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OFence: Pairing Barriers to Find Concurrency Bugs in the Linux Kernel

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Abstract

Knowing which functions may execute concurrently is key to finding concurrency-related bugs. Existing tools infer the possibility of concurrency using dynamic analysis or by pairing functions that use the same locks. Code that relies on more relaxed concurrency controls is, by and large, out of the reach of existing concurrency-related bug-tracking tools.

In this paper, we propose a new heuristic to automatically infer the possibility of concurrency in lockless code that relies on memory barriers (memory fences) for correctness, a task made complex by the fact that barriers do not have a unique identifier and do not have a clearly delimited scope.

To infer the possibility of concurrency between barriers, we propose a novel heuristic based on matching objects accessed before and after barriers. Our approach is based on the observation that barriers work in pairs: if a write memory barrier orders writes to a set of objects, then there should be a read barrier that orders reads to the same set of objects. This pairing strategy allows us to infer which barriers are meant to run concurrently and, in turn, check the code surrounding the barriers for concurrency-related bugs. As a example of a type of concurrency bug, we focus on bugs related to the incorrect placement of reads or writes relative to barriers. When we detect incorrect read or write placements in the code, we automatically produce a patch to fix them.

We evaluate our heuristic on the Linux kernel. Our analysis runs in 8 minutes. We fixed 12 incorrect ordering constraints that could have resulted in hard-to-debug data corruption or kernel crashes. The patches have been merged in the mainline kernel. None of the bugs could have been found using existing static analysis heuristics.

CCS Concepts:  • Theory of computation → Program analysis;  • Software and its engineering → Concurrent programming structures.

Keywords: static analysis, memory barrier, kernel

1 Introduction

Many software tools exist to help detect bugs in concurrent code. Tools vary, but they share a common first step: finding functions that may run concurrently. A whole body of work has been dedicated to infer possible concurrency using dynamic analysis [14, 19] or by using heuristics to pair locks (locksets) [6, 8, 11, 22]. To the best of our knowledge, code that relies on more relaxed concurrency controls is, by and large, out of the scope of existing tools.

A key observation we make in this paper is that lockless concurrent code frequently relies on memory barriers (memory fences) for correctness. Barriers are used to prevent compilers and CPUs from issuing memory accesses out-of-order, an optimization that may cause unpredictable behavior in concurrent lockless code. In the Linux 5.15 kernel, more than 2000 functions contain memory barriers and over 6000 use kernel APIs that rely on barriers for correctness (e.g., RCU).

A simple but common example of code that relies on barriers is the lockless initialization of a structure. A writer thread initializes a data structure, issues a write barrier, and sets a flag to indicate that the initialization is complete. On the reading side, a thread concurrently checks the flag. If the flag is set, the thread issues a read barrier and the structure is read. Otherwise, the reader thread aborts. The barriers are used to ensure that the writer sets the flag after initializing the structure and that the reader checks the flag before reading the structure. Without either the read or write barrier, the compiler and CPUs could reorder memory accesses, resulting in the reader reading a partially initialized data structure.

In this paper we propose to use barriers to infer possible concurrency between functions. We present a novel method to automatically discover which pairs of barriers are meant to run concurrently, a task made complex by the fact that a barrier neither indicates which functions it may run concurrently with, nor indicates which memory accesses it orders. Analyzing barriers is notably harder than analyzing lock-based code because, unlike locks, barriers do not have a unique identifier and do not have a clearly delimited scope.
Our work relies on the observation that the memory accesses surrounding barriers are related: one barrier orders the writes to a set of memory locations while the other barrier orders the reads to the same memory locations. We thus pair barriers by matching the objects that are accessed around barriers. Because these objects may be accessed using different variable names in different functions, we propose to uniquely identify them by using a combination of data types and structures’ field names. We show that this heuristic allows pairing barriers with a low false positive rate.

Pairing barriers allows us to infer possible concurrency between functions and to find concurrency-related bugs. As an example, we focus on tracking bugs related to the incorrect placement of loads and stores relative to barriers: the stores before a write barrier are expected to match the loads after a read barrier, and vice versa. If not, the barriers provide no ordering guarantee. When we detect inconsistent read and write placements, we automatically produce a patch that reorders the code to fix the bugs. In some situations, we detect that memory accesses would be correctly ordered even without the barrier and we issue a patch that removes the unneeded barrier. The generated patches describe why memory accesses are misplaced, or why the barrier is unneeded. The patches are thus easy to understand and to check for correctness.

We have implemented these ideas in a tool called OFence to be used on the Linux kernel. The tool uses static analysis on kernel code to pair barriers and detect possible deviations from correct barrier usage. We have found 12 ordering bugs in the Linux kernel that could all have resulted in hard-to-debug data corruption or segmentation faults. As of the writing of the paper, 8 patches have been merged in the Linux kernel; the remaining 4 patches correctly fix ordering issues related to barriers, but also reveal other concurrency issues in the code that require fixes that go beyond the scope of this paper. We also detected 53 unneeded barriers.

