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# Reversing, Breaking, and Fixing the French Legislative Election E-Voting Protocol

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## Abstract

We conduct a security analysis of the e-voting protocol used for the largest political election using e-voting in the world, the 2022 French legislative election for the citizens overseas. Due to a lack of system and threat model specifications, we built and contributed such specifications by studying the French legal framework and by reverse-engineering the code base accessible to the voters. Our analysis reveals that this protocol is affected by two design-level and implementation-level vulnerabilities. We show how those allow a standard voting server attacker and even more so a channel attacker to defeat the election integrity and ballot privacy due to 5 attack variants. We propose and discuss 5 fixes to prevent those attacks. Our specifications, the attacks, and the fixes were acknowledged by the relevant stakeholders during our responsible disclosure. They implemented our fixes to prevent our attacks for future elections. Beyond this protocol, we draw general lessons, recommendations, and open questions from this instructive experience where an e-voting protocol meets the real-world constraints of a large-scale, political election.

## 1 Introduction

Verifiability is a central goal in e-voting: it allows voters and auditors to verify the election result. Many e-voting protocols achieve (individual) verifiability for the voters thanks to a receipt bound to their ballots (*e.g.*, [5, 8, 13, 22]). Receipts allow to track the presence of ballots in the final bulletin board and election result and prevent a compromised or malicious voting server to drop or tamper with their cast ballots. In this paper, we ask the question how the French Legislative E-Voting Protocol (FLEP) does so by conducting a comprehensive security analysis.

The FLEP was the e-voting protocol used to organize the French legislative election for French residents overseas in June 2022 with 1.6 million eligible voters. This was the largest election (in terms of expressed votes) worldwide using e-voting. In total, to elect 11 deputies, more than 524k ballot have been cast and tallied<sup>1</sup>. The voters massively preferred using the FLEP (76%) over traditional paper-based voting (22.7%) or postal voting (0.3%) [1].

As expected, the FLEP has high security ambitions. Some of those ambitions are related to lawful requirements and recommendations from all relevant regulatory bodies. To meet those requirements, notably that it remains secure under strong threats such as internal threats, the FLEP has undergone audits and the organizers have put in place an external third-party providing verification services operated by independent French researchers. Voters were encouraged to visit this web-service to verify the presence of their ballot (and receipt) in the ballot-box. For the researchers to independently develop such a tool, the vendor made public a rather incomplete specification partially describing the verifiability mechanisms used in this protocol.

In this paper, we answer the following question: Does the FLEP meet its goals? We reverse-engineered the FLEP and found flaws in the protocol and its implementation that could have been exploited to stealthily defeat ballot privacy of target voters and verifiability under a *voting server attacker* (compromised voting server) or under an even weaker *channel attacker*, that is: honest voting client and compromised plain-text channel client-server (an example of concrete scenario is a compromise of the voting server certificate). That is a strictly weaker attacker model than the standard compromised server threat model (which can be the result of internal threats).

**Contributions.** We contribute the following.

*Reverse.* We reverse engineered the obfuscated JavaScript program running in the FLEP voting clients. Doing this, fully

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<sup>1</sup>This number includes the first and the second round of the election. To give a comparison, the second largest such election is the 2015 Australian state election with 280k expressed votes using iVote, that is 6% of the expressed votes, to elect 93 deputies.

passively in order to not alter the election, on a first version used during a large-scale test election and a second version during the main election, we were able to cross-reference information in order to fill the several critical gaps in the partial specification of the FLEP. We obtained this way a full specification of the voting client and the verifiability checks. We also studied the French lawful requirements and relevant recommendations to define a precise threat model specification that we argue is in line with the French legal framework and is also supported by the literature.

*New Vulnerabilities.* Analyzing this, we found two vulnerabilities that can be exploited by a channel attacker and even more so by a voting server attacker, which are both included in our threat model: ( $V_1$ ) A channel attacker can break the bound between voters' ballots and their receipts due to an implementation flaw in the voting client. ( $V_2$ ) We found that the sub-election identifier (associated to a consulate) is not correctly cryptographically bound to the ballot, but is to the receipt. Combined with ( $V_1$ ), this allows a channel attacker to modify the sub-election identifier of a ballot.

*Attacks.* We show how a channel attacker could have exploited those vulnerabilities to stealthily carry out the following attacks (that is without leaving any evidence of the attacks): ( $A_1$ ) By providing crafted receipts to voters, a channel attacker can selectively drop voters' ballots to defeat individual verifiability and modify the result of the election. ( $A_2$ ) Choose the ballot that will be cast in place of the genuinely sent ballot while still providing a good looking and valid receipt. This attack is a variant of  $A_1$  and is more effective at modifying the election result. ( $A_3$ ) Defeat ballot privacy of target voters. We show how a channel attacker can learn how *target* voter(s) voted by moving around ballots from sub-election (*i.e.*, consulate) to another and observing the per-consulate result. We stress that this can be done while evading all possible detection and only assuming a channel attacker; in particular decryption trustees can all be trustworthy. (We also discuss 2 other attack variants.)

We do not claim that such attacks happened. We solely claim that a malicious or compromised channel or voting server had the technical ability to perform such attacks without leaving any evidence. We responsibly disclosed those attacks to all impacted and involved actors: the operator [Europe and Foreign Affairs French Ministry \(EFA Ministry\)](#), its institutional security advisor [Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information \(ANSSI\)](#)<sup>2</sup>, and the vendor Voxaly Docaposte. All of those 3 stakeholders have acknowledged and confirmed our attacks. We later disclosed our findings to the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party services supervisors. Note that a comprehensive risk analysis is out of the scope of this paper.

*Fixes.* We propose and discuss 5 countermeasures to those

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<sup>2</sup>The ANSSI is the French National Agency for the Security of Information Systems whose missions include cyber defense of state information systems and to provide advice and support to government and operators of critical national infrastructure.

attacks. The [EFA Ministry](#), [ANSSI](#), and the vendor (Voxaly Docaposte) have confirmed to us that they have used some of our countermeasures to fix the FLEP. Already for the new elections that were organized in June 2023 (because the election was contested in some constituencies), FLEP has been partially fixed thanks to our work, as witnessed by the new specification [17]. We not not claim the absence of other attacks but only that the attacks we found were fixed.

*Lessons.* Designing a secure e-voting system is notoriously difficult. Flaws are regularly discovered on real-world protocols; *e.g.*, on those used in Estonia [25], Switzerland [20], Russia [19]. In the case of the FLEP, the protocol is derived from the state-of-the-art academic protocol Belenios that is proven secure [13] (for the threat model we consider here) and is affected by none of those attacks. What went wrong?

To answer, we draw more general conclusions and lessons from this instructive experience where an academic protocol meets the real-world, challenging constraints of a large-scale and political election. Some of those translate to new open research questions. Those lessons are of a broader interest. In particular, we highlight the pitfalls in which the deployment of the FLEP fell, that are of general interest as they could have impacted the deployment of other state-of-the-art protocols.

**Outline.** In Section 2, we present the architecture, the security goals, and the threat model for the FLEP. In Section 3, we explain how we reverse-engineered the FLEP to build a system and threat model specification and describe the latter. In Section 4, we present the vulnerabilities and attacks we found and discuss our fixes. In Section 5, we draw more general lessons from this work, that go beyond the FLEP and conclude in Section 6.

A full version of this paper, containing more details and justifications, is available at [15].

## 2 Context

We first describe the context of the FLEP, its security goals, and threat model.

### 2.1 Architecture

The specification [16] published by the vendor is largely incomplete but provides useful information about the architecture and how the FLEP is deployed in practice.

**Geographical Organization.** French citizens overseas are gathered in 11 electoral regions (*e.g.*, north America, north Africa, etc.), which are *constituencies*. Each of the constituencies is itself split into several consular sub-regions which are *consulates* and typically represent a country or a city. Each constituency elects one deputy using the FLEP with a unique election identifier  $\text{electionId}$  cryptographically bound to each ballot. Each of those elections are organized in two rounds with their own identifier  $\text{roundId} \in \{1, 2\}$ . Additionally, the




Figure 1: Organization of the French legislative elections (partial view). Each constituency (e.g., North Africa) runs its own election to elect one deputy. The eligible voters of each constituency are grouped into consulates (e.g., Alger) with their own ballot-box. Per-consulate results are also published.

French law requires that the results are also published at the level of consulates. Therefore, to each consulate in a consistency is associated a ballot-box with a unique identifier `ballotBoxId`. Figure 1 sums-up the organization.

**Protocol Roles.** Similarly to state-of-the art protocols such as Helios [5] or Belenios [13], the FLEP relies on different *roles* detailed next.

- **Voter:** they are the agents who will cast a vote. The FLEP assumes that voters own an email address and a cellphone number to receive login/password and confirmation codes before and during the election.
- **Voting device:** it is the device used by the voter to create and cast their vote. In the FLEP, the voting device is a JavaScript program provided by the voting server and executed in the voter’s browser.
- **Voting server:** it is a server operated by the **EFA Ministry** whose purpose is to authenticate voters and collect all the ballots.
- **Decryption authorities:** they are the authorities who can decrypt the ballots. More precisely in the FLEP, they are 8 couples holder/deputy, and each of these 16 authorities own a share of a decryption key based on 4-threshold encryption scheme, that is only a group of at least 4 authorities can collude to decrypt.<sup>3</sup> The 16 decryption authorities generate a unique public encryption key  $pk_E$  for all constituencies and their corresponding private keys  $sk_{E1}, \dots, sk_{E16}$ .
- **3<sup>rd</sup>-party:** it is an external server operated by independent researchers and engineers from a French lab (LORIA) and research institutes (CNRS, INRIA), commissioned by the **EFA Ministry**. It provides to the voters some verification web-services [10] whose purpose is to ensure the integrity of the election. This independently developed and open-source program is available at [12].

