOnWrite example from Linux—Forbidden

b) CopyOnWrite: Although the distinction between virtual and physical memory is apparent at the system level (at EL1), it must not be at the application level (at EL0). Hence, the `coRR` test must remain Forbidden regardless of TTD manipulations performed by an operating system (OS). We illustrate this using the CopyOnWrite test in Fig. 11, which is an excerpt of the Linux kernel given to us by its maintainers featuring a typical TTD manipulation sequence.

Threads P0 and P1 communicate exactly as `coRR` in Fig. 10 and represent user-level instructions. Thread P2 represents the OS manipulating TTDs: P2 remaps $\text{VA}(x)$ to a different PA, and a load hazard on P0 is made impossible by careful TLB maintenance on P2, which we explain next.

Initially $\text{TTD}(x)$ is valid and points to $\text{PA}(x)$. $\text{TTD}(z)$ points to $\text{PA}(x)$: z is an alias of x . Thread P2 performs a *break-before-make* sequence over $\text{VA } x$. Step-by-step, P2:

- *invalidates x by setting `valid` to 0 in $\text{TTD}(x)$;*

- uses a **first DSB ISH instruction** for ordering;
- computes a **Logical Shift Right LSR** of 12 bits over the VA x , i.e. the key for searching the TLB-cached value of $TTD(x)$;
- uses a **TLBI instruction**;
- uses a **second DSB ISH instruction** for ordering;
- **makes a copy of $PA(x)$ (accessed via VA z) into y** ;
- **uses a DMB barrier instruction** for ordering;
- **overwrites $TTD(x)$ with $TTD(y)$** .

c) *The DMB barrier:* The **DMB** on P2 ensures that the **STR W5, [X4]** and the **LDR X1, [X8]** are not re-ordered, as per the Arm application-level memory model [21]. Hence the **DMB** ensures that when P2 **makes a copy of the value of $PA(x)$ (accessed via the VA z) into y** and **overwrites the TTD of x with the TTD of y** , then the **copy is done ahead of the overwrite**.

d) *The TLB maintenance sequence:* Fig. 12 shows an execution of CopyOnWrite satisfying its exists clause. To see why, we map the instructions of the test in Fig. 11 to the Effects and relations of Fig. 12. As the full execution graph is large, we only show selected Effects: on P0, the Implicit TTD Read Effects a and c generated by the **first load** and **second load** respectively; on P2, the TTD Write Effects e and k generated by the **STR X7, [X6]** and the **STR X1, [X6]** respectively; and the **TLBI** Effect $ev31$. In this execution:

- $o \xrightarrow{rf} c$ (c **Reads-from** o), i.e. the Implicit TTD Read Effect c of **LDR W1, [X2]** on P0 reads its value from the initial Write to $TTD(x)$ represented by Effect o .
- $k \xrightarrow{rf} a$ (a **Reads-from** k), i.e. the Implicit TTD Read Effect a of **LDR W0, [X2]** on P0 reads the value written by the Explicit TTD Write Effect k of **STR X1, [X6]** on P2.
- $a \xrightarrow{po\text{-}va\text{-}loc} c$, i.e. **LDR W0, [X2]** on P0 is in program order before **LDR W1, [X2]** and to the same VA.
- $c \xrightarrow{ca} e$, (e is **Coherence-after** c), i.e. the value read by c is **invalidated** by Effect e of **STR X7, [X6]** on P2, since by convention the initial Write o that c Reads-from is Ordered-before other Writes to $TTD(x)$ such as e .
- $e \xrightarrow{dsb.ish} ev31$, i.e. e is Ordered-before $ev31$ thanks to **DSB ISH** between the two corresponding instructions, the **invalidation STR X7, [X6]** and **TLBI**.
- $ev31 \xrightarrow{dsb.ish} k$, i.e. the **TLBI** Effect $ev31$ is Ordered-before the **overwrite** k made by P2 thanks to **DSB ISH** between the two corresponding instructions, **TLBI** and **STR X1, [X6]**.
- $c \xrightarrow{TTD\text{-}read\text{-}ordered\text{-}before} k$, i.e. the Implicit TTD Read c of **LDR W1, [X2]** is Ordered-before the **overwrite** k .