The number of bugs that we fixed by pairing barriers compares favourably with the number of bugs found using the more conventional lock pairing heuristics (e.g., RacerX [8] fixed 3 races in the Linux kernel and DataCollider [11] fixed 12 races in the Windows kernel). None of the bugs we fixed could have been found using existing tools. Pairing barriers to infer concurrency is thus a useful addition to existing concurrency-detection techniques.

In summary, the contributions of this paper relate to lockless concurrent code and are as follows:

- The discovery and elimination of 12 concurrency bugs in the Linux kernel and, as a byproduct of our analysis, the elimination of 53 unnecessary barriers in the Linux kernel. None of the bugs could have been found by existing tools.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how barriers are used to enforce ordering constraints. Section 3 presents the main intuitions behind the design of OFence and the high level techniques that allow us to pair barriers. Section 4 presents the implementation of OFence. Section 5 presents the ordering constraints that we check and Section 6 evaluates OFence on the Linux kernel. Section 7 discusses possible extensions of OFence, Section 8 presents the related work, and Section 9 concludes.

2 Background on Memory Barriers

Memory barriers are used to enforce memory access orderings at the compiler and CPU level: memory accesses issued prior a barrier are guaranteed to be performed before memory accesses issued after the barrier (illustrated in Figure 1). When developing lockless code, developers rely on barriers to ensure that shared data structures are read and written following the code order.

![Figure 1. A barrier orders memory accesses done by a single thread.](image)

**Pair of barriers.** Barriers typically work in pairs, as illustrated in Figure 2. Thread₁ writes two variables, a and b, which are concurrently read by Thread₂. The barriers are used to limit the observable states: if Thread₂ reads the newest value of b, then it will also read the newest value of a. Limiting the observable states is frequently used in concurrent code to ensure that reader threads only read initialized data. For instance, in Listing 1, the writer function initializes a data structure and then sets the init flag to true. A reader function concurrently checks the data structure, and only reads its content after checking if it has been initialized. Without either barrier, the compiler and the CPU could reorder the code, resulting in the reader reading partially initialized data.

**Inconsistent orderings.** Barriers only enforce ordering constraints if the values written before the first barrier are read after the second barrier, and if the values written after the first barrier are read before the second barrier. Figure 3 illustrates an incorrect usage of barriers that offers no ordering guarantee: a is read and written before the barriers...
and b is read and written after the barriers. Depending on the interleaving of the threads, it is possible to read the new value of a and the old value of b (Figure 3(a)) or the old value of a and the new value of b (Figure 3(b)). The barriers thus provide no constraint on the observable values of a and b. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to the ordering constraints of Figure 3 as being inconsistent.

Listing 1 Example of barrier usage. The reader checks the flag before reading the structure’s content, and the write sets the flag after initializing the structure.

```c
void reader(struct my_struct *a) {
    if (!a->init)
        return;
    read_barrier();
    f(a->y);
}
void writer(struct my_struct *b) {
    b->y = ...;
    write_barrier();
    b->init = 1;
}
```

Finding objects used in multiple functions: One of the main difficulties of finding common objects is aliasing: developers may use different variable names to refer to the same memory location. So, instead of relying on variable names, we rely on data types and field names to distinguish objects.

Concurrent code mainly orders reads and writes to shared structures. For every access to a structure field, we build a tuple (typeof(struct), nameof(field)). In Listing 1, the reader function reads the field x of a structure of type my_struct. The writer function also writes the field x of a structure of type my_struct. Because the tuple (my_struct, x) is accessed by two functions, we refer to it as a shared object.

Pairing: We pair two functions if they both have a barrier and if they have at least two common shared objects. The shared objects must be ordered by a barrier in at least one of the two functions (i.e., one object is before the barrier and the other object is after the barrier in one function). A function can be paired with multiple functions as long as all functions order the same shared objects.

In some situations, the read barrier may be implicit. For instance, when a function initializes a structure, issues a write barrier, and then issues an IPC to wake up another thread, the other thread is guaranteed to read an initialized structure, even without issuing a read barrier – we consider that the IPC acts as an implicit barrier. When we detect such a pattern, we leave the writer function unpaired.

4 Implementation

O Fence is built on top of Smatch, a static analysis tool for C code [3]. Smatch is designed to track the most common programming errors in the Linux kernel, such as use after free or array overflow. O Fence adds 2100 lines of code to Smatch. The code of O Fence is available at https://github.com/BLepers/O Fence.
4.1 Finding barriers
The first step of our analysis finds barriers in the Linux kernel source code. As shown in Table 1, the kernel currently offers eight primitives to explicitly order reads and writes. OFence analyzes all files that contain memory barriers.