<sup>3</sup>We will come back in Section 5 on this threshold and how the legal requirements for decryption could be better reflected in the cryptography.

## 2.2 Security Goals and Threat Model

To conduct a security analysis of the FLEP, one first needs precise security objectives and threat models. While the partial specification [16] fails to do so, there fortunately exist lawful requirements that the FLEP should comply with, notably the Code électoral [18] (i.e., the French law governing elections) and the recommendations enacted by the **Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL)** [26]<sup>4</sup>, which are a list of requirements that such a system is expected to meet (even if there is no legal obligation).

We have studied this legal framework [18, 26] and derived security goals the FLEP should achieve and under which threat model. Our list of objectives is not exhaustive but we focus here on those that are relevant for our work. We refer the reader to [15, Appendix A] for detailed explanations about our study of this framework and how we derived the security goals and threat models that we summarize next.

**Ballot Privacy.** The Code électoral [18, R176-3-9] and the **CNIL** requirements [26, SO 1-04,1-07] agree on the fact that the FLEP must ensure the *confidentiality of the votes*.

**Verifiability.** Second, the FLEP must ensure the integrity of the election outcome and notably **individual verifiability** [18, R176-3-9], [26, SO 2-07,3-02], that is each voter should be able to verify that their ballot has been added into the ballot-box; i.e., it was not dropped or tampered with.

For instance, the requirement [18, R176-3-9] requires that "the voter is provided with a digital receipt allowing them to verify online that their vote has been taken into account". As we shall see, the FLEP uses some hashed values over the cast ballot and some meta-data as well as a signature as *digital receipt*. The voter can verify online this receipt at the voting server or the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party server, the latter independent 3<sup>rd</sup>-party verification option must exist to comply with [26, SO 3-02].

**Threat Model.** We shall define a threat model that we argue is in line with the legal framework of the FLEP.

As detailed in [15, Appendix A], we derive from the **CNIL** recommendations [26, Security level 3, SO 3-02] that the FLEP must guarantee the integrity of the election even under a compromised voting server, which also motivates the requirement to rely on an independent, 3<sup>rd</sup>-party verification service. Most of the attacks we shall present actually make weaker assumptions, i.e., assume an even weaker attacker. Indeed, instead of considering a (possibly) corrupted voting server, we shall assume a corrupted communication plaintext channel between the voters and the server, we call such an attacker a *channel attacker*. More precisely, the *channel attacker* can intercept and inject (plaintext) messages in-between voters under attack and the voting server but has not necessarily access to the voting server internals, such as its databases, the signing sheet, the authentication material, the log files, etc.

<sup>4</sup>The **CNIL** (*National Commission on Informatics and Liberty* in English) is an independent French administrative regulatory body whose mission is to ensure that data privacy law is applied.



Security Goal	Voter	Voting Device	Com. Channel	Voting Server	Dec. Auth.	3 <sup>rd</sup> -party
Our attacks on the FLEP falsify the properties under the threat model:						
Verifiability	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓
Ballot privacy	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓
State-of-the-art protocols such as Belenios are secure under:						
Verifiability	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓
Ballot privacy	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓

✓ = assumed trustworthy, ✗ = can be untrustworthy

Table 1: Comparison of the threat models under which FLEP is breached and the strictly stronger threat model under which state-of-the-art protocols such as Belenios are secure [13].

**Remark 1** (Examples of channel attackers). A channel attacker can obviously be realized by compromising the voting server. Indeed, even if the converse is wrong in general, a voting server attacker is also a channel attacker.

More interestingly, it can be realized by compromising parts of the network server infrastructure. Specific operational countermeasures are usually deployed to protect the critically important server(s) on which the election runs. However, the server(s) are connected to the Internet through a more complex and shared network infrastructure which may appear as an Achilles heel. The TLS certificates shared across the infrastructure might be less protected and shared across more devices such as TLS middle-boxes that could be deployed to monitor the plaintext traffic to mitigate e.g., DDoS attacks. This, unfortunately standard, solution would undermine the security of the communication channels voters-voting server by increasing the attack surface and the risk of man-in-the-middle attacks yielding a channel attacker.

Finally, a channel attacker could also be the result of a compromise of the network infrastructure on the voter side. For similar reasons, a voter’s company may monitor the plaintext Internet traffic to protect its employees and its assets. Unfortunately, this would, again, introduce a man-in-the-middle in the communication channels between the voter and the server. Voters have not been made aware of this threat in the context of this election.

Therefore, a channel attacker is an interesting threat model in itself as it is strictly weaker than the server attacker and can be realistic in some scenarios.

Table 1 summarizes the assumed trustworthiness of all roles for the different properties (the less trustworthy parties there are, better is the protocol). It also compares this with the threat model under which the Belenios protocol (and other state-of-the-art protocols such as Helios [5]) were proven secure. (An honest public bulletin board is usually assumed, which can be achieved by an honest 3<sup>rd</sup>-party for comparison.) It shows that our attacks break the FLEP under an (even weaker) attacker than the standard one for which

Belenios was proven secure [13], despite FLEP being derived from Belenios (according to [16]).

**Remark 2.** Assuming the voting client as a trustworthy component can be considered too strong an assumption, even more so due to the latter being a JavaScript program served by the voting server and executed in the voter’s browser. Some e-voting systems such as the IVXV [21], Helios [5], or the Swiss Post protocol [29], aim at ensuring the well-known cast-as-intended property, that is ensuring individual verifiability under a compromised voting device that could try to modify the intended vote. The FLEP protocol has obviously not been designed to protect the voters against such a threat. Therefore, to conduct a fair security analysis, we decided to assume the voting client as a trustworthy component. We discuss in Section 5 and [15, Appendix D.5] how this assumption can be made realistic in practice with the notion of “universal integrity checks” where anyone can check the JavaScript integrity to detect malicious voting servers serving malicious code.

### 3 Reverse the Protocol

[16] only provides a partial specification, that is so incomplete that the attacks we shall present could not be even described<sup>5</sup>. Indeed, this document focuses on the expected format of some verifiability-related messages (such as the receipts) but omits to specify how exactly they are computed, exchanged, and which checks are performed upon reception. Moreover, a bigger picture of the protocol is completely missing.

By reversing the JavaScript voting client code, studying and cross-referencing different sources, we built a complete description of the FLEP voting client and all its interactions with the server as well as some important server-side components (handling of errors, verifiability checks). All the impacted and involved actors (Voxaly Docaposte, ANSSI, EFA Ministry) have acknowledged our system specification is correct.

Note that even though a specification of the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party tool was missing too, we have been able to determine the checks it performed based on an informal description of the service [10], open discussions with the researchers, and an inspection of the source code.

#### 3.1 Reverse Methodology

We describe next how we overcame the lack of complete specification by reversing the obfuscated voting client.

**Obtaining data.** During the election, we collected all the web browser’s interactions with the voting server throughout the

<sup>5</sup>Based on our discussions with the stakeholders, Voxaly Docaposte published in February 2023 a new version of the specification [17] which includes a more detailed protocol specification with some countermeasures to our attacks we discuss in Section 4.

different steps of the protocol thanks to a few eligible voters<sup>6</sup>. These are gathered into **HTTP Archive format (HAR)** files that can be easily generated by major browsers. We collected for one typical voter’s journey 15 JavaScript files, 4 HTML files, 4 plain data exchanges, etc.

**Reverse engineering and data cross-referencing.** We first recollected the overall flow of messages by analyzing all the POST and GET requests in a typical voter’s journey. (We give detailed descriptions thereof in [15, Appendix C.1].) We cross-referenced this with the description of the voter’s journey published on the government website to help voters with the voting process. We obtained this way a clear big picture of the overall flow of messages of the FLEP.

Some of the fields of the GET and POST requests can be related to the partial specification [16] but many are omitted or not fully described. Moreover, even for those fields that were specified, we needed a better understanding about how they are computed and how they are checked. For this, we had to investigate the JavaScript programs that produce and check those fields. Excluding all-purpose library files (such as jquery-3.1.1.msin.js or Captcha-related files), there are 4 JavaScript files that are specific to the FLEP implementing its core logic (election.bundle.js, loria.bundle.js, app.bundle.js, and verifiabilite.bundle.js) totaling 15574 LoC when de-minimized with js-beautify<sup>7</sup>.

Those files are obfuscated: they were processed using obfuscation techniques such as function and variables renaming, or control flow modifications in order to make reverse engineering more complex, as is standard with web-development. In our case, some variable names were not obfuscated, in particular request fields were not. This way, we were able to locate part of the JavaScript code manipulating those fields. However, the control flow is so obfuscated that it makes it very hard to keep track where those fields are flowing. See for example Listing 2 from line 1 to 11 (line 12-17 turned out to contain the core logic manipulating the receipt).