e) *Hardware intuition for TTD-read-ordered-before:*

From a hardware point of view, the **TLBI** on P2 sends a message to P0, which is ordered arbitrarily w.r.t. the Implicit TTD Reads a and c . The **TLBI-before** relation denotes this arbitrary order: formally, we enumerate all possible pairs of **TLBI** Effects and Implicit Reads within the scope of the **TLBI**. If the **TLBI** message is inserted before the Implicit




Fig. 12. Forbidden execution of CopyOnWrite (Fig. 11)

Read c , then $ev31$ is **TLBI-before** c , otherwise c is **TLBI-before** $ev31$.

The **first DSB ISH** on P2 ensures that only an execution where c is **TLBI-before** $ev31$ (as shown in Fig. 12) is possible. An execution where this arbitrary order goes the other way, $ev31$ **TLBI-before** c , has a cycle forbidden by the External Visibility requirement: $ev31 \xrightarrow{TLBI\text{-}before} c \xrightarrow{ca} e \xrightarrow{dsb.ish} ev31$.

When c is **TLBI-before** $ev31$, the **TLBI** message $ev31$ waits until c has completed. P0 sends a message back to P2 to enable the completion of the **second DSB**. The **overwrite** k is in program order after the **second DSB**, and therefore **dsb.ish-after** the **TLBI**. Consequently, c is **TTD-read-ordered-before** k .

f) *TLBI contributes to External Visibility:* Unlike in the **coRR** test, the hazardous Read Effects a and c are Implicit, so CopyOnWrite is not forbidden by Hazard-ordered-before.

Forbidding CopyOnWrite requires extra synchronisation: the **TLBI** instruction on P2 ensures that if the Read a sees the value of $TTD(x)$ overwritten by **STR X1, [X6]**, then the Read c cannot see the initial state for $TTD(x)$ any longer.

Formally, **TLBI** creates a cycle forbidden by External Visibility: $k \xrightarrow{rf} a \xrightarrow{po\text{-}va\text{-}loc} c \xrightarrow{TTD\text{-}read\text{-}ordered\text{-}before} k$.

V. TRANSLATION TABLE HARDWARE MANAGEMENT

The Arm architecture associates read and write permissions of a VA with two bits of a TTD called Access Flag and Dirty Bit, respectively. Managing those can be a responsibility of system-level software, but with Translation Table Hardware Management (TTHM), a feature of the Arm architecture introduced in v8.1, the responsibility can be transferred to hardware. To this end, two bits in the special Translation Control Register, **TCR_ELx.HA** for the Access Flag and

```

AArch64 STRdb0dbm1
TTHM=HA HD
{
0:X2=x;
[TTD(x)]=(db:0,dbm:1);
}
P0
;
MOV W0,#1
;
L0: STR W0,[X2];
exists(x=1 /\
[TTD(x)]=(db:1,dbm:1) /\
~Fault(P0:L0,x,MMU:Permission))

```




Fig. 13. Semantics of STR when db is 0 and dbm is 1—Required

TCR_ELx.HD for the Dirty Bit, enable hardware management of permissions in TTDs.

We model permissions by letting a Translation Table Descriptor $TTD(x)$ to be a tuple $(oa, valid, af, db, dbm)$, whose default value is $(oa:PA(x), valid:1, af:1, db:1, dbm:0)$. (For brevity, in litmus tests we tend to omit fields with default values from initial states or exists clauses.) The output address oa is the PA corresponding to the VA x . We have seen the effect of the `valid` bit in Section III. The Access Flag is modelled by the `af` bit, and the Dirty Bit by `db`. The Dirty Bit Management bit `dbm` indicates if hardware management of the Dirty Bit is on.

Permissions are considered in the instruction semantics with the following three cases.