Table 1. Barriers used by Linux

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primitive</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>smp_rmb()</td>
<td>Orders reads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smp_wmb()</td>
<td>Orders writes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smp_mb()</td>
<td>Orders reads and writes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smp_store_mb(&amp;a, v)</td>
<td>Write + smp_mb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smp_store_release(&amp;a, v)</td>
<td>smp_mb + write</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smp_load_acquire(&amp;a)</td>
<td>Read + smp_mb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smp_mb__before_atomic()</td>
<td>Barrier before atomic_~()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>smp_mb__after_atomic()</td>
<td>Barrier after atomic_~()</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Memory barriers (smp_rmb, smp_wmb, smp_mb).** Memory barriers are used to force the compiler and CPU to order memory accesses. A read memory barrier (smp_rmb) ensures that all the reads appearing before the barrier happen before all the reads appearing after the barrier. No guarantee is provided on writes. Similarly, a write barrier (smp_wmb) only orders writes, no guarantee is provided on reads. A call to smp_mb orders both reads and writes. Memory barriers are expensive and kernel developers try to use them only when necessary.

**Acquire, release (smp_load_acquire, smp_store_release):** To ease the development of concurrent code, the kernel provides functions that issue both a compiler barrier and a memory barrier. The smp_load_acquire function reads a variable and then performs a smp_mb memory barrier. The smp_store_release function performs a smp_mb barrier and then writes the variable.

**Barriers before/after atomics:** The kernel offers more than 400 primitives to perform atomic operations on integers (e.g., atomic_inc, atomic_inc_unless, ...). Some atomic operations act as memory barriers but some do not (i.e., the CPU is allowed to reorder the atomic operation with other reads and writes). To turn an atomic operation into a barrier, kernel developers use the smp_mb__before_atomic and smp_mb__after_atomic functions. These functions compile as no-ops on most architectures, but are necessary to enforce order on some weak-memory architectures (e.g., Alpha).

4.2 Finding shared objects and pairing barriers
The second step of the analysis consists in finding shared objects. To find the objects accessed by a function, OFence relies on the control flow graphs (CFGs) produced by Smatch. Smatch generates a CFG per function. Each CFG branches through the code of a function and recursively through the code of all called functions defined in the same file or in an included header.

To avoid analyzing code that is completely unrelated to the barrier, and to reduce the cost of the analysis, we currently bound the exploration of shared objects at function boundaries. In theory, a barrier may order all memory accesses performed prior to the barrier with all memory accesses performed after the barrier but we found that developers rarely rely on the effect of a barrier across function calls. As a first approximation, we thus consider that a barrier may order the memory accesses of the function in which it occurs, as well as its immediate caller functions and callee functions. We also bound the effect of memory barriers at other memory barriers and at atomic operations that have a barrier semantics. For example, if a function contains multiple barriers, then we consider that the first barrier only orders memory accesses up to the second barrier.

For large functions, we currently limit the exploration to within 5 statements of a write memory barrier and 50 statements of a read barrier. We chose these numbers based on the manual observation of common barrier patterns – concurrent writes tend to be close to write barriers, concurrent reads are more spread out. The accuracy of the analysis is not strongly dependent on the exact values. Each shared object found in the exploration is assigned a distance value, which corresponds to the number of statements that separates it from the barrier.

**Pairing using shared objects:** We build a tuple (typeof(struct), nameof(field)) for every memory access performed within the analyzed statements, and only keep the tuples that are present in at least two functions (shared objects). We use this information to pair functions. Figure 4 illustrates our approach.

Figure 4. We extract memory accesses from the CFG produced by Smatch and pair functions based on shared objects.

The pairing is performed from the point of view of the write barriers. A write barrier is paired with another barrier if they are preceded or followed by at least two common shared objects. The shared objects must be ordered by at
least one of the two barriers (i.e., one object must be accessed before one barrier while the other must be accessed after that barrier). Algorithm 1 summarizes our approach. We first build a hashmap that associates shared objects with read barriers. Then, for each write barrier, we find barriers that have at least two shared objects in common. When multiple matches are found, we only keep the pairing whose shared objects are closest to the barriers.

Once we have paired two barriers, we build a list of all shared objects $S_0...S_n$ that they have in common. If another barrier also has the $S_0...S_n$ objects in its list of shared objects, we add the barrier to the pairing. As a consequence, it is possible for a pairing to contain more than two barriers. Such pairings happen when a writer function may run concurrently with multiple reader functions, or when the code relies on a succession of barriers to enforce complex ordering constraints.

**Special case: implicit barriers.** When a write barrier is followed by an interprocess communication (IPC) call, we consider that the IPC call acts as an implicit read barrier. To distinguish IPC calls from regular function calls, we maintain a list of wake up functions used in the kernel (e.g., `smp_call_function_many`). Note that maintaining a list of functions to detect patterns is common in static analysis – for instance to detect use-after-free bugs many static analyzers maintain lists of functions used to perform allocations and to free memory. If the wake up call is closer to the barrier than the shared objects found using Algorithm 1, then we consider that the barrier exists to order the wake up call with respect to prior memory accesses and we do not try to pair it with another function.

## 5 Statically Analysing Ordering Constraints

The pairings produced by OFence allow inferring the possibility of concurrency between pairs of functions that use barriers. In this paper, we choose to focus on checking ordering constraints and on tracking unneeded barriers. We distinguish three cases that cover all usages of barriers: unpaired barriers, barriers paired with a single barrier, and barriers paired with multiple barriers. In each case, we explain deviations from correct ordering constraints and how we fix these deviations.