Fortunately, we obtained a previous version of these JavaScript files used during the first large-scale, in-the-wild test campaign of the system conducted in September 2021 [2]. Interestingly enough, the code and the protocol for this test phase was a bit different and most importantly for us, the code was less obfuscated. In particular, the control flow was less obfuscated. We thus decided to reconcile the two code bases and cross-reference some of the most interesting function implementations. We improved our understanding of the overall logic of the code by investigating the test phase code base and then by cross-checking with the production code base. An example of such a side-by-side comparison is depicted in Figure 2.

**Reverse engineering checks and errors.** For obvious rea-

<sup>6</sup>The voters who sent us the collected data, who are computer scientist colleagues, were informed about our research and about the content of those logs. They gave us their informed consent.

<sup>7</sup><https://www.npmjs.com/package/js-beautify>

sons, we have forbidden ourselves to carry out active attacks against voting servers. Therefore, we limited ourselves to passive sniffing of the exchanged messages. This makes it hard to understand what happens when something goes wrong (since this never happened for the sessions for which we collected data. Some checks are carried out in the voting client and we

```

1 navclientApp.controller("PageVoteController", [
2   $scope, "$http", "$location", "$timeout", "
3   breadcrumbService",
4   function(e, t, i, n, a) { // HashClient core logic
5     e.vote = function() {
6       if (data.param.signatureEnabled && !e.aVote) {
7         e.aVote = !0, e.erreurHashVerification = !1;
8         var i = forge.md.sha256.create();
9         i.update(e.bulletinCrypte + data.election.
10            ordre + data.param.electeurEtOrdre);
11         var n = i.digest().toHex(),
12             a = function(e) {
13           // [7 lines omitted]
14         }(n),
15             o = data.election.ordre + "&" + n + a;
16         sessionStorage.setItem("HashClient", o);
17       }
18     }
19   }
20 ]);

```

Listing 1: Test Phase, scripts.js

```

1 function(e, t, n) {
2 // [1729 lines omitted, indentations were removed]
3 function ot(e) {
4 // [73 lines omitted]
5 function v() {
6   return (v = Pe())(Re.a.mark((function t() {
7     var n, r, a, l, u, c, s;
8     return Re.a.wrap((function(t) {
9       for (;;) switch (t.prev = t.next) {
10        case 0:
11          // [9 lines omitted]
12        case 3: // HashClient core logic
13          return (n = new jsSHA("SHA-256", "TEXT")
14            ).update(o.bulletinCrypte + f.idTour
15            + d.ordre + f.electeurEtOrdre),
16              r = n.getHash("HEX"),
17              (a = new jsSHA("SHA-256", "TEXT")).
18                update(o.bulletinCrypte + o.
19                  voteSignature),
20              l = a.getHash("HEX"),
21              u = f.idTour + "&" + d.ordre + "&" + r +
22                y(r),
23              sessionStorage.setItem("HashClient", u),
24            t.next = 1;
25          }
26        }
27      }
28    }
29  }
30 }

```

Listing 2: Production phase app.bundle.js

Figure 2: Snippets of code from test phase and production phase relevant to the computation of the HashClient stored in the web browser session storage (*i.e.*, persistent storage). Comments were added by us. The control flow of the test phase (Listing 1) is much simpler and easier to reverse (When is this piece of code triggered? What happens next?), as opposed to the production phase code (Listing 2). Conversely, the production phase is the version that matters and some message contents have changed. Therefore, we had to cross-reference both code bases.

Name	Expected value
Ballot	$b := (\{v\}_{pk_E}, \pi)$
Hash value	$h := \text{hash}(b \parallel \text{roundId} \parallel \text{electionId} \parallel \text{ballotBoxId})$
Ballot reference	$H := \text{roundId} \parallel \text{electionId} \parallel h$
Activation hash	$h_{\text{code}} := \text{hash}(b, \text{code}_{\text{activ}})$
Ballot fingerprint	$hb := \text{hash}(b)$
Seal	$\text{cSU} := \text{infoSU} \parallel \text{sign}_{sk_S}(\text{hash}(\text{infoSU})) \parallel pk_S$ $\text{infoSU} := \text{roundId} \parallel \text{electionId} \parallel \text{electionName}$ $\parallel \text{ballotBoxId} \parallel hb^{s_S}$

Table 2: Main cryptographic values involved in the FLEP.

were able to reverse them. But the others are carried out in the server side. For those, our logs were not helpful at first sight. Fortunately, some error messages are built-in in HTML pages in hidden `div` environment. By locating the JavaScript logic, we were able to partially understand the conditions under which those errors are displayed upon reception of some messages from the voting server.

The following description of the system may miss actions executed by an honest voting server, but as we shall see, it is precise enough to claim that our attacks are valid independently of those unspecified components. Indeed, our attacks rely on sending data to the server that are indistinguishable from its point of view from data honest voters would produce.

### 3.2 Reversed Specification

We now present the result of our reverse: a full description of the FLEP. We shall specify all the actions executed by the voter, the voting client, and the voting server at each step. Unlike [16], we also explicit how messages are exchanged and computed. Those steps are summarized in Figure 3.

**Step 1:** The voter browses to the election website URL and connects to the voting server and receives an HTML document displaying the login page. The voter authenticates themselves using a login and password they received before the election through two different channels, the login by email and the password by SMS. In addition to the authentication data, the voting client also sends to the voting server `client_info` (some meta-data about the voting client) and `btest` which is a dummy ballot encrypted with a dummy election public key that serves as sanity check that the voting client will be able to correctly compute the real ballot at step 4.

**Step 2:** The voting client receives an HTML document displaying the different candidates  $\mathcal{V}$  the voter can choose. This document also contains some hidden identifiers such as the election identifier `electionId` or the `ballotBoxId` and a per-session unique identifier `tokenId`. The voter chooses one candidate  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  for whom they want to vote.

**Step 3:** The voter clicks to confirm their choice.

**Step 4:** The voting client sends a request to the voting server to generate an *activation code*, acting as a second authentication factor. The voting server generates such an acti-




Figure 3: Description of the 2022 French Legislative Election Protocol. Arrows on the left correspond to interactions with the human voter. Cryptographic messages are specified in Table 2. Actions in red will be relevant for the vulnerabilities presented in Section 4. Actions in blue, and only those, are elements obtained during discussions with the stakeholders. A more detailed diagram is given in [15, Appendix C].

vation code `codeactiv` (made of 6 random digits) and sends it to the voter using a side-channel (*i.e.*, by email). The voter receives this code and enters it in the voting client and clicks on the "Vote" button. The voting client then computes some cryptographic material explained next and summarized in Table 2.

• First, the *ballot*  $b := (c, \pi)$  that is made of the encrypted vote  $v$  ( $c := \{v\}_{pk_E}$ ) with the election public key ( $pk_E$ ) along

with a **Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP)** ( $\pi$ ) proving that  $v$  is a legitimate choice of candidate, *i.e.*,  $v \in \mathcal{V}$ . This proofs is also bound to `tokenId` and `electionId` received at Step 2.

- The voting client also computes the *hash value*:

$$h := \text{hash}(b \parallel \text{roundId} \parallel \text{electionId} \parallel \text{ballotBoxId})$$

where  $\parallel$  is a delimiter, `roundId` is the round of the election (1 or 2), `electionId` is the election identifier, and `ballotBoxId` is a per-ballot-box (hence per-consulate) unique identifier.

- The *ballot reference* (omitting correction codes):

$$H := \text{roundId} \parallel \text{electionId} \parallel h$$

is computed and exchanged at different steps of the protocol, we specifically note  $H^c$  to refer to the *ballot reference* that is computed by the voting client and stored in the `SessionStorage` of the voting client browser<sup>8</sup>.

- The *activation hash value*  $h_{\text{code}} := \text{hash}(b, \text{code}_{\text{activ}})$ . This value was not described at all in the specification [16] and was supposed to act as a proof of knowledge of the activation code  $\text{code}_{\text{activ}}$ , bound to the ballot.<sup>9</sup> That said, the precise role of  $h_{\text{code}}$  is unimportant for the rest of the presentation.

The values  $b$ ,  $h_{\text{code}}$ , and  $\text{code}_{\text{activ}}$  are then sent to the voting server. The voting server then verifies the validity of the activation code  $\text{code}_{\text{activ}}$ , recomputes the *ballot reference*  $H$ , denoted by  $H^{s1}$ ; indeed  $H^c$  is not sent to the voting server. The response to the above request is  $(ko, \_)$  if the activation code was invalid and  $(ok, H^{s1})$  otherwise. Upon reception of the response, the voting client verifies that the response equals  $(ok, H^c)$ . Therefore,  $H^{s1}$  must be equal to  $H^c$ . This test provides the voting client evidence that it executes the protocol in the same context as the one of the voting server.

Finally, if those tests succeed, then the voting client computes the *ballot fingerprint*:  $hb := \text{hash}(b)$ . The ballot  $b$  is again sent to the voting server, along with  $hb$  and  $h_{\text{code}}$ .

At this point, the voting server verifies that the voter never voted before (revoting is forbidden in the FLEP) and that the ballot **ZKP**  $\pi$  are valid. If so, the voting server stores the ballot  $b$  in the ballot-box `ballotBoxId` associated to the voter (one per consulate). It also adds the voter to the *signing sheet* containing all the voters who voted so far. Finally, it computes and stores a *seal* `cSU` associated to this ballot, that is a signature over the ballot and some metadata that will be part of the receipt provided to the voter in the final step (we specify the seal `cSU` below).