Case 1: no hardware management. With TTHM implemented and `TCR_ELx.HA, HD=0, 0`, or without TTHM:


- A load or store with `af` set to 0 raises a Permission Fault;
- A store to x where $TTD(x)$ has `db` set to 0 raises a Permission Fault.

Case 2: hardware management of Access Flag only. With TTHM implemented and `TCR_ELx.HA=1`:

- A load or store with `af` set to 0 results in the MMU updating `af` to 1, and continuing without a Fault;
- A store with `db` set to 0 raises a Permission Fault.

Case 3: hardware management of Access Flag and Dirty Bit. With TTHM is implemented and `TCR_ELx.HA, HD=1, 1`:

- A load or store with `af` set to 0 results in the MMU updating `af` to 1, and continuing without a Fault;
- A store with `db` and `dbm` set to 0 raises a Permission Fault;
- A store with `db` set to 0 and `dbm` set to 1 results in the MMU updating `db` to 1, and continuing without a Fault.



```

AArch64 LDRaf0
TTHM=HA
{
0:X2=x;
int x=1;
[TTD(x)]=(af:0);
}
P0
;
L0: LDR W0,[X2];
exists(0:X0=1 /\ [TTD(x)]=(af:1) /\
~Fault(P0:L0,x,MMU:Permission))

```

Fig. 14. Semantics of LDR when the Access Flag is 0—Required

a) Metadata in litmus tests: Litmus tests can now specify if TTHM is implemented and if `TCR_ELx.HA, HD` are set to 1 (by default they are not). Thus, in the test in Fig. 14, `TTHM=HA` indicates that TTHM is implemented and that `TCR_ELx.HA` is set to 1. Initially x is 1, and $TTD(x)$ has `af` at 0. At line L0 thread P0 attempts a load of x . The `exists` clause asks if register X0 holds the value 1, $TTD(x)$ has `af` set to 1 and there was no Fault at line L0 relative to x . In the execution


```

AArch64 coWW-HD
TTHM=HA HD
{
0:X1=TTD(x); 0:X0=(oa:PA(x), db:0, dbm:1);
0:X3=x;
[TTD(x)]=(oa:PA(x), db:0, dbm:0);
}
P0          ;
STR X0, [X1] ;
MOV W2, #1   ;
L0: STR W2, [X3] ;
exists (~Fault(P0:L0, x, MMU:Permission) /\
[TTD(x)]=(oa:PA(x), db:0, dbm:1))

```

Fig. 15. Hardware Updates are Read-Modify-Writes—Forbidden

```

AArch64 STRva-STRttid
TTHM=HA HD
{
0:X0=x; 0:X1=1;
1:X3=(oa:PA(b), db:0, dbm:1); 1:X2=TTD(x);
int a=0; int b=0;
[TTD(x)]=(oa:PA(a), db:0, dbm:1);
}
P0          | P1          ;
STR W1, [X0] | STR X3, [X2];
exists (b=1 /\ TTD(x)=(oa:PA(b), db:0, dbm:1))

```

Fig. 16. Coherence-after from Hardware Update—Forbidden

graph, also in Fig. 14, we see the atomic pair (e, f) updating the af bit to 1. This represents the hardware management of the Access Flag.

In the test in Fig. 13, `TTHM=HA HD` indicates that `TTHM` is implemented and that `TCR_ELx.HD` is 1. Initially x is 0, db is 0 and dbm is 1. At line `L0` thread `P0` attempts a store of 1 to x . In the `exists` clause, we ask if x holds the value 1, db is set to 1 and there was no Fault at `L0` relative to x . In the execution graph, also in Fig. 13, we see the atomic pair (a, b) updating db to 1. This represents the hardware management of the Dirty Bit.