### 5.1 Deviations on unpaired barrier

When OFence leaves a barrier unpaired, we check if the code would offer the same ordering guarantees without the barrier. We consider that a barrier is unneeded when it is immediately followed by another barrier or by a function that offers barrier semantics.

In the Linux kernel, many functions offer barrier semantics; Table 2 presents a few of these functions. Some atomic operations act as memory barriers while others do not. The same is true for operations that only change a bit in a bitfield.

In Linux, the rule of thumb is that atomic and bit operations that return no value do not act as barriers while functions that return a usable value act as barriers. Similarly, some functions that wake up threads contain barriers while others do not. Because kernel developers are often unaware of the semantics of these functions, they sometimes issue a barrier prior to calling a function that already has a barrier semantics.

When OFence matches a barrier prior to a function that already has barrier semantics, OFence issues a patch that removes the barrier and replaces it with a comment. The comment explains that the function call acts as a barrier and documents which prior reads or writes are meant to be ordered by the barrier.

### 5.2 Deviations when a write barrier is paired with a single read barrier

A write barrier paired with a single other read barrier corresponds to the textbook usage of barriers. The pair of barriers offers ordering guarantees if the writes performed before the write barrier are read after the read barrier, and if the writes performed after the write barrier are read before the read barrier (see Section 2). Any other ordering is inconsistent. In practice, this simple rule can be broken in multiple ways that we detail in this section.

**Deviation #1: Misplaced memory access.** A misplaced memory access happens when the same shared object is both read and written on the same side of both the read and write barriers. When OFence detects a misplaced memory access, it issues a patch that moves the memory access to the correct side of the barrier. The patch is biased towards the correctness of the writer: we always move the read. The bias comes from the experimental observation that readers tend to contain more bugs than writers. Indeed, shared objects tend to be further away from the barrier in the reader than in the writer, which results in ordering constraints being more often overlooked in readers than in writers.

**Deviation #2: Wrong type of barriers.** CPUs usually offer different barriers for reads and for writes. We consider that a read barrier should be replaced by a write barrier when it only orders writes. Likewise, a write barrier should be replaced by a read barrier when it only orders reads. When OFence detects a wrong type of barrier, it issues a patch that replaces the barrier with a barrier of the correct type.

**Deviation #3: Repeated reads.** A repeated read corresponds to a variable correctly read before a read barrier, and then re-read. Listing 2 presents an incorrect re-read of a variable. At the beginning of the function, the `a->field` flag is checked and the function returns if it has a bit of `FLAG_VALUE` set. The `a->field` flag is then re-read as an argument of a function call. If the flag can be modified concurrently, the called function has no guarantee about its value. This, at
Algorithm 1 Pseudo code of the pairing algorithm; we pair barriers using common shared objects and a distance metric.

```plaintext
pairings = [];
// Create a "shared object" -> barriers hash
obj_to_barriers = {}
foreach barrier b in kernel_barriers {
    foreach shared_obj o in b->objs {
        obj_to_barriers[o.name].push(b);
    }
}

foreach barrier b in kernel_barriers {
    (min_w, match) = (inf, NULL);
    foreach (o1, o2) in make_pairs(b->objs) {
        my_weight = o1.distance * o2.distance;
        (pair_weight, pair) = get_pair(b, o1, o2);
        weight = my_weight * pair_weight;
        if(weight < min_w && (b.orders(o1, o2) || pair.orders(o1, o2))
            (min_w, match) = (weight, pair);
    }
    if(match) {
        b.pairings.push({pair:match, w:min_w});
        match.pairings.push({pair:b, w:min_w});
    }
}

foreach barrier b in kernel_barriers {
    best = b.pairings.sortBy(w).first();
    others = b.pairings.remove(best);
    foreach(others o) {
        o.pairings.remove(b);
        b.pairings = best;
    }
}

foreach barrier b in kernel_barriers {
    if(b.pairings && !b.paired) {
        pairings.push([b, b.pairings.first().pair]);
        b.paired = true;
    }
}
```

At least, questions the need for the check. We thus consider this variation as erroneous. When OFence detects a repeated read, it issues a patch that reuses the initially read value.

5.3 Writer paired with multiple readers and writers

OFence sometimes pairs a write barrier with multiple read and write barriers. While uncommon, these pairings reveal more complex usages of barriers and more complex ordering constraints than those presented previously. Checking the correctness of all possible multi-writer/multi-reader patterns is outside of the scope of this paper. We limit the analysis to the most common multi-writer/multi-reader pattern used in the Linux kernel, illustrated in Figure 5.