**Step 5:** Finally, the voting client receives from the voting server an HTML document that displays the *ballot reference*  $H$  and that asks the voter to click a link to download the PDF receipt. Voters are also encouraged to click a link to verify that their ballot is indeed included in the ballot-box.

<sup>8</sup>The `SessionStorage` is a storage local to the browser and associated to the current tab. It allows to store session-specific data that persist page reloads and page redirections. See, for example, the documentation for Firefox [3].

<sup>9</sup>We note that this is completely inefficient since the activation code  $\text{code}_{\text{activ}}$  is actually sent in clear text along  $h_{\text{code}}$  (with the ballot  $b$ ). According to the vendor, this was a mistake and will be fixed. Once fixed,  $h_{\text{code}}$  provides such a proof, even though  $\text{code}_{\text{activ}}$  can be quite easily brute-forced given  $h_{\text{code}}$  and  $b$ .

Two occurrences of the *ballot reference*  $H$  are present in this HTML document, which is generated and sent by the voting server. We thus denote those two occurrences with respectively  $H^{s2}$  and  $H^{s3}$ . The first occurrence  $H^{s2}$  appears in a HTML tag `< pclass = "recepisse - code" >` and corresponds to the value being displayed to the voter. The second occurrence  $H^{s3}$  appears in a JavaScript script embedded in the page that tests that  $H^{s3}$  equals the *ballot reference* stored in the voting client `SessionStorage`, *i.e.*,  $H^c$ . Therefore,  $H^{s3} = H^c$  or an error message is displayed.

**PDF receipt:** The very last step occurs when the voter clicks the link to download the PDF receipt from the previous page, which replaces the previous page (which cannot be loaded any more). The downloaded PDF receipt contains the *ballot reference*  $H$ , the seal `cSU`, and the *ballot fingerprint*  $hb$ . Despite those values being (partially) specified in [16], the values displayed in the PDF receipt are never checked by the voting client and could differ from the expected, specified values. Therefore, we note  $H^{s4}$  the *ballot reference* and  $hb^{s4}$  the *ballot fingerprint* that are displayed in the PDF receipt.

The seal `cSU` should be computed by the voting server (already at step 4) as follows:  $\text{cSU} := \text{infoSU} \parallel \sigma \parallel \text{pk}_S$  where `infoSU` is defined as:

$$\text{roundId} \parallel \text{electionId} \parallel \text{electionName} \parallel \text{ballotBoxId} \parallel hb^{s5}$$

and `electionName` is the name of the election,  $hb^{s5}$  is supposed to be the *ballot fingerprint*, and  $\sigma$  is a digital signature with the server's signature private key  $\text{sk}_S$  (associated to the signing verification key  $\text{pk}_S$ ) computed as follows:  $\sigma = \text{sign}_{\text{sk}_S}(\text{hash}(\text{infoSU}))$ .

**Decryption authorities:** At the end of the election, a tally ceremony involving a threshold of the decryption trustees occurs. They collaborate to decrypt an homomorphic aggregate for each ballot-box, produce **ZKPs** of correct decryptions, and announce the election results.

**3<sup>rd</sup>-party role:** The 3<sup>rd</sup>-party contributes to both the individual and universal verifiability. To this aim, the **EFA Ministry** sends it the results of the tally (*i.e.*, the ballot-boxes, **ZKPs**, and results). First, for checking universal verifiability, the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party checks the validity of the **ZKPs** of correct decryption. At the constituency level, it checks that those proofs are valid *w.r.t.* official results publicly published onto the **EFA Ministry** website. Moreover, it checks that all the ballots included in the ballot-boxes are well-formed, *i.e.*, that their **ZKPs** are all valid. For allowing individual verifiability checks, the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party proposes a web service to the voters who can check that the seal of their receipts contains a legitimate signature of the voting server. Moreover, once the election is over and the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party has received the ballot-boxes, the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party also verifies that the seal corresponds to a legitimate ballot<sup>10</sup>. After the protest period, *i.e.*, ten days following the

<sup>10</sup>In 2022, voters had to use this service once the election was over, and not before, to obtain this guarantee. In 2023, based on our recommendation (see [15, Appendix E.3.1]), the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party decided to log all the seals received during the voting phase to do this check as soon as it becomes doable.



results announcement, the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party publishes a report [10] containing a summary of all their verifications.

## 4 Vulnerabilities, Attacks, and Fixes

We present the two vulnerabilities we found (Section 4.1). We then show how these vulnerabilities can be exploited to break verifiability and the integrity of the election (Section 4.2) and the confidentiality of target voters' votes (Section 4.3). We also propose fixes to those attacks, some of them are or will be deployed by the FLEP stakeholders. We summarize all the attacks we found in Table 3. We also provide the fixes chosen by ANSSI, EFA Ministry, and Voxaly Docaposte and already implemented or to be implemented in the mid-term.

### 4.1 Vulnerabilities

When reversing the specification, we uncovered 2 critical vulnerabilities that could be exploited by a channel attacker (*i.e.*, an attacker controlling the plaintext communication channel) and even more so by a voting server attacker (*i.e.*, compromised voting server). As we shall see, they impact the integrity of the election and the confidentiality of the votes.

We stress that our reversed specification detailed in Section 3 was necessary to identify those vulnerabilities that could not even be described within the limited framework of [16].

**V1: Lack of binding of receipts with their ballots.** In the FLEP, the integrity of the election is guaranteed by the use of receipts: voters can send their receipt (the ballot reference  $H$  or/and the seal  $cSU$ ) to a server (the voting server or the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party) to verify that their ballots have been added in the ballot-box. Moreover, the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party ensures, by verifying the decryption ZKPs, that the result of the election corresponds to the content of the ballot-boxes. Thanks to these two checks, an attacker should not be able to tamper with the cast ballots and with the election result.

A subtlety we noticed in the JavaScript code of the FLEP voting client is that the ballot references that are displayed to the voter by the voting client ( $H^{s2}$  and  $H^{s4}$ ) for later checks are not necessarily the same as the one it computed for the ballot produced by the voting client ( $H^c$ ). This is the reason why we named those references differently, even though they refer to values that are expected to be equal to the legitimate value  $H^c$  computed by the voting client thanks to various consistency checks (shown in red in Figure 3).

Unfortunately, these checks are flawed in that, among the 4 references received from the voting server,  $H^{s1}$ ,  $H^{s2}$ ,  $H^{s3}$ , and  $H^{s4}$ , they only ensure that:

$$H^{s1} = H^c \quad \text{and} \quad H^{s3} = H^c.$$

There is no guarantee about the values of  $H^{s2}$  and  $H^{s4}$ , which are the only references visible by the voters, respectively in the last web page and in the PDF receipt (both are depicted

in [15, Appendix C.2]). A channel attacker can take advantage of this implementation flaw to falsify the verifiability of the FLEP and thus modify the result of the election as explained in Section 4.2. We stress that the human voters themselves are unable to recompute the genuine, honest value of  $H$  (that is  $H^c$ ) without an expert and technical knowledge. Indeed, for instance, they never learn the value of their ballot  $b$ .

**V2: Malleability of ballot-box identifiers.** As presented in Section 2.1, the FLEP is deployed in a complex environment with multiple elections and ballot-boxes. In the partial specification of the system [16], Voxaly Docaposte seems to be aware of this complexity: "The election identifier [electionId] [...] will be added in the [ZK] proofs associated to the ballot. This allows to detect if a ballot has been moved from a ballot-box to another".

Unfortunately, we found out that this statement is incorrect. Indeed, the election identifier electionId does not identify a ballot-box (associated to a consulate) but only an election (associated to a constituency). The ballots are thus cryptographically bound to an election but not to a ballot-box whose identifier is not included in the ZKP context of the ballot.

Interestingly, the ballot reference  $H$  does cryptographically bind the ballot to the ballot-box identifier ballotBoxId. However, as we shall see, this ballot reference can be recomputed by an attacker for a different ballotBoxId. As we shall see in Section 4.3, a channel attacker can use this and the previous vulnerability (V1) to move around ballots across different ballot-boxes and attack ballot privacy.

### 4.2 Attacking and Fixing Verifiability

We now present how the first vulnerability can be exploited to break verifiability and thus the integrity of the election. We also propose and discuss fixes.

#### 4.2.1 Attacking Verifiability

The first vulnerability can be exploited to falsify the individual verifiability of the system under a channel attacker. An attacker who controls the communication channels can stealthily (1) drop ballots, and (2) replace them by ballots of his choice as explained in the two attack descriptions below.

**Attack [Replace]:** This scenario assumes a channel attacker and requires at least two voters who vote in the same consulate: Bob, who will suffer from the attack, and, Alice, an arbitrary voter. In the following, we re-use all the notations introduced in Section 3.2 and Figure 3. We assume that all the variables are indexed by 1 for Alice's vote, and 2 for Bob's. The attack proceeds as follows:

**Step a:** Alice casts her vote as expected. In this first step, the attacker executes honestly, *i.e.*,  $H_1^{s_i} = H_1^c$  for all  $i \in \{1, \dots, 4\}$  and  $\sigma_1$  is honestly computed. Hence, all the checks that Alice can do to be sure that her ballot  $b_1$  has been included in the ballot-box succeed.