b) Spontaneous hardware updates: With the hardware management of the Access Flag, the Arm architecture allows for spontaneous setting of Access Flags, e.g. as a side effect of squashed speculative execution of an instruction. We model this as a *spontaneous hardware update* occurring at any point in the execution. Thus, on the graph in Fig. 14, the Hardware Update f of af occurs outside of the Thread `P0`. In contrast, Dirty Bits are not set spontaneously, and certain OSes rely on the precise ordering guarantees for those. In Fig. 13, the Hardware Update k of db in is Ordered-after the Branching Effect i , or in other words, after the TTD has been checked and a decision has been made by the MMU. This discrepancy is documented in the Arm ARM, in [30, D8.4.5,R_LHQRX] for af and [30, D8.4.6,R_DYCFD] for db .

```

AArch64 MP-TTD+DSB-TLBI-DSB+DMB.LD
{
0:X2=TTD(x); 0:X1=(valid:1, oa:PA(x));
0:X3=x; 1:X3=x;
0:X8=y; 1:X8=y;
[TTD(x)]=(valid:0, oa:PA(x));
}
P0          | P1;
STR X1, [X2] | LDR W7, [X8] ;
DSB ISH     | DMB LD       ;
LSR X9, X3, #12 | L0:      ;
TLBI VAAE1IS, X9 | LDR W4, [X3] ;
DSB ISH     |              ;
MOV W7, #1   |              ;
STR W7, [X8] |              ;
exists (1:X7=1
/\ Fault(P1:L0, x, MMU:Translation))

```

Fig. 17. Unnecessary TLB maintenance—Forbidden

c) Hardware Updates must be Read-Modify-Writes:

Test `coWW-HD` in Fig. 15 shows that Hardware Updates are Read-Modify-Writes. This ensures that the TTD Read which provokes the Hardware Update (e.g. when db is seen to be 0) cannot take its value from a Write which is Coherence-after the Hardware Update.

d) Coherence for Hardware Updates: Hardware Updates exhibit familiar coherence orderings, unlike Implicit TTD Read Effects that generally require TLB maintenance to restore coherence.

Fig. 16 shows that Coherence-after from a Hardware Update to a TTD Write counts as an ordering (the opposite ordering holds as well but is not shown for brevity). In this test, `TTD(x)` initially points to `PA(a)`, with db set to 0. The STR on `P0` aims to update x with value 1, and the STR on `P1` aims to change the output address of `TTD(x)` to point to `PA(b)`, also with db set to 0. It must not be the case that `P1` can make `TTD(x)` point to `PA(b)` if the Hardware Update of db by `P0` is Coherence-before the Explicit TTD Write by `P1`.

VI. ENHANCED TRANSLATION SYNCHRONISATION

Enhanced Translation Synchronisation (ETS) is a feature of the Arm architecture aimed at allowing lighter synchronisation in system-level code for ensuring order between TTD updates and concurrent uses of address translations: suitably for patterns of updating TTDs that cannot be cached to those that can, hardware would provide ordering w.r.t. Implicit TTD Effects without requiring `ISB`.

We illustrate the motivation for ETS using the `MP-TTD` test in Fig. 3 and showing two approaches to synchronising the update of `TTD(x)` on `P0` and the Implicit TTD Read of the load from x on `P1`—in absence of ETS.

Firstly, the `MP-TTD+DSB-TLBI-DSB+DMB.LD` test in Fig. 17. It uses a `DMB LD` barrier on `P1`, but other approaches to local ordering of Explicit Read Effects of loads could be used equivalently, e.g., an address dependency.

```

AArch64 MP-TTD+DMB.ST+DSB-ISB
{
0:X2=TTD(x); 0:X1=(valid:1,oa:PA(x));
1:X3=x;
0:X8=y; 1:X8=y;
[TTD(x)]=(valid:0,oa:PA(x));
}
P0          | P1;
STR X1,[X2] | LDR W7,[X8] ;
DMB ST      | DSB SY ;
MOV W7,#1   | ISB ;
STR W7,[X8] | L0: LDR W4,[X3];
exists (1:X7=1
        /\ Fault(P1:L0,x,MMU:Translation))