In Figure 5, four barriers work in coordination. The writer thread increments a shared object S₀, writes multiple shared objects, and then increments S₀ again. The reader reads S₀,
 Listing 2 Re-reading a variable that may be written concurrently may cause unexpected results. In the code, `a->field` might have the `FLAG_VALUE` bit set on line 4 despite the check performed on line 2.

```c
void reader(struct type *a) {
  if((a->field & FLAG_VALUE))
    return;
  subsection(a->field, ...);
  read_barrier();
}
```

reads other shared objects, and then checks if \( S_0 \) has changed since its initial read. Such a pattern is used to check if the reader reads consistent values: \( S_0 \) is the version number of an object, the reader reads the version number prior to reading the object’s content, and then re-reads the version at the end to ensure that the object did not change while it was read. In the kernel, this pattern is frequently implemented using the `seqcount` interface, as exemplified in Listing 3. The `get_counters` function of the ARP subsystem reads a per-cpu counter to ensure that the `bcnt` and `pcnt` values are not concurrently modified in the `do_add_counters` function.

```c
void get_counters(...) {
  for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
    seqcount_t *s = & per_cpu(xt_recseq, cpu);
    xt_entry_foreach(i, t->entries, t->size) {
      ...
      do {
        v = read_seqcount_begin(s);
        bcnt = tmp->bcnt;
        pcnt = tmp->pcnt;
      } while(read_seqcount_retry(s, v));
    }
  }
}
```

In this example, OFence correctly infers the possibility of concurrency between the four barriers, but the ordering constraints are more subtle than in the previous examples. The barriers work in duo: the first write barrier provides ordering constraints that are used by the second read barrier, and the second write barrier provides ordering constraints used by the first read barrier.

**Deviations.** The deviations of the multi-writer, multi-reader patterns are the same as those of the single-writer single-reader pattern, but must be checked per duo of barriers instead of being checked between all barriers. For instance, to find misplaced memory accesses OFence looks for values written before the first write barrier and read before the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primitive</th>
<th>Compiler barrier</th>
<th>Memory barrier</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>atomic_inc(&amp;a)</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>Not a barrier on some architectures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atomic_inc_and_test(&amp;a)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Always a barrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>set_bit(&amp;a)</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>Not a barrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>test_and_set_bit(&amp;a)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Always a barrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wake_up_process(&amp;task)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Always a barrier</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
second read barrier. The exploration stops when encountering a memory barrier: when looking for misplaced memory accesses before the second read barrier, the backward exploration stops at the first read barrier.

5.4 Finding and patching bugs

To find the deviations mentioned above, and to produce patches, we rely on the CFG produced by Smatch. When walking a CFG, we track local variables that point to shared objects. Checking the orderings and fixing them is easy to perform automatically, but may require manual intervention to fix styling issues.

On top of patching the code, the patch documents which shared objects were used to pair the barriers and the type of constraint that was fixed. The patch also briefly explains why the original code was erroneous (e.g., "(structX, fieldY) was read before the barrier and incorrectly re-read after the barrier").

6 Evaluation

The evaluation aims at answering the following questions:

- Is OFence effective at finding barrier misuses and at producing patches?
- What is the coverage and the false positive ratio of OFence?

6.1 Setup

We first executed OFence on the Linux 5.11 kernel and have continued to monitor barrier usage in the Linux kernel since. We compile the kernel using an unmodified Ubuntu kernel configuration file. We currently analyze 614 files out of a total of 669 files that contain memory barriers in the kernel (the 55 unchecked files belong to modules that are not compiled by the Ubuntu kernel configuration file). The full analysis of the kernel takes 8 minutes on a 16-core desktop machine with 32GB of memory. Updating the analysis after modifying a single file takes less than 30 seconds for all but 2 driver files, for which it takes 50 seconds. These numbers show that OFence is sufficiently efficient to become part of the standard kernel development toolchain.

6.2 Fixing incorrect code

Using OFence, we found and fixed 12 bugs in functions that rely on barriers for correctness. The bugs are summarized in Table 3. Eight fixes move misplaced memory accesses (e.g., a read placed on the wrong side of a barrier). We also fixed 3 incorrect re-reads of variables and fixed the type of one memory barrier. Looking at the commit history, we found that most bugs were introduced when refactoring the code or adding new functionalities. Unlike traditional race reports that force developers to reason about the race and its consequences, our patches clearly explain why the ordering is incorrect and have been accepted within 24 hours of their submission without any debate.

Table 3. Breakdown of the bugs and suboptimal patterns found in the kernel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number of patches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Misplaced memory access</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racy variable re-read after the read barrier</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read barrier used instead of a write barrier</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Example of a misplaced memory access: Patch 1 fixes a misplaced memory access in the remote procedure call (RPC) interface of Linux. OFence pairs the read and write barriers of xprt_complete_rqst and call_decode because of their shared objects. OFence then detects that req->rq_reply_bytes_recvd, which is used as a flag in xprt_complete_rqst (line 4), is incorrectly read after performing a barrier. Reading the flag after the barrier provides no ordering guarantees: the CPU could prefetch req->rq_private_buf.len (line 13) before reading the value of the flag (line 11), possibly prefetching a value that has not yet been initialized. The bug could have resulted in the userland reading seemingly random values from the kernel instead of the messages sent via RPC. The fix moves the memory access before the barrier. The patch was accepted in Linux 5.12 and backported to all maintained versions of the Linux kernel (commit f8f7e0fh22b2e75be55f2f0c13e229e75b0eac07).