Name	Attack on	Threat model	Impact	Fix that <b>are</b> or will be deployed
Replace	Indi. Verif.	Channel att.	Replace any cast ballot	Fix 1: display $H^c$
Drop	Indi. Verif.	Channel att.	Drop any cast ballot	
Swap $_H$	Ballot priv.	Voting server att., some voters collude	Learn any target voter’s vote	<b>Fix 3: add ballotBoxId to the ZKP</b>
Swap $_b$	Ballot priv.	Channel att., some voters collude	Learn any target voter’s vote	<b>Fix 3 + Fix 4 or 5: display ballotBoxId</b>
Swap $_{ID}$	Ballot priv.	Voting server att., some voters collude	Learn any target voter’s vote	

Table 3: Summary of the attacks found. The last column presents the fixes that have been chosen by the stakeholders to be implemented in the FLEP in the mid-term. We show in bold font the fixes we have confirmation they are already implemented.

**Step b:** Bob follows the protocol but the channel attacker intercepts all messages after the creation of the ballot  $b_2$  and computes by itself the responses that are normally sent by the voting server to the voting client as follows:  $H_2^{s_1} = H_2^{s_3} = H_2^c$  but  $H_2^{s_2} = H_2^{s_4} = H_1^c$  and  $\sigma_2 = \sigma_1$ . That is the attacker provides a receipt that refers to Alice’s ballot. We do not assume that the attacker knows the signing private key  $sk_S$  to compute  $\sigma_2$  since the attacker can simply replay the values obtained at Step a. The value  $H_2^c$  can be computed by the attacker since it is only made of public data (e.g. electionId and ballotBoxId) or data sent by Bob, such as  $b_2$ .

**Step c:** Because a ballot is not cryptographically bound to a voter, the attacker can forge a ballot  $b_{att} = (\{v'\}_{pk_E}, zkp')$  for  $v' \in \mathcal{V}$  of his choice and replace each occurrence of  $b_2$  by  $b_{att}$  in Bob’s messages towards the voting server. More precisely, the attacker sends  $b_{att}$ ,  $\text{hash}(b_{att}, \text{code}_{activ})$  and  $\text{hash}(b_{att})$  instead of  $b_2$ ,  $h_{code}$ , and  $\text{hash}(b_2)$ . The voting server then registers the adversarially-chosen ballot  $b_{att}$  in the name of Bob.

Even if, at Step b, Bob receives inconsistent data (e.g.,  $H_2^{s_2} \neq H_2^c$ ), these are not detected by the checks performed by the voting client and those differences are invisible to Bob himself. (This seems similar to the clash attacks of [23] but our attack does not rely on a compromised voting client to make it compute a clashing ballot.) Moreover, Bob can use the web services (provided by the voting server or the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party) to be convinced that "his" ballot has been added to the ballot-box. Indeed, Bob got Alice’s receipt which corresponds to a ballot added in the ballot-box at Step a. Finally, let us explain how the attacker can make sure Bob does not detect the replacement of his ballot in the very unlikely situation where his original ballot was the only vote for a particular choice  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  in this ballot-box (since the tally will reveal  $v$  got no vote). It suffices for the attacker to make sure each of the options  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  gets at least one vote: either by assuming the existence (e.g., large consulates) or knowing other voters casting such ballots (e.g., accomplices), or by performing the above attack on  $|\mathcal{V}|$  voters to make them cast all options. As a result, all the checks Bob was suggested, instructed, or able to do succeed despite his ballot  $b_2$  has been dropped and replaced by the attacker ballot  $b_{att}$ .

Therefore, at the end of this scenario, nobody can detect the removal and replacement of Bob’s ballot and yet, the election

result will not include Bob’s ballot  $b_2$  and include the attacker ballot  $b_{att}$  instead. Alice and Bob are convinced that their ballots have been counted and the voting or the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party server will always receive consistent data. Bob is cheated by the fact that the receipt he obtained actually points to Alice’s ballot, which does exist in the ballot-box. Note that a channel attacker can repeat this to attack an arbitrary number of voters acting as Bob, always using the same Alice’s data. (Moreover, we describe in [15, Appendix B.1] a weaker variant [Drop] of this attack that only drops Bob’s ballot instead of replacing it.)

**Impact:** An attacker who compromises the communication channel (or the voting server) can significantly modify the outcome of the election by dropping and replacing ballots, hence falsifying the individual verifiability property.

**Remark 3.** Interestingly, [Replace] is no longer possible if FLEP used the ballot format of Belenios, since this includes voters’ signatures. Therefore, the removal of signatures from Belenios to FLEP –as a means to comply with CNIL recommendations (ballots should be anonymous)– without compensating this loss with another security mechanism introduced a weakness in the protocol.

#### 4.2.2 Fixing Verifiability

We propose 2 fixes to prevent such attacks. The first one is easy to implement but makes the voter’s journey and verification tasks more complex, while the second would actually simplify them but is more complex to implement.

**Fix 1:** A first approach to fix the verifiability attacks is to display  $H^c$  instead of  $H^{s_2}$  on the last web page of the user interface (step 5). If this was done, a conscientious voter would be able to compare this reference to the one printed in their receipt to enforce the consistency  $H^{s_1} = H^{s_2} = H^{s_3} = H^{s_4} = H^c$ . Finally, the voter can then use the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party web service to check the presence of their ballot in the ballot-box with confidence. This solution would fix Vulnerability 1 as well as the two verifiability attacks [Replace] and [Drop]. However, it complicates further the voter’s tasks, which are already quite complex (see Section 5).

**Fix 2:** A second, better fix is to make the voting client generate the PDF receipt. To do so, the voting server would still

need to send the signature  $\sigma$  for the voting client to compute the seal cSU. The voting client must verify the validity of this signature (with respect to  $pk_S$ ) and its content before generating the PDF receipt by itself. We prefer this solution as it does not require extra voters' checks. Moreover, it allows to check the signature of the seal cSU before displaying the PDF receipt, allowing to detect potential forgery or voting server misbehavior as early as possible and making the voting server accountable for potential misbehavior detected later. The main drawback is that it requires to import an external library to generate PDFs or to use a static PDF file that is then dynamically filled with missing cryptographic data.

**Remark 4.** *The stakeholders chose to implement Fix 1 for elections in June 2023. Fix 2 seems to be their ultimate solution for a future version of the system.*

**Remark 5** (On Fix 1). *The version 2 of the specification [17] (from February 2023) shows that the Fix 1 was not implemented as is. We regret that the chosen implementation does not fully prevent the vulnerability V1. Indeed,  $H^c$  is now displayed on the last web page of the user interface (step 5) and the voting client now checks that  $H^c = H^{s3}$ . Very surprisingly, the vendors also decided to display  $H^{s3}$  on the same page and even to instruct the voters to visually "check that the receipt  $H^c$  [computed by the voting client] corresponds to the receipt actually inserted in the ballot-box  $H^{s3}$ ". Asking the voters to visually check  $H^c = H^{s3}$  is useless given that this test is performed by the voting client. More importantly, this gives a false sense of security as it gives the impression no further checks are needed. The voters must actually check that the displayed receipt ( $H^c$ ) corresponds to the one printed on the PDF receipt ( $H^{s4}$ ) and then use it to perform the usual individual verifiability check, preferably at the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party website.*

*In conclusion, the implemented fix allows a very cautious voter to detect our attacks (by comparing  $H^c$  and  $H^{s4}$ ). However, it also gives non-necessary additional tasks to the voters and fails to instruct them to perform the only useful check.*

### 4.3 Attacking and Fixing Ballot Privacy

The vulnerabilities (V1) and (V2) can be jointly exploited to break ballot privacy for target voters: *i.e.*, voters the attacker decides to target and attack when they cast their ballot. We shall see that a channel attacker can learn how a target voter voted provided that there are at least 2 ballot-boxes in the target voter's constituency (this is the case for all the French constituencies). We present the attack core ideas in a simplified setting before presenting the actual attacks.

**Attacks overview.** Let us assume a channel attacker willing to learn the vote of Alice, who is registered in ballot-box  $u_1$  ( $u_1$  is a ballot-box identifiers ballotBoxId). The key ingredient for this attack is *inter-ballot-box move*: the attacker can cast Alice's ballot in  $u_2 \neq u_1$  without anyone noticing. *One* approach, detailed in [Move<sub>H</sub>] below, to achieve this is for

the attacker to:

(i) move Alice's ballot  $b_A$  to  $u_2$  and, thanks to (V1), give her a forged receipt corresponding to  $b_A$  as if it was cast in  $u_1$ .

(ii) to preserve the number of ballots in each ballot-box, the ballot  $b_B$  of a voter eligible in  $u_1$ , say Bob, can be moved to  $u_1$  using the same technique.

Finally, because of (V1) Alice's and Bob's receipts pass individual checks, and because of (V2), the ballot-boxes  $u_1$  and  $u_2$  will be tallied without raising any error, despite the move of  $b_A$  to  $u_2$ .