```

Fig. 18. Canonical synchronisation pre-ETS—Forbidden

Crucially, it uses a TLB maintenance sequence on P0. Like in the CopyOnWrite test in Section IV, the TLBI on P0 ensures order w.r.t. a concurrent Implicit TTD Read on P1. Note that TTD(x) is initially invalid and, therefore, not cached in a TLB. Indeed, the Arm ARM states that *Translation table entries that generate a Translation fault, an Address size fault, or an Access flag fault are never cached in a TLB* [30, D8.12, R_XCLRD] and calls these Fault Effects TLBUncacheable [30, pp. B2-169]. Therefore, the store to TTD(x) on P0 does not require TLB maintenance to invalidate a cached TLB entry; TLBI is only used as a synchronisation primitive, which is both very costly and counter-intuitive.

Secondly, consider the MP-TTD+DMB.ST+DSB-ISB test in Fig. 18. It uses a DMB ST barrier on P0. Crucially, it uses DSB SY and ISB barriers on P1. Note that this approach places the burden of synchronisation on threads concurrent with the TTD manipulation. Feedback from Arm partners indicated that requiring an ISB was both costly and confusing.

ETS was intended to ensure that in the MP-TTD test, any approach to local ordering of Explicit Read Effects (as, e.g., in the MP-TTD+DMB.ST+DMB.LD test in Fig. 6 that would be forbidden with ETS) orders the Explicit Read Effect of the load from y before the Implicit TTD Read Effect of the load from x on P1.

a) *From ETS to ETS2*: ETS intended to extend the local ordering requirement w.r.t. a faulting instruction to its Implicit TTD Read. Our efforts towards modeling ETS uncovered subtle special cases that led to a revision of the feature.

Consider the MP-TTD+DMB.ST+lobF test in Fig. 19, which follows the pattern of MP-TTD, but on P1 instead of a load from x it performs a store release (STLR W4, [X3]). Generally speaking, the store release ensures local ordering between the Explicit Effects of the two stores on P1. However, in the execution of interest in the MP-TTD+DMB.ST+lobF test, the STLR faults. This leads to a question: does STLR have the release semantics even when the instruction faults, or only when it does not fault?

We clarified this question with Arm: Arm intended the release semantics and, more generally, any local

```

AArch64 MP-TTD+DMB.ST+lobF
{
0:X2=TTD(x); 0:X1=(valid:1,oa:PA(x));
0:X8=y; 1:X8=y;
1:X3=x;
[TTD(x)]=(valid:0,oa:PA(x));
}
P0          | P1 ;
STR X1,[X2] | LDR W4,[X8] ;
DMB ST      | L0: STLR W4,[X3];
MOV W7,#1   | ;
STR W7,[X8] | ;
exists (1:X4=1
        /\ Fault(P1:L0,x,MMU:Translation))

```

Fig. 19. Ordered-before a Fault?—Allowed w/o ETS or ETS2

```

AArch64 coRR-Permission
{
0:X2=TTD(x); 0:X1=(oa:PA(x),db:1,valid:1);
1:X3=x;
[TTD(x)]=(db:0, valid:1);
}
P0          | P1 ;
STR X1,[X2] | MOV W4,#1 ;
              | L1: STR W4,[X3] ;
              | L0: STR W4,[X3] ;
exists (~Fault(P1:L1,x)
        /\ Fault(P1:L0,x,MMU:Permission))

```

Fig. 20. ETS2 does not affect TLBCacheable Faults—Allowed

ordering to apply to faulting instructions and, hence, the MP-TTD+DMB.ST+lobF test to be forbidden with ETS. Despite clarifying the intent for ETS, it was felt by Arm that ETS deserved to be strengthened to avoid any confusion. Thus, ETS was deprecated in favour of ETS2, which provides the ordering desired on P1 in the MP-TTD test without any synchronisation at all.