Patch 1 OFence moves the barrier after the checking of req->rq_reply_bytes_recvd to preserve the ordering guarantees offered by xprt_complete_rqst.

```c
1  void xprt_complete_rqst(...) {
2      req->rq_private_buf.len = ...;
3      smp_wmb();
4      req->rq_reply_bytes_recvd = copied;
5    }
6
7 static void call_decode(...) {
8      if (!req->rq_reply_bytes_recvd)
9          goto out;
10     smp_rmb();
11    - if (!req->rq_reply_bytes_recvd)
12      - goto out;
13      req->rq_rcv_buf.len = req->rq_private_buf.len;
14  }
```

Example of an incorrect re-read prior to a barrier: Patch 2 fixes an incorrect re-read in the event interface of Linux. The perf_event_addr_filters_apply function reads the task associated with an event (line 3) and performs
OFence prevents re-reading a racy variable that was used in a condition.

```c
1 static void perf_event_addr_filters_apply(...) {
2  struct task_struct * task =
3      READ_ONCE(event->ctx->task);
4  ...
5  if (task == TASK_TOMBSTONE) return;
6  ...
7  if (ifh->nr_file_filters)
8     mm = get_task_mm(event->ctx->task);
9  + mm = get_task_mm(task);
10  ...
11  smp_mb();
12 }
```

checks on that task. The task is then re-read later in the function, voiding the guarantees of the prior checks. The bug could have caused the kernel to access a non-existent thread’s metadata, resulting in data corruption or kernel crashes. OFence patches the access by re-using the previously read value. The patch was accepted in Linux 5.15 and backported to all maintained versions of the Linux kernel (commit b89a05b21f46150ac10a962aa50109250b56b03b).

**Example of a re-read and misplaced memory access:**
Patch 3 fixes an incorrect barrier usage found in the socket interface. OFence notices that `reuse->num_socks` is incremented just after a memory barrier in `reuseport_add_sock` (line 3). The write barrier is automatically paired by OFence with a read barrier in `reuseport_select_sock` because of the shared objects. OFence notices that `reuse->num_socks` is read on the wrong side of the barrier on line 12. Re-reading `reuse->num_socks` after the barrier could result in accessing indexes of `reuse->socks` that have not been initialized (on line 15). The fix consists in reusing the value of `reuse->num_socks` that was correctly read before the barrier (on line 9 of Patch 3), fixing both the ordering and re-read problems. The bug could have caused the kernel to read an array out-of-bounds, ultimately resulting in a crash or in data corruption (`reuse->socks` on Line 15 could be NULL or point to a random kernel location in the original code). The patch was accepted in Linux 5.12 and backported to all maintained versions of the Linux kernel (commit fd2ddef043592e7de80af53f47fa46fd5573086e).

**6.3 Removing unneeded barriers**
We removed 53 unneeded barriers in the Linux kernel. Unneeded barriers were mostly found in the “single barrier” pattern where barriers are followed by a wake up function that already offers barrier semantics.

Patch 3 OFence prevents re-reading a racy variable after a barrier. OFence re-uses the value that was correctly read before the barrier.

```c
1 int reuseport_add_sock(...) {
2  reuse->socks[reuse->num_socks] = sk;
3  smp_wmb();
4  reuse->num_socks++;
5 }
6 ...
7 struct sock *reuseport_select_sock(...) {
8  int socks = READ_ONCE(reuse->num_socks);
9  if (likely(socks)) {
10   smp_rmb();
11   ...
12   while(i < ...) {
13     - if (i >= reuse->num_socks)
14     + if (i >= socks)
15     ... reuse->socks[i];
16 }
17 }
```

**Example of an unneeded barrier:** Patch 4 presents an excerpt from the I/O subsystem of Linux. The `rq_qos_wake_function` function uses a barrier before calling `wake_up_process`. OFence knows, for each wake up function, if the function contains a barrier or not and `wake_up_process` does. The extra barrier of `rq_qos_wake_function` is not necessary and can be removed.

Patch 4 OFence removes an unneeded barrier in the I/O subsystem of Linux (`wake_up_process` already contains a barrier).

```c
1 static int rq_qos_wake_function(...) {
2  data->got_token = true;
3  - smp_wmb();
4  wake_up_process(data->task);
5 }
```

**6.4 Pairings, false positives and coverage**
We experimentally found that most shared objects used to perform the pairings are within 5 statements of write barriers (see Figure 6). Exploring more statements does not significantly increase the number of pairings, but results in a slightly higher number of incorrect pairings. Reads are more spread out (see Figure 7). Just as for writes, most pairings are found using shared objects located close to the barriers, but bugs tend to happen on reads located further away from the barriers. For instance, the incorrect re-read presented in Patch 3 happens 26 statements after the read barrier.