Now, let us assume the attacker knows a ballot-box  $u_2$  with a few eligible voters. Intuitively, the attack is as follows: the attacker exploits the inter-ballot-box ballot move attack to cast in the ballot-box  $u_2$  the Alice's ballot  $b_A$ . Exploiting the attack [Replace] the attacker replaces all other ballots cast in  $u_2$  by ballots  $b_1, \dots, b_n$  whose values are known. Because the ballot-boxes are individually tallied, the attacker will learn the result for  $u_2$  from which the Alice's vote encrypted in  $b_A$  can be deduced (since the votes encrypted in  $b_1, \dots, b_n$  are assumed to be known). We present below concrete attacks exploiting these ideas and explain how the attacker can completely evade detection. We then present fixes.

#### 4.3.1 Attacking Ballot Privacy

As informally described above, our ballot privacy attacks rely on two ingredients: inter-ballot-box move, that is how to stealthily move a ballot from a ballot-box to another, and how to exploit the latter to introduce the privacy leak through tallying. We first present three inter-ballot-box ballot move techniques and then explain how any one of those can be exploited to mount ballot privacy attacks.

For each of those three inter-ballot-box move techniques, we assume that the election (constituency) identifier `e1ec` contains at least two ballot-boxes (consulates) identifiers  $u_1$  and  $u_2$ . Alice is eligible to vote in consulate  $u_1$  and is the target voter whose vote will be moved from  $u_1$  to  $u_2$ . To preserve the right number of ballots in each ballot-box, an arbitrary ballot (say Bob's) cast in  $u_2$  is moved to  $u_1$  (and possibly replaced).

**[Move<sub>H</sub>] Inter-ballot-box ballot move exploiting (V1,V2) for a voting server attacker.** This first technique assumes a voting server attacker, *i.e.*, the voting server is compromised. The attack scenario is as follows:

**Step a:** Alice votes and sends a ballot  $b_A$ .

**Step b:** The voting server attacker receives  $b_A$  but stores it in the ballot-box  $u_2$ , while Alice was eligible in  $u_1$ .

**Step c:** In addition, the voting server attacker computes malicious receipts that will be valid for  $b_A$ , even though it was placed in the wrong  $u_2$ :

$$H^{s2} = H^{s4} = m \parallel \text{hash}(b_A \parallel m \parallel u_2)$$

$$H^{s1} = H^{s3} = H^c = m \parallel \text{hash}(b_A \parallel m \parallel u_1)$$

$$\text{cSU} = m' \parallel u_1 \parallel \text{hash}(b_A) \parallel \text{sign}_{sk_S}(\text{hash}(m' \parallel u_2 \parallel \text{hash}(b_A)))$$

where  $m' = \text{roundId} \parallel \text{electionId} \parallel \text{electionName}$  and  $m = \text{roundId} \parallel \text{electionId}$  are election meta-data. Note that  $H^c, H^{s1}$ ,



and  $H^{s_3}$  are computed as expected but  $H^{s_2}$  and  $H^{s_4}$  are modified such that the receipt is valid for  $b_A$  cast in  $u_2$ . This is crucial to make all 3<sup>rd</sup>-party checks succeed and avoid detection (we come back to this in Section 4.3.2).

**Step d:** Steps a, b, and c are applied to move a ballot  $b_B$  of an arbitrary voter Bob eligible in  $u_2$  from  $u_2$  to  $u_1$ .

**[Move<sub>b</sub>] Inter-ballot-box ballot move exploiting (V1,V2) for a channel attacker.** In this scenario, we assume that the attacker only controls the (plaintext) communication channel.

The attack scenario is as follows:

**Step a:** Alice votes and sends a ballot  $b_A$ .

**Step b:** The channel attacker intercepts the ballot  $b_A$  and replaces it by a new ballot  $b_{att}$  they choose. In addition, exploiting (V1) (attack [Replace]), the attacker modifies the messages sent by the voting server to make Alice get a valid receipt for  $b_{att}$ , while she intended to cast  $b_A$  instead, i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} H_1^{s_2} &= H_1^{s_4} = m \parallel \text{hash}(b_{att} \parallel m \parallel u_1) \\ H_1^{s_1} &= H_1^{s_3} = H_1^c = m \parallel \text{hash}(b_A \parallel m \parallel u_1) \\ cSU_1 &= m' \parallel u_1 \parallel \text{hash}(b_{att}) \parallel \text{sign}_{sk_S}(\text{hash}(m' \parallel u_1 \parallel \text{hash}(b_{att}))) \end{aligned}$$

Note that  $H^c$ ,  $H^{s_1}$ ,  $H^{s_3}$  are computed as expected but  $H^{s_2}$  and  $H^{s_4}$  are modified such that they will be valid against a ballot-box  $u_1$  containing  $b_{att}$  instead of  $b_A$ . In particular,  $cSU_1$  is exactly the seal returned by the voting server when it received  $b_{att}$ ; the attacker does not need to forge a signature.

**Step c:** Similarly, the attacker intercepts  $b_B$  a ballot sent by Bob, an eligible voter in  $u_2$ , and replaces it with Alice's ballot  $b_A$  exploiting (V1) (attack [Replace]). Again the attacker modifies the references  $H_2$  and the seal  $cSU_2$  sent to Bob replacing  $b_B$  by  $b_A$ .

**[Move<sub>ID</sub>] Inter-ballot-box ballot move without exploiting (V1) for a voting server attacker.** We assume a server attacker that does not exploit (V1). Because `ballotBoxId` is sent by the voting server to the voting client, the server can send  $u_2$  instead of  $u_1$  to make the Alice's voting client compute a ballot for  $u_2$  by itself. The displayed data and the individual checks do not allow Alice to detect that the ballot was computed for the wrong `ballotBoxId`. Again, to preserve the number of ballots in each ballot-box, we assume that the voting server sends  $u_1$  instead of  $u_2$  to Bob, an arbitrary eligible voter in  $u_2$  so that Bob computes and casts a ballot for  $u_1$ .

**[Swap<sub>X</sub>] Exploiting inter-ballot-box ballot move to attack ballot privacy.** We now explain how any of the three move techniques can be exploited to violate ballot privacy with three attack variants: [Swap<sub>H</sub>], [Swap<sub>b</sub>], and [Swap<sub>ID</sub>]. In the following, we specify the attack [Swap<sub>X</sub>] for  $X \in \{H, b, ID\}$ .

We already described in the *attacks overview* paragraph (section 4.3) the main idea of gathering Alice's ballot with ballots whose votes are known to the attacker in a single ballot-box  $u_2$  so that when tallied, it reveals Alice's vote. In order to make this completely stealthily, the attacker needs to take some precautions.

First, the attacker needs to preserve a perfect correspondence between the number of ballots in each ballot-box and

the number of voters eligible in this ballot-box who did cast a ballot. Indeed, any voter who casts a vote is registered in a semi-private signing sheet. We explain in [15, Appendix B, Remark 9] that it is unlikely that voters check the signing sheet due to various practical constraints. Even if they did, the attack [Move<sub>X</sub>] takes care of preserving the number of ballots in each ballot-box, and thus prevents any potential detection.

Second, the attacker must also make sure that the moves and replacements he may operate will not make a voting option that was intended to be expressed in ballot-box  $u_1$  or  $u_2$  completely disappear, as already explained in Section 4.2. This is addressed with Step b and Step c below. Note that we assume that at least  $|\mathcal{V}|$  voters eligible in  $u_2$  (resp. in  $u_1$ ) are willing to cast a ballot, which is a reasonable assumption (see Section 4.3.2).

The attack [Swap<sub>X</sub>] is as follows. For the target Alice eligible in  $u_1$ , the attacker first selects a ballot-box  $u_2$ , ideally with a low number of voters and does the following:

**Step a:** The attacker uses [Move<sub>X</sub>] to move Alice's ballot  $b_A$  from  $u_1$  to  $u_2$  and some arbitrary Bob's ballot  $b_B$  from  $u_2$  to  $u_1$  (with a replacement of  $b_B$  by  $b_{att}$  if  $X = B$ ).

**Step b:** For any other voter willing to cast a ballot  $b$  in  $u_2$ , the attacker exploits [Replace] to replace  $b$  by an attacker-chosen ballot  $b'$ . The attacker can choose  $b'$  such that: (i) each voting option  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  gets at least one vote in  $u_2$  and (ii) the overall vote distribution is close to the expected one (to not raise any suspicion).

**Step c (optional):** If the expected vote distribution in  $u_1$  makes it likely that a voting option  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  might get no vote, then [Replace] must also be used against  $|\mathcal{V}|$  voters eligible in  $u_1$  to remedy this problem. This would not have been required for most ballot-boxes in the 2022 election (see Remark 6).

Finally, the tally of  $u_2$  leaks Alice's intended vote.