Our VMSA model and the Arm ARM define the ordering due to ETS2 as follows [30, B2.3]: *If ETS2 is implemented, E1 is an Explicit Memory Effect, E2 is an Implicit TTD Read and all of the following applies:*

- E1 is program-order-before a TLBUncacheable Effect E3
- E2 is Translation-intrinsically-before E3

Then E1 is Ordered-before E2

b) *ETS2 and non-TLBUncacheable Faults*: Although ETS2 provides stronger ordering than ETS, it still only applies to TLBUncacheable Faults, notably excluding Permission Faults. This permits designs with one TLB per store pipeline. As a consequence, the coRR-Permission test in Fig. 20 is allowed under ETS2. In contrast, the coRR-Translation test in Fig. 21 is forbidden under ETS2. This is because the Permission Fault in the coRR-Permission test is not TLBUncacheable, as opposed to the Translation Fault in coRR-Translation.

```

AArch64 coRR-Translation
{
0:X2=TTD(x); 0:X1=(oa:PA(x),valid:1);
1:X3=x;
[TTD(x)]=(valid:0);
}
P0          | P1          ;
STR X1,[X2] | MOV W4,#1      ;
            | L1: STR W4, [X3] ;
            | L0: STR W4, [X3] ;
exists(~Fault(P1:L1,x) /\
Fault(P1:L0,x,MMU:Translation))

```

Fig. 21. ETS2 on TLBUncacheable Faults—Forbidden w/ ETS2

VII. VALIDATING OUR MODEL

We validated the Arm VMSA memory model in two ways:

- by discussing with Arm architects and Arm partners
- by testing extensively against existing hardware

a) Ratification by Arm and partners: We validated our model via 3-year long in depth discussions with a forum made of Arm architects and partners. First, we developed and validated the instruction semantics, including in presence of hardware management: for example, the execution graphs in Figs. 4, 5, 14, and 13 were discussed and refined in that forum.

Second, we recorded the architectural intent by studying litmus tests (e.g. the ones in this paper) and discussing their expected behaviour, from the perspectives of both hardware implementation and software usage.

Third, after having developed an initial model which matched the recorded intent, we discussed the definitions themselves. Much reorganisation and redefinition happened at that stage: one difficulty was devising definitions which would not only make the model behave as intended, but also would be transliterated into English in an acceptable manner, and would convey relatable intuition to both hardware and software folks.

Fourth, we reviewed this revamped model with Arm and its partners from start to finish, and eventually ratified it. It was then incorporated into the Arm Architecture Reference Manual [30, B2.3], and released in the herdttools distribution [9].

b) Testing against a variety of Arm hardware: We tested the Arm VMSA model extensively against existing hardware. To do so, we have put together a suite of about 1300 litmus tests that exercise different aspects of the new semantics, such as the ones shown in this paper. Most of those tests have also been discussed during model design to validate intent.

For testing we use the open source tool litmus7 [11] to produce binaries that we can run on hardware. The litmus7 tool takes litmus tests as input and generates C with inline AArch64 assembly source code. The source code is compiled and linked to provide executable binaries that run at EL0.

We extended litmus7 to support running litmus tests at EL1 or higher exception levels: that is where TTD features used by many litmus tests of interest can be controlled. Hence, we extended litmus7 to build binaries that can run on top of

```

AArch64 STRva-SWPtttd
TTHM=HA HD
{
0:X2=x;
1:X4=TTD(x);
1:X6=(oa:PA(x),db:0,dbm:1,valid:0);
[TTD(x)=(db:0,dbm:1)];
}
P0          | P1          ;
MOV W1,#1   | SWP X6,X8,[X4] ;
L0:STR W1,[X2] |          ;
exists(1:X8=(oa:PA(x),dbm:1) /\
[TTD(x)]=(oa:PA(x),valid:0,dbm:1,db:0) /\
[x]=0 /\ Fault(P0:L0,x,MMU:Translation))

```

Fig. 22. Dirty Bit set spontaneously—Forbidden?

a virtual machine—we handle Linux KVM [1] and MacOS HVF [3]—using QEMU [4]. The source code generated by litmus7 uses the library functions provided by KVMunit-tests to setup the system, get pointers to TTDs and install fault handlers as necessary. For the purposes of this work, we added support for configurable translation granule for the arm64 target in KVM-unit-tests [6].