**False positives ratio:** The number of incorrect pairings and patches is very small. We manually reviewed all the
pairs and patches produced by OFence and found 15 incorrect pairings and 12 incorrect patches among the 456 pairs of barriers that OFence analyzed. All incorrect pairings were easy to detect: OFence paired functions by matching generic types (e.g., the list type used throughout the kernel), but the paired functions had otherwise no logic or shared objects in common.

OFence currently has a 50% false positive ratio (12 incorrect patches and 12 bugs fixed). The false positive ratio of OFence compares favorably with that of previous tools aiming at finding concurrency bugs in the Linux kernel. For instance, 90% of the data races reported by DataCollider [11] are benign. We explain the low number of false positives as follows: we only look for code that marginally deviates from correct barrier patterns. It is unlikely that OFence pairs and patches functions that look like they may perform concurrent accesses but where concurrency is not possible. Indeed, the presence of barriers and shared objects is a strong indicator that the functions are meant to run concurrently.

The main source of false positives when patching code comes from a few functions that break the assumptions made by OFence. Listing 4 presents an example of the bnx2x driver. The bnx2_sp_event function guarantees that the sp_state field always has at least one of its bits set: the BNX2X_..._ACK bit is set before clearing the BNX2X_..._PENDING bit (the ordering is guaranteed using a call to smp_wmb() on line 4 of Listing 4). In this context, the write memory barrier is used to order two writes to the same variable, which breaks our assumptions about variables being accessed either before or after a barrier. OFence produces a patch that moves the accesses after the barrier. Note that OFence still correctly pairs the bnx2_sp_event function with its reader function, the code is thus easy to check, and the false positive is easy to detect by simply looking at the way readers access the sp_state field.

Listing 4 OFence incorrectly interprets the ordering constraints on bp->sp_state because the variable is written on both sides of the barrier.

```c
1 void bnx2x_sp_event (...) {
2     ...
3     set_bit(BNX2X_..._ACK, &bp->sp_state);
4     smp_wmb();
5     clear_bit(BNX2X_..._PENDING,&bp->sp_state);
6     ...
7 }
```

Coverage: OFence identifies 456 pairs of barriers in the 614 analyzed files, which accounts for approximately 50% of the barriers present in the files that we analyze.

Our current coverage is explained by the conservative choices we made during pairing. We focused on pairing barriers with other barriers and IPC calls, and most of the barriers we did not pair are intended to run concurrently with code that uses locks or atomic instructions. Looking at the history of bug fixes in the kernel, we inferred that such code rarely suffers from inconsistent ordering or unneeded barriers, and was thus outside the scope of this work. The pairing heuristic of OFence could be extended to pair barriers with atomic operations.

Smatch relies on the kernel Makefiles to compile and check files. As a result, Smatch only verifies the code for a specific configuration of the kernel (e.g., we used the default Ubuntu x86_64 kernel configuration file), thus OFence can only check the corresponding sub-part of the kernel. The more configurations are tested, the more barrier issues will be discovered and patched.
7 Discussion

In this section we discuss extensions to OFence and discuss their interest to the Linux kernel and the static analysis community.

Extending OFence to protect against compiler optimizations: On top of re-ordering memory accesses, a compiler is allowed to modify the way a program accesses memory. For instance, a compiler might fuse a single load with other loads to limit the number of memory accesses, or it might split a single load into multiple smaller loads to make better use of available registers [5, 24]. When a variable is read and written concurrently, the observed results might be unreliable and hard to interpret (e.g., a 64b variable may contain 32b of the old value and 32b of the new value).

The kernel currently offers two annotations to prevent compiler optimizations on concurrent variables: READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE [17]. These annotations are also used by some data race detectors [14] to avoid reporting races on memory accesses that are meant to be racy. Despite calls to use these annotations on all concurrent accesses [24], few kernel functions use READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE.

We have extended OFence to find the memory accesses that need to be annotated with READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE, and to produce patches that add the missing annotations. First, we find barriers that correctly order reads and writes to shared variables. Then, we annotate the reads and writes performed to the shared objects that are accessed concurrently. We are currently in the process of submitting these patches to the Linux kernel community.

Patch 5 presents an example of a patch that adds missing annotations. OFence pairs the __pollwake and poll_schedule_timeout functions because they have common shared objects. OFence annotates the racy accesses in both functions.

Patch 5 OFence adds the missing READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE.

```
static int __pollwake(...) {
    // Paired with [barrier] in poll_schedule...
    smp_wmb();
    if (!pwq->triggered)
        WRITE_ONCE(pwq->triggered, 1);
    return ...;
}

static int poll_schedule_timeout(...) {
    if (!pwq->triggered)
        if (!READ_ONCE(pwq->triggered))
            rc = schedule_hrtimeout_range(...);
        // The following smp_store_mb [is] the counterpart rmb of the wmb in pollwake()
    smp_store_mb(...); // equivalent to smp_mb
}
```

Extending OFence to find missing barriers: We currently only look for misplaced barriers. We do not analyze code that does not contain barriers and thus do not look for missing barriers.