**Remark 6.** As presented above, the attack [Swap<sub>ID</sub>] relies on (V1) at Step b and Step c. This is actually not necessary with the following additional assumptions about other voters (where  $\mathcal{V} = \{v_1, \dots, v_k\}$ ):

1. There are  $E \geq k + 1$  eligible voters in  $u_2$ .
2. The attacker knows  $k$  voters,  $V_1, \dots, V_k$ , that are different from Alice and such that  $V_i$  is willing to vote for  $v_i$  (in  $u_1$  or  $u_2$ ). Those voters are either colluding with the attacker or are honest but the attacker has a good guess about how they will vote.
3. There exist  $k$  other voters,  $V_{k+1}, \dots, V_{2k}$ , different from Alice such that  $V_{k+i}$  is willing to vote for  $v_i$  in  $u_1$  for all  $i \in \{1, \dots, k\}$ . In contrary to  $V_1, \dots, V_k$ , we do not assume that the attacker knows  $V_{k+1}, \dots, V_{2k}$ , we solely assume that they exist. In practice, the attacker can just be convinced they exist based on statistical data (e.g., previous election results). For example, almost all of the ballot-boxes from the 2022 election got at least one vote for each of the candidates.
4. The attacker knows  $E - 1$  voters  $V'_1, \dots, V'_{E-1}$  eligible in any consulate (of the same election as Alice's) and



how they are willing to vote. Those voters are either colluding with the attacker or are honest but the attacker has a good guess about how they will vote.<sup>11</sup>

Those assumptions are reasonable in practice due to the existence, for each constituency, of both a ballot-box  $u_2$  with very few eligible voters (dozens) and a ballot-box  $u_1$  with a large number of voters (thousands).

How to achieve Step b and Step c of [SwapID] without relying on (V1) is slightly technical and detailed in [15, C.2]. [SwapID] thus breaks ballot privacy for target voters, assuming a server attacker and requires dedicated fixes as it does not rely on (V1).

### 4.3.2 Impact and Stealthiness

The impact of our privacy attacks is maximal when all plaintext votes of the ballots in the resulting ballot-box  $u_2$  are known to the attacker, except for the one of the target voter (e.g., Alice).<sup>12</sup> In this case, the result of the tally of  $u_2$  directly reveals Alice's vote to the attacker. The larger is  $u_2$ , the more replacements are needed. We now discuss how suitable  $u_2$  can be chosen using data of the election for which FLEP was used [4] and then discuss coercion and stealthiness.

**Many suitable  $u_2$ .** In the 2022 French legislative election, many consulates received a small number of votes, hence suitable choices for  $u_2$ . For example MSQ-MINSK during the second round (6 electronic votes among 129 eligible voters) or PBM-PARAMARIBO during the second round (5 electronic votes among 145 eligible voters). These two consulates belong to constituencies having consulates with a large number of voters with potential targets, hence suitable choices for  $u_1$ , such as SYD-SYDNEY which received 4049 electronic ballots during the second round, or MEX-MEXICO with 1959. There were even extreme cases with some consulates which received a *unique* ballot as discussed in [15, Appendix B.2]. Obviously, our attacks can be exploited against different targets voters (Alice) using different target ballot-boxes ( $u_2$ ).

**New coercion power.** Moreover, the attacker can also target several voters instead of just Alice and gather all their ballots into  $u_2$ . This attack would give a power of coercion, in a remote way<sup>13</sup>, against those voters: the tally of  $u_2$  will reveal the vote distribution among them and thus make the coercer able to detect that some decided to not comply with the attacker's instructions and how many (the attacker does

not learn their identity though). Similarly, the attacker can exploit this to learn the vote distribution of a population of voters of special interest, e.g., industrial actors. Those votes would normally be mixed with many other votes in their respective ballot-boxes, thus protecting their privacy.

**Why are our privacy attacks completely stealthily?** We review all checks that are performed by the different actors and explain in details why they fail to detect our privacy attacks in [15, Appendix B.2]. We summarize this study here.

From the (honest) voting server point of view, we note that data received and processed by the voting server are genuine and honest-looking, the voting server does not know how voters intended to vote. From the voting client point of view, the received malicious ballot receipts pass all consistency checks and no error can be detected. No cheating can be detected from the ballot-boxes tallied result either since each ballot-box contains (at least) one ballot for each voting option. Therefore, even if a voter's ballot has been moved in another ballot-box or replaced, then they will always see in the result at least one vote which corresponds to their intent, it could have come from their ballot.<sup>14</sup>

We now discuss public information and independent verification services proposed to the voters. The 3<sup>rd</sup>-party checks that the tally of the ballot-box has been correctly computed and fails to detect any cheating because of (V2). The voters' individual verifiability checks also fail to detect our attacks, even when carried out with the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party service. Indeed, to answer these queries, the latter recomputes all the references  $H$  and hashed values  $hb$  of the ballots provided by the authorities, which are then looked up. It is important to note that, because the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party was aiming to guarantee verifiability, this look-up is performed taking all the ballots of the given constituency identifier  $e_{lec}$  into account. Therefore, even malicious receipts will be found and deemed valid.

Finally, the human voters themselves are unable to detect that the ballot reference they were shown ( $H_1^{s_2} = H_1^{s_4}$ ) are not computed with the right ballotBoxId (and the genuine, honest ballot  $b$ ). Indeed, to be able to detect this, the voters would need to recompute  $H$  and thus to know what is hashed in  $H$  (e.g.,  $b$ ) but voters are never shown  $b$ .

**Impact:** A channel or a voting server attacker has the technical ability to learn some target voters' vote without breaking any encryption. This attack would leave no evidence we could then exploit to know if the attack happened.

### 4.3.3 Fixing Ballot Privacy

We propose three solutions to prevent our attacks.

<sup>11</sup>Strictly speaking, if those voters are not colluding and are eligible in a consulate  $u$  different from  $u_1$  and  $u_2$ , then a similar assumption as 3. should be made about  $u$ , that is it is expected that all voting options will be voted for, excluding those  $V_i'$ .

<sup>12</sup>Note that, even if some unknown ballots remain in  $u_2$ , some privacy leak still exists. Some quantitative analyses of similar privacy leaks have been conducted [24] and have revealed that it could be harmful.

<sup>13</sup>Note that the FLEP was not intended to guarantee coercion-resistance, which is usually understood as a resistance to over-the-shoulder coercion where the attacker is physically with the voter under coercion. However, one could have reasonably expected that it was resistant to this weak form of remote coercion, in which the coercer has *never* access to the voters' devices.

<sup>14</sup>The only assumption we make here is that honest voters do not collude to infer what should be the expected, honest result. Note that, the attacker can remain stealthily even under such extreme circumstances: he could rely on malicious and colluding voters in the same ballot-box to lie and cheat against the honest voters.

**Fix 3:** A first fix is to add the ballot-box (consulate) identifier `ballotBoxId` (*i.e.*, `u`) in the context of the **ZKP**. This simple modification cryptographically prevents any swap of ballots between different ballot-boxes once it has been computed.

**Fix 4:** Even if Fix 3 was implemented, `[swapID]` is still possible. Therefore, we recommend coupling Fix 3 with displaying in the voting client the `ballotBoxId` used for computing the ballot (or the readable name of the corresponding consulate). This way, the voter could notice the cheating prior to casting.

**Fix 5:** Fix 3 is already implemented and the (public) 3<sup>rd</sup>-party verification service has already been changed accordingly [11]: it now verifies the consistency between the `ballotBoxId` in the **ZKP** (and the `cSU`) and the ballot-box in which it is stored. Therefore, as an alternative to Fix 4, the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party could additionally display to the voter the consulate in which their ballot has been cast and counted.<sup>15</sup> This solution is easy to implement but only prevents privacy attacks against voters who use the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party verification service. This is of broader interest: 3<sup>rd</sup>-party, *i.e.*, an external auditor, can be useful not only to ensure verifiability, but also vote privacy.

**Remark 7.** *Fix 3 and 5 have already been implemented by Voxaly Docaposte and 3<sup>rd</sup>-party thanks to our findings and were used for elections in 2023.*

*Fixing the vulnerability (V1) with Fix 1 or Fix 2 would already prevent all but the `[swapID]` attack. The latter requires Fix 4 or the combination of Fix 3 and either Fix 4 or Fix 5. Moreover, we believe the second vulnerability we found (V2) should be addressed independently with Fix 3 as it introduces a weakness, even though not exploitable on its own. Therefore Fix 3 and 4 is the best option.*

## 5 Lessons Learned

Our reverse and security analysis of the FLEP revealed serious vulnerabilities and attacks in the protocol and its deployment. This is quite impactful on its own given the importance (nation-wide legislative election) and scale (largest political election using e-voting) of this election. Our analysis of the FLEP is also relevant for its illustration of how things can go bad with the excessively challenging real-world deployment at scale of e-voting solutions. Some of them are due to pitfalls that we point out for improving future deployments of e-voting in general. Others are due to limitations and problems with state-of-the-art academic e-voting solutions from which we derive practically relevant open research questions of general interest. We summarize those lessons that go beyond the specific case of the FLEP and we refer the curious reader to [15, Appendix E] for more in-depth discussions.

**Voting client as critical component.** Great care has been put in securing the FLEP voting server against internal and external threats, which is a common practice. E-voting requires

<sup>15</sup>Note that `ballotBoxId` is also in plaintext in `cSU` so it could be directly checked but it seems unrealistic to ask human voters to do so.

to adopt a radically different mindset in that regard as it relies on *verifiability* so that no one has to trust the voting server, its administrators, the code it runs, etc. (sometimes called *software independence* [27]). The most important component of the protocol that should be the main target of audits and analyses is actually the *voting client* and the verification services (*e.g.*, 3<sup>rd</sup>-party).<sup>16</sup> If the voting client is securely designed and implemented, the protocol should guarantee the election integrity independently of the voting server security. This is well illustrated by our work and our attacks: the partial specification and 3<sup>rd</sup>-party verification services are totally voided by the voting client being flawed. An implementation weakness in the voting client can completely defeat verifiability and privacy as we have shown. **Recommendation:** Consider the voting client and the verification services as the main targets of analyses and internal audits. We advocate for making them amenable to public scrutiny with a comprehensive public specification and open-sourced code.