Our testing uncovered infidelities to the principle that the Dirty Bit should not be updated spontaneously by hardware, as discussed in Section V. More precisely, we observed 32 contradicting tests; Fig. 22 shows one of them.

Initially it was hypothesised that we could see this result due to interactions with virtualisation in our testing setup. This led to two significant next steps: (a) Arm relaxed the architecture to allow those behaviours in the virtualised case [30, 1st bullet of R_DYCFD]; and (b) we developed a bare-metal testing infrastructure as well, to remove noisy interactions with virtualisation and confirm the hypothesis.

To that aim, we extended KVM-unit-tests and added support for building binaries that run as Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) applications. An EFI application is typically used for booting or interfacing with an operating system.

Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) and Device Tree (DT) are two methods used by system-level software (e.g. KVM-unit-tests) to discover information about the system. DT used to be the preferred way for Arm systems; it requires a file with the device tree information (FDT). ACPI removes the need for providing an FDT, but is only supported for Arm systems that boot through EFI. To make the process of running litmus tests as EFI applications as simple as possible, we added support for ACPI in KVM-unit-tests. Our work is open-source and we have already worked with the community to upstream the first series of patches to KVM-unit-tests [6].

Our 1300 tests ran for at least 160 million times both in bare-metal and virtual modes, on a Cavium ThunderX2 CN9975 (2 sockets, 28 Vulcan cores per socket, 4 threads per core); two Arm N1SDP (4 Neoverse-N1 cores); an Apple M1 Pro (8 Firestorm and 2 Icestorm cores); a HiSilicon Kunpeng 920-6426 (2 sockets, 48 TaiShan v110 cores per socket); an

ODROID C2 (4 A53 cores); a RaspberryPi 4 Model B (4 A72 cores); an ODROID N2+ (2 A53 cores, 4 A73 cores).

Interestingly, the tests which contradict the Dirty Bit principle (e.g. in Fig. 22) were observed in our bare-metal infrastructure as well. Some designs were confirmed to allow such behaviours and we are currently investigating with Arm how to relax the architecture in those cases too.

VIII. RELATED WORKS

Previous work on application-level memory models (e.g. for x86 [36], IBM Power [10], [35], NVidia [7], [33], Arm [12], [23], and RISC-V [5]) paved the way for the methodology that we use here: writing executable models validated both by discussion with architects and testing. Our work naturally builds on the Arm application-level memory model [21].

The works of [24] and [8] aim to extend the Arm application-level model with mixed-size accesses semantics—the latter has been ratified by Arm and integrated in the Arm ARM. The work of [39] aims to extend the Arm application-level model with instruction-fetch semantics. The work of [20] studies transactional memory for Arm. The work of [19] studies persistent memory for x86 and Arm. The work of [34] studies non-temporal memory accesses for x86.

Several works study virtual memory for x86 or Arm [13], [15]–[18], [22], [25]–[27], [29], [40]–[42], [44], but with no account of the weak memory models of those architecture.

The work of [28] presents a model of virtual memory called `x86t_elt`, which extends the x86-TSO memory model [37] in a similar style to ours. Empirical validation of `x86t_elt` remains open and could be approached with our testing methodology.

The work of [43] proposes a verification framework for system-level software, accounting for virtual memory and Arm’s application-level memory model. It abstracts away the semantics of Arm VMSA by relying on a discipline called `wDRF`, shown to be followed by an implementation of Linux KVM. Our model provides a step towards proving that the `wDRF` conditions assumed by [43] hold on Arm hardware.