In our experience, looking for missing barriers leads to a high number of false positives. For instance, a structure might be initialized in isolation, and then modified concurrently. The initialization does not require any barrier if it is not racy. Figuring out if code is meant to run in isolation or concurrently is, in general, a hard problem – the presence of barriers indicates that code is meant to be racy, but the absence of barriers does not give any information.

READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE could be used as an indication that the code is meant to be racy and could be used to find missing barriers. However, we found that most of the code that uses READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE without a memory barrier does so to prevent the compiler from optimizing the code but does not require ordering memory accesses for correctness. The presence of multiple READ_ONCE annotations usually indicates that the developer wants to make sure that the data is read from memory, but cannot be used to predict a missing barrier in the general case.

8 Related Work

Race detection. Data races have long been recognized as a serious problem, and there have been many works in this area. We highlight a few that illustrate the main research directions. These all mainly focus on the challenge of figuring out what code can actually be executed concurrently, even if it is not possible to observe a particular concurrent execution.

Dynamic analysis is limited by the ability of the test cases to trigger the execution of the various parts of the code base. Much of the work on race detection for the Linux kernel has
focused on static analysis. An early effort was RacerX [8] that collects locksets via static analysis. To avoid false positives, RacerX uses heuristics for ranking the results, for example using the presence of locks within a control-flow path as an indication of possible concurrency. RacerX also includes heuristics to detect shared variables that are used to collect statistics and assignments to 0 and 1, for which races may be considered to be benign. Deligiannis [6] propose a static lockset-based approach that generates a sequential approximation of a pair of driver entry points and then uses existing verifiers to check generated verification conditions. They observe that many of the races they find involve global counters, and are likely benign. DCUAF [1] uses a statistical analysis to propagate information about the possible concurrent execution of driver entry points across all of the drivers of a particular class. The approach has been applied to find races that lead to use-after-free bugs. RacerD [2, 12] relies on hints from Java programs to understand which functions may run concurrently and only reports races that have a high probability of occurring.

Previous works [13, 20, 26] rely on record and replay to compare the output of the program given different interleavings of memory accesses. Races that have no influence on the program output are classified as benign (e.g., races on statistics counters). The patterns we study have different behaviors and different outputs depending on the interleaving of memory accesses and would be classified as harmful by these works, regardless of the correctness of the enforced memory orderings.

DataCollider [11] is a dynamic data race detector that focuses on reporting races that have a high probability of happening. DataCollider inserts a small pause after an access to a shared variable. A race is only reported if a concurrent access is actually observed within this time. The current approach used in the Linux kernel, KCSAN [7], is based on this idea. DataCollider and KCSAN avoid reporting races on statistics counters and on “safe flags updates” (reading a flag bit in a memory location while another thread updates a different bit in the same memory location).

To the best of our knowledge, no race detector can successfully infer concurrency between two functions that rely on barriers, or check ordering constraints enforced by barriers. Code surrounding barriers is either always reported as erroneous, or ignored.

Use of specifications and comments. iComment [23] and aComment [23] recognize that inferring concurrency by analysing the code is hard. They propose strategies for using natural language processing techniques to infer concurrency specifications from comments and function names. We have also found the comments around barriers to be useful in determining the intent of a particular use of a barrier and, when possible, have used them verify the correctness of the pairings performed by OFence. Unfortunately, currently less than 20% of the barriers in the Linux kernel are commented, and most comments provide little information about the intent of the barrier.

Checking programming rules. Engler et al. [9] proposes compiler extensions to check implicit rules of systems. Developers document their rules using templates of the form “Always do X before/after Y”. Using these rules to document the orderings enforced by a barrier would simplify the analysis of barrier code. Engler et al. [10] proposed a methodology based on statistics to check if the above mentioned rules hold on a large code base. PR-Miner [16] continued this work to automatically extract programming rules such as “a lock is followed by an unlock” and to deduce correlations between two variables (e.g., an array’s data and the variable that indicates the number of elements in the array). Coccinelle [15, 21] provides a developer friendly notation, based on patches, to automatically check common programming mistakes such as dereferencing a NULL pointer in a block of code where the pointer is known to be NULL. The pairing heuristic of OFence could be used by these tools to check concurrency rules on code ordered by barriers.

Patterns of concurrency bugs. MUVI [18] focuses on a specific kind of concurrency bug, which occurs when two variables are expected to have correlated values. MUVI detects such pairs of variables and describes how to extend existing race detection strategies to detect this issue. MUVI only considers locks for synchronization.

Xiong et al. [25] identify ad hoc synchronization as synchronization implemented without the benefit of well known synchronization primitives such as lock/unlock and cond_wait/cond_signal. Typically, such synchronization is implemented as a loop that spins until a variable has an expected value. They find that ad hoc synchronization is common in user programs, that it is error prone, and that it leads race detection tools to report false positives.

9 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a static analysis heuristic to infer concurrency by pairing barriers. We used concurrency information to check the ordering of memory accesses. We have demonstrated the usefulness of the method on the Linux kernel. We fixed 12 incorrect memory orderings that could have caused serious crashes and removed 53 unneeded barriers.

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