The FLEP, as well as many e-voting systems assume an honest voting device (*e.g.*, [8, 13, 22]). On the surface, this seems unrealistic since the latter is distributed by a possibly compromised server or channel. Instead, it could be distributed through an app marketplace to benefit from code integrity (assuming the marketplace is trustworthy). Otherwise, when downloaded and run in the browser, it is inherently vulnerable to integrity flaws. This is resolved in the literature with the notion of "auditability" (*e.g.*, [6])<sup>17</sup>: *external auditors* (who can be any voter or external actors) can pretend to be voters to compare the code they receive with the legitimate version and thus implement some form of "universal integrity checks". We stress that such checks are by no means an audit of the code (that is rather the role of the commissioned auditors) but rather a mere comparison of two code bases – or the hashes thereof. If there are enough auditors well hidden among the voters, the voting server takes high risk of being caught when tampering with the voting client. In the context of the FLEP, such external audits were never specified and were made complex to carry over<sup>18</sup>. This can be addressed by using Single-page Application (SPA)<sup>19</sup> to distribute the voting client, as is the case for Belenios. Only the SPA needs to be compared to the legitimate version and can be considered as a static file, which can then be considered to be honest (assuming the legitimate version has been well audited by commissioned auditors, once-for-all). **Recommendation:** Distribute the voting client with a standalone app or an SPA and clearly specify external auditors' tasks, notably universal integrity checks.

Finally, the vulnerability (V1), which is essentially a ver-

<sup>16</sup>This does not dispense to make effort to secure the voting server.

<sup>17</sup>Note that mechanisms such as the Belanoh challenge [7] do not ensure the voting client integrity.

<sup>18</sup>The JavaScript code is served post-authentication, the voting client logic is spread all over HTML and JavaScript files, interleaved with user- and session-specific data (not easily comparable)

<sup>19</sup><https://developer.mozilla.org/fr/docs/Glossary/SPA>

ifiability weakness, is key to our privacy attacks. Such a verifiability-privacy relation has been documented before with a theoretical attack [14], our work illustrates further this relation with practical attacks. *Lesson:* Privacy can be attacked in practice due to a lack of verifiability.

**Operational constraints as scientific bottleneck.** For deploying a protocol in the real world and especially for political elections, many aspects that are very often omitted in the academia have to be taken into account such as the legal requirements and recommendations, compliance to a competitive public call for tenders, etc. This partly explains why, despite being derived from the proven secure Belenios [13], the FLEP ended up flawed with weaknesses that were inexistent in Belenios.

*Missing features.* First, the FLEP had to accommodate the multi-ballot-box setting. This setting seems to be a recurring pattern. Importantly, it is the source of quite impactful privacy attacks: `[Swapb, SwapH, SwapID]` for the FLEP and another privacy attack [9] for the Swiss Post 2022 protocol, which also relies on multiple ballot-boxes but exploits a different weakness. Another lacking feature in Belenios was the downloadable receipt, a desired feature of the [EFA Ministry](#) from their interpretation of the [CNIL](#) recommendations. As a result, the PDF receipt has been introduced in the FLEP but was not properly checked. *Research question:* Make state-of-the-art solutions more generic so that they can accommodate such real-world use cases and practical constraints. Moreover, formal security properties and proofs do not consider such features and could thus miss practical attacks.

*Distribution of authentication.* The FLEP suffers from a lack of trust distribution for the voter authentication process: a single entity, the voting server, is in charge of this authentication as it stores and checks the two authentication factors. A compromised voting server can thus impersonate voters and do *ballot stuffing*. A simple theoretical solution to fix this weakness is to distribute the generation and the verification of the authentication factors. Unfortunately, deploying such an infrastructure is difficult. For example, if the independent 3<sup>rd</sup>-party entity had to participate to user authentication, then it would have to offer an API for authentication verification. *Research question:* As far as we know, there is no practical academic solution to this problem that matches real-world constraints of deployments. We envision the spread of eID cards or the development of standards like openID connect [28] could be built upon for this.

*Secret Key Generation distribution.* We show in [15, E.3] that some lawful requirements governing when a quorum is met to *e.g.*, decrypt a ballot-box are not cryptographically enforced in the FLEP. (The lawful requirements combine conditions such as: a holder and a substitute for a given role cannot be simultaneously in the same quorum, a quorum should have at least 4 roles represented, etc.) As a consequence, fewer people than what is legally prescribed by the law can collude and decrypt a ballot-box. State-of-the-art academic solutions cannot be used off-the-shelf to address this. *Open*

*Questions:* Is it possible to cryptographically enforce such operational constraints to prevent any human misbehavior? Are there solutions that are generic enough to be suitable for practically relevant constraints seen in real-world use cases? We formalize such questions in [15, Appendix E.2.1].

**Clear security objectives and threat model.** Neither the FLEP nor legal requirements and recommendations clearly define the expected security objectives and threat models. It is meaningless to assess the security of a system without a clear threat model definition, that is why we first had to do it ourselves. It is also of little interest for the public to know that the FLEP has undergone audits without having access to the scope and the objectives of this audit. *Recommendation:* Election organizers, or even better the responsible for the public call for tenders ([EFA Ministry](#)), should clarify and specify their expectations regarding the security objectives and threat model. This will certainly help academic researchers to identify and address practically relevant problems, incentivize more secure solutions in calls for tenders, and allow more relevant audits and security analyses. Ideally, objectives and threat models could be prescribed by law, as it is the case in Switzerland (see [15, Remark 14]), where even mathematical cryptographic and symbolic proofs are required. We also recommend requiring such proofs.

**Simpler and precise voting journey instructions.** In the FLEP, the voters receive different confusing and quite overwhelming information about the verification process. In total, they are shown 4 quite intimidating cryptographic data and are offered 4 different verification tasks, see [15, Appendix E.3.1]. *Recommendation:* Complex protocol and notably voter's journey and verification tasks are detrimental to the overall protocol security. For the FLEP, we explain in [15, Appendix E.3.1], how the protocol can be conservatively simplified with only one cryptographic datum shown to the voters and a unique verification task, which would certainly have avoided the vulnerability (V1). In general, we recommend prioritizing any simplification impacting the voters' journey and clearly specifying what is expected from the voters and assume no more from them.

**Transparency and openness.** The FLEP was lacking a clear (and open) specification, which partially explains why its flaws remained unnoticed until we saw them, while the election was running. (We present in [15, Appendix D] additional weaknesses that are well-known in the literature, *e.g.*, ballot replay attacks, and that nonetheless also affect the FLEP.) *Recommendation:* Because designing and deploying e-voting solutions is a notoriously difficult task, we recommend promoting transparency and public scrutiny from different communities (academic researchers, hackers, etc.) to detect and prevent vulnerabilities as early as possible. This could be incentivized with public intrusion test and bug bounty programs, as done in Switzerland where open access is even a legal requirement.



## 6 Conclusion

The FLEP protocol is an instructive example of a real world deployment of a variant of an academic protocol (Belenios) that introduces design-level and implementation-level weaknesses. The latter opened up the 1.6 million eligible voters overseas of the 2022 French legislative election to integrity and privacy attacks under a voting server attacker or a weaker channel attacker. To avoid such failures in the future, we proposed fixes, which have been (almost fully) implemented, and have made various recommendations we learned from this experience. We had insightful discussions with the different stakeholders and we strongly believe more of such communication between academia and e-voting practitioners is for the better.

However, we must remain cautious as, in the absence of formal security proofs, it is still possible that other critical attacks might affect the 2023 version of the FLEP protocol. Narrowing down to the weaknesses we know of, we recall that better solutions should be proposed for authenticating the voters, getting rid of the strong assumption of a trustworthy voting client, etc. Indeed, in its current state, the FLEP protocol still allows a compromised voting server to stuff the ballot-box by impersonating voters who do not vote. Such an attacker can also modify the voters' intended vote having a corrupted voting device, *e.g.*, because of a malicious web browser extension. Moreover, unlike the flaws we discovered, we consider that there is currently no off-the-shelf solution to prevent such attacks. This might be considered as a warning that the state of the art in e-voting is not ready for such critical elections and an incentive to continue the research towards practical solutions to those problems.

## Responsible Disclosure and Acknowledgments

We conducted this security analysis during the 2022 election period through a passive analysis only; we never attacked voting servers. Therefore, we could not alter the integrity or the security of the election. All the vulnerabilities reported in this document have been reported to the relevant stakeholders right after the election and at least 3 months before publication. We thank those stakeholders, *i.e.*, [EFA Ministry](#), [ANSSI](#), Voxaly Docaposte, and the researchers running the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party services (Stéphane Glondu, Pierrick Gaudry, and Véronique Cortier) for their help and discussions after we sent them our findings.

In particular, we would like to thank again the role of [ANSSI](#) in the responsible disclosure process, which has always be a key player in promoting transparency and openness. This is greatly appreciated given the context of this work.

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## Conflicts of interest statement

The researchers running the 3<sup>rd</sup>-party services (Stéphane Glondu, Pierrick Gaudry, and Véronique Cortier) are colleagues of us. However, they were under embargo when we did our own research and were forbidden to communicate with us on that matter. Our research was carried out in a completely independent way.

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