The work of [32] extends the NVidia model [33] with a notion of proxy to formalise memory accesses going through different coherence paths. A proxy is metadata associating a memory access to a VA and a coherence path (which seems related to an Arm Observer). However, as stated in [32]: (a) the NVidia memory model is concerned with the ordering between accesses with different VAs, but not with VA modifications or TLB maintenance; (b) there is no pre-established expectation from software, such as the `CopyOnWrite` example of Fig. 11. Hence [32] is at liberty to propose a new barrier to order different proxies, whilst we needed to uncover the semantics of pre-existing barrier and TLB maintenance instructions and validate these against architects’ intent, software expectations and existing hardware implementations.

The work closest to ours is in [38], which presents a VMSA extension of the Arm application-level memory model (without Hardware Updates) written in pseudo `cat`.

To validate their model, the authors of [38] have developed tools similar to ours. For simulation, [38] relies on Isla [14],

which builds the semantics of Arm instructions from their machine-readable description given in the Arm ARM [30]. Meanwhile `herd7` relies on hand-coded semantics devised with and ratified by Arm and its partners. It appears that `herd7` is faster than Isla by one order of magnitude [14], but `herd7` would necessitate more work by hand to handle radical architecture evolution transcribed through ASL code.

For testing, the custom tool of [38] and the extended `litmus7` tool we propose offer similar functionalities, including manipulation of TTDs, custom fault handlers, EL0/EL1 transitions in both directions and possibility of bare-metal execution. But the simulator and testing tool of [38] consume `litmus` tests in different formats; whereas all our tools consume the same format and produce outputs that we can compare automatically. This guarantees the identity of simulated and executed tests by design, and partly explains that our test base, and as a result our testing campaigns, are significantly larger.

To compare the model of [38] to ours, we implemented it in `cat` to execute it with `herd7`, and some amount of guess work as to certain relations, undefined in the paper (e.g. `trf`, `IsFrom{W,R}`, instruction-order, `popa`) proved necessary. Under those assumptions, the model of [38] differs from ours: it is both stronger on certain tests (e.g. `MP-TTD+DMB.ST+DMB.LD` in Fig. 6, `MP-TTD+DMB.ST+lobF` in Fig. 19 and `coRR-Translation` in Fig. 21, all observed on hardware) and weaker on others (e.g. `MP-TTD+rfi-addr+dmb.ld` in Fig. 9, `CopyOnWrite` in Fig. 11, and `MP-TTD+DSB-TLBI-DSB+DMB.LD` in Fig. 17).

IX. CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS

We provide a formalisation of the Arm Virtual Memory System Architecture, as a machine-readable and executable model written in `cat` [9], [12]. This model has been validated extensively against hardware, and ratified by Arm—it now appears in the Arm Architecture Reference Manual [30, B2.3].

Our work does not address the matter of Stage 2 translation, which can be used to ensure that a VM can only see resources allocated to it, and not the resources allocated to other VMs or the hypervisor. Instead, our model goes from VA to PA directly, as opposed to through an intermediate address (which Arm calls IPA), as a two-stage translation would. Our work also does not model levels of translation table walks. The Arm architecture chooses a radix tree of three levels as a data structure for a translation table, so translating a VA requires traversing the tree to the leaf nodes. Our VMSA model focuses only on the last step of the traversals. We envision modelling levels and stages of translation with multiple Implicit TTD Reads per translation, and leave that out of scope of this work.

Furthermore, our instruction semantics assumes that accesses have naturally aligned addresses and do not cross page boundaries. Accesses crossing a page boundary for instance may necessitate two translations (viz, Implicit TTD Reads).

The model developed with the aforementioned assumptions has proven successful at capturing essential specifi-

cation requirements of Arm and Arm partners, which led to its ratification by Arm. Despite the limitations, our work has already helped clarify Arm’s intent for the Enhanced Translation Synchronisation feature. Furthermore, our testing infrastructure uncovered exceptions to architectural principles about the Dirty Bit with and without virtualisation. This led Arm to relax the cases with virtualisation, and investigate how to accommodate the cases without virtualisation. This exemplifies how recording the architectural intent in a formal model helps bridging the gap between the intent and its hardware interpretations.

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